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Stats on the state of the regions:Land, population, population density

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02-summary_PCIJ

THE PHILIPPINES has a total land area of about 300,000 square kilometers (sq km).

This is according to the cadastral survey and estimated land areas certified and provided to the Department of Budget and Management by the Land Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as of December 2013.

Nearly half or 43 percent consists of mainland Luzon and the islands of MIMAROPA), 40 percent Mindanao, and 17 percent the Visayas island group (Western, Central, and Eastern Visayas, and Negros Island).

LAND AREA

Among the proposed federated regions, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will be the largest in terms of land area at 36,650.95 sq kms or 12.2 percent of the country’s total land area, while the National Capital Region is the smallest at 619.54 sq kms (0.21 percent).

By province, Palawan is the largest in terms of land area at 17,030.75 sq kms, followed by Lanao del Sur, 15,055.51 sq kms; Isabela, 13,102.05 sq kms; Bukidnon, 10,498.59 sq kms; and Agusan del Sur at 9,989.52sq kms.
Of the generally smaller island provinces, Batanes is the smallest, at 203.22 sq kms, followed by Camiguin, 241.44 sq kms; Siquijor, 337.49 sq kms; Biliran, 536.01 sq kms, and Guimaras, 611.87 sq kms.

Here’s how the regions rank, from biggest to smallest, by land area:

Federalism_Regions-big-and-small,-by-land-area-_PCIJ

POPULATION

The Philippine population has reached more than 100 million, according to the 2015 Census of Population (POPCEN 2015) of the Philippine Statistic Authority.

Over half or 57 percent reside in Luzon, 23 percent in the Visayas, and 20 percent in Mindanao.

Under the proposed federal system, CALABARZON will be the largest federated region in terms of population, with 14 million people (14.3 percent of total population), while the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) will be the smallest with 1.7 million (1.71 percent).

Provinces with or near metropolitan areas usually have large populations. Cebu is currently the largest province in terms of population with 4.6 million people, followed by Cavite with 3.6 million; Bulacan, 3.2 million; Negros Occidental, 3.31 million; and Laguna, three million.

Batanes meanwhile is the smallest province in terms of population, with just 17,246 people, followed by Camiguin, 88,478; Siquijor, 95,984; Apayao, 119,184; and the Dinagat Islands, 127,152.

Here’s how the regions rank, from largest to smallest, by population:

Federalism_Population-big-and-small-by-population_V2_PCIJ

POPULATION DENSITY

The current national population density stands at 337 people per sq km.

Among the proposed federated regions, the National Capital Region (NCR) is the most densely populated with 20,785 people per sq km, while CAR is the least densely populated at 87 people per sq km.

Provinces with or near metropolitan areas are also some of the most densely populated: Rizal province has the highest population density at 2,439 people per sq km, followed by Cavite, 2,410 people per sq km,; Laguna, 1,574 people per sq km; Pampanga, 1,264 people per sq km; and Bulacan, 1,183 people per sq km.

Apayao is the least densely populated province with 26 people per sq km, followed by Abra at 57 people per sq km; and Kalinga, Mountain Province, and Palawan, all with 65 people per sq km.

Some regions are more crowded than others. Here’s how they rank, by population density:

Federalism_Regions-more-or-less-crowded-by-population-density_PCIJ

POPULATION GROWTH RATE

The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) defines population growth rate as “how fast a population increases or decreases as a result of the interplay of births, deaths, and migration during a given period of time.”

By the data in POPCEN 2015, the provinces with the highest average annual population growth rates are Maguindanao at 4.4 percent; Cavite, 3.54 percent ; Basilan, 3.39 percent; Rizal, 3.03 percent; and Sulu, 2.8 percent.

The provinces with the lowest average annual population growth rates are the Mountain Province and Dinagat Islands, both at 0.05 percent; Abra, 0.54 percent; Marinduque, 0.58 percent; and Romblon, 0.62 percent.

LAND, POPULATION, POPULATION DENSITY STATS ON THE REGIONS

NCR_PCIJ

National Capital Region

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 619 sq km (No. 18)
Population: 12.88 million (Rank No. 2)
Population density: 20,785 persons per sq km (No. 1)

 

The National Capital Region (Metro Manila) will be assigned as the federal capital of the Philippines. For statistical purposes, PSA grouped the 17 cities and one municipality of NCR into four districts: 1st District, City of Manila; 2nd District, Mandaluyong City, Marikina City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and San Juan City; 3rd District, Caloocan City, Malabon City, Navotas City, and Valenzuela City; and 4th District, Las Pinas City, Makati City, Muntinlupa City, Paranaque City, Pasay City, Pateros, and Taguig City.

NCR will be the smallest federated region in terms of land area at 619.54 sq kms (0.21 percent of the country’s total population) but will have the second largest population at 12.9 million (12.8 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015. With a population density of 20,785 people per sq km, however, NCR will be the most densely populated region in the country.

NCR’s second district is the largest of NCR’s four districts in terms of land area, at 257 sq kms (41 percent of NCR’s total land area), followed by the fourth district at 210 sq kms (34 percent); the third district at 127 sq kms (21 percent); and the city of Manila at 25 sq kms (four percent).

NCR’s second district also has the largest population, with 4,650,613 people (36 percent of NCR’s total population), followed by the fourth district with 3,627,104 (28 percent); the third district with 2,819,388 (22 percent); and the city of Manila, 1,780,148 (14 percent). The second district’s population is even larger than that of Cebu, the most populous province in the country.

The district of the City of Manila is the most densely populated, however, with 71,263 people per sq km. It is followed by NCR’s third district at 22,118 people per sq km; the second district at 18,101 people per sq km; and the fourth district at 17,259 people per sq km.

CAR_PCIJ

Cordillera Administrative Region

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 19,818 sq km (No. 10)
Population: 1.72 million (No. 18)
Population density: 87 persons per sq km (No. 18)

 

The Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) will comprise the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, Apayao, and Mountain Province.

It will be the ninth smallest federated region in terms of land area, with 19,818 sq kms (5.70 percent of the country’s total land area), and also the least populated, with 1,722,006 percent (1.71 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015.

With just 87 people per sq km, CAR will also be the least densely populated federated region. In fact, four of the least populated provinces in the country are in CAR: Apayao, Abra, Kalinga, and Mountain Province.

Apayao is the largest province in CAR in terms of land area, with 4,502 sq kms (23 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Abra with 4,200 sq kms (23 percent); Kalinga 3,282 sq kms (17 percent); Benguet 2,827 sq kms (14 percent); Ifugao 2,618 sq kms (13 percent); and Mountain Province 2,389 sq kms (12 percent).

Benguet, however, has the largest population among the provinces in CAR, with 791,590 people (46 percent of the region’s total population). It is followed by Abra with 241,160 people (14 percent); Kalinga 21,680 (12 percent); Ifugao 202,802 (12 percent); Mountain Province 154,590 (nine percent); and Apayao 119,184 (seven percent) as of POPCEN 2015.

Almost half of CAR’s total population live in Benguet, the region’s third smallest province. This makes it the most densely populated province in the region, with 280 people per sq km, or almost thrice the region’s population density. Ifugao ranks second, at 77 people per sq km, followed by Kalinga and Mountain Province, both with population densities of 65 people per sq km, and then Abra at 57 people per sq km. Apayao is the least densely populated province, not just in CAR but also in the whole country, at 26 people per sq km.

Benguet has the highest average annual population growth rate in CAR as well, at 1.84 percent, followed by Ifugao at 1.2 percent; Apayao at 1.14 percent; and Kalinga at 1.07 percent. Mountain Province has the lowest average annual population growth rate, not just in CAR but also in the whole country, at 0.05 percent, while Abra has the second lowest, at 0.54 percent.

Ilocos-Region_PCIJ

Ilocos Region

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Land Area: 12,964 sq km (No. 15)
Population: 5.03 million (No. 6)
Population density: 388 persons per sq km (No. 5)

 

The Federated Region of Ilocos will comprise the current provinces of Region I: Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan. It will be the fourth smallest federated region in terms of land area, with 12,964.62 sq kms (3.73 percent of the country’s total land area) and the sixth largest in terms of population, at 5,026,128 (4.98 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015. Ilocos Region ranks fifth in terms of population density, with 388 people per sq km.

Pangasinan is the largest province in the proposed federated region of Ilocos in terms of land area, with 5,450.59 sq kms (42 percent of Ilocos’s total land area), followed by Ilocos Norte with 3418.75 sq kms (26 percent); Ilocos Sur 2,596 sq kms(14 percent), and La Union 1,499.28 sq kms (12 percent).

Pangasinan is also the largest province in terms of population, with 2,956,726 people (59 percent of Ilocos’s total population), followed by La Union with 786,653 (16 percent); Ilocos Sur with 689,668 (14 percent); and Ilocos Norte with 593,081 (12 percent) as of POPCEN 2015.

Almost 60 percent of Ilocos’s population occupy only 40 percent of the region’s land area. Pangasinan is the most densely populated province in Ilocos, at 542 people per sq km, followed by La Union at a close 525 people per sq km; Ilocos Sur at 266 people per sq km; and Ilocos Norte at 173 people per sq km.
Pangasinan has the highest average annual population growth rate in the Ilocos Region at 1.24 percent, followed by La Union at 1.18 percent; Ilocos Sur at 0.93 percent; and Ilocos Norte at 0.87 percent.

Cagayan-Valley_PCIJ

Cagayan Valley

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 19,818 sq km (No. 10)
Population: 3.45 million (No. 15)
Population density: 116 persons per sq km (No. 15)

 

The Federated Region of Cagayan Valley will comprise the current provinces of Region II: Batanes, Cagayan, Isabela, Neuva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

It will be the second largest federated region with 29,836.88 sq kms (8.58 percent of the country’s total land area) and the fourth smallest in terms of population, with 3,451,410 people (3.42 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015. Cagayan Valley ranks 15th in terms of population density, at 116 people per sq km.

Isabela is the largest province in the proposed federated region of Cagayan Valley in terms of land area, with 13,102.05 sq kms (44 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Cagayan with 9,398.07 sq kms (31 percent); Nueva Vizcaya with 4,813.88 sq kms (16 percent), and Quirino with 2,319.66 sq kms (8 percent).

The province of Batanes, located in the group of islands north of mainland Luzon, is the smallest province not only in Cagayan Valley, but also in the entire Philippines, with 203.22 sq kms (1 percent of the region’s total land area).

Isabela is also the largest province in Cagayan Valley in terms of population, with 1,593,566 people (46 percent of the region’s total population), followed by Cagayan with 1,199,320 (35 percent); Nueva Vizcaya 452,287 (13 percent); and Quirino, 188,991 (five percent). Again, Batanes is the smallest province in Cagayan Valley (and in the Philippines) in terms of population, at 17,246 (0.50 percent of the region’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015.

In terms of population density, Cagayan ranks first, at 128 people per sq km, followed by Isabela at 122 people per sq km; Nueva Vizcaya at 94 people per sq km; Batanes at 85 people per sq km; and Quirino at 81 people per sq km.

Nueva Vizcaya has the highest average annual population growth rate in Cagayan Valley, at 1.43 percent, followed by Isabela at 1.36 percent; Quirino at 1.34 percent; Cagayan at 1.29 percent; and Batanes, at 0.76 percent.

Central-Luzon_PCIJ

Central Luzon

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 21,906 sq km (No. 6)
Population: 11.22 million (No. 3)
Population density: 512 persons per sq km (No. 4)

 

The Federated Region of Central Luzon will consist of the provinces of Region III: Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,Tarlac, and Zambales.

It will be the sixth largest federated region in terms of total land area, with 21,906 sq kms (6.30 percent of the country’s total land area) and the third largest in terms of population, with 11,218,177 people (11.11 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015. Central Luzon currently ranks third in terms of population density, at 512 people per sq km.

Nueva Ecija is the largest province in Central Luzon in terms of land area, with 5,689.69 sq kms (26 percent of the region’s land area), followed by Zambales with 3,815.35 (17 percent); Aurora with 3,133.4 (14 percent); Tarlac 3,046.49 (14 percent); Bulacan 2,783.69 (13 percent); Pampanga 2,064.59 (nine percent); and Bataan 1,372.98 (six percent).

Bulacan, though, is the largest province in Central Luzon in terms of population, with 3,292,071 people (29 percent of the region’s total population), followed by Pampanga with 2,609,744 (23 percent); Nueva Ecija with 2,151,461 (19 percent); Tarlac with 1,366,027 (12 percent); Zambales with 823,888 (7 percent); Bataan with 760,650 (7 percent), and Aurora with 214,336 (2 percent) as of POPCEN 2015.

With almost a quarter of the Central Luzon’s population but only a tenth of its land area, Pampanga is the most densely populated province in the region, with 1,264 people per sq km. Bulacan ranks second, with 1,183 people per sq km, followed by Bataan with 554 people per sq km; Tarlac 448; Nueva Ecija 378; and Zambales 216. Aurora is the least populated province in Central Luzon, with 68 people per sq km.

Bulacan’s average annual population growth rate is also the highest among the provinces in Central Luzon, at 2.4 percent, followed by Pampanga at 2.2 percent; Bataan at 2.04 percent; Nueva Ecija at 1.93 percent; Zambales at 1.74 percent; Tarlac at 1.42 percent; and Aurora at 1.27 percent.

CALABARZON_PCIJ

CALABARZON

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 16,576 sq km (No. 13)
Population: 14.41 million (No. 1)
Population density: 870 persons per sq km (No. 2)

 

The Federated Region of CALABARZON will comprise the current provinces in the current Region IV-A: Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.

It will be the sixth smallest federated region in terms of land area, at 16,576 sq kms (4.77 percent of the country’s total land area), but the largest in terms of population, at 14,414,774 (14.27 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015. With a population density of 870 people per sq km (thrice the national population density), CALABARZON will be the second most densely populated federated region in the country, next to NCR.

The province of Quezon is the largest in CALABARZON in terms of land area, at 16,576.26 sq kms (53 percent of CALABARZON’s total land area), followed by Batangas at 3,115.05 km (19 percent), Laguna at 1,928.23 km (one percent), Cavite at1,526.28 sq kms (nine percent), and Rizal at 1,182.65 km (seven percent).

Cavite is the largest province in CALABARZON in terms of population, at 3,678,301 (26 percent of CALABARZON’s population) followed by Laguna at 3,035,081 (21 percent); Rizal at 2,884,227 (20 percent), Batangas at 2,694,335 (19 percent); and Quezon, at 2,122,830 (15 percent). Cavite and Laguna also rank third and fifth, respectively, among the provinces in the country in terms of population.

With a fifth of CALABARZON’s population living in just seven percent of its land area, Rizal ranks first in terms of population density, with 2,439 people per sq km, followed by Cavite at 2,410 people per sq km; Laguna at 1,574; and Batangas at 865 people.

With a land area covering more than half of CALABARZON and only 15 percent of the region’s population, the province of Quezon is the least densely populated in the region, at 241 people per sq km.

Cavite has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in CALABARZON, with 3.54 percent, followed by Rizal at 3.03 percent; Laguna 2.6 percent; Batangas 2.53; and Quezon 1.33 percent.
Cavite ranks second, after Maguindanao, in terms of average annual population growth rate; Rizal ranks fourth, after Basilan.

MIMAROPA_PCIJ

MIMAROPA

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 29,606 sq km (No. 2)
Population: 2.96 million (No. 17)
Population density: 100 persons per sq km (No. 17)

 

The Federated Region of MIMAROPA will comprise the provinces in the current Region IV-B: Occidental Mindoro and Oriental Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, and Palawan.

It will be the third largest federated region in terms of land area, with 29,606 sq kms (8.52 percent of the country’s total land area) but the third smallest in terms of population, with 2,596,709 (2.57 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015. With a population density of 100 people per sq km, MIMAROPA will be the second least densely populated region in the country, next to CAR.

Palawan is the largest province in MIMAROPA, as well as in the country, with a land area of 17,031 sq kms (58 percent of the region’s total land area). Occidental Mindoro ranks second largest in the region, at 5,851 sq kms (20 percent), followed by Occidental Mindoro at 4,238 sq kms (14 percent); Romblon 1,533 sq kms ( five percent); and Marinduque at 953 sq kms (three percent).

Palawan also has the largest population in MIMAROPA, with 1,104,585 people (37 percent of the region’s total population). It is followed by Oriental Mindoro with 844,059 (28 percent); Occidental Mindoro, with 487,414 (16 percent); Romblon, 292,781 (10 percent), and Marinduque with 234,521 (eight percent).

Marinduque is the most densely populated province in MIMAROPA, at 246 people per sq km, followed by Oriental Mindoro at 199 people per sq km; Romblon, 191;and Occidental Mindoro, 83.

With more than a quarter of the region’s total population living in nearly three-fifths of its land area, Palawan is the least densely populated province in MIMAROPA, at 65 people per sq km. Palawan is also tied with Kalinga and Mountain Province (in CAR) for being the third least densely populated provinces in the country.

Palawan has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in MIMAROPA, at 2.13 percent, followed by Occidental Mindodo, 1.48 percent; Oriental Mindoro, 1.45 percent; Romblon, 0.62 percent; and Marinduque, 0.58 percent.

Bicol_PCIJ

Bicol Region

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 18,114 sq km (No. 11)
Population: 5.80 million (No. 5)
Population density: 320 persons per sq km (No. 8)

 

The Federated Region of Bicol will comprise the provinces in the current Region V: Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon.

Bicol Region will be the eighth smallest federated region in terms of land area, at 18,114 sq kms (5.21 percent of the country’s total land area) and a population of 5,796,989 (5.74 percent of the country’s total population) as of POPCEN 2015. Bicol will rank eighth in terms of population density, at 320 people per sq km.

Camarines Sur is the largest province in Bicol in terms of land area, at 2,277.93 sq kms (30 percent of Bicol’s total land area), followed by Masbate at 4,139 sq kms (23 percent); Albay at 2,575 sq kms (14 percent); Camarines Norte at 2,278 sq kms (13 percent); Sorsogon at 2,119 sq kms (12 percent); and Catanduanes at 1,492 sq kms (eight percent).

Camarines Sur also has the largest population among the provinces in Bicol Region, with 1,952,544 people (34 percent of the region’s total population); followed by Albay with 1,314,826 (23 percent); Masbate, 892,393 (15 percent); Sorsogon, 792,949 (14 percent); Camarines Norte, 583,313 (10 percent); and Catanduanes, 260,964 (five percent).

Albay is the most densely populated province in Bicol, with 511 people per sq km, followed by Sorsogon with 374 people per sq km; Camarines Sur, 354; Camarines Norte, 256; Masbate, 216, and Catanduanes, 175.
Camarines Norte has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in Bicol, at 1.45 percent, followed by Camarines Sur at 1.39 percent; Sorsogon, 1.37 percent; Masbate, 1.35 percent; Albay, 1.29 percent; and Catanduanes, 1.16 percent.

Western-Visayas_PCIJ

Western Visayas

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 12,773 sq km (No. 16)
Population: 4.48 million (No. 10)
Population density: 351 persons per sq km (No. 6)

 

The Federated Region of Western Visayas will comprise five of the six provinces in the current Region VI: Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Guimaras, and Iloilo.

It will be third smallest federated region in terms of land area, at 12,773 sq kms (3.67 percent of the country’s total land area) and the ninth smallest in terms of population, with 4,477,247 people (4.43 percent of the country’s total population). estern Visayas will rank sixth in terms of population density, at 351 people per sq km.

Iloilo will be the largest province in Western Visayas in terms of land area, at 5,076 sq kms (40 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Antique at 2,731 sq kms (21 percent); Capiz, 2,595 (20 percent), and Aklan, 1,760 (14 percent). The island province of Guimaras is the smallest in Western Visayas and the fifth smallest in the country, with a land area of 612 sq kms (five percent of the region’s total land area).

Iloilo also has the largest population in Western Visayas, with 2,384,415 people (53 percent of the region’s total population), followed by Capiz with 761,384 (17 percent); Antique, 582,012 (13 percent) and Aklan, 574,823 (13 percent); and Guimaras, 174,613 ( four percent).

Iloilo is also the most densely populated province in the region, with 470 people per sq km, followed by Aklan, 327; Capiz, 293; Guimaras, 285; and Antique, 213.

Aklan has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in Western Visayas, at 1.42 percent, followed by Guimaras at 1.39 percent; Iloilo, 1.35 percent; Antique, 1.28 percent; and Capiz, 1.13 percent.

Central-Visayas_PCIJ

Central Visayas

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 10,452 sq km (No. 17)
Population: 6.04 million (No. 4)
Population density: 578 persons per sq km (No. 3)

 

The Federated Region of Central Visayas will have three of the four provinces in the current Region VII: Bohol, Cebu, and Siquijor.

Central Visayas will be the second smallest federated region in terms of land area, with 10,452 sq kms (3.01 percent of the country’s total land area), but the fourth largest in terms of population, with 6,041,903 people (5.98 percent of the country’s total population).With a population density of 578 people per sq km, Central Visayas will be the third most densely populated federated region in the country.

Cebu is the largest province in terms of land area, with 5,342 sq kms (51 percent of the region’s total land area) as well as population, with 4,632,359 people (77 percent of the region’s total population).

Cebu is also the most densely populated province in the region, with 867 people per sq km, and has the highest average annual population growth rate, at 2.14 percent. In addition, Cebu has the largest population among the country’s provinces.

Bohol comes second in terms of land area, with 4,772.52 sq kms (46 percent of the region’s total land area), as well as in population, with 1,313,560 people (22 percent of the region’s total population). It is, however, the least densely populated province, with 275 people per sq km, and has the lowest average annual growth rate in the region, at 0.91 percent.

Siquijor will be the smallest province in the region, with just 337.49 sq kms of land area (three percent of the region’s total land area), and in terms of population — 95,984 people or two percent of the region’s total population. Its population density is currently at 284 people per sq km and its average annual population growth rate is at 1.06 percent. Among the country’s smallest provinces, Siquijor ranks third in terms of land area.

Eastern-Visayas_PCIJ

Eastern Visayas

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 23,234 sq km (No. 3)
Population: 4.44 million (No. 10)
Population density: 191 persons per sq km (No. 13)

 

Eastern Visayas will comprise the provinces of the current Region VIII: Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, Western Samar, Leyte, Southern Leyte, and Biliran.

It will be the fourth largest federated region in terms of land area, with 23,235 sq kms (6.68 percent of the country’s total land area), but the eighth smallest in terms of population, with 4,440,150 people (4.40 percent of the country’s total population). Eastern Visayas will rank 13th in terms of population density, at 191 people per sq km.

Leyte is the largest province in Eastern Visayas in terms of land area, with 6,537 sq kms (28 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Western Samar with 780,481 sq kms (26 percent); Eastern Visayas, 4,617 sq kms (20 percent); Northern Samar, 3,695 sq kms (16 percent), and Southern Leyte, 1,801 sq kms (eight percent). The island province of Biliran is the smallest in the region, as well as the fourth smallest in the country, with a land area of 536 sq kms.

Leyte also has the largest population among the provinces in Eastern Visayas, with 1,966,768 people (44 percent of the region’s total population), followed by Western Samar with 780,481 (18 percent); Northern Samar, 632,379 (14 percent); Eastern Samar, 467,160 (11 percent); Southern Leyte, 421,750 (nine percent); and Biliran, 171,612 (four percent).

Biliran is the most densely populated province with 320 people per sq km, followed by Leyte with 301 people per sq km; Southern Leyte, 234; Northern Samar, 171; Western Samar, 129; and Eastern Samar, 101.

Leyte has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in Eastern Samar, at 1.91 percent, followed by Eastern Samar at 1.72 percent; Northern Samar, 1.43 percent; Western Samar, 1.25 percent; Biliran, 1.19 percent; and Southern Leyte, 1.11 percent.

NIR_PCIJ

Negros Island Region

Fast Facts (Rank among 18 regions):
Land Area: 13,425 sq km (No. 14)
Population: 4.41 million (No. 12)
Population density: 329 persons per sq km (No. 7)

 

The Federated Region of Negros Island (NIR) will comprise the provinces of Negros Occidental (currently in Region VI) and Negros Oriental (currently in Region VII).

Then President Benigno S. Aquino III’s Executive Order No. 183 actually created NIR in 2015, but this was suspended by President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s EO 83 in 2016.

NIR will be the fifth smallest among the proposed federated regions in terms of land area, with 13,425.4 sq kms (4.48 percent of the country’s total land area) and the seventh smallest in terms of population, with 4,414,313 people (4.37 percent of the country’s total population). It will rank seventh in terms of population density, at 329 people per sq km.

Negros Occidental is the larger of the two Negros provinces, with a land area of 8,005 sq kms and population of 3,059,136 (the fourth largest in the country). It also has the higher population density, at 382 people per sq km, but has the lower average annual growth rate, at 1.02 percent.

Negros Oriental has a land area of 5,421 sq kms, a population of 1,354,995, a population density of 250 people per sq km, and an average annual growth rate of 1.04 people.

Zamboanga-Peninsula_PCIJ

Zamboanga Peninsula

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Land Area: 16,576 sq km (No. 13)
Population: 3.63 million (No. 14)
Population density: 215 persons per sq km (No. 11)

 

The Federated Region of Zamboanga Peninsula will comprise the provinces in the current Region IX — Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Zamboanga Sibugay — as well as the component city of Isabela in the province of Basilan (part of ARMM).

It will be the seventh smallest region in terms of land area, with 16,904 sq kms (4.86 percent of the country’s total land area) and fifth smallest in terms of population, with 3,629,783 people (3.59 percent of the country’s total population). Zamboanga Peninsula will rank 11th in terms of population density, with 215 people per sq km.

Zamboanga del Norte will be the region’s largest province in terms of land area, with 7,300 sq kms (43 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Zamboanga del Sur with 5,899 sq kms (35 percent), and Zamboanga Sibugay at 3,481 sq kms (21 percent). The component city of Isabela has a land area of 224 sq kms.

Zamboanga del Sur has the largest population, with 1,872,473 people (52 percent of the region’s total population), followed by Zamboanga del Norte with 1,011,393 (28 percent); and Zamboanga Sibugay with 633,129 (17 percent). Isabela City has a population of 112,788 (three percent of the region’s population) as of POPCEN 2015.

With more than half of the region’s population living in a third of its land area, Zamboanga del Sur is also the most densely populated province in Zamboanga Peninsula, at 317 people per sq km, followed by Zamboanga Sibugay at 182 people per sq km, and Zamboanga del Norte, at 139 people per sq km. Isabela City has a population density of 504 people per sq km, almost twice of the regional average.

Zamboanga Sibugay has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in Zamboanga Peninsula, at 1.65 percent, followed by Zamboaga del Sur at 1.17 percent and Zamboanga del Norte at 1.09 percent. Isabela City, however, beats them all with its average annual population growth rate of 2.88 percent.

Northern-Mindanao_PCIJ

Northern Mindanao

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Land Area: 20,458 sq km (No. 8)
Population: 4.69 million (No. 9)
Population density: 229 persons per sq km (No. 10)

The Federated Region of Northern Mindanao will comprise the provinces of the current Region X, namely, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Misamis Oriental.

It will be the eighth largest federated region in terms of land area, with 20,459 sq kms (5.88 percent of the country’s total land area) and population, with 4,689,302 people (4.64 percent of the country’s total population). Northern Mindanao will rank 10th in terms of population density, at 229 people per sq km.

Bukidnon is the largest province in Northern Mindanao in terms of land area, at 10,498.59 sq kms (51 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Lanao del Norte at 4,168 sq kms (20 percent), Misamis Oriental at 3,544 sq kms, and Misamis Occidental at 2,007 sq kms.

The island province of Camiguin is the smallest in the region, and second smallest in the country, in terms of land area, at 241.44 sq kms (one percent of the region’s total land area).

Misamis Oriental has the largest population, with 1,564,459 people (33 percent of the region’s total population), followed by Bukidnon, 1,415,226 (30 percent); Lanao del Norte, 1,019,013 (22 percent); and Misamis Occidental, 602,126 (13 percent). Camiguin has the smallest population among the provinces in the region, and the second smallest in the country, with 88,478 people as of POPCEN 2015.

Misamis Oriental is also the most densely populated province in the region, with 441 people per sq km, followed by Camiguin at 366 people per sq km; Misamis Occidental,300 people per sq km; and Lanao del Norte, 245 people per sq km. With 30 percent of the region’s total population living in more than half its land area, Bukidnon is the least densely populated province in the region, with 135 people per sq km.

Misamis Oriental has the highest average annual population growth rate – 2.01 percent — among the provinces in the region as well, followed by Lanao del Norte with 1.83 percent, Bukidnon 1.73 percent; Misamis Occidental 1.19 percent; and Camiguin 1.09 percent.

Davao-Region_PCIJ

Davao Region

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Land Area: 20,433 sq km (No. 9)
Population: 4.89 million (No. 7)
Population density: 239 persons per sq km (No. 9)

The Federated Region of Davao will comprise the provinces of current Region XI: Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Davao Occidental.

It will be the ninth largest federated region in terms of land area, with 20,433 sq kms (5.88 percent of the country’s total population), and seventh largest in terms of population, with 4,893,318 people (4.85 percent of the country’s total population). Davao will rank ninth in terms of population density, at 240 people per sq km.

Davao Oriental is the largest province in the proposed federated region of Davao in terms of land area, with 5,679.64 sq kms (28 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Davao del Sur with 4,608 sq kms (23 percent); Compostela Valley, 4,560 sq kms (22 percent); Davao del Norte, 3,423 sq kms (17 percent); and Davao Occidental, 2,163 sq kms (11 percent).

Davao del Sur has the largest population among the provinces in Davao Federated Region, with 2,265,579 people (46 percent of the region’s total population), followed by Davao del Norte with 1,016,332 (21 percent); Compostela Valley with 736,107 (15 percent); Davao Oriental 558,958 (11 percent); and Davao Occidental 316,342 (six percent).

Davao del Sur is also the most densely populated province in the region, with 492 people per sq km, followed by Davao del Norte with 297 people per sq km; Compostela Valley with 161; Davao Occidental 146; and Davao Oriental 98.

Davao del Sur also has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in Davao, at 2.28 percent, followed by Davao Oriental at 1.55 percent; Davao Occidental at 1.49 percent; Davao del Norte at 1.45 percent; and Compostela Valley at 1.38 percent.

SOCCSKSARGEN_PCIJ

SOCCSKSARGEN

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Land Area: 22,786 sq km (No. 5)
Population: 4.55 million (No. 9)
Population density: 199 persons per sq km (No. 12)

 

The Federated Region of SOCCSKSARGEN will comprise the current provinces of Region X: South Cotabato, North Cotabato. Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, and the independent component city of Cotabato in the province of Maguindanao (currently part of ARMM).

It will be the fifth largest federated region in terms of land area, with 22,786 sq kms (6.55 percent of the country’s total land area) and ninth largest in terms of population, at 4,545,276 (4.50 percent of the country’s total population). SOCCSKSARGEN ranks 12th in terms of population density, at 199 people per sq km.

North Cotabato is the largest province in SOCCSKSARGEN in terms of land area, with 9,317.3 sq kms (41 percent of the region’s total land area), followed by Sultan Kudarat with 5,364 sq kms (24 percent); South Cotabato with 4,287 sq kms (19 percent); and Sarangani, 3,642 sq kms. Cotabato City, meanwhile, has a land area of 176 sq kms or one percent of the region’s total land coverage.

South Cotabato has the largest population among the provinces in SOCCSKSARGEN, with 1,509,735 people (33 percent of the region’s total population), followed by North Cotabato with 1,379,747 (30 percent); Sultan Kudarat 812,095 (18 percent); and Sarangani 544,261 (12 percent). Cotabato City has a population of 299,438 or seven percent of the proposed region’s total number of people.

South Cotabato has the highest population density among SOCCSKSARGEN’s provinces, with 352 people per sq km, followed by Sultan Kudarat with 151; Sarangani 149; and North Cotabato 148. Cotabato City’s population density of 1,701 people per sq km is more than eight times that of the regional average.

North Cotabato has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in SOCCSKSARGEN, at 2.38 percent, followed by South Cotabato at 2.03 percent, Cotabato City at 1.96 percent, Sarangani at 1.76 percent, and Sultan Kudarat at 1.68 percent.

CARAGA_PCIJ

Caraga Region

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Land Area: 29,606 sq km (No. 2)
Population: 2.60 million (No. 16)
Population density: 123 persons per sq km (No. 14)

 

The Federated Region of Caraga will comprise the current provinces of Region XIII: Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, and the Dinagat Islands.

It will be the seventh largest federated region in terms of land area, with 21,121 sq kms or 6.07% of the country’s land area, but the second smallest in terms of population, with 2,596,709 people (2.57 percent of the country’s total population). Caraga will rank 14th in terms of population density, at 123 people per sq kms as of POPCEN 2015.

Agusan del Sur will be the largest province in Caraga, and the fifth largest in the country, in terms of land area, with 9,989 sq kms (47 percent of the Caraga’s total land area), followed by Surigao del Sur with 4,933 sq kms (23 percent); Agusan del Norte with 3,428 sq kms (16 percent); Surigao del Norte with 1,953 sq kms (nine percent), and the Dinagat Islands with 817 sq kms (four percent).

Agusan del Norte, however, has the largest population among the provinces in Caraga, with 700,653 people (27 percent of Caraga’s total population), followed closely by Agusan del Sur with 691,566 (27 percent); Surigao del Sur with 592,250 (23 percent; and Surigao del Norte with 485,088 (19 percent). The Dinagat islands group has the smallest population among the provinces in Caraga, and the fifth smallest in the country, with 127,152 people.

With almost a fifth of the Caraga’s total population living in a tenth of its land area, Surigao del Norte is the most densely populated province in the region, with 248 people per sq km, followed by Agusan del Norte with 202 people per sq km; Dinagat Islands with 156; and Surigao del Sur with 120. Meanwhile, with more than a quarter of the region’s total population living in nearly half of its land area, Agusan del Sur comes in as the least densely populated province in Caraga, with 70 people per sq km.

Surigao del Norte has the highest average annual population growth rate among the provinces in Caraga, at 1.85 percent, followed by Agusan del Norte at 1.49 percent, Agusan del Sur at 1.31 percent, and Surigao del Sur at 1.08 percent. Dinagat Islands has the lowest average annual population growth rate in the region, and ties with Apayao for having the lowest in the country, at 0.05 percent.

ARMM_PCIJ

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Land Area: 36,650 sq km (No. 1)
Population: 3.78 million (No. 13)
Population density: 103 persons per sq km (No. 16)

 

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will comprise the provinces of Basilan (excluding the component city of Isabela), Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao (excluding the independent component city of Cotabato), Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

It will be the largest federated region in terms of land area, with 36,651 sq kms (10.54 percent of the country’s total land area), but the sixth smallest in terms of population, with 3,781,387 (3.74 percent of the country’s total population). With a population density of just 103 people per sq km, ARMM will be the third least densely populated federated region, as of POPCEN 2015.

Lanao del Sur is the largest province in ARMM, and the second largest in the country, in terms of land area, with 15,056 sq kms (41 percent of ARMM’s total land area). Maguindanao ranks second with 9,968 sq kms (27 percent), followed by Sulu with 4,547 sq kms (12 percent), Tawi-Tawi with 3,627 sq kms (10 percent), and Basilan with 3,453 (nine percent).

Maguindanao, though, has the largest population in ARMM, with 1,173,933 people (31 percent of ARMM’s total population). It is followed by Lanao del Sur with 1,045,429 (28 percent), Sulu with 824,731 (22 percent), Tawi-Tawi with 390,715 (10 percent), and Basilan at 346,579 ( nine percent) as of POPCEN 2015.

Sulu is the most densely populated province in ARMM, with 181 people per sq km, followed by Maguindanao with 118, Tawi-Tawi with 108, and Basilan with 100. Lanao del Sur is the least densely populated province in the region, with 69 people per sq km.

The provinces in ARMM have some of the highest average annual population growth rates in the country, notably Maguindanao (highest average annual population growth rate in the region and in the country) at 4.44 percent, followed by Basilan at 3.39 percent (third highest in the country), Sulu at 2.8 percent (fifth highest in the country), and Lanao del Sur at 2.3 percent. Tawi-Tawi has the lowest average annual population growth rate in the region, at 1.29 percent. — PCIJ, July 2018
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Stats on the state of the regions: Hubs of wealth, ponds of poverty

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Poverty-Incidence_2PCIJ

THE POOR abound in this country — Filipinos who cannot earn or raise the minimum income to meet the basic food and non-food requirements. The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) clusters them among citizens living below the poverty threshold.

Across the nation, the PSA says that some 21.9 million Filipinos, or nearly one in every five, do not earn enough to be able cover his or her basic food and non-food needs.

POVERTY THRESHOLD

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, the national annual per capita poverty threshold is PhP21,753 per individual. This rises to PhP108,765 for a family of five.

In short, the breadwinner of a five-person family must earn PhP9,063.75 at least every month in order to meet his or her brood’s basic food and non-food needs. Failing this, that family is considered to be poor.

Of the proposed 18 federated regions, the National Capital Region (NCR or Metro Manila) had the highest annual per capita poverty threshold at PhP25,007, and MIMAROPA the lowest at PhP20,224. This means that it is most expensive to live above the poverty threshold in NCR, and least expensive in MIMAROPA.

Among the 81 provinces, Batanes had the highest poverty threshold in 2015 at PhP29,118, followed by Zambales at PhP26,473, Cavite at PhP24,882, and Bataan at PhP24,770.

Tawi-Tawi meanwhile had the lowest poverty threshold at PhP16,586, followed by La Union at PhP19,045, Palawan at PhP19,435, Marinduque at PhP19,722, and Occidental Mindoro at PhP19,994.

Federalism_Regions-big-and-small,-by-number-of-poor-residents_PCIJ

MAGNITUDE OF POOR POPULATION

Magnitude of the poor refers to the number of families or the population whose annual per capita income falls below the poverty threshold.

According to the 2015 Poverty Census, the magnitude of poor population in the Philippines that year stood at 21.9 million.

By regional spread, Bicol Region has the highest magnitude of poor population among the 18 proposed federated regions, at 2.1 million while Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) the lowest at 351,590.

Among the provinces, Cebu has the highest magnitude of poor population at 986,557 followed by Negros Occidental at 867,141, Bukidnon at 732,027, Lanao del Sur at 725,262, and Negros Oriental at 694,293.
Guimaras has the lowest magnitude of poor population at 8,435, followed by Bataan at 14,793, Benguet at 28,418, Ilocos Norte at 32,822, and Apayao at 36,004.

Federalism_Regions-rich-and-poor,-by-poverty-incidence_PCIJ

POVERTY INCIDENCE

The term poverty incidence, on the other hand, refers to the proportion of individuals with per capita income less than the per capita poverty threshold.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, poverty incidence in the Philippines stands at 21.6 percent. This means that nearly one out of five Filipinos lives below the poverty line and is considered poor.

Lower poverty thresholds do not necessarily translate to lower poverty incidence. This is because the cost of living in each location must be taken into account to derive both figures.

Thus, despite having the highest annual per capita poverty threshold, NCR has the lowest poverty incidence as of the 2015 Poverty Census, at 3.9 percent.

ARMM or the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, meanwhile, has the highest poverty incidence at 53.7 percent, which means more than half of ARMM’s population are considered poor.

All but two regions in the Luzon group of islands have poverty incidence lower than the national average.

In contrast, all regions in the Visayas and Mindanao, as well as Luzon’s MIMAROPA and Bicol Region, have poverty incidence numbers that are higher than the national figure of 21.6 percent.

By provincial spread, four of the five poorest provinces are in Mindanao, based on the 2016 Poverty Census.

Lanao del Sur stands out for having the highest poverty incidence rate of 71.94 percent, which means seven in every 10 of its residents endure poverty conditions. Next to Lanao del Sur is Maguindanao, the second poorest in the nation, with a 57.25 percent poverty incidence. Northern Samar in the Visayas comes in third at 56.17 percent followed by Sarangani at 55.2 percent, and Sulu at 54.91 percent.

In most of the Mindanao provinces, too, the poverty incidence is higher than the national average. The only exceptions are Misamis Oriental (19.26 percent), Davao del Sur (15.64 percent), and Tawi-Tawi (12.62 percent).

In the meantime, Luzon hosts four of the five provinces with the lowest poverty incidence rates, according to the 2015 Poverty Census.

These are Bataan, which has the lowest poverty rate at 2.03 percent, followed by Benguet at 3.48 percent, Bulacan at 4.46 percent, and Pampanga at 4.94 percent, with Ilocos Norte at 5.27 percent in fifth place. Guimaras in the Visayas comes in fourth at 5.22 percent.

Despite having the highest poverty threshold among the provinces, Batanes has no one living below poverty threshold and zero poverty incidence as of the 2015 Poverty Census. PSA, however, urges caution in using this estimate due to Batanes’s very small sample size.

HOW THE REGIONS RANK (From poorest to less poor)

NCR_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR)

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 3.9 percent (No.17)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 494,631 (No. 17)

The National Capital Region will be assigned as the federal capital of the Philippines. For statistical purposes, PSA grouped the 17 cities and single municipality of NCR into four districts: 1st District: City of Manila; 2nd District: Mandaluyong City, Marikina City, Pasig City, Quezon City, San Juan City; 3rd District: Caloocan City, Malabon City, Navotas City, Valenzuela City; and 4th District: Las Pinas City, Makati City, Muntinlupa City, Paranaque City, Pasay City, Pateros, and Taguig City.

Among the proposed federated regions, NCR has the highest poverty threshold at PhP25,007. Despite this, it has the lowest poverty incidence of only 3.9 percent. NCR also has the second lowest magnitude of poor population, with 494,631.

Among NCR’s four districts, however, the city of Manila has the highest poverty incidence at 5.17 percent, followed by the fourth district at 4.55 percent, the third district at 4.1 percent, and the second district at 2.91 percent, as of the 2015 Poverty Census.

NCR’s fourth district has the highest magnitude of poor population with 159,242, followed by the second district with 137,392, the third district with 115,990, and the City of Manila with 82,007.

CAR_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION (CAR)

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 19.7 (No. 12)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 351,590 (No.18)

The Cordillera Administrative Region will comprise the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, Apayao, and Mountain Province.

CAR ranks ninth highest among the proposed federated regions in terms of annual per capita threshold at PhP21,770. Its poverty incidence is the sixth lowest among the proposed federated regions at 19.7 percent, even as it has the owest magnitude of poor population, with 351,590.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Mountain Province has the highest poverty threshold among the CAR provinces at PhP23,620, followed by Ifugao at PhP22,673, Benguet at PhP21,561, Abra at PhP21,420, Apayao at PhP20,947, and Kalinga at PhP20,468.

Mountain Province also has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in CAR at 39 percent, followed by Kalinga at 34.9 percent, Apayao at 34.9 percent, Ifugao at 32.5 percent, and Abra at 28.9 percent.

Benguet has the lowest poverty incidence in CAR, and the third lowest in the country, at 3.48 percent. Benguet is also the only CAR province with a poverty incidence lower than the national average.

Kalinga has the highest magnitude of poor population in CAR, with 78,585, followed by Abra with 76,930, Ifugao with 68,321, Mountain Province with 63,332, with 36,004, and Benguet with 28,418.

Benguet and Apayao rank third and fifth, respectively, among the provinces in the country with the lowest poor population.

Ilocos-Region. Poverty Incidence- PCIJ

ILOCOS REGION

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 13.1percent (No.14)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 671,087 (No.15)

The proposed federated region of Ilocos will comprise the provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan.

It has the second lowest annual per capita poverty threshold among the proposed federated regions at PhP20,448, fourth lowest poverty incidence at 13.35 percent and the fourth lowest magnitude of population living below poverty threshold: 671,087.

Ilocos Sur has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in the region, at PhP22,535, followed by Ilocos Norte at PhP20,615, and Pangasinan at PhP20,444.

La Union has the lowest poverty threshold in the region, and the second lowest in the country at PhP19,045.

Meanwhile, Pangasinan has the highest poverty incidence in Ilocos Region at 15.3 percent, followed by La Union at 12.2 percent, and Ilocos Sur at 12.1 percent.

Ilocos Norte has the lowest poverty incidence among the provinces in the region, and the fifth lowest among the provinces in the country at 5.27 percent.

Pangasinan also has the highest magnitude of poor population in Ilocos Region with 439,701, followed by La Union with 111,952, and Ilocos Sur with 86,612.

Ilocos Norte has the lowest magnitude of poor population in the region: 32,822, which is also the fourth lowest in the country.

Cagayan-Valley_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

CAGAYAN VALLEY

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 15.8 percent (No.13)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 553,616 (No.16)

The proposed federated region of Cagayan Valley will comprise the current Region II provinces: namely, Batanes, Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

Cagayan Valley ranks eighth highest among the proposed federated regions in terms of annual per capita poverty threshold at PhP21,860.

It has the fifth lowest poverty incidence at 15.8 percent and the third lowest magnitude of poor population, with 553,616.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Batanes has the highest poverty threshold – PhP29,118 – not only among the provinces within the region, but also nationwide.

Isabela has the second highest poverty threshold in the region at PhP22,547, followed by Nueva Vizcaya at PhP22,174, Cagayan at PhP21,094, and Quirino at PhP20,941.

In terms of poverty incidence, Quirino ranks the highest among the provinces in Cagayan Valley, at 26.5 percent, followed by Cagayan at 15.9 percent, Isabela at 15.2 percent, and Nueva Vizcaya at 13.6 percent.

Isabela has the highest magnitude of poor population in the region with 259,183, followed by Cagayan with 189,581, Quirino with 53,106, and Nueva Vizcaya with 51,746.

As mentioned previously, Batanes has zero poverty incidence and thus, zero magnitude of poor population, despite having the highest poverty threshold in the region.

Central-Luzon_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

CENTRAL LUZON

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 11.2 percent (No.15)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.24M (No.10)

The proposed federated region of Central Luzon will comprise the provinces of Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales.

Central Luzon has the second highest annual per capita poverty threshold, next to NCR, at PhP23,200 in 2015. Its poverty incidence is at 11.2 percent; it has the 10th highest magnitude of poor population among the 18 proposed federated regions, with 1,242,071.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Zambales has the highest poverty threshold among the provinces in Central Luzon at PhP26,473, followed by Bataan at PhP24,770, Nueva Ecija at PhP23,403, Tarlac at PhP23,008, Pampanga at PhP22,474, Bulacan at PhP21,989, and Aurora at PhP20,458.

Zambales and Bataan rank second and fourth highest, respectively, among all the provinces in the country in terms of poverty threshold.

Despite having the lowest poverty threshold among the provinces in Central Luzon, Aurora has the highest poverty incidence at 26.3 percent, followed by Nueva Ecija at 22.6 percent, Tarlac at 18.1 percent, Zambales at 16.8 percent, Pampanga at 4.94 percent, Bulacan at 4.46 percent, and Bataan at 2.02 percent.

Meanwhile, Nueva Ecija has the highest magnitude of poor population in Central Luzon, with 547,711, followed by Tarlac with 252,471, Bulacan with 151,491, Pampanga with 114,511, Zambales with 103,475, Aurora with 57,619, and Bataan with 14,793.

CALABARZON_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

CALABARZON

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 9.1 percent (No.16)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.29M (No.8)

The proposed federated region of CALABARZON will comprise the current provinces in the current Region IV-A namely, Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.

CALABARZON ranks sixth highest among the proposed federated regions in terms of annual per capita poverty threshold at PhP22,121 in 2015.

It has the second lowest poverty incidence (9.1 percent) next to NCR, but the eighth highest magnitude of poor population, with 1,287,967.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Cavite has the highest poverty threshold among the provinces in CALABARZON, as well as the third highest in the country at PhP24,882, followed by Rizal at PhP24,198, Laguna at PhP21,770, Batangas at PhP21,767, and Quezon at PhP20,515.

Quezon has the lowest poverty threshold among CALABARZON’s provinces, but it has the highest poverty incidence: 22.7 percent. Quezon is also the only province in CALABARZON with poverty incidence that is higher than the national average.

Batangas has the second highest poverty incidence in the region at 9.3 percent, followed by Cavite at 6.85 percent, Laguna at 5.43 percent, and Rizal at 5.42 percent.

Quezon also has the highest magnitude of poor population in the region, with 482, 295, followed by Batangas with 254,132, Cavite with 233,844, Laguna with 181,507, and Rizal with 136,189.

MIMAROPA_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

MIMAROPA

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 24.4 percent (No.9)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 754,222 (No.14)

The proposed federated region of MIMAROPA will comprise the provinces in the current Region IV-B: Occidental Mindoro and Oriental Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, and Palawan.

MIMAROPA has the lowest annual per capita poverty threshold among the proposed federated regions at PhP20,224 in 2015. It ranks ninth highest in terms of poverty incidence at 24.4 percent, but has the fifth lowest magnitude of poor population with 754,222.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Romblon has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in MIMAROPA at PhP21,601, followed by Oriental Mindoro at PhP20,410, Occidental Mindoro at PhP19,994, Marinduque at PhP19,722, and Palawan at PhP19,435.

Moreover, Occidental Mindoro, Marinduque, and Palawan rank third, fourth, and fifth lowest, respectively, among the provinces in the country in terms of annual per capita poverty threshold.

Occidental Mindoro has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in the region, at 41.2 percent, followed by Romblon at 36.6 percent, Oriental Mindoro at 21.6 percent, Palawan at 17 percent, and Marinduque at 16.2 percent.

Yet still, Occidental Mindoro has the highest magnitude of poor population in MIMAROPA, with 208,435, followed by Oriental Mindoro with 180,760, Palawan with 179,895, Romblon with 132,772, and Marinduque with 52,450.

Bicol_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

BICOL REGION

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 36 percent (No.6)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 2.17M (No.1)

The proposed federated region of Bicol will comprise the current Region V provinces: Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon.

Among the proposed federated regions, Bicol’s annual per capita poverty threshold is the seventh lowest at PhP21,476. It has the sixth highest poverty incidence at 36 percent, as well as the highest magnitude of poor population among the proposed federated regions, with 2,172,414.

Camarines Sur has the highest annual per capita threshold among the provinces in Bicol at PhP22,154, followed by Camarines Norte at PhP22,096,Albay at PhP22,081, Catanduanes at PhP21,660, Sorsogon at PhP20,480, and Masbate at PhP20,406.

Despite having the lowest poverty threshold, Masbate has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in Bicol Region at 45.4 percent, followed by Catanduanes at 43.4 percent, Sorsogon at 41.3 percent, Camarines Norte at 36.4 percent, Camarines Sur at 35.4 percent, and Albay at 25.2 percent.

Camarines Sur has the highest magnitude of poor population among Bicol’s provinces, with 665,165, followed by Masbate with 424,568, Sorsogon with 375,178, Albay with 340,305, Camarines Norte with 237,712, and Catanduanes with 129,486.

Western-Visayas_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

WESTERN VISAYAS

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 22.4 percent (No.10)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 861,256 (No.13)

The proposed federated region of Western Visayas will comprise five of the current Region VI’s six provinces: Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Guimaras, and Iloilo.

Among the proposed federated regions, Western Visayas’s annual per capita poverty threshold is the fifth lowest at PhP21,070, based on 2015 data. It has the eighth lowest poverty incidence at 22.4 percent.

Guimaras has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in Western Visayas at PhP23,136, followed by Iloilo at PhP22,117, Aklan at PhP21,384, Capiz at PhP21,146, and Antique at PhP20,382.

Despite having the lowest poverty threshold, Antique has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in Western Visayas at 26 percent, followed by Iloilo at 20 percent, Aklan at 14.9 percent, and Capiz at 12.9 percent. Guimaras has the lowest poverty incidence among the provinces in the region, at 5.22 percent.

Meanwhile, Iloilo has the highest magnitude of poor population, with 540,001, followed by Antique with 126,943, Capiz with 118,678, Aklan with 67,199.

Guimaras has the lowest magnitude of poor population – 8,435 — not just among the provinces in Western Visayas, but in the whole country as well.

Central-Visayas_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

CENTRAL VISAYAS

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 27.6 percent (No.8)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.36M (No.7)

The proposed federated region of Central Visayas will have three of the current Region VII’s four provinces: Bohol, Cebu, and Siquijor.

Central Visayas ranks seventh highest among the proposed federated region in terms of annual per capita poverty threshold, with its figure at PhP21,914 in 2015. It has the eighth highest poverty incidence at 27.6 percent.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Cebu has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in Central Visayas at PhP21,470, followed by Siquijor at PhP21,675, and Bohol at PhP20,437.

Meanwhile, Siquijor has the highest poverty incidence among the region’s provinces at 53 percent, followed by Bohol at 26 percent, and Cebu at 21 percent.

Cebu also has the highest magnitude of poor population not only among the provinces in Central Visayas, but also in the whole country, with 986,557. It is followed by Bohol with 298,196 and Siquijor with 78,433.

Eastern-Visayas_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

EASTERN VISAYAS
Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 38.7 percent (No.3)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.76M (No.3)

The proposed federated region of Eastern Visayas will comprise the current Region VIII provinces: Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, Western Samar, Leyte, Southern Leyte, and Biliran.

Among the proposed federated regions, Eastern Visayas’s average annual per capita poverty threshold is the sixth lowest at PhP21,304 in 2015. It ranks third in terms of poverty incidence after ARMM and Caraga, posting a figure of 38.7 percent. It also has the third highest magnitude of poor population, after Bicol and ARMM, with 1,756,744.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Southern Leyte has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in Eastern Visayas at PhP23,318, followed by Eastern Samar at PhP22,886, Northern Samar at PhP21,574, Biliran at PhP21,008, Leyte at PhP20,807, and Western Samar at PhP20,139.

Northern Samar has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in Eastern Visayas, and the third highest among all the provinces in the country at 56.2 percent. Western Samar has the second highest poverty incidence in the region at 46.9 percent, followed by Eastern Samar at 46.3 percent, Southern Leyte at 38 percent, Leyte at 31 percent, and Biliran at 21.3 percent.

Leyte has the highest magnitude of poor population among the provinces in Eastern Visayas, with 652,690, followed by Western Samar with 348,948, Northern Samar with 337,064, Eastern Samar with 226,309, Southern Leyte with 146,726, and Biliran with 45,007.

Negros-Island_Poverty Incidence_PCIJ

NEGROS ISLAND REGION

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: no data available as yet
Magnitude of Poor Population: no data available as yet

The proposed federated region of Negros Island (NIR) will comprise the provinces of Negros Occidental (formerly of Region VI) and Negros Oriental (formerly of Region VII). NIR was established under then President Benigno S. Aquino III’s Executive Order No. 183 in 2015, but this was suspended by President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s EO No. 83 in 2016.

Negros Occidental, the larger of the two Negros provinces in terms of land area and population, has lower annual per capita poverty threshold at PhP20,464, and poverty incidence at 29 percent. Despite this, Negros Occidental still has the second highest magnitude of poor population among the provinces in the country, with 867,141 people living below the poverty threshold.

By comparison, Negros Oriental has higher annual per capita poverty threshold at PhP22,823, and higher poverty incidence at 45 percent. Negros Oriental has the fifth highest magnitude of poor population – 694,293 — among the provinces nationwide.

Zamboanga_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 33.9 percent (No.7)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.27M (No.9)

The proposed federated region of Zamboanga Peninsula will comprise not only the current Region IX provinces — Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Zamboanga Sibugay – but also the component city of Isabela, now in the province of Basilan, which is part of ARMM.

Among the proposed federated regions, Zamboanga Peninsula’s annual per capita poverty threshold is the third lowest at PhP20,925. It has the seventh highest poverty incidence at 33.9 percent and the ninth lowest magnitude of poor population, with 1,274,657.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Zamboanga del Norte has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in Zamboanga Peninsula at PhP21,725, followed by Zamboanga Sibugay at PhP20,551, and Zamboanga del Sur at PhP20,095. Isabela City has an annual per capita poverty threshold of PhP20,617.

Zamboanga del Norte also has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in the region at 51.6 percent, followed by Zamboanga Sibugay at 31.7 percent, and Zamboanga del Sur at 24.8 percent. Isabela City has a poverty incidence of 25.1 percent.

Zamboanga del Norte has the highest magnitude of poor population in Zamboanga Peninsula, with 588,451, followed by Zamboanga del Sur with 476,765, and Zamboanga Sibugay with 164, 230. Isabela City’s poor population stands at 45,211.

Northern-Mindanao_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

NORTHERN MINDANAO

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 36.6 percent (No.5)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.72M (No.4)

The proposed federated region of Northern Mindanao will comprise the provinces in the current Region X: Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Misamis Oriental.

Northern Mindanao ranks fifth highest among the proposed federated regions in terms of annual per capita poverty threshold, with its figure at PhP22,345. It has the fifth highest poverty incidence at 36.6 percent and the fourth highest magnitude of poor population, with 1,720,472.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Bukidnon has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in Northern Mindanao at PhP23,682, followed by Lanao del Norte at PhP21,836, Camiguin at PhP21,678, Misamis Oriental at PhP21,299, and Misamis Occidental at PhP20,376.

Bukidnon also has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in the region at 53.6 percent, followed by Lanao del Norte at 44.3 percent, Misamis Occidental at 36.9 percent, and Camiguin at 34 percent.

Misamis Oriental has the lowest poverty incidence in the region, at 19.3 percent, and is one of the three provinces in Mindanao with poverty incidence lower than the national average.

Bukidnon has the highest magnitude of poor population among the provinces in Northern Mindanao, as well as the third highest in the country, with 732,027, followed by Lanao del Norte with 415,967, Misamis Oriental with 338,972, Misamis Occidental with 197,324, and Camiguin with 36,182.

Davao_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

DAVAO REGION

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 22 percent (No.11)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.09M (No.11)

The proposed federated region of Davao will comprise the current Region XI provinces: Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Davao Occidental.

Among the proposed federated regions, Davao’s annual per capita poverty threshold is the eighth lowest at PhP22,754, as of 2015. It has the seventh lowest poverty incidence at 22 percent and the eighth lowest magnitude of poor population, with 1,092,201.

Davao del Norte has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in Davao, as well as the fifth highest in the country at PhP24,424, followed by Compostela Valley at PhP22,740, Davao Oriental at PhP22,210, and Davao del Sur at PhP21,846.

Davao del Norte also has the highest poverty incidence among the provinces in the proposed region, clocking in at 33.2 percent, followed by Davao Oriental at 29.9 percent, and Compostela Valley at 28.1 percent.

Davao del Sur, meanwhile, has the lowest poverty incidence among the provinces in Davao, posting 15.6 percent. It is one of only three provinces in Mindanao with a poverty incidence lower than the national average.

Despite this, Davao del Sur has the highest magnitude of poor population among the region’s provinces, with 450,012, followed by Davao del Norte with 299,673, Compostela Valley with 178,922, and Davao Oriental with 163,594.

Davao Occidental, the newest province in the country, was created only in 2013 and was not included in PSA’s 2015 Poverty Census.

SOCCSKSARGEN_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

SOCCSKSARGEN

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 37.3 percent (No.4)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.72M (No.5)

The proposed federated region of SOCCSKSARGEN will comprise the current Region X provinces of South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Sarangani, along with the independent component city of Cotabato in the province of Maguindanao, which is now part of ARMM.

Among the proposed federated regions, SOCCSKSARGEN’s annual per capita poverty threshold is the fourth lowest at PhP21,025 in 2015. It has the fourth highest poverty incidence at 37.3 percent and the fifth highest magnitude of poor population, with 1,716,649.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, South Cotabato has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in SOCCSKSARGEN at PhP22,147, followed by Sarangani at PhP20,753, Sultan Kudarat at PhP20,620, and North Cotabato at PhP20,555. Cotabato City has a poverty threshold of PhP21,825.

Sarangani has the highest poverty incidence – 55.2 percent — among the region’s provinces, and the fourth highest countrywide.

Sultan Kudarat has the second highest poverty incidence at 48 percent, followed by North Cotabato at 41.4 percent, and South Cotabato at 24.6 percent. Cotabato City has a poverty incidence of 31.6 percent.

North Cotabato has the highest magnitude of poor population among the provinces in SOCCSKSARGEN, with 615,923, followed by South Cotabato with 411,404, Sultan Kudarat with 393,833, and Sarangani with 233,164. Cotabato City has a poor population of 62,325.

CARAGA_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

CARAGA

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 39.1 percent (No.2)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.06M (No.12)

The proposed federated region of Caraga will comprise the current Region XIII provinces: Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, and the Dinagat Islands.

Among the proposed federated regions, Caraga has the fourth highest annual per capita poverty threshold at PhP22,570 in 2015. It has second highest poverty incidence, after ARMM, at 39.1 percent and the seventh lowest magnitude of poor population, with 1,062,313.

As of the 2015 Poverty Census, Surigao del Norte has the highest poverty threshold among the provinces in Caraga at PhP23,057, followed by Agusan del Sur at PhP22,957, Surigao del Sur at PhP22,759, and Agusan del Norte at PhP21,535.

Agusan del Sur has the highest poverty incidence at 47.3 percent, followed by Surigao del Sur at 40.1 percent, Agusan del Norte at 34.9 percent, and Surigao del Sur at 34.7 percent.

Agusan del Sur also has the highest magnitude of poor population in the region, with 318,638, followed by Agusan del Norte with 270,149, Surigao del Sur with 248,345, and Surigao del Norte with 225,181.
Dinagat Islands was not included in PSA’s 2015 Poverty Census.

ARMM_Poverty-Incidence_PCIJ

AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO

Fast Facts: (Rank among 18 regions)
Poverty Incidence: 53.7 percent (No.1)
Magnitude of Poor Population: 1.99M (No.2)

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will comprise the provinces of Basilan (excluding the city of Isabela), Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao (excluding Cotabato City), Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

Among the proposed federated regions, ARMM’s average annual per capita poverty threshold is the eighth lowest at PhP21,563 as of 2015. Despite this, ARMM has the highest poverty incidence at 53.7 percent and the second highest magnitude of poor population, with 1,990,504.

Lanao del Sur has the highest annual per capita poverty threshold among the provinces in ARMM at PhP22,802, followed by Maguindanao at PhP21,423, Sulu at PhP20,778, and Basilan at PhP20,678.

Tawi-Tawi’s poverty threshold of PHP16,586 is the lowest not just in ARMM, but also in the whole country.
But it is Lanao del Sur that stands out for having the highest poverty incidence, not only in ARMM but in the whole country, at 71.9 percent.

Lanao del Sur also has the highest magnitude of poor population among the provinces in ARMM, as well as the fourth highest in the country, with 725,262, followed by Sulu with 577,987, Maguindanao with 551,681, Basilan with 75,019, and Tawi-Tawi with 60,555.

In the meantime, the province of Maguindanao ranks second poorest in the country at 57.2 percent, followed by Sulu at 54.9 percent, and Basilan at 37 percent.

And then there is Tawi-Tawi, whose poverty incidence of 12.6 percent makes it the only province in ARMM and one of only three provinces in Mindanao with a poverty incidence lower than the national average. — PCIJ, July 2018
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Stats on the state of the regions:A tricky tug of war for IRA, revenues

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Federalism_IRA_V2_PCIJ

ONLY THREE of the proposed 18 federated regions have revenue collections larger than the fund transfers that they are getting from the national government in terms of Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA.

The rest of the 15 regions remain largely dependent on their IRA shares to sustain their most basic operations.

The three regions with strong to significant fighting chance to take the path to fiscal autonomy in the pitch to shift to a federal system of government are the National Capital Region (Metro Manila), CALABARZON, and Central Visayas.

The presence of bustling centers of business, finance, commerce, trade, and industry in their areas are their common competitive advantage.

And because they similarly host large populations, the three regions have also consistently received bigger shares of IRA from the national government.

Data from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), and Department of Budget and Management (DBM) show that these three regions had revenue collections that were large enough to cover for their respective IRAs in 2016.

Of the country’s 81 provinces, only nine raised revenue collections large enough to cover for their respective IRAs in 2016. These are Laguna, Cebu, Davao Del Sur, Cavite, Pampanga, Misamis Oriental, Batangas, Benguet, and Zambales.

The Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) required national government to remit IRA shares to local government units (provinces, chartered cities, component cities, municipalities, and barangays) every budget year.

The IRA is the annual share of local governments out of the proceeds from national internal revenue taxes. “It is estimated at forty percent (40%) of the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes during the third fiscal year preceding the current year, as certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),” according to DBM circulars.

It adds that the following national internal revenue taxes are being used as bases for the computation of IRA: income tax, estate tax and donor’s tax, value-added tax, other percentage taxes, and taxes imposed by special laws, such as travel tax.

Federalism_Revenue-Collection_V2_PCIJ

SOURCES OF REVENUE

Various revenue sources raise funds for the Philippine government — taxes, tariffs, income from government-owned and -controlled corporations, foreign aid, among others.

The government collects national taxes, the country’s primary source of revenue through BIR in various forms: income tax, estate and donor’s taxes, value-added tax, other percentage taxes, excise taxes, documentary stamp taxes, and so on.

According to the official statistics of BIR reported by PSA, the Philippine government raised a total revenue of ₱1.51 trillion in 2016.

Local government units meanwhile collect local taxes such as real property tax, municipal tax on business, community tax, among others, and do not have to remit or report these to the natonal government.

Among the 18 proposed federated regions, the National Capital Region (Metro Manila) accounts for the largest revenue collection. In 2016 alone, it raised PhP1.27 trillion worth of national taxes or 84.24 percent of the country’s total revenue collection for that year.

In contrast, in 2016 the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao raised the smallest at PhP1.64 billion, or 0.11 percent of the national total.

Among the 81 provinces, Cebu ranks No. 1 in revenue collection, with its haul in 2016 reaching P24.6 billion.

Next in the Top 5 revenue-rich provinces is Laguna with PhP20.4 billion, then Cavite with PhP15.8 billion, Davao del Sur PhP13.1 billion, and Pampanga PhP12.8 billion.

The cellar dwellers in the 2016 revenue roster are Tawi-Tawi with PhP224 million, then Sulu with PhP231 million, Basilan PhP238 million, Marinduque PhP263 million, and Ifugao PhP264 million.

Federalism_Provinces_PCIJ

INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT

Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) refers to a local government unit’s share of revenue from the national government.

The sharing scheme has been prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 according to a fixed formula. Every province, city, municipality, and barangay will get an IRA proportional to their respective population, land area, and an equal-sharing provision. Thus, LGUs with larger populations and land areas tend to receive larger IRA shares than their smaller counterparts.

Official data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) show that in 2016, the national government allocated PhP429 billion of its revenue to LGUs in the country, with roughly 51 percent going to LGUs in Luzon, 21 percent to LGUs in the Visayas, and 27 percent to LGUs in Mindanao.

The IRA share that year of CALABARZON was the largest at PhP47.3 billion (11.04 percent of total IRA), while the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) received the smallest at PhP13.2 billion (3.08 percent of total IRA).

Metro Manila received PhP27 billion, or nearly percent that received by CALABARZON. Next in terms of IRA size was Cebu at PhP15.1 billion, followed by Negros Occidental at PhP14.3 billion, Pangasinan at PhP11.7 billion, Cavite at PhP10.8 billion, and Isabela at PhP10.3 billion.

Batanes received the smallest IRA share: PhP569 million.

Also getting slivers of the IRA pie were Camiguin with PhP743 million, Siquijor PhP881 million, Guimaras PhP1.05 billion, and Dinagat Islands at PhP1.08 billion.

THE IRA AND REVENUES OF THE REGIONS

Federalism_IRA-NCR_PCIJ

National Capital Region

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP1.27 trillion, 84.24% of PH total (No.1)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP27.0 billion, 6.30% of PH total (No.3)

The National Capital Region will be designated as the federal capital of the Philippines. For statistical purposes, PSA grouped the 17 cities and single municipality of NCR into four districts: 1st District, City of Manila; 2nd District, Mandaluyong City, Marikina City, Pasig City, Quezon City, San Juan City; 3rd District, Caloocan City, Malabon City, Navotas City, Valenzuela City; and 4th District, Las Pinas City, Makati City, Muntinlupa City, Paranaque City, Pasay City, Pateros, and Taguig City.

As the nation’s primary center of finance and development, NCR is the national government’s largest source of tax revenues. In 2016, NCR raised PhP1.27 trillion worth of national taxes (84.2 percent of the country’s total revenue collection).

Having the second largest population among the regions, NCR also received the third largest IRA at PhP27 billion (6.30 percent of the country’s total IRA) in 2016.

NCR is also one of the three proposed federated regions with total revenue collection large enough to cover for its IRA, apart from CALABARZON and Central Visayas.

Federalism_IRA-CAR_PCIJ

Cordillera Administrative Region

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP5.7 billion, 0.38% (No.15)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP13.2 billion, 3.08% (No. 18)

The Cordillera Administrative Region will comprise the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, Apayao, and Mountain Province.

Among the proposed federated regions, CAR raised the fourth smallest revenue in 2016 at PhP5.7 billion (0.38 percent of the country’s total revenue collection). Having the smallest population among the proposed federated regions, CAR also received the lowest IRA among them at PhP13.2 billion (3.08 percent of the country’s total IRA).

In 2016, Benguet raised the largest tax revenue among the CAR provinces at PhP4.2 billion (73 percent of CAR’s total revenue collection). Kalinga raised the second largest at PhP565 million, followed by Abra at PhP437 million, Mountain Province at PhP282 million, and Ifugao at PhP264 million. Apayao reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Tabuk, Kalinga.

Benguet also received the largest IRA among the CAR provinces in CAR at PhP3.25 billion (25 percent of CAR’s total IRA), followed by Abra at PhP2.67 billion (20 percent), Kalinga at PhP2.3 billion (17 percent), Ifugao at PhP1.75 billion (13 percent), Apayao at PhP1.73 billion (13 percent), and Mountain Province, at PhP1.51 billion (11 percent) in 2016.

Benguet is the only province in CAR and one of only nine provinces in the country with a revenue collection higher than its IRA. In 2016, it collected revenue amounting to PhP4.2 billion while its IRA reached only PhP3.25 billion. The highly urbanized city of Baguio is located in Benguet.

Federalism_IRA-Ilocos-Region_PCIJ

Ilocos Region

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP11.9 billion, 0.79% (No.7)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP23.7 billion, 5.53% (No.6)

The proposed federated region of Ilocos will comprise the current Region I provinces: Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan.

Among the proposed federated regions, Ilocos Region raised the seventh largest revenue in 2016 at PhP11.9 billion (0.79 percent of the region’s total revenue collection) and received the sixth largest IRA at PhP23.7 billion (5.53 percent of the country’s total IRA).

In 2016, Pangasinan raised the largest tax revenue among the provinces in the Ilocos Region, at PhP6 billion (50 percent of the region’s total revenue collection), followed by La Union at PhP2.73 billion (23 percent), Ilocos Norte at PhP1.63 billion (14 percent), and Ilocos Sur at PhP1.59 billion (13 percent).

Pangasinan also received the largest share of the region’s IRA, and the third largest in the country, in 2016, getting PhP11.7 billion (49 percent of Ilocos Region’s total IRA), followed by Ilocos Sur with PhP4.4 billion (19 percent), Ilocos Norte PhP3.94 billion (17 percent), and La Union PhP3.7 billion (16 percent).

Federalism_IRA-Cagayan-Valley_PCIJ

Cagayan Valley

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP8.9 billion, 0.59% (No.11)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP22.1 billion, 5.15% (No.9)

The proposed federated region of Cagayan Valley will comprise the current Region II provinces: Batanes, Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

Among the 18 proposed federated regions, Cagayan Valley raised the eighth smallest tax revenue in 2016 at PhP8.9 billion (0.59 percent of the country’s total revenue collection) and received the ninth largest IRA at PhP22 billion (5.15 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Cagayan raised the largest tax revenue among the region’s provinces at PhP4.48 billion (50 percent of the region’s total revenue collection), followed by Isabela at PhP3.25 billion (36 percent), Nueva Vizcaya at PhP904 million (10 percent), and Quirino at PhP301 million (three percent). Batanes reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Meanwhile, Isabela received the largest IRA among the provinces in Cagayan Valley, and the fifth largest in the country at PhP10.3 billion (47 percent of the region’s total IRA) in 2016, followed by Cagayan at PhP6.66 billion (30 percent), Nueva Vizcaya PhP2.86 billion (13 percent), and Quirino PhP1.71 billion (eight percent).

Batanes received the smallest IRA not just among the provinces in the region, but also in the country at PhP569 million (three percent of the region’s total IRA).

Federalism_IRA-Central-Luzon_PCIJ

Central Luzon

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP35.8 billion, 2.37% (No. 3)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP40.7 billion, 9.51% (No.2)

Central Luzon region will comprise the provinces in the current Region III: Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales.

Among the proposed federated regions, Central Luzon raised the third largest revenue at PhP35.8 billion (2.37 percent of the country’s total revenue collection) and received the second largest IRA at PhP40.7 billion (9.51 percent of the country’s total IRA) in 2016.

Two provinces in the region managed to raise tax revenues large enough to cover for their respective IRAs. Pampanga raised the fifth largest revenue collection in the country at PhP12.8 billion, and received the third largest IRA at PhP8.01 billion across Central Luzon. Zambales raised PhP3.73 billion and received PhP3.63 billion. The highly-urbanized cities of Angeles and Olongapo are located in Pampanga and Zambales, respectively.

Among the region’s provinces, Pampanga’s revenue in 2016 was also the highest among the region’s provinces and was equivalent to 36 percent of Central Luzon’s total revenue collection. This was followed by Bulacan at PhP9.73 billion (27 percent), Nueva Ecija at PhP3.86 billion (11 percent), Zambales (10 percent), Tarlac at PhP2.87 billion (8.0 percent), and Bataan at PhP2.54 billion (7.1 percent). Aurora had the smallest revenue at PhP344 million (1.0 percent).

In terms of IRA allotment, Bulacan received the largest at PhP9.91 billion (24 percent of the region’s total IRA), followed by Nueva Ecija at PhP9.13 billion (22 percent), Pampanga (20 percent), Tarlac at PhP5.26 billion (13 percent), Zambales (8.9 percent), and Bataan at PhP3.04 billion (7.5 percent).

Aurora received the smallest IRA that year at PhP1.77 billion (4.3 percent).

Federalism_IRA-CALABARZON_PCIJ

CALABARZON

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP54.6 billion, 3.62% (No.2)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP47.3 billion, 11.04% (No. 1)

The proposed federated region of CALABARZON will comprise the current provinces in the current Region IV-A: Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.

Among the proposed federated regions, CALABARZON raised the second largest revenue at PhP54.6 billion (3.62 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), and received the largest IRA, at PhP47.3 billion (11.04 percent of the country’s total IRA) in 2016.

CALABARZON is also one of the three proposed federated regions with total revenue collections large enough to cover for their IRAs.

Three provinces in CALABARZON managed to raise in 2016 tax revenues large enough to cover for their respective IRAs: Laguna raised the second largest revenue collection in the country at PhP20.4 billion, and received an IRA of PhP9.93 billion; Cavite raised the third largest revenue collection in the country at PhP15.8 billion and received the fourth largest IRA in the country at PhP10.8 billion; and Batangas raised PhP10.7 billion and received PhP9.47 billion.

Among the provinces in CALABARZON, Laguna also raised the largest revenue in 2016, which was equivalent to 37.3 percent of the region’s total revenue collection. Next came Cavite, whose revenue was equivalent to 28.9 percent of the region’s total, followed Batangas (19.7 percent), Rizal at PhP4.02 billion (7.4 percent), and Quezon at PhP3.69 billion (6.8 percent).

It was Cavite, however, which received the largest IRA among the CALABARZON provinces in 2016, with its share at 22.8 percent of the region’s total IRA). This was followed by Laguna (21.0 percent) and then Quezon, which received PhP9.50 billion (20.1 percent). Batangas was fourth in terms of IRA share (20.0 percent). Getting the smallest IRA was Rizal at PhP7.64 billion (16.1 percent).

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MIMAROPA

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP5.4 billion, 0.36% (No.16)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP18.7 billion, 4.36% (No.15)

The proposed federated region of MIMAROPA will comprise the current Region IV-B provinces: Occidental Mindoro and Oriental Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, and Palawan.

In 2016, MIMAROPA raised the third smallest revenue among the proposed federated regions at PhP5.4 billion (0.36 percent of the country’s total revenue collection) and received the fourth smallest IRA at PhP18.7 billion (4.36 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Palawan topped MIMAROPA’S provinces in terms of revenue collection, raising PhP2.86 billion (53.0 percent of the region’s total revenue collection), followed by Oriental Mindoro at PhP1.28 billion (23.8 percent), Occidental Mindoro PhP608 million (11.3 percent), and Romblon at PhP375 million (7.0 percent). Bringing up the rear was Marinduque, with PhP263 million (4.9 percent).

Palawan also received the largest IRA among the provinces in MIMAROPA in 2016: PhP8.13 billion or 43.5 percent of the region’s total IRA). Next came Oriental Mindoro with PhP4.15 billion (22.2 percent), Occidental Mindoro PhP3.03 billion (16.2 percent), Romblon PhP2.00 billion (10.5 percent), and Marinduque PhP1.42 billion (7.6 percent).

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Bicol Region

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP9.2 billion, 0.61% (No.10)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP26.6 billion, 6.22% (No.4)

The proposed federated region of Bicol will comprise the current Region V provinces: Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon.

Bicol raised the tenth smallest revenue among the proposed federated regions in 2016, at PhP9.22 billion (0.61 percent of the country’s total revenue collection). But it also received the fourth largest IRA: PhP26.6 billion or 6.22 percent of the country’s total IRA.

Among the provinces in Bicol, Camarines Sur had the largest revenue that year at PhP3.19 billion (35 percent of Bicol’s total revenue collection), followed by Albay at PhP3.08 billion (33 percent), Sorsogon PhP981 million (11 percent), Camarines Norte PhP790 million (nine percent), and Masbate at PhP739 million (eight percent). Catanduanes raised the smallest revenue that year, with PhP440 million (five percent).

Camarines Sur also received the largest IRA among the provinces in Bicol in 2016 at PhP8.15 billion (31 percent of Bicol’s total IRA), followed by Albay at PhP5.73 billion (22 percent), Masbate PhP4.49 billion (17 percent), Sorsogon PhP3.76 billion (14 percent), Camarines Norte PhP2.70 billion (10 percent), and Catanduanes PhP1.81 billion (seven percent).

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Western Visayas

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP10.7 billion, 0.71% (No.8)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP20.6 billion, 4.80% (No.12)

The proposed federated region of Western Visayas will comprise five of the six provinces in the current Region VI: Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Guimaras, and Iloilo.

Western Visayas in 2016 raised the eighth largest revenue among the proposed 18 federated regions at PhP10.7 billion (0.71 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), but received the seventh smallest IRA at PhP20.6 billion (4.80 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Among the provinces in Western Visayas, Iloilo raised the largest tax revenue at PhP7.32 billion (68 percent), followed by Aklan at PhP1.61 billion (15 percent), Capiz PhP1.18 billion (11 percent), and Antique at PhP621 million (six percent). Guimaras reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Iloilo City, Iloilo.

Iloilo also received the largest IRA among the provinces in Western Visayas in 2016 at PhP9.88 billion (48 percent of the region’s total IRA), followed by Capiz at PhP3.70 billion (18 percent), Antique PhP3.21 billion (16 percent), and Aklan PhP2.76 billion (13 percent).

Guimaras that year received the smallest IRA in the region, and the fourth smallest in the country, getting PhP1.05 billion (five percent of the region’s total IRA).

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Central Visayas

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP26.8 billion, 1.78% (No. 4)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP22.8 billion, 5.31% (No.8)

The proposed federated region of Central Visayas will have three of the four provinces in the current Region VII: Bohol, Cebu, and Siquijor.

Among the proposed federated regions, Central Visayas raised the fourth largest revenue at PhP26.8 billion (1.78 percent of the country’s total revenue collection) and received the eighth largest IRA at PhP22.8 billion (5.31 percent of the country’s total IRA) in 2016.

Central Visayas is also one of the three proposed federated regions with a total revenue collection that was large enough to cover for its IRA.

Among the provinces in Central Visayas, Cebu raised the largest revenue in 2016 at PhP24.6 billion, or 92 percent of the region’s total revenue collection. Bohol collected a far lower PhP2.15 billion (eight percent). The province of Siquijor reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental.

Cebu as well received the largest IRA among the provinces in Central Visayas in 2016 at PhP15.1 billion (66 percent of the region’s total IRA), followed by Bohol at PhP6.78 billion (30 percent). Siquijor received the smallest IRA – also the third smallest in the country – at PhP881 million (four percent of the region’s total IRA).

Cebu is the only province in Central Visayas (and in the Visayas group of islands) and one of only nine provinces in the country with revenue collections higher than their IRA shares.

In 2016, Cebu raised the largest revenue collection among the provinces nationwide at PhP24.6 billion and received the largest IRA at PhP15.1 billion.

The highly-urbanized cities of Cebu, Lapu-Lapu, and Mandaue, as well as their surrounding cities and municipalities, make up Metro Cebu.

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Eastern Visayas

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP7.8 billion, 0.52% (No.13)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP26.6 billion, 6.20% (No.5)

Eastern Visayas will comprise the provinces in the current Region VIII: Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, Western Samar, Leyte, Southern Leyte, and Biliran.

Eastern Visayas in 2016 raised the sixth smallest tax revenue among the proposed federated regions, at PhP7.8 billion (0.52 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), but received the fifth largest IRA, PhP26.6 billion (6.20 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Among the provinces in Eastern Visayas, Leyte raised the largest revenue at PhP4.74 billion (60.5 percent of the region’s total revenue collection), followed by Western Samar at PhP1.09 billion (13.9 percent), Northern Samar PhP716 million (9.1 percent), Eastern Samar PhP687 million (8.8 percent), and Southern Leyte PhP604 million (7.7 percent). The province of Biliran reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Tacloban City, Leyte.

Leyte also received the largest IRA among the provinces in Eastern Visayas in 2016, getting PhP9.42 billion (35 percent of the region’s total IRA), followed by Western Samar with PhP5.71 billion (21 percent), Eastern Samar PhP3.81 billion (14 percent), Northern Samar PhP3.65 billion (14 percent), Southern Leyte PhP2.85 billion (11 percent), and Biliran PhP1.14 billion (four percent).

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Negros Island Region

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP10.3 billion, 0.68% (No. 9)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP21.9 billion, 5.10% (No.10)

The proposed federated region of Negros Island (NIR) will comprise the provinces of Negros Occidental (formerly of Region VI) and Negros Oriental (formerly of Region VII).

NIR was previously established under former President Benigno S. Aquino III’s Executive Order No. 183 in 2015, but this was suspended by President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s EO No. 83 in 2016.

Together, the two Negros provinces raised the ninth largest revenue among the proposed federated regions at PhP10.3 billion (0.68 percent of the country’s total revenue collection). Their combined IRA of PhP21.9 billion (5.10 percent of the country’s total IRA) was also the 10th largest, surpassing other regions with more provinces.

Negros Occidental, in fact, raised the eighth largest revenue among all the provinces in the country at PhP7.96 billion, and received the second largest IRA in the country at PhP14.3 billion in 2016.

Meanwhile, Negros Oriental raised PhP2.36 billion in tax revenues and received an IRA of PhP7.6 billion in the same year.

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Zamboanga Peninsula

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP5.9 billion, 0.39% (No.14)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP17.7 billion, 4.14% (No.16)

The proposed federated region of Zamboanga Peninsula will comprise the current Region IX provinces — Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Zamboanga Sibugay — as well as the component city of Isabela in the province of Basilan (part of ARMM).

In 2016, Zamboanga Peninsula raised the fifth smallest revenue among the proposed 18 federated regions at PhP5.9 billion (0.39 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), and received the third smallest IRA at PhP17.7 billion (4.14 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Zamboanga del Sur raised PhP4.48 billion in tax revenues, while Zamboanga del Norte raised PhP1.38 billion. Zamboanga Sibugay reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del Sur.

Zamboanga del Sur also received the largest IRA among the provinces in Zamboanga Peninsula in 2016 at PhP7.89 billion (44 percent of the region’s total IRA), followed by Zamboanga del Norte at PhP6.09 billion (34 percent), Zamboanga Sibugay PhP3.23 billion, and the city of Isabela PhP532 million (three percent).

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Northern Mindanao

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP12.0 billion, 0.79% (No. 6)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP23.1 billion, 5.39% (No.7)

The proposed federated region of Northern Mindanao will comprise the current Region X provinces: Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Misamis Oriental.

Among the proposed 18 federated regions, Northern Mindanao in 2016 raised the sixth largest revenue at PhP11.9 billion (0.79 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), and received the seventh largest IRA at PhP23.1 billion (5.39 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Misamis Oriental raised the largest revenue among the provinces in Northern Mindanao at PhP7.56 billion (63 percent of the region’s total revenue collection), followed by Bukidnon at PhP1.7 billion (14 percent), Lanao del Norte PhP1.68 billion (14 percent), and Misamis Occidental PhP1.01 billion (8 percent). Camiguin reports its revenue collection to the RRO in Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental.

Meanwhile, Bukidnon received the largest IRA among the Northern Mindanao provinces at PhP7.69 billion (33 percent of the region’s total IRA), followed by Misamis Oriental at PhP6.22 billion (27 percent), Lanao del Norte PhP4.71 billion (20 percent), Misamis Occidental PhP3.74 billion (16 percent). Camiguin received the smallest IRA in the region, and the second smallest in the country, at PhP743 million (three percent of the region’s total IRA).

Misamis Oriental is the only province in Northern Mindanao and one of only nine provinces in the country with revenue collections higher than their IRAs. Misamis Oriental’s revenue collection reached PhP7.56 billion in 2016 and received an IRA of PhP6.22 billion. Cagayan de Oro, a highly urbanized city, is in Misamis Oriental.

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Davao Region

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP16.9 billion, 1.12% (No.5)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP20.7 billion, 4.82% (No.11)

The proposed federated region of Davao will comprise the current Region XI provinces: Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Davao Occidental.

Davao in 2016 raised the fifth largest revenue among the proposed federated regions at PhP16.9 billion (1.12 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), but received the eighth smallest IRA at PhP20.7 billion (4.82 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Davao del Sur raised the largest revenue among the region’s provinces at PhP13.1 billion (78 percent of Davao’s total revenue collection), which was also the fourth largest revenue collection in the country.

Davao del Norte was a far second at PhP3.12 billion (18 percent), while Davao Oriental had a revenue total of PhP662 million (three percent). Compostela Valley reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Tagum, Davao del Norte, while Davao Occidental reports its revenue collection to the
Revenue District Office in Digos, Davao del Sur.

Davao del Sur also received the largest IRA among Davao’s provinces, getting PhP7.8 billion or 38 percent of the region’s total IRA. This was followed by Davao del Norte at PhP4.61 billion (22 percent), Davao Oriental at PhP3.65 billion (18 percent), Compostela Valley PhP3.39 billion (16 percent), and Davao Occidental PhP1.21 billion (six percent).

Davao del Sur is the only province in Davao and among the nine provinces in the country with revenue collections higher than their IRA shares. Davao City, the heart of Metropolitan Davao, is in Davao del Sur.

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SOCCSKSARGEN

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP8.8 billion, 0.58 (No.12)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP19.2 billion, 4.48% (No.14)

The proposed federated region of SOCCSKSARGEN will comprise the current Region X provinces: South Cotabato, North Cotabato. Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, and the independent component city of Cotabato in the province of Maguindanao (part of ARMM).

In 2016, SOCCSKSARGEN raised the seventh smallest revenue among the proposed federated regions at PhP8.8 billion (0.58 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), and received the fifth smallest IRA at PhP19.2 billion (4.48 percent of the country’s total IRA).

South Cotabato raised the largest tax revenue among the region’s provinces at PhP4.87 billion (55 percent of the region’s total revenue collection), followed by North Cotabato at PhP1.45 billion (16 percent), and Sultan Kudarat at PhP1.24 billion (14 percent).

Cotabato City also raised PhP1.24 billion in tax revenues (14 percent). The province of Sarangani submits its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Digos, Davao del Sur (part of Davao Region).

North Cotabato received the largest IRA among the provinces in SOCCSKSARGEN in 2016 at PhP6.42 billion (33 percent of the region’s IRA), followed by South Cotabato at PhP5.42 billion (28 percent), Sultan Kudarat PhP3.96 billion (21 percent), and Sarangani PhP2.57 billion (13 percent). In addition, Cotabato City received an IRA of PhP814 million (four percent).

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CARAGA

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP 5.2 billion, 0.35% (No.17)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP 16.9 billion, 3.94% (No.17)

The proposed federated region of CARAGA will comprise the current provinces in Region XIII: Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, and the Dinagat Islands.

CARAGA in 2016 raised the second smallest revenue among the proposed federated regions at PhP5.2 billion (0.35 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), and received the second smallest IRA at PhP16.9 billion (3.94 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Agusan del Norte raised the largest tax revenue among CARAGA’s provinces in CARAGA at PhP2.47 billion (47 percent of the region’s total revenue collection), followed by Surigao del Norte at PhP989 million (19 percent), Agusan del Sur PhP895 million (17 percent), and Surigao del Sur PhP888 million (17 percent). The province of Dinagat Islands reports its revenue collection to the Revenue District Office in Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.

Agusan del Sur received the largest IRA among the provinces in CARAGA at PhP5.04 billion (30 percent), followed by Surigao del Sur at PhP4.06 billion (24 percent), Agusan del Norte PhP3.76 billion (22 percent), and Surigao del Norte PhP2.93 billion (17 percent).

Dinagat Islands received the smallest IRA in Caraga, and the fifth smallest in the country at PhP1.08 billion (six percent of Caraga’s total IRA) in 2016.

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Autonomous Region In Muslim Mindanao

Fast Facts, as of 2016 data (Rank among 18 regions):
Revenue Collection: PhP1.6 billion, 0.11% (No.18)
Internal Revenue Allotment: PhP19.9 billion, 4.63% (No.13)

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will comprise the provinces of Basilan (excluding the city of Isabela), Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao (excluding Cotabato City), Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

ARMM in 2016 raised the lowest revenue among the proposed 18 federated regions at PhP1.64 billion (0.11 percent of the country’s total revenue collection), and received the sixth smallest IRA at PhP19.9 billion (4.63 percent of the country’s total IRA).

Lanao del Sur raised the largest tax revenue among ARMM’s provinces, mustering PhP491 million (30 percent of ARMM’s total revenue collection), followed by Maguindanao with PhP458 million (28 percent), Basilan PhP238 million (15 percent), and Sulu PhP231 million (14 percent).
Tawi-Tawi raised the lowest revenue among the provinces, both in ARMM and nationwide, at ₱224 million (11 percent).

Lanao de Sur also received the largest IRA among the provinces in ARMM in 2016, getting PhP7.14 billion or 36 percent of ARMM’s total IRA. This was followed by Maguindanao with PhP4.58 billion (25 percent), Sulu PhP3.33 billion (17 percent) and Tawi-tawi PhP233 million (12 percent).

Basilan received the smallest IRA among the provinces in ARMM at ₱2.09 billion (11 percent).

— PCIJ, July 2018
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For more data on the Philippines across periods of time, check out PCIJ’s MoneyPolitics Online!

Stats on the state of the regions: Only half of all Pinoys are voters

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WE ARE a nation of more than a hundred million people, but as of 2016, only one in every two Filipinos had registered as voters and could be allowed to participate in elections.

If the pitch to shift to a federal system of government gets approved and submitted to a plebiscite, it is only this half of the national population that are registered voters whose decision would be counted.

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Data from the Commission on Elections (Comelec) show that only 53.8 percent of the country’s total population or 54 million registered to vote in the 2016 National and Local Elections.

Of that number, even fewer or 44 million (81 percent of the total registered voters and 43.6 percent of the country’s total population of 100.2 million) actually voted.

The absolute figures are 54,363, 844 registered voters vis-a-vis 44,549,848 who actually voted in May 2016, according to Comelec.

The number of voters should be higher in fact at 6 in every 10 Filipinos, according to data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). But not every Filipino who could vote has registered to claim the right.

As of the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, PSA said 60.3 percent of the 92.09 million household population, at least 55.5 million Filipinos were already of voting age (18 years old and above) at the time. The 2010 proportion was more than the 56.6 percent voting-age population recorded in 2000.

However, Comelec data show that there were only 50.7 million registered voters in 2010 and only 38 million actually voted. That 75 percent turnout was then the highest recorded in 30 years of Philippine election history or since 1978.

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By the 2016 elections, the total number of female registered voters in the country was recorded at slightly higher than that of males: 28.1 million (51.6 percent of the country’s total registered voters) compared to 26.3 million male registered voters (48.4 percent).

In 2016, the female voter turnout of 22.9 million (51.6 percent of the country’s voter turnout; 81.6 percent of female registered voters) was also higher than that of males.

Only 21.1 million registered male voters cast their ballot in 2016 (48.4 percent of the country’s turnout; 80.4 percent of male registered voters).

Majority of the registered voters are adults between the age of 20 and 59, at 44.6 million (82.1 percent of the country’s total registered voters).

More than 12 percent or 6.69 million registered voters are senior citizens aged 60 and above.

The balance of 3.04 million (5.6 percent) are youths between age 17 and 19.

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FEMALE, MALE VOTERS

Starting 2004, a new trend has emerged — that of the number of women outpacing the men in the league of registered voters.

During the 2004 general elections, there were 17,014,643 registered female voters and only 16,495,449 male voters, for a gap of 3.1 percent.

In the 2007 legislative and local elections, the difference was slightly lower at 2.6 percent. There were 16,503,110 registered female voters compared to 16,084,962 registered male voters.

In the 2010 elections, however, the gender gap rose to five percent in favor of the women. There were 19,068,323 registered female voters and 18,155,722 registered male voters.

In the May 2013 elections, there were 27,406,600 registered female voters than men, 26,379,623 voters, for a variance of 3.9 percent.

For the May 2016 elections, there were 28,052,138 registered female voters and only 26,311,706 male voters, a sharp 6.6 percent difference.

In 2013, the top provinces with more registered female than male voters were the National Capital Region (NCR), Cavite, Cebu, Rizal, and Laguna.

In contrast though, some of the provinces beset with conflict, such as North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Maguindanao, registered bigger numbers of male voters.

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‘VULNERABLE’ AND UNLETTERED

They may be fewer and have special needs but the right to suffrage of voters with disability and with little or no education is just as important as that all voters share.

In large measure, their being “vulnerable voters” derives from the internal conflict and the poverty that afflict us all in the nation.

In the 2013 elections, Comelec counted a total of 626,236 registered voters with disability, and another 339,144 who are illiterate or with little or no formal schooling and could not read or write.

The number of voters with disability was recorded by Comelec at a much lower 318,013 in 2016.

Another 99,764 indigenous people have also registered as voters as of 2016.

In both elections, however, the data reveal that a majority of voters with disability and low literacy come from areas that are also the poorest in the country, and those most vulnerable if not to cheating and fraud, then to other irregularities that may visit the balloting this year. The big numbers of persons with disability among registered voters are from the conflict-affected regions of Mindanao.

As of the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) said that of 71.5 million Filipinos aged 10 years old and above, 97.5 percent or 69.8 million were literate or could read and write. This was better than the literacy rate of 92.3 percent recorded in the 2000 census.

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Yet another source of municipal-level data on persons with disability (PWDs) is the 2011 National Household Targeting System for Poverty Reduction of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). As of February 2011, DSWD data showed that across age groups that year, there were 302,421 PWDs across the nation. They included:

• 27,972 who are hearing-impaired;
• 53,034, vision-impaired;
• 28,259 speech-impaired;
• 41,551 orthopedic cases;
• 45,396 with multiple disabilities;
• 28,610 mentally-impaired; and
• 77,599 with other disability.

The DSWD survey excluded as yet the Set-A beneficiaries of the Conditional Cash Transfer Program in 2009-10. It reported that the country’s PWD community comes from 4,466,649 households, or about a fifth of the 20.17 million total households in 2010. Official data show that by 2015, the number of households in the country had risen to 22.98 million.

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BIGGER AND SMALLER BASES

CALABARZON has the largest voting population among the regions, with currently 7.6 million registered voters (14.0 percent of the country’s total registered voters) and a turnout of 5.9 million (13.4 percent of the total nationwide).

The Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) has the smallest number of voters at 906,000 (1.67 percent of the country’s total registered voters) and a turnout of 757,000 (1.72 percent of the country’s voters who actually voted).

Among the provinces, Cebu has the largest voting population, at 2.7 million, followed by Cavite at 1.84 million, Pangasinan at 1.71 million, and Laguna at 1.68 million.

Batanes has the lowest voting population, at 11,000, followed by Camiguin at 58,000, Apayao at 65,000, and Siquijor and Dinagat Islands both at 69,000.

THE VOTERS OF THE REGIONS

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NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 6.25 million (No.2)
Voter Turnout (2016): 4.73 million

The National Capital Region will be assigned as the federal capital of the Philippines.

For statistical purposes, the PSA grouped the 17 cities and municipality of NCR into four districts: 1st District: City of Manila; 2nd District: Mandaluyong City, Marikina City, Pasig City, Quezon City, San Juan City; 3rd District: Caloocan City, Malabon City, Navotas City, Valenzuela City; and 4th District: Las Pinas City, Makati City, Muntinlupa City, Paranaque City, Pasay City, Pateros, and Taguig City.

NCR has the second largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 6,253,249 registered voters (11.5 percent of the country’s total registered voters) in 2016. Only 4,731,407 of these voters (10.7 percent of the country’s voters’ turnout) though actually took to the polls in 2016.

NCR has the second lowest voters’ turnout among the proposed federated regions, at just 76 percent of its total registered voters.

As of 2016, 3,426,657 of NCR’s registered voters are female (54.8 percent of NCR’s total registered voters), while 2,826,592 are male (45.2 percent). NCR has the largest gender difference among the proposed federated regions.

Of NCR’s registered voters, 5,166,803 are adults between the age 20 and 59 (82.6 percent of NCR’s total registered voters), 721,967 are senior citizens (11.5 percent), while 364,479 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (5.8 percent).

NCR’s second district has the largest voting population, at 2,030,961 (32 percent of NCR’s total registered voters), followed by the fourth district at 1,959,417 (31 percent), third district at 1,288,392 (21 percent), and the city of Manila at 974,479 (16 percent).

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CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 906,162 (No.18)
Voter Turnout (2016): 757,748

The Cordillera Administrative Region will comprise the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, Apayao, and Mountain Province.

CAR has the smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 906,162 registered voters (1.67 percent of the country’s total registered voters) in 2016. Out of CAR’s total number of registered voters, 83.62 percent or 757,748 voters actually voted in the 2016 National and Local Elections.

There are slightly more registered male voters in CAR, at 456,154 (50.3 percent of CAR’s total registered voters), than female voters, at 450,008 (49.7 percent).

Of CAR’s registered voters, 750,514 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (82.8 percent of the total), 118,218 are senior citizens above the age 60 (13 percent), and 37,430 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (4.1 percent).

Benguet has the highest voting population among the provinces in CAR, at 352,291 (39 percent of CAR’s total registered voters), followed by Abra at 156,968 (17 percent), Kalinga at 121,375 (13 percent), Ifugao at 112,328 (12 percent), Mountain Province at 98,333 (11 percent), and Apayao at 64,867 (seven percent).

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ILOCOS REGION

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.95 million (No.6)
Voter Turnout (2016): 2.53 million

The proposed Federated Region of Ilocos will comprise the current Region I provinces: Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan.

Among the proposed federated regions, Ilocos has the sixth largest voting population, with 2,950,775 registered voters (5.43 percent of the country’s total registered voters). With 2,526,422 voters who actually voted during the 2016 elections (5.74 percent of the national voters’ turnout), Ilocos had the highest voters’ turnout among the regions, at 85.76 percent of its total registered voters.

As of 2016, 1,498,242 of Ilocos’s registered voters are female (50.8 percent of Ilocos’s total registered voters), while 1,452,533 registered voters are male (49.2 percent).

Of its registered voters, 2,400,823 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (81.4 percent of Ilocos’s total registered voters), 433,725 are senior citizens above age 60 (14.7 percent), while 116,227 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (3.9 percent).

Pangasinan has the largest voting population among the Ilocos provinces, at 1,705,260 (58 percent of the region’s total registered voters), followed by La Union at 454,778 (15 percent), Ilocos Sur at 411,951 (14 percent), and Ilocos Norte at 378,786 (13 percent).

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CAGAYAN VALLEY

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 1.92 million (No.14)
Voter Turnout (2016): 1.56 million

The proposed Federated Region of Cagayan Valley will comprise the current Region II provinces: Batanes, Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

The region has the fifth smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 1,920,952 registered voters (3.53 percent of the country’s total) in 2016. Cagayan Valley’s voter turnout in 2016 was 1,560,772, or 80 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016, 966,745 of Cagayan Valley’s registered voters are female (50.3 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 954,207 registered voters are male (49.7 percent).

Of Cagayan Valley’s registered voters, 1,556,732 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (81 percent of the region’s total), 216,210 are senior citizens above age 60 (11.3 percent), while 148,010 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (7.7 percent).

Isabela has the largest voting population among the provinces in Cagayan Valley, at 911,910 (47 percent of the region’s total), followed by Cagayan at 647,035 (34 percent), Nueva Vizcaya at 246,540 (13 percent), Quirino at 104,461 (5 percent), and Batanes at 11,006 (one percent).

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CENTRAL LUZON

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 6.06 million (No.3)
Voter Turnout (2016): 4.97 million

The proposed Federated Region of Central Luzon will comprise the current Region III provinces: Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales.

The region has the third largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 6,056,392 registered voters (11.14 percent of the country’s total registered voters) in 2016. Central Luzon’s voter turnout that election year was 4,974,372, or 82 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016, 3,156,086 of Central Luzon’s registered voters are female (52.1 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 2,900,306 are male (47.9 percent).

Of Central Luzon’s registered voters, 5,051,194 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (83.4 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 788,004 are senior citizens above age 60 (13 percent), while 217,194 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (3.6 percent).

Bulacan has the largest voting population among the region’s provinces, at 1,640,615 (27 percent of the region’s total), followed by Nueva Ecija at 1,314,658 (22 percent), Pampanga 1,278,260 (21 percent), Tarlac 739,526 (12 percent), Bataan 494,076 (8 percent), Zambales 462,732 (eight percent), and Aurora 126,525 (two percent).

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CALABARZON

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 7.62 million (No.1)
Voter Turnout (2016): 5.91 million

The proposed Federated Region of CALABARZON will comprise the current Region IV-A provinces: Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.

CALABARZON has the largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 7,619,272 registered voters (14.02 percent of the country’s total) in 2016. CALABARZON’s voter turnout that election year was 5,906,393, or 78 percent of its total registered voters.

As of 2016, 4,048,859 of CALABARZON’s registered voters are female (53.1 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 3,570,413 are male (46.9 percent).

Of the region’s registered voters, 6,319,382 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (82.9 percent of the region’s total), 835,169 are senior citizens above age 60 (11 percent), while 464,721 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (6.1 percent).

Cavite has the largest voting population among the provinces in CALABARZON, at 1,843,163 (24 percent), followed by Laguna at 1,675,366 (22 percent), Batangas at 1,526,195 (20 percent), Rizal at 1,450,458 (15 percent), and Quezon at 1,124,090 (15 percent).

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MIMAROPA

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 1.59 million (No.16)
Voter Turnout (2016): 1.27 million

The proposed Federated Region of MIMAROPA will comprise the current Region IV-B provinces: Occidental Mindoro and Oriental Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, and Palawan.

MIMAROPA has the third smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 1,589,326 registered voters (2.92 percent of the country’s total registered voters) in 2016. MIMAROPA’s voter turnout that election year was 1,273,017, or 80 percent of its total registered voters.

As of 2016, 803,462 of MIMAROPA’s registered voters are female (50.6 percent of the region’s total), while 785,864 are male (49.4 percent).

Of MIMAROPA’s registered voters, 1,326,318 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (83.5 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 199,106 are senior citizens above age 60 (12.5 percent), while 63,902 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (four percent).

Palawan has the largest voting population among the region’s provinces at 583,057 (37 percent of MIMAROPA’s total), followed by Oriental Mindoro at 445,216 (28 percent), Occidental Mindoro at 249,734 (16 percent), Romblon at 175,209 (11 percent), and Marinduque at 136,110 (nine percent).

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BICOL REGION

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 3.12 million (No.5)
Voter Turnout (2016): 2.65 million

The proposed Federated Region of Bicol will comprise the current Region V provinces: Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon.

Among the proposed federated regions, Bicol has the fifth largest voting population, with 3,121,662 registered voters (5.74 percent of the country’s total). Bicol’s voter turnout in 2016 was 2,647,166, or 85 percent of its total registered voters.

As of 2016, 1,606,228 of Bicol’s registered voters are female (51.5 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 1,515,434 are male (48.5 percent).

Of Bicol’s registered voters, 2,549,459 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (81.7 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 426,092 are senior citizens above age 60 (13.6 percent), while 146,111 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (4.7 percent).

Camarines Sur has the largest voting population among the provinces in Bicol, at 1,001,870 (32 percent), followed by Albay at 742,204 (24 percent), Masbate at 477,701 (15 percent), Sorsogon 425,025 (14 percent), Camarines Norte 300,890 (10 percent), and Catanduanes 173,972 (six percent).

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WESTERN VISAYAS

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.58 million (No.9)
Voter Turnout (2016): 2.18 million

The proposed Federated Region of Western Visayas will comprise five of the six provinces in the current Region VI: Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Guimaras, and Iloilo.

Among the proposed federated regions, Western Visayas has the ninth largest voting population, with 2,578,661 registered voters (4.74 percent of the country’s total registered voters). The region’s voter turnout in 2016 was 2,178,753, or 84 percent of its total registered voters.

As of 2016 national and local elections, 1,313,416 of Western Visayas’s registered voters are female (50.9 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 1,265,245 are male (49.1 percent).

Of the total number of registered voters in the region, 1,963,488 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (76.1 percent of the region’s total), 335,832 are senior citizens above age 60 (11 percent), while 279,341 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (10.8 percent). Among the proposed federated regions, Western Visayas has the highest percentage of registered young voters.

Iloilo has the largest voting population among the region’s provinces, at 1,347,514 (52 percent), followed by Capiz at 457,382 (18 percent), Aklan 345,359 (13 percent), Antique 322,861 (13 percent), and Guimaras at 105,545 (four percent).

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CENTRAL VISAYAS

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 3.6 million (No.4)
Voter Turnout (2016): 3.08 million

The proposed Federated Region of Central Visayas will have three of the four provinces in the current Region VII: Bohol, Cebu, and Siquijor.

Central Visayas has the fourth largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 3,59,044 registered voters (6.60 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016. With 3,076,789 voters who actually voted during the 2016 elections (6.99 percent of the national voters’ turnout), Central Visayas had the second highest voters’ turnout among the proposed federated regions, at 86 percent of its total number of registered voters. It tied with Eastern Visayas in the voters’ turnout rankings.

As of 2016, 1,864,797 of Central Visayas’s registered voters are female (51.9 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 1,725,247 are male (48.1 percent).

Of the region’s registered voters, 2,941,449 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (81.9 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 500,028 are senior citizens above age 60 (13.9 percent), while 148,567 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (4.1 percent).

More than three-fourths of Central Visayas’s voting population are registered in Cebu, at 2,722,288 (76 percent). Bohol has a voting population of 798,768 (23 percent), while Siquijor has 68,988 (two percent).

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EASTERN VISAYAS

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.7 million (No.7)
Voter Turnout (2016): 2.31 million

Eastern Visayas will comprise the current Region VIII provinces: Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, Western Samar, Leyte, Southern Leyte, and Biliran.

Among the proposed federated regions, Eastern Visayas has the seventh largest voting population, with 2,698,880 registered voters (4.96 percent of the country’s total). With 2,312,318 voters who actually voted during the 2016 elections (5.25 percent of the national voters’ turnout), Eastern Visayas has the second highest voters’ turnout, at 86 percent of its total number of registered voters.

As of 2016 national and local elections, there are slightly more registered male voters in Eastern Visayas, at 1,360,862 (50.4 percent of the region’s total registered voters), than female registered voters, at 1,338,018 (59.6 percent).

Of the registered voters in the region, 2,153,573 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (79.8 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 397,889 are senior citizens above age 60 (14.7 percent), while 147,418 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (5.5 percent).

Eastern Visayas has the highest percentage of registered senior-citizen voters among the proposed federated regions.

Leyte has the largest voting population among the provinces in Eastern Visayas, at 1,151,497 (43 percent of the region’s registered voters), followed by Western Samar at 490,421 (18 percent), Northern Samar 386,163 (14 percent), Eastern Samar 300,818 (11 percent), Southern Leyte 261,148 (10 percent), and Biliran 108,833 (four percent).

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NEGROS ISLAND REGION

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.45 million (No.11)
Voter Turnout (2016): 1.86 million

The proposed Federated Region of Negros Island (NIR) will comprise the provinces of Negros Occidental (formerly of Region VI) and Negros Oriental (formerly of Region VII).

NIR was established under then President Benigno Aquino III’s Executive Order No.183 in 2015 but this was suspended by President Rodrigo Duterte’s EO No. 83 in 2016.

NIR has the eighth smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 2,449,204 registered voters (4.51 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.

Only 1,856,003 of this number actually took to the polls in 2016, however. NIR ranked No.12 in the voters’ turnout roster, among the proposed federated regions, at just 76 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016 national and local elections, 1,248,590 of NIR’s registered voters are female (51 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 1,200,614 are male (49 percent).

Of NIR’s registered voters, 1,944,119 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (79.4 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 317,969 are senior citizens above age 60 (13 percent), while 187,116 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (7.6 percent).

Between the two provinces, Negros Occidental has the larger voting population, at 1,663,492 (68 percent of NIR’s total registered voters), while Negros Oriental has 785,712 (32 percent).

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ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.0 million (No.13)
Voter Turnout (2016): 1.50 million

The proposed Federated Region of Zamboanga Peninsula will comprise the current Region IX provinces — Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Zamboanga Sibugay — as well as the component city of Isabela in the province of Basilan, which is presently part of ARMM.

Among the proposed federated regions, Zamboanga Peninsula has the sixth smallest voting population, with 2,000,245 registered voters (3.68 percent of the country’s total. Only 1,503,816 of its registered voters (3.41 percent of the national voters’ turnout) actually took part in the 2016 elections, however.

Zamboanga Peninsula has the lowest voters’ turnout among the proposed federated regions, at just 75 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016, 1,003,148 of Zamboanga Peninsula’s registered voters are female (50.2 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 997,097 are male (49.8 percent).

Of Zamboanga Peninsula’s registered voters, 1,662,841 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (83.1 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 247,214 are senior citizens above age 60 (12.4 percent), while 90,190 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (4.5 percent).

Almost half of the region’s total registered voters are in Zamboanga del Sur: 975,950. Next in number is Zamboanga del Norte at 605,146 (30 percent), Zamboanga Sibugay at 350,699 (18 percent), and the city of Isabela at 68,450 (three percent).

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NORTHERN MINDANAO

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.54 million (No.10)
Voter Turnout (2016): 2.11 million

The proposed Federated Region of Northern Mindanao will comprise the current Region X provinces: Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Misamis Oriental.

Northern Mindanao has the ninth smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 2,541,331 registered voters (4.67 percent of the country’s total) in 2016. The region’s voter turnout that election year was 2,112,841, or 83 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016, 1,284,481 of Northern Mindanao’s registered voters are female (50.5 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 1,265,850 are male (49.5 percent).

Of Northern Mindanao’s registered voters, 2,115,044 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (83.2 percent of the region’s total registered voters),327,808 are senior citizens above age 60 (12.9 percent), while 98,479 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (3.9 percent).

Misamis Oriental has the largest voting population among the region’s provinces at 863,160 (34 percent), followed by Bukidnon at 765,898 (30 percent), Lanao del Norte 489,436 (19 percent), Misamis Occidental 365,267 (14 percent), and Camiguin 57,570 (two percent).

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DAVAO REGION

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.66 million (No.8)
Voter Turnout (2016): 2.16 million

The proposed Federated Region of Davao will comprise the current Region XI provinces: Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Davao Occidental.

Among the proposed federated regions, Davao has the eighth largest voting population, with 2,659,704 registered voters (4.89 percent of the country’s total registered voters). Davao’s voter turnout that election year was 2,160,284, or 81 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016 national and local elections, 1,345,001 of Davao’s registered voters are female (50.6 percent of the region’s total registered voters), while 1,314,703 are male (49.4 percent).

Of the region’s registered voters, 2,184,944 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (82.1 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 258,288 are senior citizens above age 60 (9.7 percent), while 216,472 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (8.1 percent).

Nearly half of Davao region’s total registered voters can be found in Davao del Sur, at 1,247,362, followed by Davao del Norte at 525,342 (20 percent), Compostela Valley 408,539 (15 percent), Davao Oriental 319,942 (12 percent), and Davao Occidental 158,519 (six percent).

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SOCCSKSARGEN

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 2.19 million (No.12)
Voter Turnout (2016): 1.74 million

The proposed Federated Region of SOCCSKSARGEN will comprise the current Region X provinces — South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Sarangani – along with the independent component city of Cotabato in the province of Maguindanao (presently part of ARMM).

Among the proposed federated regions, SOCCSKSARGEN has the seventh smallest voting population, with 2,189,642 registered voters (4.03 percent of the country’s total). SOCCSKSARGEN’s voter turnout in 2016 was 1,738,891, or 79 percent of its total registered voters.

As of 2016, there are slightly more registered male voters in SOCCSKSARGEN, at 1,102,724 (50.4 percent of the region’s total registered voters), than female voters, at 1,086,918 (49.6 percent).

Of the region’s registered voters, 1,880,163 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (85.9 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 240,314 are senior citizens above age 60 (11 percent), while 69,165 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (3.2 percent).

SOCCSKSARGEN has the lowest percentage of registered young voters among the proposed federated regions.

South Cotabato has the largest voting population among the SOCCSKSARGEN provinces, at 724,325 (33 percent of the region’s total), followed by North Cotabato at 669,019 (31 percent), Sultan Kudarat at 392,693 (18 percent), Sarangani at 300,075 (14 percent). Cotabato City has a voting population of 103,530 (five percent).

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CARAGA

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 1.55 million (No.17)
Voter Turnout (2016): 1.32 million

The proposed Federated Region of Caraga will comprise the current Region XIII provinces: Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, and the Dinagat Islands.

Among the proposed federated regions, Caraga has the second smallest voting population, with 1,547,093 registered voters (2.85 percent of the country’s total registered voters). Caraga’s voter turnout in 2016r was 1,319,868, or 85 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016, there are slightly more registered male voters in Caraga, at 779,567 (50.4 percent of the region’s total registered voters), than female voters, at 767,526 (49.6 percent).

Of Caraga’s registered voters, 1,269,508 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (82.1 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 204,366 are senior citizens above age 60 (13.2 percent), while 73,219 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (4.7 percent).

Registered voters in mainland Caraga are roughly divided evenly among the provinces: Agusan del Norte has the largest voting population at 411,961 (27 percent of the region’s total registered voters), followed by Agusan del Sur at 373,500 (24 percent), Surigao del Sur at 367,528 (24 percent), and Surigao del Norte at 325,053 (21 percent). Meanwhile, there are 69,051 registered voters in the Dinagat Islands (four percent).

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AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO

FAST FACTS (Rank among 18 regions):
Registered Voters (2016): 1.69 million (No.15)
Voter Turnout (2016): 1.41 million

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will comprise the provinces of Basilan (excluding the city of Isabela), Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao (excluding the Cotabato City), Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

Among the proposed federated regions, ARMM has the fourth smallest voting population, with 1,691,250 registered voters (3.11 percent of the country’s total registered voters). ARMM’s 2016 voter turnout was 1,406,422, or 83 percent of its registered voters.

As of 2016 national and local elections, there are slightly more registered male voters in ARMM, at 847,294 (50.1 percent of ARMM’s total registered voters), than female voters, at 843,956 (49.9 percent). ARMM has the smallest gender difference among the proposed federated regions.

Of ARMM’s registered voters, 1,388,828 are adults between ages 20 and 59 (82.1 percent of the region’s total registered voters), 127,052 are senior citizens above age 60 (7.5 percent), while 175,370 are youths between ages 17 and 19 (10.4 percent). ARMM has the lowest percentage of registered senior citizen voters among the proposed federated regions.

Maguindanao has the largest voting population among the provinces in ARMM, at 530,793 (31 percent of ARMM’s total registered voters), followed by Lanao del Sur at 484,435 (29 percent), Sulu at 324,543 (19 percent), Tawi-Tawi at 183,879 (11 percent), and Basilan 167,600 (10 percent).

The number for Basilan excludes Isabela City while that for Maguindanao excludes Cotabato City. — PCIJ, July 2018
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Stats on the state of the regions: Who will rule? Send in the clans

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A “SELF-EXECUTING” ban on political dynasties is supposedly one of the crown jewels of the draft constitution for the pitch to shift to a federal system of government. It is paired with a proposed ban on turncoatism, or candidates changing political parties between elections or during election campaigns.

These are supposed to limit the opportunities for the powerful few to continue to have considerable clout, as well as to prevent candidates from repeatedly making a mockery of the political-party system.

But there are a few big ifs. Drafted by the 22-member Consultative Committee to Review the 1987 Constitution that President Rodrigo R. Duterte organized via an executive order, the proposed Charter has yet to be reviewed and certainly amended by Congress sitting as a Constituent Assembly (ConAss). Once approved in its possibly mangled glory, the draft will have to secure the vote of the 55-million or so registered Filipino voters.

And if by some miracle the ban on political dynasties passes approval, all that it would prohibit is the succession and simultaneous holding of public office by members of the same family, up to the second degree of affinity or consanguinity (parents, children, siblings).

The catch is that the draft Charter, once approved in a plebiscite targeted for 2019, calls for the conduct of synchronized elections for all regional and federal positions in May 2022 — on a zero-sum game basis.

This means simply that old and new politicians, notably those from the about 200 political clans enduring, emerging, and lording over the nation’s 81 provinces could all run for a four-year term, and even get re-elected for another four.

And because all the same clan members could all run — and win as they most likely would — they could grab 10 more years of uninterrupted reign in their turfs during the 10-year transition period to federalism.

By the data of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in the last five elections from 2004 to 2016, most of the same families have dominated politics in the regions, cities, towns, and barangays, and consequently cornered and controlled vast sums of public funds.

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POWER IS HEIRLOOM?

Politics is family in nearly all the 81 provinces.

The patriarch or matriarch launches a dynasty after getting elected as mayor or governor, and with the spouse running in tandem for vice mayor or vice governor. A son or daughter is fielded to seats in the council or barangay, and over a series of elections groomed to succeed the father or mother. Forced to sit out after three three-year terms or nine years, the parents bequeath their posts to the children, or to siblings or in-laws or surrogates, passing on power to one of their own as if it were the clan’s heirloom.

For many clans, the path to greater power is a lateral stretch. They move to expand their turf on to another town or province, or — in situations where there are more clan members running than there are seats to pick and grab in the clans’ bailiwick — to the House of Representatives or the Senate.

For some others, the path to greater power is a vertical stretch. The patriarch rules for nine years, and while forced to sit out in the bleachers, the wife or son or daughter runs in his stead. After his brief respite from elections, the patriarch runs again, the succession process repeats, and power remains with the clan.

PCIJ had reported that throughout the 24 years of elections in the Philippines’s 20 provinces with the most number of registered voters, family names on the ballots seem to keep repeating themselves, the same ones popping up over and over again.

Based on the list of candidates from the 1992 to 2013 elections from the Commission on Elections (Comelec), about 10,000 persons had repeatedly occupied 17,673 elective posts in six of the nation’s 20 vote-rich provinces. They have held positions of power from the local level to the halls of Congress simply by belonging to political clans that have continued to hold sway over communities large and small across the country for the last quarter of a century.

Various members of these political clans that litter Comelec’s list often take the same positions again and again. Members of a clan are also usually elected all at the same time for different posts. It is also not uncommon to see members of the same family fighting against each other in an electoral race.

A few members of these families have even found their way to a political career through barangay elections, or turned to barangay positions after failed local bids. This has been a common practice, despite barangay officials supposedly being non-partisan in nature. A number of them have also managed to install their members to national positions, including the highest one that enabled their family to wield power from within the Palace along the Pasig River.

101 NAMES DOMINATE

PCIJ analyzed Comelec’s data on the list of candidates in six of the 20 vote-rich provinces from the 1992 elections. These six have a combined voters’ strength of 10.86 million or 20 percent of the latest count of total registered voters of 55.5 million.

The Comelec data showed at least 101 different family names that are each tied to at least eight electoral successes in the last eight elections, excluding the town-council seats. These family names are shared and carried by as many as 1,159 elected officials.

The top 10 most recurring family names in the Comelec’s list of candidates, or those that have more than four members who won their electoral contests and have at least 17 electoral victories over the last eight elections, include:

• Durano, Garcia, Martinez, and Yapha in Cebu in Central Visayas, which is home to five percent of the country’s voting population and has an economy trailing that of Metro Manila;


• Celeste, Espino, and Perez in Pangasinan in northern Luzon, which is the richest province in Ilocos Region;

• Alvarez, Lacson, and Maranon in Negros Occidental in the newly created Negros Island Region with the highly urbanized city of Bacolod as the center; and

• Bautista in Davao del Sur in the southeastern part of Mindanao.

THE CLANS OF THE REGIONS

In truth, what has been touted to be a redistribution strategy or a mechanism for sharing public funds and resources among the revenue-rich and revenue-poor regions of the country, the pitch to shift to federalism could, says De La Salle University political science professor Dr. Julio Teehankee, who is also a ConCom member, well have as “unintended consequences” escalated political rivalry and electoral violence among political clans.

Fellow De La Salle professor Ronald Holmes, who is also head of the pollster PulseAsia Research Inc., also worries that federalism could just “create new patrons” and even “semipatrons at the subnational level” as the clans battle it out over not just the presidency, but also the federal states’ premier posts.

Indeed, which clans with the longest and strongest hold on power in the regions would likely compete for the regional pot? For this report, PCIJ curated and analyzed Comelec reports on the candidates who won in the last five elections that were held in 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016.

The weight of clan clout in the region was pegged on the number of candidates with the same surnames who ran for the position of councilor, vice mayor, mayor, vice governor, and member of the House of Representatives in the five election years covered.

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NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

The National Capital Region will be assigned as the federal capital of the Philippines.

For statistical purposes, the Philippine Statistics Authority grouped the 17 cities and municipality of NCR into four districts: 1st District: City of Manila; 2nd District: Mandaluyong City, Marikina City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and San Juan City; 3rd District: Caloocan City, Malabon City, Navotas City, and Valenzuela City; and 4th District: Las Pinas City, Makati City, Muntinlupa City, Paranaque City, Pasay City, Pateros, and Taguig City.

NCR has the second largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 6.25 million registered voters (11.5 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.

The Belmontes of Quezon City make up currently the largest political family in NCR, with five members who had ran and won political office.

Long-time city mayor Feliciano ‘Sonny’ Belmonte Jr. is currently serving his second term as House member for Quezon City’s fourth district, along with his nephew Jose Christopher Belmonte who is also serving his second term as House member for the city’s sixth district. Feliciano’s son, Ma. Josefa, is now on her third term as vice-mayor. Two other kin, Irene and Oliviere Belmonte, serve as members of the city’s Sanggunian.

In the other cities of NCR, however, the same political families have held sway over the last 15 years with apparent lock and key over the top positions, in a vertical line of succession for family members. They include the Binays of Makati; the Zamoras and Estrada-Ejercitos of San Juan and Manila; the Cayetanos of Taguig; the Aguilar-Villar clans of Las Pinas; the Eusebios of Pasig; the Gatchalians of Valenzuela; the Abaloses of Mandaluyong; the Echiverris of Caloocan; and the Oretas of Malabon, among others.

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CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

The Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) will comprise the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, Apayao, and Mountain Province.

CAR has the smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 906,162 registered voters (1.67 percent of the country’s registered voters) for 2016 NLE.

Out of CAR’s 906,162 registered voters, 81 percent or 757,748 voters actually voted (1.72 percent of the country’s voters who actually voted) for the 2016 National and Local Elections.

Benguet has the highest voting population among the provinces in CAR, at 352,291 (39 percent of CAR’s voting population), followed by Abra at 156,968 (17 percent), Kalinga at 121,375 (13 percent), Ifugao at 112,328 (12 percent), Mountain Province at 98,333 (11 percent), and Apayao at 64,867 (7 percent).

The gubernatorial seat in Benguet, the most populous province in the Cordilleras, had been held by former La Trinidad mayor Nestor Fongwan for three terms until 2016, when he stepped down and ran as Sangguniang Panlalawigan member. Former vice governor Cresencio Pecalso won as governor that year.

Former House member Maria Jocelyn Valera-Bernos is the current governor of Abra, the second most populous province in the Cordilleras. Her father, Dominic Valera, has been elected for a second term as mayor of capital town of Bangued, while her brother-in-law, Joseph Bernos, succeeded her as House of Representatives member.

Meanwhile, the gubernatorial seat in the lesser populated province of Apayao remains under the Bulut family. Former House of Representatives member Elias Bulut Jr. succeeded his father, Elias Sr. as governor in 2010. Elias Jr.’s sister, Eleanor Bulut-Begtang, served as Apayao’s House representative in his stead while their father was mayor of Calanasan until his death in 2015.

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ILOCOS REGION

The proposed Federated Region of Ilocos will comprise the current provinces of Region I: Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan.

Among the proposed federated regions, Ilocos has the sixth largest voting population, with 2,950,775 registered voters (5.43 percent of the country’s voting population). With 2,526,422 voters who actually voted during the 2016 elections (5.74 percent of the national voters’ turnout), Ilocos has the third highest voters’ turnout, at 86 percent.

Pangasinan has the largest voting population among the provinces in Ilocos, at 1,705,260 (58 percent of Ilocos’ voting population), followed by La Union at 454,778 (15 percent), Ilocos Sur at 411,951 (14 percent), and Ilocos Norte at 378,786 (13 percent).

The current political families of Ilocos include the Singsons of Ilocos Sur, the Ortegas of La Union, and the Espinos of Pangasinan.

The Singson family of Ilocos Sur is currently the largest political clan in the region with 10 members elected in 2016. Its patriarch Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson has been a long-time governor of the province until 2013, when he was succeeded by his son, then House member Ryan Luis. Chavit’s other son, Jeremias, serves as his brother’s vice-governor. Chavit’s cousin, Eric, is also House member, while his nephew, Ericson, is the current mayor of Candon.

In La Union, six members of the Ortega family were elected in 2016. Francisco Emmanuel Ortega succeeded his father, three-term governor Manuel Ortega, as governor of La Union in 2016. A brother of Manuel, three-term San Fernando city mayor Pablo Ortega, replaced another brother, three-term House member Victor Francisco. One of Francisco Emmanuel’s brothers, Alfredo Pablo, was elected as city vice-mayor of San Fernando. Three other kin were elected as members of local Sanggunians in 2016.

From 1992 to 2013, 14 prominent families have dominated politics in Pangasinan. During the period, they included the Perezes with 22 electoral victories, the Celestes with 19, the Espinos and Reyeses with 17 each, the Sorianos with 15, the Villars with 14, the Resuellos and de Veras with 12 each, the Calimlims, Rosetes, and de Guzmans with 11 each, and the Agbayanis and Peraltas with 10 each.

The Espino family of Pangasinan, meanwhile, has the advantage of having a firm grip on more than half of the region’s constituents. Its current patriarch, Amado Espino Jr., has been the governor of Pangasinan from 2007 until 2016, when he was succeeded by his son, former Bautista town mayor Amado III. Amado Jr. is now a House member for the fifth district of Pangasinan. Amado Jr.’s other sons are also in the local government: Amadeo succeeded his brother as mayor of Bautista, while Jumel Anthony serves as mayor of municipality of Bugallon. Amadeo’s son, Joseph, is also elected in 2016 as his father’s vice mayor.

The Espino name comes up frequently in the politics of the province’s second district and the poor town of Bautista. From 1992 to 2013, the political Espinos included siblings Amado Jr., Amadeo, and Jose. Amado Jr.’s sons, Amado III and Jumel Anthony, and Jose’s son Joseph. Nephews Armando and Joshua and niece Nerissa are also politicians. The family has remained firmly on the mayoral seat of Bautista town since 1995, the post occupied first by Jose and then Amado III. Amadeo took over the position later.

The Marcos family, popularly known for their deceased patriarch Ferdinand Marcos, maintains a firm grasp on the gubernatorial seat and House representation for the province of Ilocos Norte.

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CAGAYAN VALLEY

The proposed Federated Region of Cagayan Valley will comprise the current provinces of Region II: Batanes, Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

Cagayan Valley has the fifth smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 1,920,952 registered voters (3.53 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.

Isabela has the largest voting population among the provinces in Cagayan Valley, at 911,910 (47 percent of the region’s total registered voters), followed by Cagayan at 647,035 (34 percent), Nueva Vizcaya at 246,540 (13 percent), Quirino at 104,461 (5 percent), and Batanes at 11,006 (1 percent).

The current political families of Cagayan Valley include the Dys of Isabela, and the Vargas and Mamba families of Cagayan.

With seven members elected in 2016, the Dy family is currently the largest political clan in Isabela, the province with the largest constituency in Cagayan Valley. Faustino Dy III, currently serving his third term as governor, was a former House member. Two of his brothers, Caesar and Benjamin, have served as mayor of the city of Cauayan, while another brother, Napoleon, served as mayor of the municipality of Alicia. For the 2013 and 2016 local elections, Benjamin is succeeded by his son, Bernard Faustino, while Napoleon is succeeded by his son, Ian Paul. Faustino III’s own son, Francis Faustino, is the current mayor of the municipality of Echague. Another member of the Dy clan, Faustino Michael Carlos, is currently the mayor of the municipality of San Manuel.

In Cagayan, the Vargases hold sway, with five members in government in 2016. Its patriarch, long-time governor and House member Florencio Vargas, died in 2010. His daughter, then Abulug vice mayor Baby Aline Vargas-Alfonso, succeeded him as House member. Baby Aline is currently serving her third term as House member. Her brother Jesus Emmanuel is on his third term as mayor of the municipality of Abulug, while their sister Precy is serving what is also her third term as vice mayor of the same town. Another Vargas brother, Melvin, is as vice governor of Cagayan.

The gubernatorial seat of Cagayan, however, is currently held by former House member Manuel Mamba. His brother, Francisco Mamba Jr., is currently serving his second term as mayor of the municipality of Tuao, while another brother, three-term Tuao mayor William Mamba, serves as their brother’s vice mayor.

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CENTRAL LUZON

The proposed Federated Region of Central Luzon will comprise the provinces in the current Region III: Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales.

Central Luzon has the third largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 6,056,392 registered voters (11.14 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.
The current political families of Central Luzon include Sy-Alvarado of Bulacan, Umali of Nueva Ecija, and Yap of Tarlac.

Bulacan has the largest voting population among the provinces in Central Luzon, at 1,640,615 (27 percent of the region’s total registered voters), followed by Nueva Ecija at 1,314,658 (22 percent), Pampanga at 1,278,260 (21 percent), Tarlac at 739,526 (12 percent), Bataan at 494,076 (8 percent), Zambales at 462,732 (8 percent), and Aurora at 126,525 (2 percent).

The gubernatorial seat of Bulacan, the province with the largest constituency in Central Luzon, is currently held by Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado who is serving his third term. His wife Ma. Victoria was a former mayor of Hagonoy and a three-term member of the House of Representatives. She was succeeded by son Jose Antonio as House member.

Nueva Ecija, the province with the second largest constituency, is currently governed by Czarina Umali, who succeeded her husband, three-term governor Aurelio Umali, in 2016. Czarina Umali was also a three-term member of the House of Representatives before she replaced her husband. Aurelio’s brother, Anthony, was elected as vice-mayor of Cabanatuan City.

In the province of Tarlac, the Yap family has maintained its hold on gubernatorial, mayoral, and House seats for more than a decade now. Its now-deceased patriarch, Jose Yap, was succeeded by his son, Victor, in 2007. Jose’s daughter, Susan Yap, succeeded her brother as governor in 2016, while Victor was elected as House member. Another brother, Jose Yap Jr., is currently serving his third term as mayor of the municipality of San Jose.

Carlos Cojuangco, nephew of former president Corazon Aquino and distant cousin to Benigno Aquino III, is currently a House member for Tarlac.

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CALABARZON

The proposed Federated Region of CALABARZON will comprise the current provinces in the current Region IV-A: Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.

CALABARZON has the largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 7,619,272 registered voters (14.02 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.

Among the provinces, Cavite has the largest voting population in CALABARZON, at 1,843,163 (24 percent), followed by Laguna at 1,675,366 (22 percent), Batangas at 1,526,195 (20 percent), Rizal at 1,450,458 (15 percent), and Quezon at 1,124,090 (15 percent).

The Ynares family of Rizal is one of the longest-reigning and largest political clans in CALBARZON. Then Rizal Governor Casimiro Jr. was succeeded by his son, Casimiro III, in 2007, who in turn was succeeded by his mother, Rebecca, in 2013. Casimiro III ran and won as mayor of the city of Antipolo that year.

Meanwhile, Casimiro Jr.’s brothers, Cesar and Cecilio, serve as mayor and vice mayor of the town of Binangonan, respectively.

Cavite, the most populous province in CALABARZON, is currently governed by Jesus Crispin Remulla, a three-term House member who succeeded his brother, Juanito Victor or Jonvic, in 2016. At present, though, only Jesus Crispin is in public service. The office of the vice-governor, meanwhile, is currently held by Ramon ‘Jolo’ Revilla III, son of Bacoor City mayor Lani Mercado-Revilla and former senator Ramon Revilla Jr., and nephew to House member Edwin Revilla. A family of movie and television actors, the Revillas – actually a screen name, the clan’s real name being Bautista — currently stand as among the more popular political clans in Cavite.

Long-time House member and patriarch Danilo Suarez returns as representative for Quezon’s third district in 2016, succeeding his wife, Aleta, who had served in his stead for one term in 2013. One of their sons, David, is currently serving his third term as governor of Quezon. Another son, Danilo Jr., was elected for the first time as vice mayor of their hometown, Unisan, in 2016, while a third son, Donaldo, is currently a member of the provincial Sanggunian.

From 1992 to 2013, Laguna’s 608 elected officials were a mix of several family names affiliated with national political parties.

During the period, only six clans had at least eight electoral victories each in Laguna: The Chipecos won 11 times in total in the second congressional district and Calamba City’s mayoral seats. The Perezes were elected eight times as mayor of the cities of Los Banos and Binan.

Eight electoral victories were also enjoyed by the San Luises in the fourth congressional district, provincial seats, and the town of Santa Cruz; the Buesers in the third district and the city of San Pablo and town of Alaminos; the Ramoses in the town of Bay; and the Sanchezes in Calauan City and town of Pakil.

The Ejercito clan, which traces its roots in Laguna, had a total of seven electoral victories in the town of Pagsanjan and gubernatorial positions. Other members of the clan dominate the politics of San Juan City in Metro Manila, where former ousted President and now Manila Mayor Joseph Ejercito Estrada began his political career.

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MIMAROPA

The proposed Federated Region of MIMAROPA will comprise the provinces in the current Region IV-B: Occidental Mindoro and Oriental Mindoro, Marinduque, Romblon, and Palawan.

MIMAROPA has the third smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 1,589,326 registered voters (2.92 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.

Palawan has the largest voting population among the provinces in MIMAROPA, at 583,057 (37 percent), followed by Oriental Mindoro at 445,216 (28 percent), Occidental Mindoro at 249,734 (16 percent), Romblon at 175,209 (11 percent), and Marinduque at 136,110 (9 percent).

Jose Chaves Alvarez is currently serving his second term as governor of Palawan, the largest province in MIMAROPA. His daughter Ma. Carmela has been the mayor of the municipality of San Vicente since 2010 to present, while his nephew, former House member Franz Joseph, lost in the 2016 polls.

The Umali family of Oriental Mindoro, the second largest province in the region, is larger and more stable than Palawan’s father-daughter political tandem. Alfonso Umali Jr. is currently serving his third term as governor, while his brother, Reynaldo, is also serving his third term as House member. Reynaldo’s son Paulo was elected for the first time as member of the provincial Sanggunian.

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BICOL REGION

The proposed Federated Region of Bicol will comprise the current Region V provinces: Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon.

Among the proposed federated regions, Bicol has the fifth largest voting population, with 3,121,662 registered voters (5.74 percent of the country’s voting population).

Camarines Sur has the largest voting population among the provinces in Bicol, at 1,001,870 (32 percent), followed by Albay at 742,204 (24 percent), Masbate at 477,701 (15 percent), Sorsogon at 425,025 (14 percent), Camarines Norte at 300,890 (10 percent), and Catanduanes at 173,972 (6 percent).

Two of Bicol’s political clans are the Villafuertes of Camarines Sur and the Salcedas of Albay. Miguel Villafuerte is currently serving his second term as governor of Camarines Sur, after he succeeded his father, long-time governor Luis Raymund ‘LRay’ Villafuerte Jr., in 2013. Luis Raymund is now serving his first term as House member.

In Albay, Bicol’s second most populous province, three-term governor Jose Ma. Clemente Salceda ran for and was elected as a House member in 2016. Jose Ma. Clemente’s brother, Jesus Jr., was elected as vice mayor of the municipality of Polangui in 2010, when their father, Jesus Sr. finished his third term as mayor. Jose Ma. Clemente’s nephew, Jesus, is currently serving as member of the provincial Sanggunian.

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WESTERN VISAYAS

The proposed Federated Region of Western Visayas will comprise five of the six provinces in the current Region VI: Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Guimaras, and Iloilo.

Among the proposed federated regions, Western Visayas has the ninth largest voting population, with 2,578,661 registered voters (4.74 percent of the country’s voting population).

Iloilo has the largest voting population among the provinces in Western Visayas, at 1,347,514 (52 percent), followed by Capiz at 457,382 (18 percent), Aklan at 345,359 (13 percent), Antique at 322,861 (13 percent), and Guimaras at 105,545 (4 percent).

With six members elected in public office as of 2016 polls, the Tupas clan is currently the largest political clan in Iloilo. Raul Tupas is currently serving his first term as House member after he replaced his brother, two-term House member Niel Tupas Jr. Another brother, Niel III, is currently serving his second term as mayor of Barotac Viejo. Their father, Niel Tupas Sr., was a long-time governor of Iloilo until 2010, when Arthur Defensor Sr. was first elected.

Former House member Arthur Defensor Sr. is currently serving his third term as governor of Iloilo. One of his sons, Arthur Jr., is currently serving his second term as House member, while another, Lorenz, is a first-time member of the provincial Sanggunian.

Federalism_Pol-Clans_Central-Visayas_PCIJ

CENTRAL VISAYAS

The proposed Federated Region of Central Visayas will have three of the four provinces in the current Region VII: Bohol, Cebu, and Siquijor.

Central Visayas has the fourth largest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 3,590,044 registered voters (6.60 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.

More than three-quarters of Central Visayas’s voting population is registered in Cebu, at 2,722,288 (76 percent). Bohol has a voting population of 798,768 (23 percent), while Siquijor has 68,988 (two percent).

Two of the top political clans in Central Visayas are the Durano and the Garcia families of Cebu.

The Durano clan maintains a seat in the House of Representative as well as top local positions in Danao City and the municipality of Sogod. Three-term House member Ramon Durano VI returned to Congress after being briefly relieved by his brother, Joseph Felix Mari, in 2013. Their father, Ramon III, is currently serving as mayor of Danao City, while their cousin, Lissa Marie Durano-Streegan succeeded her father, Thaddeus Durano, as mayor of Sogod.

In the region’s record of elections from 1992, the Duranos have shown greatest resiliency in power among the clans of Central Visayas.

Compared with election data from all the nation’s 81 provinces, the Duranos emerged as having the most electoral wins: 57 from the 1992 to 2013 elections. An average of seven Durano members has simultaneously won at the congressional and provincial elections as well as in Danao City and the towns of Samboan and Sogod.

In the 2013 elections, 10 Duranos won their respective electoral contests. Thus far, this is the highest number a political clan in Cebu has achieved in a single poll in the last two decades. Such number could be next to the record set by the Ampatuans of Mindanao who enjoyed at least 15 electoral victories in 2013 despite being implicated in the country’s worst electoral violence yet in 2009.

Then there are the Garcias of Cebu, with 18 electoral victories from 1992 to 2013. Leading the Garcia clan is patriarch Pablo Sr., who served as Cebu’s three-term governor from 1995 to 2004. He was also congressman in the province’s third district from 1987 to 1995 and in the second district from 2007 to 2013. His daughter Gwendolyn or Gwen succeeded him in the provincial capitol and completed her third consecutive three-year term in 2013.

Gwendolyn then assumed the congressional seat her brother, Pablo John, held from 2007 to 2013 in the third district. She now serves as deputy speaker of the House of Representatives. Pablo Sr.’s other sons, Marlon and Nelson Gamaliel, took local posts in the towns of Barili and Dumanjug, where they served, respectively, as vice mayor and mayor. Winston, another of Pablo’s sons, was Cebu provincial board member from 1992 to 1995.

Apart from Gwendolyn, the Garcia clan also maintains local seats in the municipalities of Dumanjug and Barili. One of Gwendolyn’s brother, Marlon, is currently serving his first term as mayor of the municipality of Barili, while another brother, Nelson, had served as mayor of Dumanjug from 2010 to 2016.

The Martinezes of Cebu, meanwhile, have had 20 electoral victories from 1992 to 2013. At least six Martinezes have been elected into office, representing Cebu’s 4th District from 1992 to 2007 and occupying the mayoral offices of Bogo City and the town of San Remigio from 2001 to present. Bogo city is a sixth-class city, whereas San Remigio is a third-class town.

Among the Martinezes is Celestino Jr. who served in Congress from 1992 to 1998 and as Bogo City mayor from 2007 to present. His wife Clavel took over his seat in Congress from 1998 to 2007, and their son Celestino III served as mayor of Bogo City from 2001 to 2007.

Next with 19 electoral victories each are the Celestes of Pangasinan and Maranons of Negros Occidental.

Eight members of the Celeste family have served in Congress and in the local offices of fourth-class city of Alaminos and first-class municipality of Bolinao. Bolinao’s mayoral seat has been held consecutively by siblings Jesus, Alfonso, and Arnold since 1995. Jesus served from 1995 to 2001; Alfonso, from 2001 to 2010; and Arnold, from 2013 to 2016.

Jesus was elected in 2010 and 2013 as congressman in Pangasinan’s first district, replacing his brother Arthur, who held the same position from 2001 to 2010. In 2013, Arthur was elected mayor of Alaminos City. Another sibling, George, served as Bolinao councilor from 1998 to 2007 and 2010 to present. A cousin, also named George, is currently in his last term as councilor.

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EASTERN VISAYAS

Eastern Visayas will comprise the provinces in the current Region VIII; namely, Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, Western Samar, Leyte, Southern Leyte, and Biliran.

Among the proposed federated regions, Eastern Visayas has the seventh largest voting population, with 2,698,880 registered voters (4.96 percent of the country’s voting population).

Leyte has the largest voting population among the provinces in Eastern Visayas, at 1,151,497 (43 percent of the region’s registered voters), followed by Western Samar at 490,421 (18 percent), Northern Samar at 386,163 (14 percent), Eastern Samar at 300,818 (11 percent), Southern Leyte at 261,148 (10 percent), and Biliran at 108,833 (4 percent).

The Petilla family of Leyte, while not the largest family in terms of members in office, still maintains the gubernatorial seat in the province with the largest constituency. Leopoldo Petilla is currently serving his second term as governor of Leyte, after succeeding his brother, three-term governor Jericho Petilla. Their mother, Remedios, is currently serving her third term as mayor of Palo.

The other similarly large political families in Leyte include the Romualdezes of Tacloban City, the Codillas of Ormoc City, and the Caris of Baybay City.

Biliran, the smallest province in Eastern Visayas, is still dominated by the Espinas. Former Naval mayor Gerardo Espina Jr. is currently serving his third term as governor of Biliran. He succeeded his brother, Rogelio, in 2010. Rogelio now is also serving his third term as House member representing the province. Their other brother, Rodolfo, is currently serving his second term as mayor of the municipality of Kawayan.

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NEGROS ISLAND REGION

The proposed Federated Region of Negros Island (NIR) will comprise the provinces of Negros Occidental (formerly of Region VI) and Negros Oriental (formerly of Region VII).

NIR was established under then President Benigno Aquino III’s Executive Order No. 183 in 2015, but this was suspended by President Duterte’s EO No. 83 in 2016.

NIR has the eighth smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 2,449,204 registered voters (4.51 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016. Negros Occidental has the larger voting population, at 1,663,492 (68 percent of NIR’s voting population), while Negros Oriental has 785,712 (32 percent).

The Marañons have dominated the politics of Negros Occidental’s second district and the third- class city of Sagay. Members of the clan were also elected four times as governor of the province.

In 1992, Joseph Marañon was elected mayor of Sagay City. He was re-elected in 1995 and 1998 before he secured the gubernatorial seat in 2001; he held to the provincial post for three terms. His brother Alfredo was congressman from 1995 to 2004, Sagay City mayor from 2007 to 2010, and governor from 2010 to 2013.

Alfredo III replaced his father Alfredo in Congress and served from 2004 to 2010. He also assumed the mayoral seat in 2010; he was elected for a second term in 2013. A nephew, Leo Rafael Cueva, took over as Negros Occidental 2nd District Representative in 2013.

The Marañon clan is currently the top political family in Negros. Former Sagay city mayor Alfredo Marañon, Jr. is serving his third term as governor of Negros Occidental, after succeeding his brother, Joseph, in 2010. Alfredo Jr.’s son, Alfredo III, was a three-term House member before replacing his father as mayor of Sagay.

In Negros Occidental, from 1992 to 2013, there were five elected Alvarezes, including Genaro Jr., his wife Mercedes, sons Genaro Rafael III and John Paul, and daughter-in-law Joyce.

The family has simultaneously held electoral posts in the province’s sixth congressional district and the second-class town of Ilog. Genaro Jr. was provincial board member from 1992 to 1995. He served in Congress from 1995 to 2004 and 2007 to 2010. He then won the vice gubernatorial race in the 2010 elections. He was succeeded by his son Genaro Rafael III in Congress from 2004 to 2007, and by his wife from 2010 to present. Another son, John Paul, was Ilog’s mayor from 1998 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2013. John Paul’s wife Joyce took over the mayoral seat from 2007 to 2013.

Meantime, from 1992 to 2013, the Lacsons of Negros Occidental managed to bag 25 electoral wins, placing second to the Duranos in the highest number of electoral victories across a 24-year period nationwide.

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ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA

The proposed Federated Region of Zamboanga Peninsula will comprise the provinces in the current Region IX: Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Zamboanga Sibugay, as well as the component city of Isabela in the province of Basilan (currently part of ARMM).

Among the proposed federated regions, Zamboanga Peninsula has the sixth smallest voting population, with 2,000,245 registered voters (3.68 percent of the country’s voting population).

Almost half of the region’s voting population is registered in Zamboanga del Sur, at 975,950, followed by Zamboanga del Norte at 605,146 (30 percent), Zamboanga Sibugay at 350,699 (18 percent), and the city of Isabela at 68,450 (3 percent).

The Cerilles family currently holds Zamboanga del Sur, the province with the largest constituency in the region. Antonio Cerilles, who had served as Environment and Natural Resources secretary under the Estrada administration, has been the governor of the province since 2010, while his wife Aurora has been a House member since 2013. The couple’s son, Ace Cerilles, has been a three-term mayor for the municipality of Dumalinao before being elected as vice governor. Ace’s wife, Sweet, is the current mayor of Dumalinao.

Federalism_Pol-Clans_Northern-Mindanao_PCIJ

NORTHERN MINDANAO

The proposed Federated Region of Northern Mindanao will comprise the provinces in the current Region X: Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Misamis Oriental.

Northern Mindanao has the ninth smallest voting population among the proposed federated regions, with 2,541,331 registered voters (4.67 percent of the country’s voting population) in 2016.

Misamis Oriental has the largest voting population among the provinces in Northern Mindanao, at 863,160 (34 percent), followed by Bukidnon at 765,898 (30 percent), Lanao del Norte at 489,436 (19 percent), Misamis Occidental at 365,267 (14 percent), and Camiguin at 57,570 (2 percent).

Three of the top political families of Northern Mindanao are the Zubiris of Bukidnon, the Romualdos of Camiguin, and the Dimaporos of Lanao del Norte.

Long-time governor Jose Maria Zubiri Jr. was elected yet again in 2016. The gubernatorial seat was held for one term by Alex Calingasan in 2010. One of Jose Maria’s sons, Jose Maria III, had been a three-term House member from 2007 to 2016, while another son, Manuel, succeeded in his brother’s stead in 2016. The most well-known of Jose Maria’s sons, Juan Miguel or Migz, is a sitting senator, while a nephew, Ignacio Zubiri, is currently mayor of Malaybalay.

Meanwhile, in Lanao del Norte, former House member Imelda Dimaporo succeeded her son, three-term governor Mohamad Dimaporo, in 2016. She was succeeded by her other son, Khalid, as first district of Lanao del Norte’s House representative. Imelda’s husband, Abudallah, is a long-time House member for the province’s second legislative district.

The Dimaporos currently hold two seats in the House of Representatives, the governorship of Lanao del Norte, and the mayoral and vice-mayoral position of the municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo, named after a prominent member of the family in the past.

Former Mambajao mayor Maria Luisa Romualdo succeeded her husband, three-term governor Jurdin Jesus, as governor of Camiguin in 2016. Jurdin Jesus himself replaced his wife as mayor Mambajao that same year. The couple’s son, Xavier Jesus, succeeded his grandfather, long-time governor Pedro Romualdo, as Camiguin’s House member.

Federalism_Pol-Clans_Davao_PCIJ

DAVAO REGION

The proposed Federated Region of Davao will comprise the provinces of current Region XI: Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, and Davao Occidental.

Among the proposed federated regions, Davao has the eighth largest voting population, with 2,659,704 registered voters (4.89 percent of the country’s voting population).

Nearly half of Davao region’s voting population is in Davao del Sur, at 1,247,362, followed by Davao del Norte at 525,342 (20 percent), Compostela Valley at 408,539 (15 percent), Davao Oriental at 319,942 (12 percent), and Davao Occidental at 158,519 (6 percent).

The region boasts today of having the greatest sway on national politics with the election as president in 2016 of Rodrigo R. Duterte, Davao City mayor for 23 years, and the designation of Rep. Pantaleon ‘Bebot’ Diaz Alvarez of the first district of Davao del Norte as speaker of the House of Representatives. Alvarez had served as Transportation and Communication secretary under the Arroyo administration.

The Bautista family dominated the then-newly created province of Davao Occidental on its first election in 2016. Claude Bautista, Davao del Sur’s elected governor in 2013, ran and won as Davao Occidental’s first governor in 2016.

The Bautistas of Davao del Sur, like Perezes of Pangasinan, had won 22 electoral victories each from 1992 to 2013.

Five Bautistas had occupied various posts in the second district of Davao del Sur, as well as the mayoral seat of Malita town. Malita, a first-class municipality, is now the capital of newly created province of Davao Occidental. The Bautistas were also present at the provincial level with two members of the clan both once elected as governor. One of the two was also elected as vice governor, the other as member of the provincial council.

The late Benjamin Bautista Sr. was the clan patriarch. He was Malita mayor in the 1960s and served as Davao del Sur 2nd District representative from 1987 to 1998. His son Franklin took over his seat in Congress, occupying it from 1998 to 2001 and then from 2007 to 2013. Franklin also replaced Benjamin as Malita mayor from 1992 to 1998 and 2001 to 2007. Another of Benjamin’s sons, Claude, entered politics in 1995 and was elected as member of the provincial council. Claude replaced his brother as Malita mayor in 1998 and as congressman in 2001 and 2004. Claude became the second Bautista to be elected governor in 2013.

Long-time Davao del Sur governor Douglas Cagas returned to office in 2016, a term after losing the post to Claude Bautista. Douglas’s wife Mercedes is also currently serving her second term as House member, succeeding her son, Marc Douglas IV.

The Duterte family maintains their stronghold in Davao City, with the President’s daughter Sara and eldest son Paolo or Pulong elected mayor and vice mayor, respectively, in 2016. Pulong resigned in 2017 amid reports of his alleged links to a drug-smuggling case that was investigated at the Senate.

Federalism_Pol-Clans_SOCCSKSARGEN_PCIJ

SOCCSKSARGEN

The proposed Federated Region of SOCCSKSARGEN will comprise the current provinces in Region XII: South Cotabato, North Cotabato. Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, and the independent component city of Cotabato in the province of Maguindanao (part of ARMM).

Among the proposed federated regions, SOCCSKSARGEN has the seventh smallest voting population, with 2,189,642 registered voters (4.03 percent of the country’s voting population).

South Cotabato has the largest voting population among the SOCCSKSARGEN provinces, at 724,325 (33 percent), followed by North Cotabato at 669,019 (31 percent), Sultan Kudarat at 392,693 (18 percent), Sarangani at 300,075 (14 percent). Cotabato City has a voting population of 103,530 (5 percent).

The Mangudadatus of Sultan Kudarat make up the largest political family in SOCCSKSARGEN. Datu Suharto Mangudadatu succeeded his father, Datu Pax, as governor of Sultan Kudarat in 2007. After three terms, Datu Suharto ran as House member while his father returned as governor. Datu Pax’s niece, Azel Mangudadatu, is currently serving her second term as mayor of the municipality President Quirino.

Federalism_Pol-Clans_CARAGA_PCIJ

CARAGA

The proposed Federated Region of Caraga will comprise the current provinces in Region XIII: Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, and the Dinagat Islands.

Among the proposed federated regions, Caraga has the second smallest voting population, with 1,547,093 registered voters (2.85 percent of the country’s voting population).

Registered voters in mainland Caraga are roughly divided among the provinces: Agusan del Norte has the largest voting population at 411,961 (27 percent), followed by Agusan del Sur at 373,500 (24 percent), Surigao del Sur at 367,528 (24 percent), and Surigao del Norte at 325,053 (21 percent). Dinagat Islands has 69,051 registered voters (four percent).

The current political families of Caraga include the Amantes of Agusan del Norte, the Plazas of Agusan del Sur, the Matugas of Surigao del Norte, and the Ecleos of Dinagat Islands.

The Amante family is the top political clan in Agusan del Norte. Their patriarch, Edelmiro Amante, was a long-time House member until his death in 2013. He was then succeeded by his son, three-term governor Erlpe John Amante, who himself was later replaced by his sister, Ma. Angelica Matba, as governor.

Meanwhile, the siblings’ cousin, Ferdinand Amante, was the city mayor of Butuan, but failed to be re-elected in 2016.

Adolph Edward Plaza is presently on his third term as governor of Agusan del Sur. His sister Maria Valentina is also serving her third term as House member. Three other relatives were elected to municipal positions in 2016.

Sol Matugas is on her third term as governor of Surigao del Norte. Her husband Francisco was a three-term House member before being succeeded by their son Francisco Jose. Francisco’s brother Ernesto was a mayor of Surigao city but failed to be re-elected in 2016.

Dinagat Islands’ first governor, Geraldine Villaroman, was succeeded by her mother, Glenda Ecleo in 2010.With 10 members serving in three municipalities as well as the top provincial seats, the Ecleo family is currently the largest political clan in Caraga, although limited in power within the islands of Dinagat.

Federalism_Pol-Clans_ARMM_PCIJ

AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) will comprise the provinces of Basilan (excluding the city of Isabela), Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao (excluding the Cotabato City), Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.

Among the proposed federated regions, ARMM has the fourth smallest voting population, with 1,691,250 registered voters (3.11 percent of the country’s voting population).

Maguindanao has the largest voting population among the provinces in ARMM, at 530,793 (31 percent of ARMM’s total registered voters), followed by Lanao del Sur at 484,435 (29 percent), Sulu at 324,543 (19 percent), Tawi-Tawi at 183,879 (11 percent), and Basilan at 167,600 (10 percent).

ARMM is home to some of the largest political families in the country, including the Adiongs of Lanao del Sur, the Tans of Sulu, and the Sinsuats, Ampatuans, and Mangudadatus of Maguindanao.

Bai Soraya Adiong succeeded her son, three-term governor Mamintal Jr., for the gubernatorial seat of Lanao del Sur in 2016. Mamintal Jr. himself was the successor of his father, Mamintal Sr. in 2007.
Mamintal Jr. now serves as his mother’s vice governor.

Meanwhile, in Sulu, Abdulsakur Tan II is currently serving his second term as governor, after succeeding his father, Abdulsakur, as governor in 2013.

Maguindanao has been governed by Esmael Mangudadatu, former Buluan mayor, for three terms now. One of his brothers, Zajid, was a former mayor of Pandag before being elected as House member, while another brother, Freddie, is the mayor of Mangudadatu. Two sisters-in-law, Lorena and Zihan, are mayors of Buluan and Palag, respectively, while a distant kin, Mariam, is mayor of Abdullah Sangki. In addition, Esmael’s son, Kingjhazzer, is as member of the provincial Sanggunian, while two other kin are members of municipal council.

The Ampatuans, for their part, have 19 members in public office, serving as mayors, vice mayors, and councilors of six municipalities. The royal Sinsuat clan, meanwhile, have 11 members holding public posts, including the vice governorship and local offices in a municipality in Maguindanao. — With research and reporting by Rowena F. Caronan, PCIJ, July 2018
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State of the PH in 2018: Catching crooks, averting corruption

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Carpio Morales_Combating Corruption-Photo_PCIJ

WHAT policy and action reforms can enhance and sustain the campaign against crooks and corruption under the Duterte administration?

What follows is the speech of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, Ombudsman of the Republic of the Philippines, at the forum on “Democracy and Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business” that was organized by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, in partnership with the Office of the Ombudsman of the Philippines and the Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, on July 5, 2018, in Pasig City, Metro Manila.
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BARELY A month before the end of my term as Ombudsman, I had told myself to refrain from accepting speaking engagements because I intended to put in even more focus on office work, striving to muster all the time and energies to reduce the remaining balance. Then again, in the last few speaking engagements that I have graced, the interrogatives are of the similar lines. I thought to myself, there is still this lingering need to cover a lot of areas, reach a wider audience, and involve a broader set of sectors.

There is no better time to do this than these days, when there is a good indication of public interest in the work of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is our privilege to have ignited this interest fromthe public, for it may be an expression of institutional relevance and a manifestation of the public consciousness. I would have wished to touch-base with more, but with our bounded time, we can only do so much.

Carpio-Morales. 8-point Agenda, 2011-2018, Slide No.9

There lies much of the stimulus to speak before you, untiringly repeating ourselves just to make the account of our work a little more lucid for the expectant public.The Office of the Ombudsman, under any circumstance and amid the volumes of cases, cannot resist the opportunity to disseminate information that remains our steady shield in countering misinformation.

Sadly, misinformation has distorted reality and conditioned this otherwise freedom-loving nation in: surrendering their rights to might, accepting intimidation as the norm in governance, dismissing human rights as figments of imagination and invention of criminal protectors, and ushering a realm of mistrust in the rule of law under the pretext of the dire need to effect the promise of change, swiftly, albeit unduly.

So here I am again today, as feisty as most of you accord me, to speak about how corruption in the public sector is being addressed by the Office, to introduce and re-introduce the reforms made, the milestones achieved, the balance of work, and, if I may, as occasional side notes, an unsolicited piece, for the consideration of the future leadership, on the direction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Carpio-Morales. The Ombudsman, Slide No. 3

Staying true to the mandate

As most of you are aware, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional office tasked to uphold and promote integrity, transparency and accountability in the public service. Let me run down on the vital elements. As an independent office, the Office is protected by constitutional provisions that insulate it from political influences that potently cloud an impartial discharge of duty and blur the advocacy against impunity.

Since it is created by the Constitution, the Office is protected against abolition by legislative caprice. The head of office is removable only by impeachment, with deputies who are not under the disciplinary jurisdiction of external authorities. It comes as no surprise that those who have intended to circumvent the law would be uncomfortable and even insecure with the independence and fiscal autonomy it enjoys, making it not beholden to any powers-that-be.Such is the beauty of independence in the scheme of checks and balance.

The Office upholds integrity by means of striving to be, in itself, an ‘institution of credibility’ that gives equal protection to the people. It does not turn a blind eye to the misdemeanor and infractions of its personnel, hence the creation of the Internal Affairs Board that closely watches over and sanctions its own rank.

We have indicted a former Deputy Ombudsman for nondisclosure of a property in his SALN. Another has been fined and barred from public office due to grave misconduct. A Deputy Ombudsman and an Assistant Ombudsman were charged for tampering with official documents. We have also charged our own graft investigators for extortion. We have been transparent about these incidents, sometimes to the detriment of institutional reputation, but we offer no illusion as to the immaculate image of our people, so long as there is fairness in the process of hearing cases.

Concretizing the blueprint

The Office understands the enormity of the social malaise of corruption and that approaches to solving this problem is not limited to the powers of prosecution. There is more to the monstrosity of corruption than beheading it through punitive actions. Had punishment been absolutely and successfully deterrent, then integrity work would have been a walk in the park, anti-corruption would have been less relevant, good governance would have been on the high, and, as for me, retirements could have been earlier enjoyed.

Since the punitive approach is not the only conceivable means to effectively address corruption, the Office used other essential dimensions, giving birth to our 2011-2018 Policy Thrust and Eight-Point Agenda, operationally using punitive, preventive, and promotional strategies.

In terms of disposition of high-profile cases, the first in our list, the Office has prioritized resolving grand corruption cases, including the exposé on congressional discretionary funds otherwise known as the “PDAF scam” against several legislators and a number of public officials and conspiring private individuals. The latest count shows that there have been more or less 40 legislators from either Senate or House of Representatives, who are facing criminal indictment before the Sandiganbayan. And as you may know, the Office has recently indicted high-ranking officials on the controversial Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) case.

Carpio-Morales. Appellate Advocacy, Slide No.7

Where then does the claim of selective justice coming from? Is it selective when the law being applied sees neither political color nor political affiliation? Is it impartial when all parties have been heard and all points raised in the course of the legal process have been considered? Is it not independence when audacity to go against crooks even in the highest places is shown? Is it still selective when our decisions are open to be challenged before the appellate courts, which mostly affirm our decisions? In fact, in terms of appellate advocacy for the first five months of 2018, the appellate courts has affirmed our administrative dispositions in more than 82 percent of the appellate cases being defended by the Office, while the Supreme Court has affirmed 100 percent of the criminal dispositions in the appellate cases being defended by the Office.

You be the judge; we can only defend our position. For no matter how important public opinion is, the Office cannot fully operate on mere perceptions. There is the law to always turn to. The tendency of some quarters to rush to prejudgment when the case is still being assessed on the merits in observance of due process should not shake our values. Our judicious attention to the discharge of our functions arms us to confidently stand our ground and defend our work against unwarranted intimidations and unhelpful distractions.

Carpio-Morales. Conviction Rate, from 2011, Slide No.8

The prosecution’s conviction rate in the Sandiganbayan in 2011 was 41 percent. It increased to a high of 75 percent and 68.5 percent in 2015 and 2016, respectively. Last year, it reached an even higher rate of 77 percent, where one or more accused were convicted in 331 out of the 429 decided cases. As an update, the conviction rate for the first quarter of 2018 is already 81.46 percent. In the same quarter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) has continued to have a high percentage of success in appellate advocacy. The rate of success before the Supreme Court is 76.19 percent and 72.73 percent before the Sandiganbayan.

In 2011, we inherited a massive number of 19,000-plus cases, on top of the average annual intake of roughly 5,000 cases in each succeeding year. The collective efficiency of the workforce brought the number to a steady decline over the years, to a manageable number of around 6,000 by the end of 2017. We are confident to bank on this development and realize the zero-backlog docket as the Office rounds up its seven-year, eight-point Agenda. This is more than beating the deadline, but it is to end a culture of delays that erodes public trust and credibility of the Ombudsman process. The Office has long proven that it is not “Mona Lisa’s lair” and that cases do not lie there and just die there. They are being judiciously acted upon with speed and prudence.

Caprio-Morales. Case load, zero backlog, Slide No. 10

As a matter of sustaining this gain, by the third quarter of 2017, we had implemented an office-wide Physical Inventory of Pending Cases. We are no better investigators if we do not validate and re-validate our data and figures. Just recently, the Office institutionalized the biennial physical inventory process with the signing of Office Circular No. 14 (series of 2018), which prescribes the guidelines for the conduct of periodic physical inventory of Ombudsman cases. This initiative hopes to put more integrity to our work and better approximation, if not real time information, on pending cases for action, as also monitored in our electronic database called Complaints and Case Management System (CCMS).

The survival rate of our fact-finding is already at an average of 22 percent in the last five years, a significant improvement compared to the less-than-four-percent rate during my first two years in the Office. This goes to show that we have heightened efforts to improve the quality of our investigative work while, at the same time, weeding out baseless or frivolous complaints at the first instance. This goes to show that we go by the evidence, and we are not on a witch-hunt.

Carpio-Morales. Survival rate of cases, Slide No.13

If there is no evidence, complaints do no survive or merit any further proceedings. This was made possible through continuous training and education in specialized techniques such as forensic engineering, accounting, and auditing. We have a number of development partners sharing both resources and expertise on these areas. Capacities and processes need further improvement if the Office is to bring the survival rate toa higher level, especially when it is measured on two levels pertaining to the indictment rate and punitive rate. At any rate, securing convictions of erring public officials is the key target.

In fortifying the credibility of the Office, it does not preach “all bark, no bite.” To keep it from becoming a “eunuch” or a toothless tiger, it makes sure that it keeps an eye on the enforcement of its directives as a disciplining authority through its agenda on enforced monitoring of referred cases. For quite some time, there was no functional unit and mechanism dedicated to the monitoring of administrative penalties against erring public officials. Monitoring was on a need basis and not a mainstream function.

In December 2013, our Prosecution, Information, Evaluation and Monitoring Services (PIEMS) commenced its function of monitoring the compliance with the directives to implement the penalties imposed on respondents. In the same vein, we have effected memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with the Department of Justice, the Civil Service Commission, the Philippine Competition Commission, the National Police Commission and the Philippine National Police, on the proper coordination and referral of cases.

Further, the area of improving responsiveness of public assistance has been identified as one of our offerings under the banner of “protecting the people.” We understand that the speedy or prompt delivery of public services has the ability to shape an idea of a functioning bureaucracy.

Carpio-Morales. Monitoring of Referred Cases, Slide No. 15

For proper guidance of our own rank in dealing with our primary client – the people – we have issued directions and guidelines on handling Requests for Assistance in 2013, and we have expanded these guidelines in 2018 to include guidance on Other Forms of Assistance such as administration of oaths, response to queries, referral of recourse, actions on letters/documents, and the like.

The issuance of these guidelines has improved our handling of requests for assistance. In terms of mediation, there has been a higher success rate at 72 percent reported in 2017 over the success rate of 59 percent in 2016. Overall, from July 2011 to March 2018, the disposal rate for Requests for Assistance and Mediation Cases has been calculated at 99.18 percent, while the disposal rate has been 100 percent for Other Forms of Assistance.

Carpio-Morales. Public Assistance, Slide No.17

In spite of the good numbers, we know that the ultimate judge of the impact of our assistance is the recipient. For this, we have setup a system of public evaluation and feedback. We act on negative feedback and refer complaints on the misconduct of Ombudsman personnel toour Internal Affairs Board.

As I have mentioned on several occasions, anti-corruption is not the function of prosecution alone, and is never the sole domain of Ombudsman. An improved anti-corruption policy and program coordination among sectors found its proper place in our eight-point Agenda.

The Office has crafted and implemented several anti-corruption programs along with multi-sectoral partners that introduced multi-faceted approaches and perspectives to fight corruption. For one, the Integrity Management Program (IMP), the flagship corruption prevention program that we implemented in partnership with the Office of the President, assesses the systems and processes of key government agencies in terms of their risks and vulnerabilities to corruption, and subsequently recommends corrective and preventive measures to the heads of agencies. It has been launched in over 30 government agencies, which are heading toward the implementation of integrity management plans based on the assessments. The number of government agencies, including those at the local levels, voluntarily signifying their interest to implement the program puts the idea of its bureaucracy-wide implementation closer to realization. The monitoring and evaluation tools are being refined and this can be an opportunity for further collaboration among different agencies.

The Integrity, Transparency and Accountability in Public Service (ITAPS) Program also answers the need for customized training modules for government officials and employees, thereby reinforcing a culture of good governance.

In a decentralized government, holistic mainstreaming of anti-corruption strategies also means bringing down interventions to the level of local governments that are similarly vulnerable to corrupt acts and transactions.One approach is the Blue Certification Program, which is designed to assess LGU systems and procedures on applications for permits and licenses using 87 standards, and determine its level of compliance. It attempts to correct deficiencies in LGU procedures and recommends a systematic operation free from bureaucratic red tape. The conduct of Blue Certification has been piloted in four cities in Metro Manila and other LGUs in key cities nationwide.

Our Campus Integrity Crusaders (CICs) program aims to enhance the capacity and the participation of the youth sector in promoting a culture of integrity through the development and enhancement of leadership skills and the values of social responsibility and good citizenship. It has accredited over a thousand student organizations in 2017.

Carpio-Morales. eSALN, Slide No. 23

One of the major anti-corruption projects of the Office is on the Electronic Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth or the eSALN project. A prototype of the eSALN was launched in May 2016 in collaboration with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President. It is a system that transitions the manual-based SALN to an electronic platform.

To date, a total of 3,245 civil servants have attended the hands-on orientation-training on the eSALN. Incidentally, a five-year bureaucracy-wide implementation of the eSALN is expected under the Philippine Development Plan (PDP) 2017-2022. Under the 2018 General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the Office, approximately PhP16 million has been provided for the eSALN initiative. The hope is that the eSALN would instill a culture of conscientiousness in the public disclosure of assets and liabilities.

Our move toward addressing sectoral corruption is borne out of an understanding that corruption exists in myriad forms in all areas and sectors. There is a need to approach it at a sectoral level using specialized programs. Our initial contributions are the Investment Ombudsman program and the Environmental Ombudsman program.

The Investment Ombudsman program aims to encourage local and foreign investments in the country and improve global competitiveness through prompt action on investor-related grievances and speedy resolution of investors’ complaints. Since its launching in 2014, it has taken in about 25 complaints, of which it has already resolved 23.

Meanwhile, the Environmental Ombudsman Program has been handling prioritized, high-value cases involving corruption in the environmental sector and violations of environmental laws involving high-ranking public officers. At the forefront of carrying out its mandate, the Environmental Ombudsman (EO) Team has been supporting the aggressive implementation of the Solid Waste Management Voluntary Compliance Project since 2013.

It has issued 1,600 letters to local government units requesting them to assess their observance of the legal requirements and standards. Fact-finding investigations were thereafter initiated against 50 LGUs across the country, involving more than 500 officials, which were the subjects of the complaints filed by the Solid Waste Management Commission. The Program has been instrumental not only in the filing of formal cases against officials in 33 LGUs, but also in the safe closure of dumpsites in 11 LGUs. Imagine what this could do for several communities after a full-blown implementation of the Program.

Carpio-Morales. Environmental Ombudsman Program, Slide No.25

In 2013, we also operationalized the Project Management Bureau, not only to handle donor-assisted projects, but also to provide a dedicated workforce to ensure a coordinated anti-corruption program. With the assistance from development partners, such as the ADB, British Embassy, INL, UNDP, UNODC, USAID, and the World Bank, programs and projects focusing on institutional capacity assessment, systems enhancement, capacity building, and knowledge-sharing were implemented. One of these is the formulation of the National Anti-Corruption Road Map, which has been adopted during the 3rd State Conference on the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The same is being revisited and refined, attuning to times and related developments. As it is planned to cover a wide-range of actors, state and non-state alike, your participation and contribution in the forthcoming consultations would be material.

Institution-wise, we have also made strides in the rationalization of the Office’s functional structure, by restructuring offices to augment the manpower and filling of positions in a multi-disciplinary perspective. This initiative will be completely realized once the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) fully approves theentire restructuring proposal.

Last, but definitely not the least in our priority, is the enhanced transparency and credibility of the Office. I think all of the aforementioned initiatives are contributing to this goal.Our regular reports are being uploaded in the Ombudsman website. Decisions in high-profile cases are being publicized. We have maximized the use of technology and social media in information dissemination. Please like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter through, by the way — our legitimate accounts, please. And yours truly has been consistently reporting and speaking in Integrity Caravans and public fora on various reforms, milestones, and updates.

Summing up

In a span of 30 years, the Office of the Ombudsman has been cognizant of addressing corruption at various fronts. Indeed, a strong prosecution potently deters corrupt actions and sends a message to the potential perpetrators that no one is spared so they better get their acts together. Its expertise in prosecution, however, has not limited the institution in combating corruption through prosecution alone. We know from the beginning that we will never make sense in the anti-corruption agenda if we only go on catching crook after crook, when they only seem to multiply in the fertile ground of corruption.

From what we have gathered, there really is a challenge on the preventive aspect because it has a broader scope that goes into the root of the problem involving not only monetary or economic concerns, but also behavioral, cultural, systemic and procedural factors.

The idea is for the Office to really start strong on the prosecution and set the tone on the resolute stance against corruption. But the larger aim is to create a credible and inspiring institution, so we can shift the perspective from “exacting accountability” to “inspiring accountability.”

The story of fighting corruption never ends, only the tone changes. And this time, we hope to leave positive ones.

Carpio-Morales. On personalities, institutions Slide No. 36

If the next leadership would not turn a cold shoulder on the existing initiatives, wheels need not be reinvented, only improved. We believe in the reforms that have been instituted. To see them sustained until their impact can already be harnessed is a dream of this transitioning leadership.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not faultless. But the difference is its boldness to own up to its mistakes. We take governance seriously, and we don’t have the privilege to get away with blunder by dismissing it as jokes. We know how to rectify errors and we respect third-party opinions. Such is governance – a democratic one, at that.

As the fifth Ombudsman, with a light heart, I am confident of the reforms and the people I will be leaving the institution with. For the incoming leadership, the only option is to take care of these people who bore much of the pain and gain of integrity work.

Our worth as public servant may be concretely measured by cast-performance standards and statistics, but to borrow the words of the great Albert Einstein, “not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.” There is more to our mission than numbers and hard data that barely capture the nuance of our work, which only appear in the stories behind our case victories, forged partnerships, and instituted reforms. And so I always advise our people to never let external, and even internal, pressures sway their convictions.

Carpio-Morales. Einstein on what counts, Slide No. 35

To the public — you, as our partners — thank you for not wavering. The Office has a tough job but you did not hesitate. Since the dawn of my term, you have been there extending assistance. In the coming years, I hope that you would be that same unfaltering advocates of good governance. Do not abandon the institution. It needs your voice. The people need to assert transparency, demand integrity and exact accountability from the powers-that-be. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all governmental authority emanates from them. When the citizenry chooses to grant this power to their selected officials, the citizenry should closely monitor and see how these officials fare the test of character.

Abraham Lincoln was attributed this relevant dictum: “Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man’s character, give him power.” Indeed, a person’s character is tested not just by how one handles the hardships encountered, but also — and more significantly — by how he or she handles the power bestowed. Along these lines were the words of U.S. lawyer Robert Green Ingersoll: “Nothing discloses real character like the use of power. It is easy for the weak to be gentle. Most people can bear adversity. But if you wish to know what a man really is, give him power. This is the supreme test.”

Carpio-Morales.The supreme test, Slide No.35

Public officials thus need to account for the use of the power granted by the people. The people deserve to check whether these public officials pass or fail this test. If they seriously fail and commit abuse of such power, they should not go unpunished.

To the avengers of corruption, whatever may come, affirm your vision and focus on your work. Do not give in to the temptation of complacency and apathy in the challenging environment. Bring this nation to greater heights and never fail to extend an ounce of help, looking less at personalities, and looking more at institutions. — Speech delivered at the PCIJ Forum on “Democracy & Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Suplus, and Unfinished Business, July 5, 2018, Pasig City, Metro Manila

State of the PH in 2018: The Insulted Economy

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De Dios_Insulted Economy-Photo_PCIJ

WHAT is the true state of the economy, and the status of economic and policy reforms, under two years of the Duterte administration?

What follows is the presentation, by text and graphics, of Dr. Emmanuel S. de Dios of the University of the Philippines School of Economics, at the forum on “Democracy and Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business” that was organized by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, in partnership with the Office of the Ombudsman of the Philippines and the Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, on July 5, 2018, in Pasig City, Metro Manila.

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SETTING THE BASELINE:
Ex ante developments justify high expectations

1. “Demographic dividend”
– a growing population of working age
– expansion of a middle class
2. Favourable global environment
– global low interest-rate regime
– liberal migration and trading regimes
– low energy prices (shale oil revolution)
3. Technological developments, esp. in ICT
4. Reforms by past administrations (Arroyo and Aquino)

Growth acceleration 2011–2018?
* Eight years of per-capita GDP growth of 3.5% or more
* Per-capita GDP growth 2% higher than the past period
* Higher per-capita income than ever achieved before
* Actual record: 4.46% v. 2.75%

Absent economic crises
* Current-account surpluses 2005–2016
* Fiscal primary surpluses 2011–2015
* Diminishing debt burden: interest/GDP fell from 5.3% (2005) to 2% (2017)
* Inflation at low single digits
* Declining poverty incidence from 26.3% (2009) to 21.6% (2015)

Unexploited potential
* Growth rates still substantially below what other countries achieved in similar episodes – and below government’s own targets of 7-8 percent.
* Demographic dividend not fully used: shrinking labour force and fewer jobs despite a growing population.

Growth accelerations

De Dios. Growth Accelerations Slide No. 5

Seventh place, not third in 2017

De Dios. PH Seventh Place, Slide No. 7

Even Laos and Cambodia grew faster

De Dios. Even Laos, Cambodia grew faster, Slide No.8

Smaller labour force, fewer jobs?

De Dios. Smaller Labor Force, Fewere Jobs. Slide No. 9

0-10 point agenda
0. Fight crime and corruption.
1. Maintain macro, trade, fiscal, and monetary policies.
2. Progressive tax reform, effective tax collection; tax indexation
3. Competitiveness and ease of doing business.
4. Spend up to 5% of GDP on infrastructure; key role for PPP.
5. Rural and value-chain development.
6. Security of land tenure.
7. Invest in health and education; skills matching.
8. Promote S&T and arts.
9. Improve social protection and CCT
10. Strong implementation of planned parenthood

The administration’s analysis and strategy
* Identify infrastructure bottlenecks as main constraint to growth
* Hence the “3-Build” programme
* Allowance for higher deficit ceiling up to 5% of GDP
* Emphasis on public infrastructure spending
* To keep deficit in check (at 3% of GDP), a tax reform programme (TRAIN 1-5).

Surprises
* Government continues to miss its growth targets.
* Government continues to underspend and fall below its total deficit and infrastructure spending targets.
* But current account and BOP surpluses have already been reversed.
* And inflation has broken through government targets.

Deficits and infrastructure

De Dios. Public sector deficit and infrastructure spending. Slide No. 14

* Government continues to underspend relative to its own infrastructure and deficit targets.
* Missed infrastructure and deficit targets undermine the case for new taxes.
* Few flagship projects have gotten underway (2018?); infra- spending mostly on maintenance and repair on standard projects, e.g., roads. (Q: How much is net investment?)
* A notable shift towards ODA and away from PPP (contrary to 10-point agenda).
* Public sector deficit and infrastructure spending (as % of GDP)

Reasons for underperformance

De Dios. Old Problems, Slide No. 16

* Tedious government procurement procedures
* Old problems still unsolved, including ROW, BAC rules
* Technical deficit among government personnel
* Planning, project preparation, bid evaluation
* Supply constraints on private contracting sector
* Shortage of qualified local firms for big projects
* Shortage of skilled staff (engineers and planners)
* Red tape even in ODA projects
* Old problems

Unintended consequences
Fiscal space with additional revenues, combined with infrastructure underperformance provides opportunities for:
* Populist measures: unconditional transfers (₱40 bn); free college tuition (₱40 bn); salaries for uniformed personnel (₱60 bn); universal health care improvements (₱90 bn); free irrigation services
* Feeding frenzy: E.g., DOT, DepEd purchasing scandals, foreign and local trips among executives

Lax infra spending: repair and replace versus new investment
Revenues intended for BBB may be pre-empted by consumption spending and waste. As a result revenue generation may have to run simply in order to stand still. A disruptive process.

New inflation (deed of many hands)
1. Impact of TRAIN through fuel and “sin” products
2. Exchange-rate movements because of capital outfloqws and behind-the-curve monetary policy
3. Muddled rice policy
4. Failure to account for inflation expectations

Inflation in the CPI and food

De Dios. Inflation in CPI and food, Slide No. 19

US Fed funds rate and BSP RRP rate

De Dios. US Fed funds rate and BSP RRP rate, Slide No. 20

Competitiveness and ease of doing business
* Export competitiveness slight upward tick but well below comparators
* From 28.4% of GDP (2015) to 28.0% (2016) to 30.5% (2017)
* FDI rising but well below comparators
* From 1.9% GDP (2015) to 2.7% (2016) to 3.2% (2017)

Ease of doing business rank has fallen
from 99 (2016 and 2015) to 113 (2017)

De Dios, Ease of doing business 2017, Slide No. 24

Corruption perceptions rank has fallen
From 95 (2015) to 101 (2016) to 111 (2017)

De Dios. Corruption Perceptions, index and rank 2017, Slide No. 27

Exports of goods and services
(as % of GDP; 1998-2017)

De Dios. Exports of goods, services, 1992-2017, Slide No. 22

Foreign direct investment inflows
(as % of GDP; 2010-2017)

De Dios. Foreign direct investment inflows, 2010-2017, Slide No. 23

Ease of doing business 2017
“Distance to frontier” and (rank) [WB 2018]

De Dios. Ease of doing business, 'distance to frontier', Slide. No. 25

Ease of doing business [WB 2018]

De Dios. Ease of doing business, WB 2018, Slide No.26

Corruption perceptions (index and rank 2017)

De Dios. Corruption Perceptions, index and rank 2017, Slide No. 27

0-10 point agenda

De Dios. 0-10 Agenda, Slide No. 28

insult (noun): in medicine: an event which causes damage to a tissue or an organ
– Oxford English Dictionary

INGLORIOUS INSULTS TO THE ECONOMY

De Dios. Inglorious Insults to the Economy-Uncertainty, Redistribution, Slide NO. 30

1. Uncertainty insult

De Dios_Inglourious Insults 1_Uncertainty-Photo_PCIJ

Click to video video: De Dios_Inglourious Insults 1_Uncertainty_PCIJ
2. Redistribution insult

De Dios_Inglourious Insults 2_Redistribution-Photo_PCIJ

Click to view video: De Dios_Inglourious Insults 2_Redistribution_PCIJ

De Dios. Inglorious Insults to the Economy Selectvity, Slide No. 31

3. Selectivity insult

De Dios_Inglourious Insults 3_Selectivity-Photo_PCIJ

Click to view video: De Dios_Inglourious Insults 3_Selectivity_PCIJ

De Dios. Inglorious Insults to the Economy - Impunity, War and Disorder, Slide NO. 32

4. Impunity and threat insult
5. War and disorder insult

De Dios_Inglourious Insults 4-5-Photo_PCIJ (3)

Click to view video: De Dios_Inglourious Insults 4-5_PCIJ (1)

Despite the President’s seeming disinterest in economic policy, what throws a shadow over business and the economy is the demonstration of overarching power – power without checks, without accountability, and without regard for custom, values, or history.

More than the soundness of policy, it is unbridled power – and its selective application – that is the source of worry for business and the people under the Duterte administration.

— Presentation delivered at the PCIJ Forum on “Democracy & Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business”, July 5, 2018, Pasig City, Metro Manila

State of the PH in 2018: Perils, Pitfalls of Shifting to Federalism

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IS the proposed shift to federalism “a Trojan horse to stay in power” for President Duterte and his political allies?

What follows is the speech of Atty. Christian S. Monsod, former Commission on Elections chairman and member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, at the forum on “Democracy and Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business” that was organized by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, in partnership with the Office of the Ombudsman of the Philippines and the Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, on July 5, 2018, in Pasig City, Metro Manila.
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THE INSPIRATION for the 1987 Constitution was EDSA and the restoration of democracy through peaceful means. But EDSA was more than that – it was also the promise of a new social order especially to the poor with radical changes, but through democratic means.

Before its writing, consultations nationwide were held to listen to the people and they overwhelmingly preferred the stability of familiar structures – a democratic, representative, unitary presidential system, with checks and balances and separation of powers. And, they wanted the power to directly vote for and have access to their president. But from the experience of the Marcos regime, they also wanted safeguards against the return of authoritarianism in any form. They wanted social justice and wanted our national destiny to be firmly and safely placed on Filipinos themselves. Thus, these are the central themes of our Constitution.

All this was, in many ways, counter-cultural and therefore “radical” because our history is marked by a tendency to give up powers to colonizers and dictators, of deferring to so-called “strong” leaders, of allowing business to rule our economy, and of an over-dependence of the poor on rich landowners for their basic necessities.

This is validated by the studies of experts that a number of factors account for our laggardness among our neighbors in addressing mass poverty and inequality. But foremost are flawed policies and weak institutions rooted in a feudalistic system that has been impervious to change for generations and, of course, its companion evil: corruption.

The 1987 Constitution is the history of Filipino struggles to achieve an independent democracy. One used to oppressive colonial forces is balanced by a stronger citizenry; a tendency to defer to foreigners with parity rights to our land and resources balanced with stronger pro-Filipino policies; a strong business sector balanced with economic opportunities for the poor; a culture of corruption balanced by more avenues to hold our government officials accountable.

Thus, the Constitution can be viewed as affirmative action for our democracy – to correct the shortcomings of previous constitutions, to address the “wrongs” of history and to empower and enable the ordinary Filipino to rise above himself. It provides a system that should correct itself whenever it threatens to get out of control. And in that process of correction, the role of the people is critical because “sovereignty resides in the people.”

Our Constitution is considered one of the most progressive in the world alongside that of South Africa. We already have the provisions that many countries are trying to install in theirs in the search for peace and development.

The 1987 Constitution was the first time that we spoke to the world as a truly independent and democratic Filipino nation. It is a document that had not been imposed on us by any colonial power or by a dictatorship.

The 1987 Constitution cut the umbilical cord of the 1935 and 1973 constitutions to the United States Constitution, which gives primacy to civil and political rights because it is a country of immigrants who all started from the same position and only wanted to be free from autocracy.

Our Constitution gives social and economic rights equal primacy with civil and political rights because we are a country of inequalities from the colonial days to the present where the starting positions of the rich and the poor are not equal. Social Justice and human rights are about the adjustment of these starting positions. It is the central theme, the heart, of the Constitution.

It is a Constitution under threat of overhaul because it is blamed as the source of our problems today and is not part of the solutions.

A week ago, I was a speaker at a forum of an international NGO about the future of their operations because of its external environment, both international and domestic. As of December 2017 their list of uncertainties in the Philippines were: democratic space, rule of law, political institutions, civil and political space, domestic and foreign policy, the government’s openness to international aid and development assistance, martial law, revolutionary government and escalating conflicts in Mindanao.

Since December, another uncertainty has been added with some urgency – a charter change that threatens not only our “spaces” for democracy but also democracy itself with a new constitution that is likely to allow or facilitate “constitutional authoritarianism.” The urgency may have been triggered by statements from the military that it would not support a “revolutionary government,” because it would be an extra-constitutional measure beyond its scope of powers and duties.

How easily we forget. The Marcos years were not just about the brutality in the violation of human rights, but also the economic disaster from which we did not recover until 2002, or 20 years after our per capita real income collapsed in 1983 from the weight of foreign debt. And on top of that — perhaps the worst legacy of all — was the culture of corruption that persists to this day.

We are told that our leaders, especially judges, not only shape our lives but also our values. From the experience of the last 18 months, it’s clearer now that the Duterte Administration knows how to govern only through the use of fear and force. Thus, if the Marcos legacy is a culture of corruption, then the Duterte legacy would be a culture of violence. In fact, I believe that we are already on a slippery slope to authoritarianism even without charter change.

A book entitled How Democracies Die published earlier this year, among several books on the same subject, says that where authoritarianism during the Cold War was imposed through coups d’etat by the military, since then authoritarianism has been assumed by elected leaders through constitutional revisions that would allow them to stay in power indefinitely, i.e. Fujimori of Peru, Chavez of Venezuela, Erdogen of Turkey, even our Marcos and several others. It also says that there is already danger when even just one of the four signs that an elected leader wants to become a dictator is present. The signs are:

• Rejects in words or actions the democratic rules of the game – both in written constitutions or unwritten norms of conduct and civility in a functioning democracy;

• Denies the legitimacy of opponents;

• Tolerates or encourages violence; and

• Indicates a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents.

The question: are these happening in the Philippines today?

Think about Sen. Leila de Lima, under detention for 15 months through trumped-up testimonies of 12 convicted felons, which were upheld by the Supreme Court. Or about former Supreme Court Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno, deposed from her position through quo warranto proceeding by no less than the Supreme Court that ignored the constitutional provision on impeachment and the ethical norms of inhibition by five justices.

Or think about Congress, especially the House that could not establish an “impeachable offense” against Sereno and suspended its transmission to the Senate of a weak case in order to give way to the quo warranto proceeding. Or the proclamation of martial law and its extension for one year in the whole of Mindanao that was affirmed by the Supreme Court with unusual deference to the President and abdicating its mandate to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law. Such that now, the President is empowered to declare martial law anywhere, anytime in the Philippines.

What about the attempt at a zero budget for the Commission on Human Rights and the attacks on the Ombudsman, which only stopped since the Honorable Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales will be stepping down this July – an Ombudsman who, to paraphrase Albert Camus, put herself at the service not of those who make history but of those who suffer it.

With the weakening of the constitutional “checking powers” of Congress, of the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, and of the media (i.e. Rappler and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, among others), there remained the potential checking power of the Church to deal with. There are only three institutions with a nationwide reach: the LGUs, the police/military establishment, and the Church. That may account for the latest attempt to smear the “source” of its power – God.

Legal adventurism encourages disrespect of the Constitution and devalues the most potent weapon to protect the rights and freedoms of the people. That would constitute, wittingly or unwittingly, a step toward what mental-health experts refer to as “malignant normality,” which can take different forms but, in the case of democratic countries, would consider aberrant behavior or language as part of the democratic process. Thus, a dangerous leader becomes normalized, and malignant normality would dominate the governing dynamic. Clearly, this endangers our democracy.

Who could have foreseen a situation where the designated guard dogs of the Constitution would become the lapdogs of the President?

With regard to the ad hoc Consultative Committee or ConCom, one of its more credible members denied that the President has tried to interfere with its work.. He missed the point. The selection of appointees to the ConCom predetermined its agenda. The ConCom was not meant to seriously study other options to the articulated purpose of federalism: to end the reign of “Imperial Manila” in order to address the underdevelopment of the outlying areas and the urgent problems of mass poverty and gross inequalities.

There may be a second purpose to charter change. In this regard, a comparison of the ConCom Chairman Reynato Puno’s statement to Business in July 2017 and his marching orders to the ConCom in its opening session last February 19 is instructive. To Business, the former chief justice said that federalism is a slippery slope with six conditions to protect or avoid, the most important being a truly independent judiciary. To the Concom he said, “There ought to be a moderation on the extreme exercise of the checking power by each branch of government….On certain issues of primordial importance to the political, economic, and social interest of our people, the three departments of our government must speak with one voice. In times of crises, more than one voice is noise.”

That sounds dangerously Marcosian. It uses lofty rhetoric to rationalize authoritarianism – a throwback to the Marcos regime when all three departments of government spoke with “one voice.”

Who determines what is “extreme exercise” and what are “issues of primordial importance”? What happens to the system of checks and balances? Where in that kind of government is the role of the Supreme Court as the “conscience of the nation”?

Where are we going?

The President is a master politician. He has not lost a local election in 28 years and he won in his first attempt in national elections. He knows that any attempt to bring him down through “people power” will not prosper given his very high trust ratings. He is perceived as incorrupt and considered as a hope for radical social change across the economic classes. Moreover, there is a changing paradigm of people power. The ordinary people will no longer allow themselves to be used as pawns for power players who all come from the same elite class.

In 2016, many voters deserted the mainstream. As someone describes the phenomenon, most voters “hungered for politicians who can make a rousing argument for drastic solutions.”
In other words, Duterte the Mayor got it right on the deeper yearnings of the people and was elected by a huge plurality. But can Duterte the President pull it off on his own terms – the radical change he promised? We can only ignore the sentiment behind the vote for him at the peril of undertaking the wrong solutions.

In a span of only two years, the President has taken control of Congress, especially the House, most of the LGUs and ruling dynasties, and of the Supreme Court. By 2022, he will have appointed 13 of the 15 justices. He has gone out of his way to secure the loyalty of the military and the police, including doubling their salaries. I am not sure if the President really wants or considers it still necessary to shift to federalism given his almost total control of these power centers. And he must be aware of the succession risks to the country of a Constitution that is tailored to his way of governance, if he dies before his time.

But if he wants to stay in power beyond 2022, the only legal way to do it is by charter change. With a new constitution that allows him to run again. Mainly through its Transitory Provisions, the way Marcos did it.

Which gives rise to another question: Is federalism a Trojan horse to stay in power?

Based on the various drafts of a federal constitution and the statements of high officials of the administration, my best guess is that the extension of the terms of the office are likely to be done through any of these alternatives:

• By the suspension of elections; or or extension of terms. By changing the rules for re-election for those who would otherwise be banned from staying in power, including the president himself. Moreover, during the transition between 2018 or 2019 until 2022, by allowing President Duterte to finish his elected term but with much greater powers, until the election of the President under a Federal System, where the cards are stacked in his favor.

The recommendations of the ConCom (as supposed to be finalized yesterday with all 22 commissioners signing it) I received parts of it from two reliable sources and one complete version from a reputable institution that was branded by the ConCom as “not genuine.”

But the questions and comments by people, including myself, based on the Resolutions 8 and 9 of the House and the PDP-Laban proposed federal constitution appear to be addressed by the ConCom. I will only cover six items for lack of time in digesting all the changes, as follows:

On the form of government: Federal-Presidential, without a parliamentary system;

• On the checks and balance system: The creation of new institutions that is broader in scope than the present system among the three great departments, the three constitutional commissions, and the office of the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights. Under the new distribution of powers the Fed CHR is now expressly included as well as three additional supreme courts to the Federal Supreme Court, namely the Federal Constitutional Court, the Federal Administrative Court, and the Federal Electoral Court. The appointing power would be distributed other than the president For example, to the Fed CC 3-3-3 shall be appointed among the President, Commission on Appointments and Federal Constitutional Court. In turn appointments to the Federal Constitutional Court 3-shall also be appointed 3-3-3 by the President, the Commission on Appointments and the Federal Supreme Court. And the Fed. Adm Court 3-3-3 by the President, COA appointments, and Fed Sup Court. The Fed Electoral Court will have 15 members – with 5-5-5 (by the Pres., COA appointment, Fed. Cons. Court). And then there is the Federal Intergovernmental Commission to handle the “equalization fund” and help poor regions become viable.

There would be no more need for confirmation. Instead, the candidates shall be vetted by a reconstituted Judicial Appointments and Disciplinary Council consisting of 11 ex-officio members: the four CJs, Fed Ombudsmen, SC administrator, minority Senator, majority rep. CSC, COA, Sec Justice. The regular members would be someone from the IBP, a law professor, representatives from the associations of generals/flag officers/ retired Fed SC. Do you think that these agencies under a Duterte administration will be objective in their choices?

• The federated regions will not share sovereignty. There are exclusive powers and shared powers to be exercised jointly or separately. In case of dispute, the federal power shall prevail. This is not substantially different from the present multi-tiered unitary system.

• With regards to the fiscal powers, can these not be done today with an overhaul of the Local Government Code? These are standard recommendations by fiscal expert Prof. Rosario ‘Chat’ Manasan on a meaningful fiscal decentralization without federalization.

• The good news of the version I have seen, if genuine, is that the social justice provisions appear to be intact both those in Art. XII on the Economy and Article XIII on social justice, with some amendments on labor rights, for example, unlike the PDP-Laban proposed constitution. But the bad news is that with regard to land, natural resources, and public utilities, Congress is now allowed to change the requirements of acquisition, lease or ownership, which opens the door to transactional legislation.

• On the transitory provision: The President shall head the Transition Council from 2019-2022 (assuming a plebiscite sometime in 2019), with 10 members with the nominees to be appointed by the President from a search committee headed by the CSC Chair with four members appointed by the President.

The Transition Council has vast powers:

SECTION 2. The Federal Transition Commission shall have the following powers and duties:

(a) To formulate and adopt a transition plan for the orderly shift to the new system of government as provided for in this Constitution. The transition plan shall be published in the Official Gazette and in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation, and any digital platform chosen by the Transition Commission;

(b) For the proper execution of the transition plan, it shall promulgate the necessary rules, regulations, orders, decrees, proclamations, and other issuances, do all acts to implement the same, and resolve all issues and disputes that may arise therefrom; (similar to the powers of Marcos)

(c) To organize, reorganize, and fully establish the Federal Government and the governments of the Federated Regions, in accordance with this Constitution;

(d) To exercise all powers necessary and proper to ensure a smooth, speedy and successful transition.

SECTION 3. The transition plan shall include the following:

a) The respective transition plans for the different branches of the Federal Government, the independent Constitutional Bodies, the Federated Regions and other component units;

b) The fiscal management and administration plan including, but not limited to, generation of revenue and resources and their appropriation, allocation, and expenditure;

c) The establishment of mechanisms for people’s participation in the transition.

SECTION 4. The Federal Transition Commission shall ensure people’s participation by involving faith-based, civil society, indigenous peoples, sectoral, non-government and other community based organizations in the transition, especially in the selection and screening of appointees to the new government.

Is the President allowed to run for the presidency of the Federal government? The transitory provisions:

SECTION 5. The first national, regional and local elections under this Federal Constitution to elect the President, Vice President, Regional Senators, District Representative, Proportional Party Representative, regional and local officials shall be on the 2nd Monday of May 2022. They shall assume office at noon on June 30, 2022.

SECTION 6. The term of the President and Vice-President, which shall end on June 30, 2022, shall not be extended.
The caveat, however, is that there is no explicit prohibition on President Duterte’s running on the second Monday of May 2022 under the new constitution.

SECTION 7. All laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules, regulations, letters of instructions, and other executive and judicial issuances not inconsistent with this Federal Constitution shall remain valid until amended or repealed.

But then. can it postpone the 2022 elections if the transition process takes longer than expected??

SECTION 8. All officials of the government under the 1987 Constitution shall continue to hold their office and exercise their respective powers and duties under such terms and conditions as may be provided in the transition plan.

SECTION 9. Permanent employees of the government separated from service as a result of the reorganization of government shall be entitled to separation pay, early retirement pay or retirement pay, or other appropriate benefits accruing to them under existing laws. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the Federal Government, the Regional Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries in accordance with the existing civil service laws, the corporate charters of these corporations, and other relevant statutes.

What we have thus is a total overhaul of the country’s institutions, system of governance and the bureaucracy under the leadership and direction of President Duterte. This at a time when we should be addressing the twin problems of mass poverty and gross inequalities.

What are the imponderables? First, on the process: The issue of joint or separate vote by the Senate and the House in the Constituent Assembly. What if the SC says the vote must be separate? And what if the three-fourth vote of the Senate cannot be marshalled by the administration?

Then there is the imponderable of what the President really wants. The imponderable of whether can free and fair elections can be conducted under martial law. And finally there is the judgment of the people in the plebiscite.

Secondly, on the substance: Will Congress in a ConAss adopt the good provisions of the ConCom? The ConAss version will surely reflect the power plays of the political dynasties and the compromises of the self-interest of politicians. Senate President Vicente Sotto III has already said that Congress will not pass an anti-dynasty law and President Duterte has publicly said he is not in favor of it. Then again, the two-degree proposal is already tokenism since the Ateneo and World Bank studies define a political dynasty as one of extended families, inter-marriages, and of clans, of which there could be anywhere between 178 (Ateneo) and 200 (WB).

Moreover, some members of the ConCom have reportedly admitted that one of the imponderables is whether federalism will merely empower these dynasties to become more entrenched. There is also the possibility of political violence as they fight for supremacy in the regions. There is, after all, the law of unintended consequences especially in an inductive process as federalism, as admitted by one of authors of the PDP-Laban version, will only indirectly address the urgent problems of mass poverty and gross inequalities.

It is also not clear if all the regions will become federated states immediately even as they strive to stand on their own and if the equalization tax system will work in this regard given the diversity of resources and of capabilities of the regions.

As one commentator said, changing the structure now with so many uncertainties is like boarding a plane without knowing its destination. So why not consider the cautionary insights of experts like Prof. Gene Lacza Pilapil of the U.P. political science department, who I believe has done the most exhaustive research on institutional design literature. Among other things, Pilapil has observed that there is no consensus on the superiority of a federal to a unitary system of government (there are in fact about 160 unitary systems and about 27 federal systems) and vice-versa. There are arguments on both sides between federal and unitary systems on several key indicators that include: human development, economic performance, income inequality, democratic stability, quality of democracy, rule of law and anti-corruption campaign, and there is no meaningful difference in performance between the two.

Pilapil also suggests reform rather than overhaul for democratic countries with functioning systems. If there is no superiority of either one, why the need to overhaul? Institutional overhaul tasks are too institutionally and intellectually complex for the lofty goals that proponents talk about. From the enthusiasm of the 1990s there is a lot of sobering in the realization that actual empirical outcomes did not conform to the glowing theoretical predictions of reformers.

No democratic country with an existing unitary-presidential setup has been crazy enough to make these constitutional overhauls of form and systems at the same time, (like building a fully functioning political party system to replace political dynasties). There is, after all, the law of unintended consequences to contend with.

But suppose there are proposals that may be acceptable under other circumstances. Do the benefits from those changes exceed the costs of authoritarian powers to President Duterte even beyond his present term to 2022?

Some people say that the President suffers from illnesses like Narcissistic Personality Disorder” or NPD and of paranoia, which exaggerates threats to himself that is manifested in streaks of vindictiveness. I believe, though, that the issue about him is not “mental illness” but of “dangerousness,” especially if given total powers. And the costs of that on human rights, on social justice and on the economy far outweigh the benefits from the proposed charter change.

How then do we proceed?

First, we have to do our homework. Let us do a thorough and objective study of the ConCom recommendations, as well as the moves of the Congress in the weeks ahead. There may be constitutional reforms worth considering, assuming the government is willing to refine rather than overhaul, like judiciary reforms, voting of the president and vice-president in tandem, a run-off of the presidency. And then there are the major revisions by legislation of the Local Government Code – some 30 provisions arrived at in a nationwide consultative process in 2014 among the academe, LGU officials, central government officials, and NGOs.

Second: I believe that there is a statesman in every politician and it is up to us to find it in whatever way we can. Democracy is about dialogue and compromise. Maybe the President can be persuaded to consider alternatives that are not divisive and will directly help the poor without changing the form of government, assuming he has no other agenda.

If that approach fails, we would have a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, a battle in which education campaigns, legal activism, and intelligent advocacy would be more effective than sloganeering and street action calling for people power upheavals to bring a duly-elected president down.

We must not only be well-meaning; we must also be correct in our cause and in the manner of pursuing it.

Real change requires both a transformational leader and a transformational people. Every other combination would be dysfunctional to our objectives, such as:

• a transactional people and a transactional leader that is about bargaining about power and money. This may be our real situation today.

• a transactional people and a transformational leader, which would require a long-march; and

• a transformational people and a transactional leader that will result in revolution.

Real change requires us to all change. For real change to happen, our longer-term goal is a new generation of leaders who come from the poor.

This is not a time for silence or indifference, or self-censorship in a climate of fear and retribution. This is the time to think deeply about our future, to organize and to do something worthy of this country.

This is admittedly a difficult agenda. But we have done this before and we can do it again. We have fought five of the last six presidents on issues of principle and have won all of them. As a Pulitzer Prize winner reminds us, the only way people lose power is when they think they don’t have any. — Speech delivered at the PCIJ Forum on “Democracy & Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business”, July 5, 2018, Pasig City, Metro Manila


State of the PH in 2018: Why Must We Live Within the Truth?

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WHAT has happened to civil and political rights, and the rule of law, under two years of the Duterte administration?

What follows is the speech of Atty. Jose Manuel I. Diokno, dean of De La Salle University’s College of Law and national chairman of the Free Legal Assistance Group, at the forum on “Democracy and Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business” that was organized by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, in partnership with the Office of the Ombudsman of the Philippines and the Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, on July 5, 2018, in Pasig City, Metro Manila.
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IT’S QUITE a challenge to talk about civil and political rights and the rule of law under the Duterte Administration. There’s really no need to cite statistics, case studies, or other evidence. Everyone – whether for or against this administration – knows that the President is antagonistic to human rights and the rule of law.

When he was still campaigning for the presidency, Rodrigo Duterte told us: “Forget the laws on human rights. If I make it to the palace, I will do just what I did as mayor.”And that is exactly what he did when he took office, by unleashing a War on Drugs that has killed, according to his own administration’s 2017 Year-End Report, at least 20,322 men, women, and children—and counting. Once firmly ensconced in the Palace, he continued his tirade against human rights and human rights defenders with statements like:

• “One of these days, you human rights groups, I will investigate you. That’s the truth. For conspiracy.”

• “If it involves human rights, I don’t give a shit. I have to strike fear because the enemies of the state are out there to destroy children.”

• “The human rights (defenders) said I ordered the killings. I told them ‘OK. Let’s stop. We’ll let them (drug users) multiply so that when it’s harvest time, more people will die. I will include you (human rights defenders) because you are the reason why their numbers swell.”

He also banned a news organization from covering him because of what he called their “twisted” reporting, called for the abolition of the Commission on Human Rights, cursed United Nations human-rights rapporteurs and officials, and gave notice to the International Criminal Court that the Philippines was withdrawing from the Rome Statute.

Not content with his War on Drugs, he recently ordered a crackdown on “tambays” that has led to the warrantless arrest and detention of thousands and the killing of Genesis Agoncillo, mauled to death while in the custody of the police.

So I don’t have to tell you the state of civil and political rights and the rule of law under the present dispensation because it is obvious. There’s really no need to belabor the point. The sad reality is that the gains made by the human-rights movement from 1986 until 2016 have been all but wiped out. It appears that we have gone full circle. We find ourselves once again in a situation where human rights is a bad word and human-rights defenders are enemies of the State.

Why is this administration so antagonistic to human rights and the rule of law? Why is it blaming human-rights defenders for rampant crime when the reason why crime is so rampant has nothing to do with human rights and everything to do with our weak justice system – a system that has not delivered on its promise of bringing justice to the people? Instead of strengthening the justice system, why is this administration circumventing it by condoning if not encouraging “justice” from the barrels of guns instead of the gavels of judges?

Before I attempt to answer these questions I think it’s important that I address the notion that human rights and the rule of law don’t really matter because they are concepts that we imported from the West. I beg to vehemently disagree. Our language and our history show, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that we have a uniquely Filipino concept of justice. That our concept of justice is intimately connected with human rights. And that it is firmly rooted in fairness and equity.

In 1981, Ka Pepe Diokno observed that Tagalogs, Ilongos, Cebuanos, and Pampangos use the same word for “justice”: katarungan, derived from tarong, a Visayan word that means straight, upright, appropriate, correct. For us, therefore, justice means to act with rectitude, to do the morally right act.

Since justice, for us, means doing what is right or appropriate, it includes the concept of equity, for which we have no native word because it is already embedded in our concept of justice.

The word we use for “right”–karapatan–is derived from dapat, which means fitting, appropriate, correct. Justice and human rights, therefore, are intimately connected because they share the same meaning.

The English language is similar. Justice and right come from the same root word, ius. But katarungan is native to us, unlike the English term for justice, which is Latin in origin. Katarungan, moreover, embraces the concept of equity; the English word does not. Our concept of justice, therefore, is broader than the Western concept of justice.

How about “right” and “privilege”? While we have a native word for “right”— karapatan — we have none for “privilege” and instead use a Spanish derivative, pribilehiyo.

From this Ka Pepe concluded that “[t]he fundamental element in the Filipino concept of justice is fairness”; and that “privilege and naked power–two of the worst enemies of fairness–are alien to the Filipino mind.”

In summary, our language establishes:

• First, that we have our own distinctly Filipino concept of justice;

• Second, that it is “a highly moral concept, intimately related to the concept of right”;

• Third, that it is broader than the Western concept of justice, for it embraces equity;

• Fourth, that its fundamental element is fairness;

• And fifth, that it eschews privilege and naked power.

Not only our language, but also our history supports these conclusions. Our endless revolts against Spain, the wars we fought against the United States and the Japanese Occupation forces, and the crusade we mounted against a dictatorship can best be described, as Ka Pepe put it, “a continuous and continuing struggle to create a just society,” to attain self-determination, the collective aspect of human dignity.

To say that we imported the concept of human rights from the West ignores our language and our history, and insults our heroes who gave their lives so that we could live ours in freedom and dignity.

What I have said about human rights applies with equal force to the rule of law. “The rule of law,” according to Macquarie law professor Denise Meyerson, “is the opposite of the rule of power.” The rule of law is fairness in action. The rule of law is inherent in our concept of justice because the cornerstone of our concept of justice is fairness and equity.

Human rights and the rule of law are “two sides of the same principle, the freedom to live in dignity,” says the United Nations. The rule of law, it adds, “is the implementation mechanism for human rights, turning them from a principle into a reality.” The United Nations also says, “There is no rule of law…if human rights are not protected and vice versa; human rights cannot be protected…without a strong rule of law.”

Which brings me back to the questions I raised earlier: Why is this administration so antagonistic to human rights and the rule of law? Why is it blaming human rights defenders for rampant crime? Why is it condoning if not encouraging the use of guns to dispense justice instead of the gavels of judges?

I submit that the reason why this administration is so antagonistic to human rights and the rule of law is because human rights and the rule of law cannot co-exist with a government that operates on the rule of power.

I submit that the reason why this administration is blaming human-rights defenders for rampant crime is because it does not want us to realize that the only lasting solution to rampant crime is to strengthen our justice system, not short-circuit it.

I submit that the reason why this administration is condoning, if not encouraging, the use of guns to dispense justice is because, as Vaclav Havel once said, a government based on the rule of power thrives on fear and violence, seeks “to eliminate all expressions of non-conformity” and wants to consign our reason and conscience “to a higher authority.”

In a government based on the rule of power, the late Czech writer and statesman also said, “reality does not shape governance”. It is, he said, “governance that shapes reality,” that dictates what is true and what is not.

Our government tells us, for example, “there’s no such thing as EJK’s,” when we see poor people being killed left and right in the name of the War on Drugs.

Our government tells us, “no one is invading our territory,” when we see China taking over our seas and appropriating our fishermen’s catch as their own.

Our government tells us, “our legal system is working,” when we see a different kind of justice supplanting it, blasting from the barrels of guns.

Our government tells us, “we have a right to speak freely,” when we see those who criticize the administration attacked by trolls, shut down, or put in jail.

Our government tell us, “it’s all right to slut-shame women and put them down,” when we know in our hearts that it isn’t right to do that.

Our government is not only telling us these lies, it’s forcing us to pretend along with it – or as Havel put it, “to live within their lies.” Even if we don’t believe their lies, it’s enough that we accept our life under their regime. Because by doing so, we not only confirm the regime, we fulfill it. And in so doing, we embrace what Havel called the “world of appearances” that our government is foisting on us.

When Government wields power not so we may realize ourselves as human beings but to make us surrender our human identity in favor of the identity of the system, we are faced with a fundamental choice: to succumb to the system or stand up to it. To assert our rights or surrender them.

When Government forces its people to live within its lies, the only way to effectively oppose it is to live within the truth. Said Havel, once a dissident himself: “So long as living within the lie is not confronted with living within the truth, it will never be exposed.”

But he also said that when we live within the truth, we break through the façade of the system
and unmask the real nature of its power.

When we live within the truth, we expose the real problems that plague our society—problems that the regime has “hidden beneath a thick crust of lies”.

When we live within the truth, we reveal reality as it is, and allow others to see it as well.

When we live within the truth, we reclaim our inherent human dignity and self-worth.

That, said Havel, is the “singular, explosive and incalculable power” of living within the truth.

Some of us, despite the prevailing threats, fear, and violence, are already living within the truth:

• The young woman who stood, alone, in protest against the burial of a dictator in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

• The fisherfolk who, despite the pressure, revealed what is really happening in the West Philippine Sea.

• The bloggers who, despite of the vicious attacks by trolls, continue to tell it like it is.

• The journalists, who, despite the fear and the threats, continue to publish real stories about real people.

• The teachers, scientists, historians, and social scientists who, despite popular demand, practice independent scholarship and refuse to toe the government’s line.

• The human-rights defenders and relatives of victims who, at the risk of being victims of EJK’s themselves, continue to expose the arbitrary executions being done in the name of the War on Drugs and other gross violations of human rights.

Living within the truth under the harshest conditions is what made national heroes of Jose Rizal, Apolinario Mabini, and other courageous Filipinos.

When we live within the truth, we cast a powerful light that illuminates our surroundings and allows others to see the regime for what it really is.

This kind of illumination, said Havel, has “profound and incalculable consequences” – which explains why governments based on power “suppress the truth more severely than anything else.”

To live within the truth is to say, with conviction:

I do not believe in a political system that requires that I sacrifice my human identity in its name.

I do not believe in a political system that has no respect for human life and no regard for human dignity.

I do not believe in a political system that slut-shames women and treats them as lower beings.

I do not believe in a political system that stifles free expression and prevents human beings from developing to their full potential.

I do not believe in a political system that suppresses the truth and forces me to live within its lies.

All of us, at this very moment, can choose to live within the truth.

Havel wrote that “every free expression of life” — in literature, film, music, science, sports, education, photography, dance, or whatever it is you do – is an act of living within the truth.

Every assertion of our inherent human dignity, our longing for peace and harmony, and our desire for solidarity with others, is an act of living within the truth.

Every action that springs from our “authentic inner conviction,” Havel said, our innermost being, and our self-worth, is an act of living within the truth.

Every time we affirm our unique human identity, make use of our unique talents for others, and act “in the spirit of our own hierarchy of values,” we live within the truth.

Every time we lend a helping hand to those in need, to the weak, the vulnerable, and the oppressed, we live within the truth.

Every time we demand that justice be done and that the Constitution be respected, we live within the truth.

Living within the truth may not be easy. Living within the lies peddled by the government is much easier.

But which path will provide a lasting solution to our problems?

Which path will allow us to live, as Havel wrote, “freely in dignity and partnership”?

Which path will give us the space we need to bring our unique talents and abilities to full flower?

What is the truth about the society we live in? What do our people really desire from the bottom of their hearts?

While we may disagree on many things, there is one thing we all agree on, and long for: a just society run by a government whose officials are truly accountable to the people.

A society whose government officials are not corrupt and whose only interest is in serving the people.

A society whose government is capable of putting criminals behind bars and punishing them.

A society whose government respects human life and our inherent dignity as human beings, and which allows our people to bring their talents to full flower.

A society we can all be proud of.

That is a matter of vital importance that this administration is trying desperately to suppress by ramming its lies down our throats.

That is a matter of crucial significance that this administration is trying to conceal by using the barrel of the gun to dispense justice.

That is a matter of paramount concern that we must embrace if we truly want to see freedom and justice reign in our land. — Speech delivered at the PCIJ Forum on “Democracy & Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business”, July 5, 2018, Pasig City, Metro Manila

State of the PH in 2018: Our jails are now world’s most congested

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THE WAR on drugs and the mass arrest of the loiterers and the shirtless under the Duterte administration have triggered a monstrous humanitarian crisis: Philippine jails and detention centers are now the most overcrowded in the world, eclipsing erstwhile topnotcher Haiti.

In this report for the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, visiting professor Dr. Raymund Narag of Southern Illinois University’s Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice reveals fresh but worrisome data that he has gathered from his training seminars for jail personnel and nongovernment organizations working for the welfare of inmates.

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A HUMANITARIAN crisis is facing the Philippine corrections. The Philippine National Police (PNP) detention centers, the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) and provincial jails, and the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) prisons are not only full to the brim, they are teeming with emaciated and disease-carrying bodies.

On June 30, 2016, upon assumption of Rodrigo Duterte as President of the country, the BJMP population stood at 96,000 inmates or Persons Deprived of Liberties (PDLs). Now, two years and three State of the Nation Addresses (SONA) after, the BJMP population stands at 160,000 PDLs. That is a staggering growth of 64 percent in two years.

That population does not include the 30-percent increase in BuCor prisons, and the unquantifiable growth in PNP detention cells and provincial jails where data are scantly collected and tallied.

We are now officially the most overcrowded correctional facilities in the whole world: our 605-percent congestion rate is far ahead of Haiti’s 320 percent, the second most crowded.

In some jails, it is even worse: the Quezon City Jail Male Dorm has a rated bed capacity of 286; it now has 3,911 inmates, meaning it is over-congested by 1,000 percent, even after many other PDLs had already been transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex in Bicutan, Taguig.

Other jails have recorded 3,000-percent over-congestion. With the current rate in which the police are arresting drug users and tambays, the population growth will continue to rise.

This humanitarian crisis has taken a massive toll on the physical and mental health of the PDLs.

In the Quezon City Jail Male Dorm alone, around three to five inmates die every month due to simple and easy-to-treat diseases like manas (swelling), rumbu-rumbu (skin diseases), as well as heart attack — all because of lack of ventilation and lack of access to medical care.

In the whole Metro Manila, around 40 PDLs die every month in the different BJMP jails.

Unrecorded tragedies

Death rates are worse in PNP detention centers, though most of these go unrecorded. Most PNP cells are single detention cells where 50 to 100 PDLs are cramped in cells designed for four to six people; additionally, PNP does not have a budget for food and medicines for detainees, unlike the BJMP and the BuCor, both of which have a budget of PhP60 per day per inmate for food.

Last week, a flesh-eating skin disease struck the Manila Police District Station 9 and killed a PDL shortly after he was transferred to the Manila City Jail Male Dormitory. The crowding also leads to violence among inmates causing the death of Genesis ‘Tisoy’ Argoncillo, a tambay arrestee, in the hands of two veteran inmates.

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Click to view video: Narag_Jail Congestion_PCIJ

Aside from the deaths, a number of inmates have acquired highly communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, red eyes, and small pox in the detention and jail facilities due to the face-to-face proximity.

The Department of Health (DOH) should be alerted of the many new cases of communicable diseases acquired by PDLs that could be transmitted to many others once the PDLs are released. The DOH should declare a state of calamity in the local detention centers and jails.

De facto punishment

The sudden growth of the PDL population has also overwhelmed our criminal-justice system. The number of the local courts, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers has mostly remained stagnant. As such, despite the best efforts of the Supreme Court to speed up the disposition of cases, criminal-trial proceedings still flow slowly.

Innovations in the judiciary aimed at speeding up the process have included the Continuous Trial, where judges are instructed to conduct marathon hearings, and the Task Force Katarungan and Kalayaan (TFKK), where BJMP paralegal officers identify Detainees of Interest (DOI) or detainees who have exceeded three years of stay in Regional Trial Courts (RTC) and six months in Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTC) and alert their respective judges. And yet data from the BJMP Jails show that, on average, PDLs stay in jail for 372 days from time of detention until disposition.

Around 20 percent of the PDLs have stayed in jail for at least two years. Some inmates stay in jail for more than 18 years, only to be acquitted. Ironically, it takes longer to be acquitted than to be convicted. This suggests that time in detention has become a de facto mechanism to punish PDLs.

One inmate in Bohol District Jail has so far spent 15 years in jail, 10 years of which went by without his having a trial. As of this writing, that inmate is still undergoing trial and presumed innocent.

Court actors are also suffering the consequences of the sudden PDL population growth and should not be blamed for the delay of cases. Despite their best efforts, they are in a bind.

Interviews with judges suggest that they, too, are physically suffering from their heavy caseloads. In urban areas, judges can be handling as many as 2,000 to 3,000 criminal cases at a time. This number does not include civil and administrative cases filed in their salas. Two judges also share one prosecutor and one public defender. Worse, they can be assigned in multiple jurisdictions.

Deepened distrust

Judges work triple time just to keep their caseloads manageable. They schedule 20 to 30 trials a day, spending their weekends writing decisions, compromising their social, physical, and mental health. Many judges, prosecutors, and public defenders also get promoted or transferred while hearing cases, while others resign or die before the cases are done. Any change in personnel easily translates to six months to one year of delay for the inmates.

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Click to view video: Narag_Overwhelmed Courts_PCIJ

The delay in cases has deepened the distrust in the criminal justice system. As a coping mechanism, PDLs try to shorten the hearings, find ways to elude the system, exploit opportunities to bribe police, prosecutors, and judges, and pay off guards.

Interviews with PDLs suggest that they want to undergo the whole trial proceedings squarely; yet, they also know that they are already punished even if they are not yet found guilty. Worse, legal and extralegal opportunities are usually acquired by PDLs with resources, thus furthering the belief that is it only the poor that are carrying the brunt of the inequities of the justice system.

Broken justice system

For most people unaware of its dynamics, case delay is a manifestation of a broken justice system, which furthers their legal cynicism. Thus, the following narratives have been socially accepted: it is okay to kill criminals and drug users if they are caught in the act, if they are given a warning and did not change, if caught numerous times, and if they will simply evade arrest and conviction. These public sentiments also justify lengthy detention in horrible, humanitarian-crisis conditions. The President himself has articulated it: let them suffer in detention centers, jails, and prisons.

Unnoticed in the public support for massive incarceration is the financial toll to the society. While the budget per inmate is pitiful, when aggregated, it still drains our limited resources.

The budget per inmate per year is PhP74,000, which is double the tuition of students in public colleges and three times the budget in elementary and secondary education.

With the conservative estimated increase of 100,000 inmates from detention centers, jails, and prisons for the past two years, the government spent PhP2.9 billion for food alone. That does not include the operational cost to run the facilities and the lost economic contribution of the detained workforce, which is way higher.

Social, financial toll

What has led to this humanitarian crisis?

It is the President’s belief that the detention centers, jails, and prisons should be as difficult as they can be to serve as a deterrent to future criminals, drug dealers, and users. He believes that by sending them to jails and prisons, they will learn from their mistakes and make amends. And for the incorrigible, those who continue to use drugs despite repeated warnings, and those who they resist arrest and fight the police, the President has repeatedly encouraged the law enforcement to use deadly force.

The President’s underlying and unstated policy, usually incoherently mumbled in different speeches is: I am going to protect my beloved country at all costs. As he has curtly, and repeatedly, stated: If you destroy my country, I will kill you.

Two years on, has such a policy made a dent? Are all the arrests and deaths, the social and financial costs associated with the war on drugs worth it? Have we become more peaceful? Are the horrible inhuman facilities deterrent to crime?

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Click to video video: Narag_Govt Shortcomings_PCIJ
For a punishment to be an effective deterrent, it must be swift, severe, and certain. The offender should understand that the punishment is intended for him or her. It means that for the horrible inhumane detention in jail and prison facilities to be a deterrent, it must be imposed swiftly, severely, and with certainty. The offender should also understand that the horrible inhumane facility is intended for him or her. If not, then all of these massive arrests and killings will not make a difference. It will simply drain our country’s human resources without changing the root causes of the problems.

Interviews with PDLs suggest that this is the case. From their perspective, it is not a deterrent to whatever behavior or act it was that got them into trouble. When asked if they voted for Duterte during the presidential elections or if they support him upon winning, they overwhelmingly report yes. Most PDLs say they voted and support him because of his staunch action against drugs. They say that they concur to the notion that drug users deserved to be killed.

When asked what brought them to jail, 75 percent point to drugs. But while many admit to being drug users, all claim that when the police arrested them, whatever evidence was used against them was planted.

When asked why they continue to use drugs when so many have already been killed and arrested, they say, “Hindi naman kami ‘yung addict na sinasabi niya (We aren’t the addicts the President is referring to).” Or, “Paminsan-minsan lang naman kaming gumagamit (We use drugs only once in a while).” Or, “Gumagamit lang kami para suportahan ang trabaho (We use drugs only to keep our energy up for work).”

In their mind, the message is not for them; it is for someone else – “Sa iba ‘yun!” The President’s technique of othering — “basta’t hindi ka addict, safe ka” (as long as you are not an addict, you are safe)” — also applies to them. Thus, they don’t feel threatened and they continue to do drugs.

Coupled with the delay in case proceedings (lack of swiftness) and the erroneous police methodologies (lack of certainty), the PDLs don’t see a connection between their drug use and the punishing conditions (lack of severity). Massive killings and arrests, and overcrowded jails and prisons therefore have no deterrent effect when it comes to perennial drug users.

More meaningful tracts

Admittedly, this qualitative information is anecdotal, and more interviews need to be conducted before one can generalize the findings. Still, this puts in to question the utility of horrible correctional facilities as deterrents to crime and drug use.

More importantly, it suggests that other more meaningful tracts need to be entertained by the highly popular President to effect change in the criminal-justice system.

He can start by improving the correctional conditions, increasing the number of court actors, and professionalizing the police, jail, and prison services.

He can adopt the principles of effective correctional management where PDLs are properly classified, housed and treated while in jails and prisons, so they can later be released as responsible citizens of the country. He can use many advocates of jail and prison reforms as partners who share his frustrations about the justice system but offer more humane approaches.

He can also permanently halt the wanton arrests of tambays and drug users.

These policies have created a monster in our criminal justice system, a monster that is used to justify the use of more punitive policies. This humanitarian crisis has afflicted our correctional system, and will all haunt us down the road, three more SONAs from now. — PCIJ, July 2018

Duterte’s 3rd: What The People Would Have Wanted to Hear

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Civil, political rights

A FORTNIGHT AGO, a policy forum on the state of “Democracy and Governance in the Philippines: Deficit, Surplus, and Unfinished Business” was conducted by the PCIJ, in partnership with the Office of the Ombudsman of the Philppines and the Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition.

To flesh out inputs from the resources persons — Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales, Atty. Christian S. Monsod, Atty. Jose Manuel I. Diokno, and Dr. Emmanuel S. de Dios — the forum organized the 100-plus participants from civil society organizations, media, academe, and government into four workshop groups to discuss specific policy and action reforms they deem relevant and urgent.

The forum served as well as a cursory audit of what issues the participants wish could be address in third State of the Nation Address of President Rodrio R. Duterte.

Each group was tasked to define topic-specific policy issues that should be underscored by the Duterte administration, as well as specific action steps that must be undertaken at various levels and by different stakeholders. No guide questions were provided but the organizers designated group facilitators to assist the workshop objectives. A third of the forum participants signed up for the workshop that lasted for two hours. Each group later reported to the plenary a summary of their discussions.

The reports of the workshop groups follow, with comparative notes on what were addressed in part or in whole, or not addressed at all, in the President’s third SONA.

Workshop.2 Civil and Political Rights

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(Workshop Participants: Greenpeace, Public Services Labor Independent Confederation (PSLink), CEU/DZMM, Nightwatch, Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department (CPBRD)-House of Representatives/ Facilitator: Sunshine Serrano, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines)

Weak realization of human rights as well as low public awareness of what these rights are were pinpointed as topmost concerns by the group assessing civil and political rights and the rule of law.

The participants also highlighted increased “securitization” as an issue in civil and political rights. This is particularly concerned with government programs or directives such as “Oplan Tokhang” and “Anti-Tambay” that the government and the police have projected as measures to protect the security of citizens. As a result, people swayed by the justification eventually let go of certain civil and political rights in exchange for “security.”

Yet, the participants noted, the poor implementation of laws and policies remains a problem, especially since there seems to be a double standard in the application of rules and regulations. To the participants, erring rank and file employees in the public service sector are more likely to face consequences for their actions than high-ranking officials.

According to the participants, there seems to be a widening gap in terms of equity and fairness in the implementation of laws and policies.

One policy they cited was that against tambays that resulted in another wave of arrests and detentions of people coming from poor communities. The police, obviously, won’t look for tambays in posh subdivisions, said the participants.

The group’s viewpoint is that lack of proper enforcement of laws erodes confidence of the people in laws. Coupled with limited to no access to redress mechanisms, institutions expected to carry out justice are perceived to be perpetrators themselves, while those who seek redress are attacked and killed, resulting in a creeping culture of fear.

The participants noted, too, that people are less likely to realize or assert their civil and political rights these days even as their economic rights diminish as well. To the group, thus, communicating rights issues and raising the level of critical thinking are urgently needed so that the public would not only appreciate their rights, but also assert them. These in turn call for concerted efforts in mobilizing communities and educational institutions to inform and educate the public on human rights.

But the participants observed as well that there is now diminishing civic space for discussion of issues. This is due to attacks on press freedom, using the Internet as a weapon with the rise of trolls, limited access to information, and the proliferation of misinformation and disinformation.

According to the 2017 Oxford University study “Troops, trolls and troublemakers: A global inventory of organized social media manipulation,” some USD200,000, or around PhP10 million were used to hire 400 to 500 trolls to spread propaganda for then presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte and target his opposition. The report said that “many of the so‐called ‘keyboard trolls’ who were hired to spread propaganda for Duterte during the election “continue to spread and amplify messages in support of his policies” now that he is in power. Responding to this through media interviews, Duterte has admitted he may have spent PhP10 million for trolls during the elections, but that now he has “no need to defend himself against attacks.”

Those who may be in need of defense against attacks may in fact be members of the media. In May 2018, the Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR), National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), and PCIJ reported a total of 85 cases of attacks and harassment against the press in the first 22 months of the Duterte administration. This included at least nine deaths. Since the report was published, at least four more deaths have been reported.

At the same time, the media often face difficulty when requesting for information or documents, not in the least because of the continuing lack of a Freedom of Information Law. The situation has become even more complicated, however, with the enactment of the Data Privacy Act.

Consequently, the group considers a media and information literacy campaign to be a vital measure that must be undertaken – one that engages the academe and other yet untapped sectors, and encourages international solidarity – with the end view of building a community that agrees on common ground in fighting for civil and political rights. As well, the participants think the media should start looking into its own shortcomings and address of issues of corruption and unethical behavior, and more importantly, do better journalism.

As specific policy action points for the government, the group suggested these:

• Rule of law should apply to all regardless of who you are;
• Review and consider revising obsolete provisions in existing laws;
• Streamline the due process mechanism;
• Strengthen institutions;
• Government transparency and accountability is important; and
• There should be an accountability mechanism for non-implementation of laws.
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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON THE DRUG WAR
“…the war against illegal drugs is far from over.”
“…the illegal drugs war will not be sidelined. Instead, it will be as relentless and chilling, if you will, as on the day it began.”
“If you think that I can be dissuaded from continuing this fight because of [your] demonstrations, your protests, which I find, by the way, misdirected, then you got it all wrong.”
“Your concern is human rights, mine is human lives.”
“Human rights to me means giving Filipinos, especially those at the society’s fringes, a decent and dignified future through the social and physical infrastructures necessary to better their lives.”


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Workshop. Economy and Business

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS POLICY REFORMS
(Workshop Participants: Freedom from Debt Coalition, United Nations Development Programme, and Action for Economic Reforms/ Facilitator: Joy Chavez, Action for Economic Reforms)

Deficits on transparency, accountability, and participation in governance were identified as the overarching concerns with regard to economic and business policy reforms. The group observed difficulty in monitoring how economic and business policies are crafted, as well as how these are implemented.

The participants said that stress should be given to more democratic participation of people in governance even as they emphasized that Duterte’s “populism” is not the way to go. The incompetence of some government officials was also identified as an issue affecting economic and business policies.

Foremost of the specific issues identified by the group are the unexpected and unintended consequences of instituted economic policies or reforms such as the TRAIN Law. This includes the high inflation rate and its impacts on the poor and basic sectors, and redistribution issues.

According to Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) data, the headline inflation in the country increased by 5.2 percent in June 2018. This is 0.6 percent higher than the previous month’s 4.6 percent and 2.7 percent higher than the 2.5 percent headline inflation in June 2017. The June 2018 inflation rate is also all-time highest since 2013, based on PSA data.

The participants also highlighted the government’s failure to protect the rights of consumers and workers from predatory practices of companies, such as profiteering, laying off of workers, and increases in prices beyond the excise taxes, among others. Then again, the group identified a lack in clear policies and programs on job generation and industrial policy as major concerns in economic and business reforms. While there are existing roadmaps on certain industries such as those of copper, furniture, and automotive, the participants noted that no policies exist to rationalize the integration and development of these industries as well as address the weakness of the country’s agricultural sector.

Meanwhile, the group described as “selective” the government’s focus on energy investment projects since it leaves out other economic sectors. The participants called the implementation of the anti-contractualization policy on certain firms as “selective” as well. Too, the group raised concerns on the implementation issues and dangers of the Build, Build, Build program, particularly on:

• Debt generation (Official Development Aid vs. Public-Private Partnership);
• Non-participation of people in the planning of projects;
• Transparency issues; and
• Involvement of Chinese ODA/money.

Lastly, the participants shared their concern on the implications of human-rights issues on the country’s economic prospects. The war on drugs and “anti-tambay” policy of the government has had an impact on investment and business confidence, they said. It is important, they stressed, to craft a national action plan on business and human rights to provide additional protection and standards for people, government, environment, and business.

As specific policy action points, the group identified the following:

• More transparency on the plans- disclosure on what have been implemented;
• Address the impacts of TRAIN: e.g. arrests and sanctions against firms found to be violating workers’ and consumers’ rights, in the guise of TRAIN impacts;
• Have a clear roadmap to address selectivity issues, lack of industrial policy and job generation;
• Review the impacts of these policies (e.g. E.O. 30, establishing the Energy Investment; Coordinating Council or EICC) on key sectors such as indigenous people (IPRA);
• More proactive disclosure of information
o Transparency on the status of loans
o Public disclosure on who is building and using the money;
• Passage of FOI law and Deepening FOI Practice;
• Pursue the enactment of a National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights and its implementation, with the rights of people as primary consideration
o rights of workers
o rights of consumers
o rights of communities
o government as duty-bearer to see this through; and
o More platforms for constructive engagements and discussions

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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
“…we shall continue to assert and pursue an independent foreign policy. Our long-term national development and national security goals come first.”
“We shall continue to reach out to all nations regardless of their prevailing political persuasions or proximity to or distance from our shores so long as these nations wish us well.”
“Our stronger bonds with our ASEAN friends have made possible our trilateral border patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia, which has since then put out of business sea pirates, piracy and other terrorists who used to infest our shared seas.”
“Our re-energized relations with China has (sic) also led to an unprecedented level of cooperation between our nations on the war against transnational crimes.”
“Our improved relationship with China, however, does not mean that we will waver in our commitment to defend our interests in the West Philippine Sea.”
“Opening lines of communication and amicably managing differences have led to positive developments that include renewed access of Filipino fishermen in the areas in dispute in the Philippines — West Philippine Sea.”


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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON LABOR ISSUES
“We strongly condemn the deaths and abuses experienced by Filipino migrant workers in the hands of their foreign employers.”
“It is for this reason that we are continuing to work with the host nations to ensure the welfare of our countrymen. I appeal to all host governments to help us, as true and dependable partners, in this endeavor.”
“Our campaign against Endo has resulted in the regularization of more than 300,000 workers as of early this month. On May 1 of this year, I signed Executive Order 51, which sought to protect the workers right to security of tenure.”
“I understand that this does not satisfy all sectors. I share their sentiment; I truly do. Much as I would like to do the impossible, that power is not vested upon me by the Constitution.”
“That is why I add mine to their voices in asking Congress to pass legislation ending the practice of contractualization once and for all.”
“I urge you Congress to convene the [bicameral] conference committee and pass at the soonest possible time the bill establishing the Coconut Farmers’ Trust Fund.”

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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON RICE PRICE AND SUPPLY
“To help stabilize rice prices, we also need to address the issue of artificial rice shortage. “
“I am directing all intelligence agencies to unmask the perpetrators of this economic sabotage and our law enforcement agencies to bring them to justice.”
“We need to switch from the current quota system in importing rice to a tariff system where rice can be imported more freely. This will give us additional resources for our farmers, reduce the price of rice by up to 7 pesos per kilo, and lower inflation significantly.”

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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON TAX REFORM AND TRAIN LAW
“I applaud Congress for the timely passage of the TRAIN law. You have made funds available to build better roads and bridges, and improve health and education, and strengthen our safety and security.”
“Some have incorrectly blamed our efforts toward a fairer tax system for all the price increases in the past months, and some irresponsibly suggesting to stop TRAIN’s implementation. We cannot and should not.”
“TRAIN is already helping poor families and senior citizens cope up with rising prices.”
“I am committed to a comprehensive tax reform, and I ask Congress to continue the job.”
“The enactment of the Package 2 is what stands between today and millions of jobs in the near future.”
“By the end of July 2018, all 5 packages of my tax reform would have been submitted to Congress. Apart from TRAIN, rice tariffication, and Package 2, they include the mining, alcohol, and tobacco tax increase, reform in property valuation, reform in capital income and financial taxes, and an amnesty program. I urge Congress to take them seriously and pass them in succession…

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Workshop. 2 Federalism and ESCR

FEDERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
(Workshop Participants: CODE-NGO, UP College of Social Work and Community Development, Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, National Economic and Development Authority, CPBRD – House of Representatives, and Philippine Press Institute / Facilitator: Eirene Aguila, Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition)

To the group, the top and crucial question regarding the proposal to shift to federalism is whether or not the country is ready for it, considering the capacity (or lack thereof) of the proposed federal states to grow economically, reduce poverty, and to govern themselves.

The group also questioned the government’s ability to roll out and trickle down the conversation and discussion on federalism to the grassroots level.

A recent report of the PCIJ revealed that only three of the proposed federated regions — National Capital Region (Metro Manila), CALABARZON, and Central Visayas – have local revenue collections larger than their Internal Revenue Allotment or IRA from the national government. The rest of the 15 regions remain largely dependent on their IRA shares to sustain their most basic operations. With the shift to federalism, these 15 regions would have to fight it out to survive.

The group’s sense was that there is a need to bring the draft federal bill to the grassroots level for consultation. But this has become moot since the draft federal constitution drawn up by the Consultative Committee was approved by President Duterte last July 10 and is now in the hands of Congress.

Nonetheless, the group among other things also thought it fair to seek clarity on the impact of federalism on issues related to environmental management, delivery of social services, rural development, and promotion and protection of economic, social, and cultural rights, among others. They broke these down further into:

Environmental Management
• Management and control of local environmental resources;
• Effects on land, water, forest, and mining; and
• Who gets to exploit environmental resources.

Rural Development
• Initiatives to enhance capacity of LGUs/federated regions;
• Relation to Bangsamoro, effect on Mindanao; and
• Vertical/horizontal relations.

Delivery of Social Services
• Division of labor and assignment of powers: role of local and role of national;
• Effect on healthcare service: availability of medicine, procurement/contracting, healthcare financing, universal health care and coverage;
• Effect on education;
• Politicizing delivery of services;
• Exacting accountability from three levels of government under federalism;
• Determination of national standards, existence of minimum standards for delivery of services;
• Information and Communication Technology (ICT) policy standards, information systems readiness; and
• Relation and role of private sector in the federal system.

Promotion and upholding Economic, Social, and Cultural rights:
• Progressive realization and basic minimum of ESCR; rights-based development planning;
• Are there minimum standards already for ESCR?; and
• Constitutional and legal frameworks for ESCR under federalism.

The participants agreed that there could be a lot more things that will be in the realm of confusion should the federal shift push through. As such, the group said that there should be more intelligent advocacy, meatier discussions, and deeper appreciation of scenarios – whether to retain the current system or shift to federal system.

Opportunities for detailed and timeline-based discussion with civil society organizations and their respective sectors must be carried out, the participants said, and avenues that will allow sectors and groups to raise questions, and share concerns and information, should be pursued.
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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON ISSUES IN MINDANAO
“…Mindanao pauses at the crossroads of history. One road leads to harmony and peace; the other, to war and human suffering.”
“Despite all that has been said [for] or against the Bangsamoro Organic Law by all sectoral groups, I make this solemn commitment that this administration will never deny our Muslim brothers and sisters the basic legal tools to chart their own destiny within the Constitutional framework of our country.”
“To me, war is not an option. We have been through the catastrophe in Marawi. We have seen the horror, the devastation, and the human toll and the displacement of both Christians and Muslims alike.”
“I have made a pledge that ISIS terrorists or groups or its allies will never gain foothold in our country.”

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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
“What has happened to Boracay is just an indication of the long-overdue need to rationalize, in a holistic and sustainable manner, the utilization, management, and development of our lands.”
“I therefore urge the Senate to urgently pass the National Land Use Act to put in place a national land use policy that will address our competing land requirements for food, housing, businesses, and environmental conservation. We need to do this now.”
“…we, in the Cabinet, have approved for immediate endorsement to Congress the passage of a law creating the “Department of Disaster Management,” an inter-agency — just like FEMA.”
“My policy in the utilization of these resources is non-negotiable: the protection of the environment must be top priority and extracted resources must be used for the benefit of the Filipino people, not just a select few.”
“To the mining industry, I say this once again and maybe for the last time, do not destroy the environment or compromise our resources; repair what you have mismanaged.”
“Again, I warn irresponsible miners, along with their patrons, to stop destroying our watersheds, recharge areas, forests, and aquatic resources.”
“I exhort all concerned agencies and local government units to uphold the concept of intergenerational responsibility in [the exploration] and utilization of our mineral wealth, the protection and preservation of our biodiversity, anchored on the right to a balanced and healthy ecology.”

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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON HEALTH ISSUES
“We are currently institutionalizing the unified implementation of the “No Balance Billing Policy” through which the government and our private healthcare providers can work out a system that will provide an order of charging of medical expenses.”
“Much needs to be done to improve our healthcare system, which remains highly fragmented, resulting in disparity in health outcomes between the rich and the poor in the urban areas and rural.”
“We shall pool all our resources for health services under the [PhilHealth]; institutionalize primary care as a prerequisite to access higher level of healthcare; and supplement human resource gaps of the LGUs through a National Health Workforce Support System.”
“…I urge the speedy passage of the Universal Health Care Bill”

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WHAT DUTERTE SAID IN HIS 3RD SONA: ON CHARTER CHANGE
“I have no illusions of occupying this office one day longer than what the Constitution under which I was elected permits; or under whatever Constitution there might be.”
“I therefore consider it a distinct honor and privilege to have received earlier from the Consultative Committee that I created, the draft Federal Constitution that will truly embody the ideals and aspirations of all the Filipino people.”
“I am confident that the Filipino people will stand behind us as we introduce this new fundamental law that will not only strengthen our democratic institutions, but will also create an environment where every Filipino—regardless of social status, religion, or ideology—will have an equal opportunity to grow and create a future that he or she can proudly bequeath to the succeeding generations.”

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Workshop.2 Combatting Corruption

CATCHING CROOKS AND AVERTING CORRUPTION
(Workshop Participants: Office of the Ombudsman, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism/ Facilitator: Czarina Medina-Guce, Institute for Leadership, Empowerment, and Democracy)

Save for the facilitator and the PCIJ staff, the group for this topic was made up of representatives of the Office of the Ombudsman. They said that while the Ombudsman has established a zero-backlog goal in the disposition of cases, it has had to deal with the issue of “inordinate delay” and the so-called “Condonation Doctrine” being used as a shield by officials facing charges.

In 2017, the Office of the Ombudsman asked the Supreme Court for a clear definition and ruling on “inordinate delay,” as well as to issue a temporary restraining order on the Sandiganbayan for acquitting respondents based on the Inordinate Delay Doctrine. The Supreme Court then ruled that “inordinate delay” should include fact-finding investigation, which is contrary to the opinion of the group – you do not have a case yet when you are in the fact-finding phase, said the participants.

The Condonation Doctrine, meanwhile, presupposes that when a public official is elected into office by the electorate, the latter has complete knowledge of the any and all administrative misconduct of the said official and that this suits them fine still.

Apart from these, the group said that the Office of the Ombudsman has had “cooperation problems with some agencies,” contributing to delays in investigations.

Still, the Philippines has been going down Transparency International’s corruption-perceptions index in the last few years. The index ranks countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople. It uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. In 2015, the country scored 35 and ranked 95th of 168 countries. The Philippines scored the same in 2016 but went down to 101strank of 176 countries. By last year, it gained a score of 34 and was at 111 out of 180 countries.

The participants said that there is still a greater need in corruption-prevention measures that include all stakeholders, including government agencies, students and the academe, and civil-society organizations at the local, national, and international levels. Greater awareness must be achieved among all Filipinos, they said, adding that awareness-raising activities must include knowledge on procurement policies, since many cases filed are related to violations of these.

Particular policy actions identified by the group were:
• Update on case filed questioning the ruling of the Supreme Court on inordinate delay. Take a second look of existing jurisprudence;
• Abandonment of Condonation Doctrine relative to elective officials. Re-election should no longer obliterate an official’s previous administrative liability;
• Review provisions in Bank Secrecy Law;
• Pass the Whistleblower Protection Act;
• Do away with preliminary investigation in forfeiture/asset recovery cases.Reverse the Marquez ruling, which prevents the Ombudsman from looking at bank accounts;
• Enforcement of an Ombudsman order by the House of Representatives, i.e. case of Deputy House Speaker Gwen Garcia, who was ordered dismissed by the Ombudsman last February but who remains in her seat;
• Strengthen MOA/Joint investigations with Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, Anti-Money Laundering Council, Philippine National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Department of Justice;
• Increase awareness and compliance of officials, especially of local government units, of the Government Procurement Reform Act; and
• Build capacity of investigators and prosecutors.
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WHAT DUTERTE SAID in his 3rd SONA: ON CORRUPTION
“Time and again, I have stressed that corruption must stop.”
“One day, justice will catch up with those who steal government funds. And when that day comes, it will be the public who will have its retribution.”
“Our people deserve efficient, effective, and responsive government services. They deserve nothing less.”
“…make your living from the pockets of the people, and you have a lousy and corrupt bureaucracy.”
“I have friends and political supporters whom I appointed to public office and then dismissed or caused to resign.”

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The Tripoli Agreement of 1976: Lessons, impact on the Mindanao peace process

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A FORTNIGHT AGO on July 27, 2018, President Duterte signed Republic Act No. 11054 or the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) that was finalized by the Senate and the House of Representatives bicameral conference committee, and which enrolled some amendments to the draft submitted by the Bangsamoro Transition Committee. A ceremonial signing event was held on Aug. 6, 2018. But the seminal document covering the peace process in Mindanao, The Tripoli Agreement, was signed in 1976, or over two generations ago. This guest article offers the backstory of negotiations for peace and development in Southern Philippines.

Ceremonial signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law at Malacanan Palace on Aug. 6 2018, Photo by King Rodriguez, Presidential Photo

Ceremonial signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law at Malacanan Palace on Aug. 6 2018, Photo by King Rodriguez, Presidential Photo

ALMOST 42 years ago, an important document signed in Tripoli, Libya became a benchmark in the history of the Mindanao peace process. On 23 December 1976, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) signed the Tripoli Agreement, which created the first autonomous region in the southern Philippines.

More than just providing for the first autonomous region in Mindanao, the Tripoli Agreement symbolized the highly indefinite, open-ended and circuitous nature of the Mindanao peace process. The agreement also signalled the beginning of the internationalisation of intrastate conflict resolution in the Philippines, a departure from the so-called ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) convention of non-interference into member states’ internal conflicts. The new strategy involved the facilitation and mediation of international bodies like the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the good offices of a foreign government—that of Libya.

As the very first peace accord signed between the Philippine government and a Moro rebel group, the Tripoli Agreement was only a small step, but it was hoped it would be an important step in the right direction—towards lasting peace in the Bangsamoro, then in all of Mindanao and eventually in the entire country. Unfortunately, the accord started what became a protracted peace process on the wrong foot, and for the wrong reasons.

Considered one of the world’s longest-running internal conflicts, the armed hostilities in the southern Philippines involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and different iterations of Moro rebel groups, starting with the MNLF, which was created in the early 1970s.

After the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, some of the founding members of the MNLF, such as Ustadz Salamat Hashim, decided to form their own group. Part of the MNLF delegation present in Tripoli For the signing of the agreement in December 1976, Ustadz Hashim led the MILF from its founding years until his death in 2001.

A pyrrhic victory

As signing an agreement with the MNLF at the urging of a global power like the OIC was no small concession for Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the agreement was considered a pyrrhic victory for the MNLF and a breakthrough for peace. However, it provided only false hopes to Philippine peace constituencies and did not fulfil its promise.

By 1977, a breakaway faction, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), announced their existence and launched offensives against Philippine government forces. The MILF claimed to be more moderate than the MNLF, stating that their struggle was aimed at attaining ‘genuine autonomy within the sovereignty of the Philippines’. In contrast, the MNLF’s battle cry demanded independence from the Philippine state.

As noted earlier, the Tripoli Agreement was a benchmark in the long history of the Mindanao peace process. For one, it firmed up the MNLFs’ position of belligerence vis-à-vis the Philippine government. This distinctive position came with the added bonus of the MNLF’s being accorded observer status in the meetings of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a status that continues to the present day. For another, the Tripoli Agreement was evidence of the Philippine government’s acquiescence to a geopolitical game changer—the increasing political power of certain OIC countries, almost all of which were awash in black gold or oil.

It is widely known that President Marcos decided to seek Libya’s intercession after he learnt of the dwindling oil and fuel reserves in the Philippines at that time. Then and now, the country has been dependent on the Middle Eastern oil-rich member countries of the OIC for its oil supply. The OIC, which saw how Muslims were suffering during Marcos’ martial law, had earlier threatened an oil embargo on the Philippines should the latter refuse to start peace talks with the MNLF.

Ceremonial signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law at Malacanan Palace on Aug. 6, 2018. Photo by King Rodriguez, Presidential Photo

Ceremonial signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law at Malacanan Palace on Aug. 6, 2018. Photo by King Rodriguez, Presidential Photo

Wily strategist

President Marcos consented to sign a ‘peace agreement’ with the MNLF under the aegis of the Libyan government, then headed by Muammar Qaddafi. After a series of meetings with Philippine government representatives, led by no less than the First Lady at that time, Imelda Marcos, Qaddafi facilitated the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976.

However, wily strategist that he was, President Marcos found the means to hoodwink the MNLF into signing an agreement filled with provisions that lacked clarity in terms of future implementation, for example, mantra-like phrases such as ‘to be discussed later’, ‘to be fixed later’ or ‘to be determined later’. Eleven of the agreement’s nineteen provisions ended with either ‘to be discussed later’ or ‘to be fixed or determined later’.

For instance, the provision on the integration or ‘joining’ of MNLF forces to the Philippine military was to be ‘discussed later’. This specific provision started with a statement that defense and national security were the concern of the national or central government. This was a devious way of seemingly consenting to the demands of the other party to share in the powers of maintaining national security, but without operationalizing the granting of authority since the ‘joining’ of the MNLF to the Philippine military forces was to be ‘discussed later’. Opportunities for ‘later’ discussion of MNLF integration were not made available until after the signing of the Final Peace Agreement in September 1996.

Interminable wait

The sad consequences of the vague wording were that the ‘fixing’ or ‘later discussion’ stretched to an almost indeterminable time, spanning more than three decades and three presidential terms (1976 to 1996). And nothing was really ever fixed, even after former president Fidel V. Ramos initiated the peace process that led to the signing of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the MNLF on 2 September 1996.

However, nothing was ‘final’ in the Final Peace Agreement. The guns of the MNLF may have been silenced, but a few hours after the FPA signing, the MILF launched its first major offensives in various areas of Mindanao where they enjoyed substantial support. These offensives signalled the need for a further peace process to be considered by the government, this time with a ‘new’ player—the MILF. To make matters worse, the series of retaliatory actions by the Philippine government in response to the MILF offensives created a distraction or detour that impeded the implementation of the full provisions of the FPA.

Incremental gains

After more than 17 years of painstaking negotiations with the Philippine government (1996–2013), the MILF seemed to have succeeded in forging several peace accords, including a new Tripoli Agreement signed in 2006. All the accords that provided incremental gains for the MILF can be subsumed within two major agreements: the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), signed in 2012, and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), signed two years later in 2014. The CAB incorporated all the unimplemented provisions in previous agreements, including those in the FPA and the original Tripoli Agreement.

The CAB provided for the creation of a body that was to formulate the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which was in keeping with the substantial provisions of the CAB, the result of bilateral efforts between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF peace panels.

A CAB-compliant BBL was supposed to be approved in the Philippine Congress in mid-2015, but the infamous Mamasapano tragedy, a serious and bloody distraction, occurred on 25 January 2015. Forty-four members of the Special Action Force (SAF) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and twenty-four individuals, including women and children, lost their lives during the execution of Oplan Exodus, a PNP operation against suspected Malaysian terrorist Zulkiflin bin Hir (aka Marwan) and his close aide, Basit Usman. Marwan had earlier embedded himself among the Maguindanawon communities in a remote barangay of Mamasapano town, allegedly teaching local terrorist groups how to manufacture improvised explosives.

The marshland part of the town is popularly known as a ‘hotbed’ of various armed groups, including the MILF, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (a breakaway faction of the MILF), guns for hire and other lawless elements. The SAF elements reportedly carried out Oplan Exodus without coordinating properly with the Joint Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities (JCCCH), created after the signing of several peace accords between the GPG and the MILF. The JCCCH is one of several peacekeeping bodies composed of elements from both the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the MILF to ensure that the terms of the peace accords are kept and hostilities are avoided while peace talks are going on.

Mamasapano tragedy

It was early dawn of 25 January 2015 when fully armed SAF swooped down on shanties in the area, believed to be where Marwan was sleeping. The PNP reported the operation as a ‘partial’ success: they killed Marwan, but Basit Usman escaped. But they paid a heavy price for their limited success in the death toll: 44 members of SAF and 25 civilians. The PNP, however, reported a different profile of the dead: 44 SAF, 18 MILF and five civilians. It was also believed that some MILF fired at the SAF causing their deaths.

After the tragic incident, the members of a predominantly Catholic House of Representatives renounced their previous statement of support for the first version of the CAB-compliant BBL. Consequently, almost all members of both the lower chamber (House of Representatives) and the upper chamber (Senate) condemned the incident, placing the blame on the MILF for the deaths of the 68 individuals.

With the assumption to office of the current Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, several peace advocates had high hopes that the CAB-compliant BBL, temporarily shelved after Mamasapano and the exit of former president Benigno S. Aquino III, would be enacted. Duterte, who is from Mindanao, had promised prior to his election that he would address the ‘historical injustices’ against the Bangsamoro by expediting the passage of the BBL.

Towards the last quarter of 2016, President Duterte created another Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) to draft a new version of the BBL that would get the nod of the two legislative houses. The new BTC was inclusive of both the MNLF and MILF as well as representatives of government and the indigenous peoples.

Download (PDF, 11.08MB)

Carpet-bombed Marawi

A new BBL version was ready to be submitted when another distraction happened: the Marawi siege, which began on 23 May 2017. People’s optimism was again transformed into pessimism and despair.

For five months, a major part of the city of Marawi was ‘carpet bombed’ (President Duterte’s description of the air strikes) on a daily basis, almost destroying the city’s infrastructure. The strikes were in retaliation for the offensive launched by a ragtag group of ‘terrorists’ called the Maute Group, believed to be supporting the internationally feared terror group ISIS. In support of the massive and aggressive military action against the Maute, President Duterte also declared martial law in Mindanao, a situation that eerily harked back to the dark days of Marcos’ martial law in the 1970s.

Despite a series of lobbying efforts and some community-based consultations, the new BBL version garnered very little support from legislators. Both houses of Congress mangled the BTC version and further undermined the intent of granting genuine autonomy to the Bangsamoro—the main reason for all the previous agreements, especially the Tripoli Agreement.

Lessons from history

The fate of the new BBL version now hangs like the proverbial sword of Damocles in the hands of a bicameral committee tasked with reconciling the conflicting upper and lower house versions of the BBL. Peace advocates see only a tiny ray of hope in the members of this Congressional committee, many of whom are known to hold deep prejudices against the Bangsamoro.

More than four decades after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976, with all the twists and turns in the longstanding Mindanao peace process, there seems to be no hope in sight that the armed struggle of the Moro rebel groups will yield substantial gains in the Bangsamoro’s quest for self-determination.

Would the present peace process and the passage of a truly CAB-compliant BBL have succeeded if the circumstances surrounding the signing of the first Tripoli Agreement had been ‘proper’? Would the present context of the peace process have changed if the Tripoli Agreement had had a rational grounding, i.e. an understanding that it was time to address the long years of historical injustice and the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people rather than buttress the political interests of a dictatorship?

Such rhetorical questions lead us to a future that will recycle the lessons of history that have never been learnt.

* Rufa Cagoco-Guiam is a retired sociology professor at the Mindanao State University – General Santos city. This essay was commissioned by the Sharjah Art Foundation and first published for the exhibition ‘A Tripoli Agreement’ (July 14 – September 1, 2018) curated by Renan Laru-an.

The PowerChina puzzle: Newly registered ‘domestic firm’ bids for P17-B Marawi deal

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LAST JULY 2, after being declared ineligible to bid for the multibillion-peso contract to rebuild Marawi City’s conflict zone or “most affected area (MAA),” a consortium led by a China state-owned enterprise filed a motion for reconsideration with the Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM).

As of this writing, the Task Force has yet to decide with finality on the consortium’s motion. Yet on the same day that the motion for reconsideration was filed, TFBM began negotiations with another group, also led by a China state-owned enterprise.

Power Construction Corporation of China Ltd. (PowerChina) — through a newly registered “domestic” firm called PowerChina Corporation of the Philippines (PCPC) — heads the new consortium that is reportedly the “second-best proponent” for the massive Marawi rehabilitation project. Initially, PCPC wanted to snare the deal for PhP19 billion or PhP3 billion more than what was put forth by the first consortium.

But which of the 331 subsidiaries and 346 branches of PowerChina, the “ultimate parent company,” is actually bidding for the rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Marawi’s 250-hectare “conflict zone”?

The online Data Cloud service of Dun & Bradstreet Hoovers, which “delivers the world’s most comprehensive business data and analytical insights…on 300 million business records, from more than tens of thousands sources,” even shows that PowerChina has 678 “corporate family connections” in all.

The Task Force is not clear about which PowerChina entity it is dealing with, and the documents that PCPC has submitted so far are no help either.

Last June 5, 2018, PCPC registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a “domestic corporation” with three Filipinos listed as incorporators and shareholders. They reportedly invested PhP18 million each, or PhP54 million in all, representing 60 percent of PCPC’s PhP90-million subscribed capital, hence its “domestic corporation” status. As taxpayers, though, the three Filipinos are classified as “employees” only.

Another 39 percent or PhP35.83 million of PCPC’s equity came from PowerChina International Group Ltd. — again a subsidiary of PowerChina the parent company — and the puny balance of 0.2 percent from two Chinese nationals, Zhao Zhihao and Si Yang, with only PhP90,000 each in equity.

PCIJ’s validation with various agencies show that PCPC was on its third week of negotiations with the TFFBM’s selection committee when it enrolled as a registered taxpayer last July 21, and when it secured its business permit from Makati city hall last July 23.

And because it has hardly started operations, PCPC is still not registered with the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS) as a supplier, and has no license as yet from the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB). Documents at the SEC show its date of incorporation as April 6, 2018.

PCIJ.-THE-POWERCHINA-CONSORTIUM,-aug-2018_gp

NorthRail a lesson

The folly of closing deals with subsidiaries of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as had happened in the botched North Luzon Railways Corp. (NorthRail) project should serve the Task Force an abject lesson.

The project had run into serious trouble on many levels: the contract for Phase 1 of the project was awarded without bidding; the contract price was on the high side; the project’s scope of work was too broad and flabby; the contractor had finished only 15 percent of the project after six years and, failing in its bid to get a bigger budget for the project, decided to reduce and revise the project scope of work; the contractor is a mere subsidiary or operating unit of a China SOE.

It was in 2003 when the Arroyo administration awarded the contract without bidding to China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) or CNMEG, the firm designated by China to get the deal. The project was funded with a US$400-million loan from the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim).

By 2010, CNMEG had accomplished only 15 percent of the NorthRail project and in the same year had changed its name to China National Machinery Industry Corp. or Sinomach.

CNMEG had sought and secured an amended contract that increased the project cost from US$421.050 Million to US$593.88 Million, and extended project completion date from February 2010 to June 2012.

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Immune from suit?

Because of supposed project revisions and delays, the Aquino administration in 2012 cancelled the supply contract for the NorthRail project. Saying the cancellation was “not justified,” Beijing threatened to declare the Philippines in default of its loan and submitted the case for arbitration proceedings in Hong Kong.

In its motion for the dismissal of the case, CNMEG argued that Philippine courts “did not have jurisdiction on its person, as it was an agent of the Chinese Government, making it immune from suit, and the subject matter, as the NorthRail Project was a product of an executive agreement.”

To avoid being declared in default, however, Manila in 2012 agreed to pay Beijing installment amounts on more than half the total loan that had already been disbursed, or US$180.8 million plus annual interest of three percent. Last year, Duterte’s Cabinet members managed to settle the issue with both Manila and Beijing agreeing to mutually give up their claims on the project.

Ironically, the National Housing Authority (NHA), which will now sign for the government in the proposed contract for Marawi’s MAA rehabilitation, had also played a lead role in the NorthRail fiasco. NHA was assigned by then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to manage a PhP6.6-billion resettlement program for the 40,000 families from Malolos City and five towns of Bulacan who had been displaced by the NorthRail project. See related PCIJ story: “Nightmare at NorthRail”

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Legal flaws, red flags

What happened with the failed NorthRail project should be a timely prompt for the Bangon Marawi Selection Committee (BMSW) to also scrutinize the data and documents that have been submitted by PowerChina, the second proponent consortium for the city’s MAA projects.

As it is, PCIJ’s research with various state agencies show that the “PowerChina” entity that is now bidding for the Marawi contract seems to be no better prepared or proper with its documentary submissions than the Chinese SOE leading the first consortium; neither does it seem to show more qualifications to take on the MAA project in what is the capital of Lanao del Sur.

On many counts, PCPC as an entity bears many legal flaws and posits red-flag issues. Some of its shareholders are apparent dummies. It has not registered to be a supplier of goods and services for the government. It has no track record and therefore no license as yet as a contractor. It even has a record of abandoning contracts with local corporate partners.

Too, it has had no operations as yet. Still, while it has only PhP90 million in subscribed capital by the date of its incorporation, it has proposed to roll out the Marawi MAA proposal at an initial cost of PhP19 billion — now supposedly down to P16.8 billion — via a joint-venture agreement with government.

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Bank doc from Beijing

Yet, last July 25, PCPC submitted to the Task Force a number of documents, including “Proof of Successfully Undertaken Projects,” “List of Contractor’s Equipment Units,” and “Bank Certification showing available funds amounting to 605 million renminbi,” which is equivalent to about US$88.38 million or PhP4.72 billion.

Curiously, instead of securing the certification of available funds for the project from a domestic bank, as is typically required for contracts signed and sealed locally, PCPC’s certification came from a Bank of China branch in Beijing.

The Public-Private Partnership Governing Board, in its Resolution No. 2017-08-03 dated April 19, 2018, prescribed that for unsolicited proposals for projects like the Marawi MAA contract, the proponent entity must pass the following “Financial Qualification Requirements”:

* “Have (1) a Net Worth or (2) a Set-Aside Deposit, the amount of which is a significant percentage of the indicative project cost of the Unsolicited Proposal; and /or

* “Letter testimonial from one or more domestic universal/commercial banks or one or more international banks with a subsidiary/branch in the Philippines or any international bank recognized by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas ‘BSP’ attesting the financial capacity must be covered by a certification of available funds the Proponent and/or members of the Consortium (if the Proponent is a consortium) are banking with them and that they are in good financial standing, and qualified to obtain credit accommodations, the amount of which is a significant percentage of the indicative project cost of the Unsolicited Proposal.”

The PPP Resolution requires that “the sum of (i) and (ii) should be equal to the indicative project cost of the Unsolicited Proposal. In addition, the Proponent may be required to submit a Project Financing Plan, which may include the amount of equity to be infused, debt to be obtained for the project and sources of financing.”

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Employees on board

The consortium of PCPC, PowerChina International Group Ltd., and FINMAT International Resources Corp. altogether have financial assets that would amount to no less than PhP150 million. This would include PCPC’s PhP90-million subscribed capital, FINMAT’s total assets of PhP43.46 million as of 2016, and the still unvalued one-percent investment of PowerChina in the consortium.

The three Filipinos on PCPC’s board — Ma. Realeza C. Estenoso, Meichel V. Silvestre, and Rieza Decena — have not assumed lead roles in the firm’s negotiations with Task Force Bangon Marawi. Instead, it is Zhao Zhihao — who introduces himself as “Jacky Zhao” — who leads the negotiations with Task Force Bangon Marawi as “the representative with authority from PowerChina.”

PCIJ was unable to find more details about two of the Filipinos on PCPC’s board. Estenoso’s digital trail, meanwhile, shows her to be an employee of Sinohydro B7 Corp., a subsidiary of PowerChina the parent SOR, is named as PCPC treasurer. PCPC’s registration papers with SEC show no other company officers; the rest of the Filipinos and Chinese in the firm are mere “directors.”

PowerChina entities, too

PCIJ research, however, found that at least five other entities or apparent subsidiaries of PowerChina, the parent company, have located in the Philippines since 2015.

Two entities — P.C. Guizhou EPC Phils. Inc., which registered with SEC in July 2017, and PowerChina International Group, which registered with SEC in October 2017 — hold office at the same office address of PowerChina Philippines Corp. on the 21st floor of Equitable Bank Tower, 8751 Paseo de Roxas, Bel-Air, Makati.

Another PowerChina-related entity, Powerchina B7 Philippines Corp., which registered with SEC on Nov. 2, 2015, holds office at a condominium in Malate, Manila. But what it has in common with PCPC is an incorporator and shareholder: Ma Realeza C. Estonoso.

PowerChina B7 Philippines Corp. lists Estenoso as its representative and board member with a PhP6-million investment or 30 percent of its subscribed capital of PhP40 million as of February 2016.

In the PCPC, the PowerChina entity negotiating with Task Force Bangon Marawi, Estenoso is listed as treasurer with PhP18 million in shareholdings. Her total investments in the two PowerChina entities amount to PhP24 million.

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Invalid TINs

Yet another PowerChina entity, Powerchina International Group Limited, under the name Powerchina Philippines Representative Office registered with the SEC on Oct. 20, 2017 as a “foreign stock” entity for “Other Svc. Activities.”
And then there is Sinohydro Corp. — a major subsidiary of the mother SOE PowerChina — that had secured a “License to Transact Business in the Philippines” from as early as Jan. 5, 2007. At that time, Sinohydro issued a bank certification that it had deposited US$45,465.46 or PhP2,227,807 at prevailing exchange rate at a local bank.

Apart from Estenoso, two Chinese nationals — Li Hongliu and Dou Zhaochuan — and four Filipinos are listed as incorporators and shareholders of PowerChina B7 Corp. Three of the four Filipinos listed their address at Lanao del Norte, including one with subscribed capital of PhP1.6 million and another with PhP4.4 million.

But PCIJ’s check with regulatory agencies showed that two of the Filipino investors had invalid taxpayer identification numbers, while the TIN of a third Filipino investor was not updated.

In addition, the parent SOE, Power Construction Corp. of China Limited (PowerChina), is not registered with the SEC, and thus cannot not do business in the Philippines. On PCIJ’s request, the SEC issued a certificate of non-registration by PowerChina as July 16, 2018.

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Not on PhilGEPS, PCAB

All apparently related subsidiaries or operating units of the parent SOE PowerChina, the six PowerChina entities in the Philippines share some more things in common: None of them is registered with the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS) as suppliers as of August 2018. None of them has secured a license with the Philippine Contactors Accreditation Board (PCAB) as contractors, as of June 2018.

There is also no PowerChina-related firm listed in PhilGEPS list of bid and award notices from 2000 to first quarter of 2018.

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According to the Housing and Urban Development Council Secretary General Falconi V. Millar, who also chairs the Task Force’s selection committee, PowerChina Philippines Corp. — as “a Filipino corporation” submitted on the last week of July one ring bond of documents, including a 45-page Proposed Draft Joint Venture Agreement, List of Contractor’s Equipment Units, and Proposed Master Plan for the Recovery, Reconstruction, and Rehabilitation Projects in the Most Affected Areas of Marawi City.

A week later, on Aug. 6, PCPC submitted its “Consortium Agreement” covering itself, representing 60-percent share in the Consortium; Power Construction, one percent; and FINMAT International Resources, Inc. (FIRI), 39 percent.

FINMAT has a Triple-A contractor accreditation with PCAB (valid from June 30, 2018 to Dec. 20, 2020), and a “Platinum” supplier registration status with PhilGEPS valid until March 24, 2019.

Reynaldo Carlobos De Jesus is president of FIRI, which began operations in February 1997 and was once registered as FINMAT Marketing.

According to the company’s website, “FINMAT was involved in marketing and small-scale projects from counter top installation to toilet tiling” and “by 1998, started to engage in architectural finishes such as drywall partition, gypsum and acoustic ceiling, and tiling works for small-scale construction.”

“The company grew by leaps and bound over the next few years; hence, in 1999 to early quarter of 2014, FINMAT became busy in the construction of commercial, offices, condominium, banks, high end residential in exclusive subdivisions and villages for a quality plumbing, glass, electrical and civil works,” company’s website added. It was during the same period that FIRI said that it was “accredited by owners/contractors such as Robinson Land Corporation, SM Land Development Corporation, SM Development Corporation, Empire East Land Holdings Inc, to name a few.”

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Total assets: PhP43.56M

In 2015, FINMAT said, it was awarded the architectural and structural works for the Manila Bay Resort Project, paving the way for securing its ISO certification and PCAB accreditation.

SEC records show, however, that FINMAT registered as a stock corporation only on March 17, 2000. Its listed office address at No. 371 Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Barangay Caniogan, Pasig 1606 is just a townhouse/apartment unit by make and size.

And while its accreditation and registration papers seem to be in order, whether FINMAT’s financial capacity would be sufficient to support its 39-percent share in the PowerChina-led consortium begs further evidence.

In its latest financial statement for 2016 filed with the SEC, FINMAT said it had total assets of only PhP43,556,777.

Its total paid-up capital is PhP60 million, including PhP21 million from Reynaldo de Jesus (PhP15 million) and PhP6 million combined from six other Filipino incorporators; and PhP39 million from an entity called DJS Holdings that lists as its address FINMAT’s office address.

In the last two months, online job-hunting sites show about two dozen job openings at FINMAT for civil engineers (plumbing), geodetic engineer, architect, CAD operator, electrical engineer. FINMAT reportedly has projects in Davao City and Cebu City.

Office of FINMAT International Resources Corp. in Caniogan, Pasig City

Office of FINMAT International Resources Corp. in Caniogan, Pasig City

Wholly state-owned

To be sure, the parent company PowerChina is a huge conglomerate. It ranked No. 182 in the 2017 Fortune’s Global 500 List, and has reportedly 186,234 total employees. Its revenues last year reached US$53.87 billion, but its profits came to only US$946.7 million, down 10.5 percent from 2016.

According to a financial outlook report posted on Wall Street Journal online, in 2017 PowerChina, a listed company, marked a decline in its capital expenditures by $73.14 billion, while its free cash flow slid by P67.3 billion. Its cash flow per share rose by a third of a percent, but its free cash flow per share went down by 4.40 percent. Wall Street Journal said that PowerChina had only 131,091 employees.

As of March 2018, the report said that PowerChina had cash and short-term investments of US$69.41 billion, a significant US$270 billion in total debt, US$487.29 billion in total liabilities, US$76.37 billion in total shareholder’s equity, and 4.86 book value per share.

PowerChina’s official website says that it is “a wholly state-owned company that was set up in September 2011 on the basis of 14 provincial/municipal/regional electric power survey and design, engineering and equipment manufacturing enterprises formerly affiliated to Sinohydro Group Ltd, HydroChina Corporation, State Grid Corporation of China, and China Southern Power Grid Company Limited.”

Two years later in 2013, PowerChina said it already “consists of Sinohydro Corporation with 32 subsidiaries, HYDROCHINA Corporation with 12 subsidiaries, China Renewable Energy Engineering Institute, 12 survey and design institutes, 23 construction companies, and 18 manufacturing and maintenance companies.”

PowerChina says that its ranks “42nd among the Top 500 Enterprises of China; fifth in the list of the world’s 250 largest global contractors, and placed second among the top 150 engineering design companies worldwide.” Its major subsidiaries Sinohydro, HydroChina, SEPCO III and SEPCO have quickly risen in the roster of the world’s top contractors and design firms, it added.

For five consecutive years, PowerChina says, it “has been evaluated as a Grade A enterprise by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.” — With research by Karol Ilagan, PCIJ, August 2018

Bangon Marawi? Rush to seal deals locked in delay, confusion, funds lack

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SINCE last May, the task force leading the government’s efforts to rebuild the Islamic City of Marawi in Lanao del Sur has been setting and resetting groundbreaking rites for a multibillion-peso, 22-component project under its “minimum scope of work” in the 250-hectare “conflict zone” or the city’s “most affected area” (MAA).

Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) has rescheduled the groundbreaking rites for seven times now. The latest target date for the event is this September 19. By the Task Force’s record of extended negotiations in the last 10 months, however, the chances of that pushing through are slim. Unfortunately, that would mean that the 350,000 residents displaced and dispossessed by a war not of their own choice or liking may have to wait some more before their city is able to rise again and their lives can return to normal.

Amid the impatience and disgust of the displaced Meranaw, the Task Force is reportedly poised to announce shortly a strategic shift in its procurement mode to fast-track projects for Marawi’s MAA.

Instead of submitting all 22 components of the “minimum scope of work” for Marawi’s ground zero to a joint-venture agreement (JVA) with a private consortium, the Task Force may soon conduct a negotiated procurement for two urgent components: debris management and road infrastructure.

In a series, 12 other components deemed to be “non-income generating” will be bidded out, also via negotiated procurement. That would mean leaving only eight components deemed to be “profitable” or with some promise of income, to be covered by the JVA with the private consortium.

But money, billions of it, which government must guarantee would be available and be covered with budget authority, is the first requirement of the shift to negotiated procurement. Marawi’s MAA projects have no allocations as yet in either the current 2018, or in the proposed 2019, national budgets.

The options are few: public funds will have to be re-aligned for Marawi’s MAA projects from elsewhere, or a supplemental budget might have to be submitted and passed by Congress. Either way, Marawi’s displaced and dispossessed might have to brace for further delays.

“This is not delay, we are just updating indicative, tentative timelines,” TFBM chairman Eduardo del Rosario insisted in an interview with PCIJ. “We are doing everything possible.”

“We will still meet the deadline for the projects to be completed until last quarter of 2021,” he also said.

Fifteen months ago, on May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo R. Duterte had launched massive military operations against Islamist militants in Marawi. By “liberation day” six months later, the 8,407-hectare home of the Meranaw had been carpet-bombed, reduced to a hamlet of about 10 to 15 million tons of debris, a wasteland. More than 1,000 lives were lost, including those of at least 47 civilians.

The government pledged to do its best to rebuild the Islamic city and help it recover in the quickest time possible. It even convened an inter-agency task force for that purpose in June last year while the fighting was still going on, before replacing it with the TFBM four months later.

But nearly a year after the conflict ended, Marawi remains in ruins. In the meantime, the selection committee tasked to choose the entity to undertake the project is mired in major issues that divide or confound its seven members – among whom is the TFBM head — its consultants from the Public-Private Partnership Center (PPP), and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).

‘Quick but legal’

The seven-person Bangon Marawi Selection Committee (BMSC) also serves as the bids and awards committee of TFBM. It is authorized to conduct negotiations and select private partners for the joint venture envisioned in the Marawi rehabilitation project.

“Quick but legal” – that is the goal, BMSC head Falconi V. Millar had told PCIJ.

The committee’s speed in accomplishing its work, however, has been hindered by one worry after another, topmost of which is whether or not to revise the procurement guidelines and scope of work it had prescribed and set out to enforce.

Option 1 is to include all 22 components of its original “minimum scope of work” in a joint-venture agreement (JVA) with a private consortium as its guidelines so state. Option 2 is to go not only for a combined JVA with a private consortium for the eight “profitable” components, but also a negotiated procurement for 14 other components with little or no promise of future income. That change in scope of work, though, would certainly require funding by government for the 14 “non-profitable” components if these would be submitted to negotiated procurement.

No budget cover

The Task Force has not enrolled these components as expenditure items in the proposed 2019 general appropriations act, however. It would not thus be unable to request or provide budget cover for them, unless it could move Congress and heaven and earth to secure supplemental funding before yearend.

This year, only PhP10 billion has been allocated for projects outside Marawi’s conflict zone. In the proposed 2019 general appropriations act, only PhP3.5 billion has been proposed for projects to rebuild Marawi (a portion of the budget for the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council) apart from PhP1.5 billion more for the reconstruction of military camps.

The total funding required for Marawi’s full revival in the next five years, however, has risen and fallen from an initial estimate of PhP51.64 billion last February to PhP70.42 billion and then PhP73.42 billion in June, to PhP62.26 billion in July, and PhP86.4 billion this month, according to statements of NEDA and TFBM officials.

In all, until 2022 — according to a master plan that the government seems to keep revising and updating to this day — Marawi would need about PhP47 billion for projects outside the conflict zone, about PhP17.2 billion for projects in the MAA, PhP20 billion in compensation for the properties destroyed in the siege (excluding PhP882 million specifically for mosques), and PhP1.2 billion for livelihood. The master plan is a virtual shopping list of “800 priority programs, projects, and activities” that would be implemented by various departments and agencies.

At a press conference last June, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) said that the hefty bill that Marawi requires includes PhP26.15 billion for physical infrastructure; PhP5.87 billion for social services; PhP10.38 billion for housing settlements; PhP7.77 billion for livelihood and business development; PhP1.25 billion for local governance and peace-building; and PhP2 billion for land resource and management. The MAA projects to be covered by a separate JVA are not included as yet in this budget breakdown.

Financing for the projects will reportedly come from public funds, grants and donations from national and multilateral donor agencies, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and the float of “Marawi Bonds” that is still on the drawing board of the Department of Finance.

National Treasurer Rosalia de Leon had told PCIJ earlier that the government was thinking of pegging the “Marawi Bonds” as partial compliance with the Agri-Agra Reform Credit Act of 2009 (Republic Act No. 10000), which requires private banks to allocate up to 25 percent of their loanable funds for the agri-fisheries sector, including agrarian reform beneficiaries. De Leon added, though, that government has yet to pitch the “Marawi Bonds” concept with the banks, and it might take months or until next year to finalize it before any launch schedule could be announced.

On July 16, Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez in a press statement had also said that the government was thinking of issuing the bonds in several tranches as retail treasury bonds “so that people will really feel that they are participating in the rebuilding of Marawi City.”

“The tenor of the bonds would depend on market conditions and the issuance might be PhP10 billion a year, with the government probably end(ing) up raising maybe PhP40 billion of the PhP62-billion total rehabilitation cost,” Dominguez said.

Inertia, inexperience

Money, however, is not the only problem the BMSC has to deal with when it comes to Marawi’s MAA projects.

Indeed, inertia hounds BMSC’s work in part because of the lack of experience in the procurement of general construction and civil-works projects by a majority of the seven BMSC members who include loyal, long-term Duterte associates.

Task Force chair del Rosario (who is also Housing Secretary), for example, is a retired general who knew Duterte from 1983 when he was an Army lieutenant and later Task Force Davao commander in 2000. Del Rosario had also served as secretariat head of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council.

National Housing Authority (NHA) Administrator Marcelino P. Escalada Jr. — who had served with Duterte since 1995 as human-resource officer, special-projects head, planning and development officer, and city administrator of Davao City – meanwhile will sign on to the contract with the MAA contractor.

By mandate, NHA and the housing agencies under del Rosario have expertise largely in “housing finance, housing regulation, housing production, and institutional development.” See related story here: “A majority of Duterte allies will pick Marawi’s ground-zero contractor”
Unruly rules

The problems faced by the Task Force and the selection committee are far more complicated, and have included rules that have had to be revised and now reviewed for possible splitting of the 22 components of the scope of work for the MAA contractor.

Duterte’s Executive Order No. 49 dated Feb. 5, 2018 had exempted the Marawi conflict zone project from NEDA’s Guidelines on JVAs supposedly “to expedite the implementation of recovery, reconstruction, and rehabilitation projects in the most affected areas of Marawi City.”

Nearly a fourth or 24 of Marawi’s 96 barangays make up “ground zero” or the “most affected area” — bombed to the ground, rendered uninhabitable — even as the rest of the villages sustained widespread damage to private, commercial, and public structures and facilities.

But instead of rushing negotiations on the JVA for the ground-zero projects, the exemption from NEDA’s rules has put Task Force Bangon Marawi in a state of legal limbo. It has had to revise, improvise, and update its own rules on eligibility and documentary requirements for project proponents, and push back deadlines for their submission of documents. See related story here: “A patchwork of sketchy plans, loose rules, uncertain funding”

Consortium 1 out

In the case of the Bagong Marawi Consortium or BMC, the Task Force undertook eligibility check toward May and June 2018 only, or months after del Rosario had repeatedly announced since December 2017 that it was likely to be granted “original proponent status” for the MAA deal. BMC had quoted a P16-billion tab on its proposal.

In the case of a newer proponent, another consortium, the eligibility check commenced ahead of the review of its JVA proposal.

The BMSC spent five months, from December 2017 to June 25, 2018, in negotiations with BMC, led by a China state-owned enterprise (SOE), which was later disqualified for reported failure to meet technical and financial requirements.

BMC, Notice of Termination, 25 June 2018

And then for over two months now since July 2, BMSC has been conducting negotiations with a second consortium led by another China SOE; the talks will end on Aug. 24, barring further delays that the proposed splitting of the 22-component scope of work could trigger.

The Task Force’s row with the first proponent, BMC, is far from over though. BMC, led by China State Construction Engineering Corp. Ltd and its Philippine entity partner, Future Home Co. Ltd. (a company based out of Tacloban City that sells prefabricated, lightweight concrete houses, and other construction materials) has filed with the Task Force a motion for reconsideration of its disqualification.

FS in Chinese

In a letter dated June 18, 2018, the Task Force terminated its negotiations with BMC because of its “inability to submit legal, technical, and financial documents in proper form, to prove the Consortium’s Legal Capacity, Technical Capacity, and Financial Capacity — all requisites to participate in the Joint Venture Activity as prescribed in the JV Guidelines.”

Task Force chair del Rosario told PCIJ that BMC’s eligibility was denied because it had submitted financial statements in the Chinese language, and managed to show proof of only PhP900 million in a bank certification of funds available for the project, or way below the PhP4.8 billion or 30 percent required for its PhP16-billion proposal for the MAA.

On June 22, 2018, the consortium wrote the BMSC to clarify what “eligibility requirements” were needed, and to indicate its intention to file a motion for reconsideration or MR.

On June 25, NHA chair Escalada replied: “We maintain that BMC, with the information available, may pursue any proper remedy, including the filing of an MR, upon receipt of a letter of Termination of Negotiations… dated 18 June 2018.”

“Needless to say,” Escalada continued, “your letter of 22 June 2018 does not toll the prescriptive period for filing an MR, which will expire on 27 June 2018.”

He also said, “We would like to emphasize the fact that BMC is, up to this day, unable to submit its eligibility requirements in proper form.”

BMC Notice of Failed Negotiations 18 June 2018

MR still pending

BMC filed an MR or motion for reconsideration anyway; as of this writing, the BMSC has not ruled with finality on the appeal. The matter has reportedly been referred to “ADB (Asian Development Bank) consultants” assisting the committee. Final decision on the MR had been scheduled last Aug.18, but a “lack of a quorum” forced a resetting to an uncertain date.

PCIJ asked Future Home’s president, Ramil Joselito Tamayo, about the status of his consortium’s MR. On July 30, 2018, he replied: “I would like to inform you that the MR is still pending resolution by the BMSC, and we are constrained from disclosing its contents, as it might jeopardize our legal remedies.”

“Further, all project information at this point is proprietary,” wrote Tamayo. “Once the Project is awarded to a proponent (whether it is BMC or another entity), then the details may be made public for transparency. Hoping for your understanding.”

Clearly, though, the Task Force’s selection committee had headed off to a new round of negotiations with a second proponent, the consortium led by the Power Construction Corporation of China Ltd. or PowerChina, even before it could decide with finality on the MR filed by the first proponent, BMC.

And yet, by PCIJ’s research with various regulatory agencies, PowerChina seems to be no better prepared or proper with its documentary requirements. Neither is it more qualified to take on the MAA project through a subsidiary that just recently registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as “a domestic corporation” with no operations as yet and only P90 million in subscribed capital. (See related story: Unlocking the PowerChina puzzle)

Del Rosario, however, remains upbeat. He also told PCIJ: “The negotiations have been very tedious, we work even on weekends. I don’t think the Selection Committee has been remiss in its duty.” — With research by Karol Ilagan and John Reiner Antiquerra, PCIJ, August 2018

DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects

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Build, Build, Build, homepage

IN THE TWO years since he assumed office and promised to usher in a “golden age of infrastructure”, President Rodrigo R. Duterte has put money where his mouth is. Boasting that, by his term’s end in 2022, multiple roads, bridges, ports, and airports will rise across the nation, his “Build, Build, Build” program now has a potential bill upwards of PhP8.4 trillion that will come from public funds, private monies, and loans.

By a Cabinet secretary’s account, Duterte is simply unstoppable when he wants to get something done. First christened “Dutertenomics,” the mammoth Build, Build, Build program currently has tens of thousands of civil-works contracts bidded out, apart from multiple multibillion-peso big infrastructure projects partly funded by official development assistance (ODA) or loans from China, Japan, and other bilateral partners.

This dwarfs the infrastructure frenzy under one of Duterte’s predecessors, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who is said to have had an “edifice complex” so bad that roads and bridges were being built at a speed that would make it possible for her to inaugurate one or two in her visits to the provinces week on week.

As a result, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) during the Arroyo administration bidded out 27,535 civil-works contracts in eight years, from 2000 to 2008. But this has turned out to be just 60 percent of the Duterte administration’s total projects bidded out, which come to 44,000 in all, according to DPWH Secretary Mark A. Villar, in a mere 24 months, from July 2016 to July 2018.

If Villar’s number is correct, that total redounds to an average of 1,833 DPWH projects awarded monthly, or 60 projects daily. Apart from roads and bridges, DPWH is also building schools, flood-control systems, and water systems, while other agencies are constructing irrigation, power systems, as well as ports, airports, and other civil-works projects.

Like Arroyo – now the Speaker of the House — Duterte has proclaimed his massive infrastructure program as an anti-poverty antidote. He wants, he has said, to build infrastructure and bolster industries so he can create jobs and curb poverty by nearly half, or from 21.6 percent in 2015 to between 13 and 15 percent in 2022.

In addition, like Arroyo and all presidents before him, Duterte has promised that his projects and administration would be rid of corruption. “I assure you,” he had said at the launch of his socio-economic agenda in 2016, “this will be a clean government.”

DVO-Most-Favored_05_PCIJ

Regressive results

But contractors, current and former officials, procurement experts, and affected citizens interviewed by PCIJ have separately offered guarded to cynical prognoses about Build, Build, Build. Indeed, most say that the program could be falling or crashing down due to its own massive weight, and is now yielding not progressive but regressive results after two years of Duterte.

Not surprisingly, they also say that corruption remains a formidable feature in many of the projects that are supposedly aimed to improve the lives of people.

“Year 1 marks the launch, the testing period, for Build, Build, Build,” said an executive of a big contractor. “Year 2 is when it unravels and encounters problems. By Year 3, the chokepoint, it would be difficult to save it.” Next year, 2019, the program and the Duterte administration will turn three.

But DPWH Secretary Villar offers a rosy picture still. “I wouldn’t say that it’s hitting any snags,” he told PCIJ in an interview. “It’s not without any challenges. It’s not without the challenge, but my statement about the Build, Build, Build is we’re on track and it is improving and the support is there.”

DPWH, the government’s engineering and construction arm and an implementor of major projects under Build, Build, Build, receives the biggest infrastructure allotment as well as the second biggest budget annually among the departments. This year, DPWH was allotted PhP637.9 billion, reflecting a 40-percent increase from its PhP454.7 billion budget in 2017.

But while Villar seems unperturbed by “snags” in Build, Build, Build, observers and insiders alike say that these are significant enough to hinder the program’s progress.

For one, they affirm in separate interviews, some local, legislative, and public works officials colluding with favored but unqualified contractors are “syndicated” circles of corruption that continue to stalk many of the projects.

DVO-Most-Favored_04_PCIJ

Greed and need

In fact, as early as February 2017, contractors had noted in meetings with public officials that “implementing agencies, especially in remote regions, continue to become victims of local government officials and in some isolated cases even national government officials who influence the award of projects to favored sub-par contractors.”

“There is a need,” the contractors had thus said, “to craft measures to insulate and isolate infrastructure projects from political intervention which has become syndicated.”

A senior official with expertise and insight into the problems meanwhile observed, “Greed is driving project contracting, the projects are falling below accomplishment targets, most projects are bloated.”

Apparently, the bigness of the projected bill of Build, Build, Build — about 5.4 percent in 2017 to 7.4 percent in 2022 of gross domestic product, or PhP8.4 trillion in all in five years (compared to the PhP2.4 trillion or so total infrastructure budget during the Aquino administration’s six years) — has also magnified multiple-fold the opportunities as well as the costs of corruption. And with the focus often on the money to be made, many projects have wound up suffering from poor planning and monitoring, and are awarded with unsettled right-of-way or in some areas, security, issues, among others.

Project identification, evaluation and approval, as well as the competitive public bidding, notice of award, and local government permits and clearances, have also run into delays until mid-year, or by the onset the rainy season, thus impeding actual construction work, or even the deployment of workers, equipment, and aggregates.

In addition, there is the fact that there are just too many projects to do, prompting some big and small contractors to enter into subcontracting arrangements. Several small contractors, in violation to procurement rules, have even resorted to borrowing the licenses of some big contractors, in exchange for flat two- to five-percent fees out of the total project cost.

Bad and corrupt projects, according to various sources, result when agencies fail to identify the right and needed projects; the procurement process is not competitive or is marred by collusive bidding and influence-pedding by politicians and contractors; project cost is not commensurate to desired project quality; and implementation of projects is not monitored and achieved within deadline.

PCIJ. Obscure firms bad huge deals

Back in harness

To be sure, corruption and inefficiency have long marred public-works contracts. In 2009, for instance, PCIJ reported that Arroyo’s rush to roll out projects resulted in obscure contractors bagging billion-peso worth of contracts even though there wasn’t enough proof that they were capable of doing quality work.

Eight years later, with Duterte at the helm, contractors with a history of blacklisting, registration revocation, graft cases, poor performance, and political ties have again emerged as the top firms moving earth to open roads to traffic.

In 2010, DPWH under then Secretary Rogelio Singson launched reforms to improve the integrity of its procurement process, starting with standard unit cost analysis per project before going to public bidding across the board. Bidding for national projects became more transparent, competitive, and less vulnerable to corruption. Yet contracts awarded by local engineering districts, and those funded by the Priority Development Assistance Fund or “pork barrel” funds at the time were not spared by some politicians who, according to reports, still collected payoffs.

This kind of corruption in road projects has lingered under the Duterte government. In a 2017 dialogue conducted by the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines (CIAP), “politics and political intervention” still emerged as a key concern among contractors. The situation, according to one former government official, even “discourages good and honest contractors from doing projects in certain regions where contractors are designated as project takers.”

CIAP initiated the dialogue to determine the capacity and readiness of the construction industry to take on projects under the Build, Build, Build program. Representatives of the DPWH, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of Transportation (DOTr), Department of Education (DepEd), Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB), and contractors’ associations attended the dialogue.

Daang Matuwid, payoffs to pols in contracts

Tong-pats, taripa

Two senior government officials and at least four contractors separately interviewed by PCIJ on condition of anonymity said that for the most part, the system has only evolved and adapted to policies of DPWH officials through the years. One contractor said, however, that in many areas where the same politicians have ruled for long periods, backroom deals between and among elected officials, firms, and DPWH engineers have not changed, making them “the biggest mafia” in the country.

Under Arroyo, when profiting from infrastructure projects were more or less an open secret, kickbacks came in the form of “tong-pats” (patong) or an amount added to the actual cost of the project to accommodate the commission rate of local politicians. According to contractors, the rate at the time was about 12 percent of the contract price.

This figure apparently had to go down during the term of President Benigno S. Aquino III, when then DPWH Secretary Singson initiated across-the-board cuts on project costs to minimize public funds being pocketed by officials. But then “tong-pats” merely morphed into “taripa (tariff),” or portions of project costs already earmarked for kickbacks.

One contractor recalled how he had to negotiate with a congressman and a local DPWH official to lower their rates to eight percent and two percent, respectively, and leave the contractor with a profit of at least another eight percent. In all, the three-part sharing scheme meant that 18 percent of project cost had already been set aside for taripa and profit, even before groundbreaking rites for the project.

Another contractor meanwhile confirmed that politicians also get “assistance” from contracting firms for their election or reelection campaigns.

Project covered by a joint-venture agreement between Three W Builders and CLTG Builders. Completion deadline was December 2017 yet. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

Project covered by a joint-venture agreement between Three W Builders and CLTG Builders. Completion deadline was December 2017 yet. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

“Joint-ventures” on the rise

Behind closed doors and without paper trail, these deals unfold outside the purview of regulatory bodies, and beyond the formal scope of the procurement rules. Of late, legal loopholes have also allowed contractors and taripa-seekers to still corner contracts and commissions, resulting in fly-by-night firms winning some of the biggest projects.

In the last two years, an increasing number of “joint-venture” agreements have been sealed, providing a supposedly legal way-out for smaller contractors to win huge contracts — which they would not have qualified to get on their own — by “using” the license of bigger, much more established contractors.

On paper, both small and big contractors are expected to implement the project. In reality, on ground, only the small contractor gets the project and implements it. According to those privy to such arrangements, a “royalty fee” worth two to five percent of the total contract amount is paid to the big contractor for “lending” its license.

Such set-ups are most obvious in “joint ventures” where the “authorized managing office” is the representative of the small firm and not of the big firm, said one contractor. The source added that because the small contractor is not really capable of completing the JV project, the project gets delayed.

There are also cases when a public official is himself the contractor. Two contractors separately told PCIJ of a governor who supposedly gets all infrastructure projects in his bailiwick by making deals with Triple-A contractors, which, through their licenses and qualifications, bid and win projects for the governor’s firm. But the projects actually go to the governor’s construction firm while the Triple-A contractors each get a “fee” in the deal.

Projects lost, found

There was no governor involved in a project PCIJ stumbled upon in a field visit to Davao City last June. But it did find a company owned by Davao businessman and presidential assistant for sports Glenn Escandor working on a project that had been won by another firm.

Among other things, PCIJ had gone on field to take a look at a project that was supposed to be at 0.22 percent accomplishment rate as of April 30, 2018: the PhP24.8-million rehabilitation/reconstruction of the Mabuhay-Pañalum-Paquibato Road with slips slope and landslide” in Davao City. The project, which on paper was to be implemented by Las Piñas-based Three W Builders Inc., was supposed to have started on May 4, 2017 and completed by Oct. 21, 2017. Three W is a Triple-A contractor.

PCIJ failed to locate the project but instead found another Three W project: the PhP44.8-million “construction of slope protection along Lasang River, Paquibato Proper Section, Davao City.” The actual work for the project, however, was being done by Genesis 88 Construction Inc., an A-licensed construction firm owned by Escandor. The project engineer, the payroll request form, and the backhoe at the project site were all from Genesis 88. No Three W Builders employee was on site.

Backhoe and equpment of Genesis 88 Construction owned by Presidential Assistant for Sports  Glenn Escandor at the site of a project supposed to be implemented by Three W Builders.  DPWH has no record of Genesis 88 being awarded this project.  PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

Backhoe and equpment of Genesis 88 Construction owned by Presidential Assistant for Sports Glenn Escandor at the site of a project supposed to be implemented by Three W Builders. DPWH has no record of Genesis 88 being awarded this project. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

As of this writing, Genesis 88 and Three W Builders have yet to respond to letters sent by PCIJ despite multiple follow-up calls made to each of their staff personnel.

Procurement rules allow subcontracting under certain circumstances only. A contractor like Three W may subcontract portions of the works, provided that it will undertake, using its own resources, not less than 50 percent of the contract works in terms of cost. At the same time, subcontractor is supposed to subcontract not more than half of the work. Moreover, it should be a PCAB-licensed contractor with Net Financing Contracting Capacity (NFCC), which is computed based on its net worth as submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and SEC.

Prior approval of the head of the procuring entity — in this case the Davao City 1st District Engineering Office — is required as well before subcontracting is allowed. But District Engineer Wilfredo Aguilar and Assistant District Engineer Milagros de los Reyes of Davao City said that no application for subcontracting has been processed by their office. They said, though, that it is possible that Genesis 88 may have rented its equipment to Three W or Three W hired Genesis 88’s employees for the project.

UNRECORDED WITH DPWH RXI.GENESIS 88 PROJECT SITE, PCIJ

Dismal disbursement rate

For sure, illegal or irregular deals could have only helped lead to the dismal findings regarding DPWH that the Commission on Audit (COA) recorded in its 2017 Annual Audit Report of the agency.

For instance, government auditors found, of the total PhP610.9 billion obligated by DPWH, only PhP222.66 billion or 34 percent was disbursed because of delayed and non-implementation of infrastructure projects. According to the report, DPWH was not able to implement:

• 2,334 projects worth PhP62.59 billion, which were not completed within the contract period;
• 135 suspended projects costing PhP6.07 billion;
• 15 terminated projects amounting to PhP2.1 billion; and
• 815 unimplemented projects worth PhP2.58 billion.

On the same day that news broke about the COA report last July, President Duterte in a speech in Davao City warned that he would hold DPWH Secretary Villar accountable for delayed and failed projects.

Said the President: “I would like to call the attention of the secretaries, especially Secretary Villar, that if there is any slippage of any work of any kind by the national government. If you delay or if I see tomorrow, beginning tomorrow, and you are all invited to see me in Malacañang.”

“Kaya sinasabi ko sa inyo, I’m exacting now something of like this. ‘Yang project mo pagka pumalpak (If your project fails), I will hold the Secretary responsible,” Duterte added.

Four days later, on July 11, Villar clarified details raised in the COA report and announced that DPWH had started investigation proceedings “for suspension of 43 contractors” behind the 400 projects with slippage or facing implementation delays.

Interviewed by PCIJ last Aug. 19, Villar acknowledged that there is a problem but qualified the findings in DPWH’s context. He said that the obligation amount used by COA includes multi-year projects, which was reportedly why disbursement was pegged at 34 percent. By DPWH calculations, he said, the agency’s disbursement rate stands at 60 percent for “all funds, all legal bases.”

DPWH’s data

Data provided by DPWH show that of its 2017 total PhP672.97-billion amount obligated, PhP406.48 billion had been disbursed. (According to a former DPWH insider, however, the amount the agency records as having disbursed usually “includes carryover projects from previous years, since disbursement by agency is cumulative.”)

Villar also said that the aggregate number of infrastructure projects is 44,000, making the percentage of the delayed projects — 2,334 by COA’s report — only five percent of the total. DPWH spokesperson Anna Mae Lamentillo meanwhile said that the portion of suspended projects over the total number is at three percent, making the statistics actually “good.” But DPWH did not confirm if the aggregate number refers to 2017 projects only, which was COA’s reference.

COA also found that DPWH did not impose liquidated damages on the contractors or rescind or terminate any of the 120 delayed projects that have already incurred negative slippage of 15 percent. These delayed projects are worth PhP6.67 billion.

The 2016 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9184 provides that a procuring entity such as DPWH “may rescind the contract, forfeit the contractor’s performance security and takeover the prosecution of the project or award the same to a qualified contractor through negotiated contract” in case that the delay in the completion of the work exceeds 10 percent of the specified contract time plus any time extension granted.

Lamentillo, though, said that rescinding a contract is optional, highlighting the law’s use of the modal verb “may.” She said that DPWH does not automatically terminate a project because sometimes it becomes more expensive for the government to re-award it. Bidding alone, she said, usually takes about three months. If the contractor is able to comply with its catch-up plan, said Lamentillo, DPWH allows the firm to continue and complete the project.

Multiple reasons

COA allowed that the delay, termination, and non-implementation of the DPWH projects were caused by various factors, ranging from the agency’s responsibilities such as right-of-way acquisition, inadequate planning, monitoring, and supervision of projects, and lack of cooperation with local government units to address contractors’ concerns such as having insufficient workforce and equipment. Late issuance of permits, peace and order issues, and unfavorable weather conditions were likewise among the reasons cited for project delays, said COA.

But it noted that consultants and the DPWH management failed to consider these during the preliminary engineering study on the viability of the projects. Moreover, COA said, these same issues have been noted in the prior years’ audit reports.

“Had management considered the right-of-way and project site issues during the preliminary engineering study on the technical viability of the project, the same could have been resolved prior to project implementation or the proposed projects could have been excluded in the final list of projects for bidding,” COA said.

“These problems should have been disclosed during the planning stage and properly discussed during the BAC (Bids and Awards Committee) meetings when deliberations for projects implementation were conducted with Management officials to arrive at decisions advantageous to the government,” it added. “Likewise, coordination with concerned government agencies and private companies should have been conducted early and regularly to address the permit issues and follow-up the release of permits.”

DPWH Road and Bridge Inventory

More hires, reforms

An ex-DPWH official said of COA’s comments on the right-of-way issue, though, “If DPWH does not take some risk and will only budget a project once the full right of way is completed, then many infra projects of government will never get started. Landowners delay actual turnover of land if they know that there is still no budget for the project.

In any case, PCIJ asked Villar how DPWH was going to address the problems pointed out by COA since more projects will have to be undertaken with the Build, Build, Build program. He replied in part by saying that DPWH is about to hire almost 4,000 additional project engineers and has organized for job fairs to help contractors find personnel.

“I’m not saying that it’s not difficult,” he also said. “It’s difficult and all of us are working 24/7 to solve these issues.”

The DPWH chief also cited technology as one solution to address issues of corruption and irregularities in civil-works contracts. He said that DPWH is promoting the use of applications and analytics to minimize discretion, and in turn, to minimize corruption.

For example, Villar said, having a satellite based geo-tagging system makes it difficult to cheat on the reporting of project status. He also said that being able to see constantly updated records from a central database has allowed DPWH for the first time to use analytics.

Analytics fan

Villar — the youngest to serve in the DPWH and by some contractors’ accounts the least prepared for the job — described himself as a firm believer of analytics. Any major company that handles huge volumes of work needs analytics, he said.

“That’s what we’re doing,” said Villar. “The more use of analytics, the more use of quantitative measurements. It minimizes discretion, therefore you minimize corruption.”

He disagreed with the view that technology cannot or may not capture cases of collusive bidding, lending of licenses, and illegal subcontracting that all happen behind closed doors. Technology could still capture these irregularities to a certain extent, he argued.

“These construction companies that supposedly ‘subcon’ (subcontract) — if they are held to be more accountable for their projects, if we’re better at monitoring — we can more or less see who the low-performing contractors are,” said Villar. “More or less, these are the ones who have low capability.”

DPWH uses an application called Infratrack, which is supposed to improve transparency and accountability in the monitoring of civil-works projects. It uses geotagging technology to help the agency monitor the progress of projects virtually. Through this application, Villar said, DPWH can more or less get a better picture of contractors who have taken large volumes of projects but don’t seem to have the necessary capability.

DPWH uses an application called InfraTrack, which is supposed to improve transparency and accountability in the monitoring of civil-works projects. It uses geotagging technology to help the agency monitor the progress of projects virtually.

Politicians’ picks?

According to Villar, DPWH has used the system to identify the 43 contractors currently facing suspension over delayed projects. One of the 43, R.C. Tagala Construction, which is now operating under the name Syndtite Construction Corporation, was recently blacklisted for one year beginning Aug. 16, 2018.

Asked to comment on allegations that politicians have been known to “place” their favored regional director or district engineer in their bailiwicks, Villar replied in part by saying that he also uses metrics in assessing the performance of DPWH district engineers.

According to Villar, people make recommendations to his office, but he always refers to his grading system, which is based on performance composed of disbursements, bid variance, and design and quality audits scores. District engineers are then ranked from one to 99. Those ranked at the bottom might be floated.

“I don’t approve these recommendations, I make a choice,” the secretary said. “People can recommend but ultimately, I make a choice. For operational decisions, if he’s (district engineer) underperforming, he goes.”

‘A careful politician’

Since Villar became public works secretary, at least 10 percent of district engineers have been floated. All of the district engineers in the Cordillera Administrative Region, for instance, have been replaced because, said Villar, they were performing poorly.

But contractors interviewed by PCIJ noted that Villar has been acting like a careful politician from a political family with vast business interests in real estate, retail, and water services. Commented one contractor: “He is careful not to offend political allies and friends.”

The secretary is the younger of two sons of real estate mogul and former Senate president Manuel Villar and re-electionist Sen. Cynthia Villar. The Villars lead the Nacionalista Party or NP. Foreign Affairs Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano ran for vice president under the NP banner in 2016. Meanwhile, Mark Villar is married to Emmeline Aglipay, until recently the DIWA party-list representative who was named Justice undersecretary last August. Mark Villar himself gave up his seat in Congress shortly after being appointed to head the DPWH in July 2016.

PCIJ asked Villar why his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth shows that he has zero investments in Vista Land & Lifescapes, Inc., a multibillion-peso integrated property developer owned by his family, as well as whether he got the DPWH post as a return favor for the election campaign donation said to have been given by the Villars to Duterte.

Villar replied with a general comment. “I don’t involve myself,” he said. “If there’s anything that I feel would be any conflict, I wouldn’t do it myself. I don’t have any investments in anything.”

Debt of gratitude

The President himself, however, has been open about his fondness for the Villars.

In March 2017, Mark Villar’s father, former Senate President Manuel B. Villar, was part of Duterte’s business delegation to Thailand. Before a crowd of Filipinos, President Duterte heaped praise on Villar as “isa sa pinakamabait, pinakamabait na tao. Hindi marunong magmura ‘yan. Naging Speaker namin ‘yan. Ni minsan, ‘di ko nakikita – naging congressman ako panahon Speaker siya — wala akong narinig na mag-init ‘yung ulo (one of the nicest people I have met. He doesn’t curse, and not once — when I was a congressman, he was the Speaker — have I seen him blow his top).”

For the elder Villar, Duterte said, “Para sa akin, puwede ako magpakamatay sa kanya kasi mabait eh (I could die for him because he is nice.)”

More than just fondness, however, Duterte has acknowledged that he owes the Villars gratitude.

At a public event in October 2017, he said that Mark Villar’s mother, Sen. Cynthia A. Villar, helped him during the election campaign in 2016. News reports reported him as saying, “During the presidential debates, in between far and wide the debates, there was this intermission. Nakita mo wala akong advertisement. Walang pera eh. Buti na lang tumulong si Ma’am Cynthia. Tinulungan niya ako. I have to admit it, na tinulungan ako. (I had no advertisements, no money. It was good that Ma’am Cynthia helped me. She helped me. I have to admit it, she helped me.)”

In his campaign spending report to the Commission on Elections, Duterte did not name the Villars among his donors in the 2016 elections. PCIJ had reported that of the PhP371.36 million in campaign donations that Duterte raised, 89.28 percent or PhP334.8 million came from 13 multimillion-peso donors. One of them, Marcelino Mendoza, gave PhP14.5 million. A resident of the Villars’ bailiwick of Las Piñas City, Mendoza is listed as an incorporator, board member, and stockholder of the Villar family’s Vista Land conglomerate. — With additional reporting by Carolyn O. Arguillas and John Reiner Antiquerra, PCIJ, September 2018

PCIJ. Millionaires for Digong, dec 2016

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Check out PCIJ’s reports on “Build, Build, Build hits chokepoint”

* DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects
* Top 10 contractors under Duterte run record of fraud, delays, blacklisting
* Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest
* Vetting contractors
* Davao Region most favored; others get cuts, token hike in infra budgets
* Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao
* Did he help Dad, half-brod get deals? Unfair! Prove it, I will resign – Bong Go


Top 10 contractors under DU30 runrecord of fraud, delays, blacklisting

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THREE HAD been suspended or blacklisted, including one for submitting fake tax clearance certificates. One had its corporate registration revoked. The officers of four others are facing trial for alleged graft. Two have direct connections to politicians, some others had sealed deals via financial favors exchanged with certain politicians. All share a record of incomplete or bad projects, and unsatisfactory ratings in some project performance evaluations.

Contractors with checkered histories have emerged as the Top 10 winners of the biggest civil-works contracts awarded from July 2016 to December 2017 under President Rodrigo R. Duterte.

All the 10, however, are now facing investigation by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) “for various reasons,” according to DPWH Secretary Mark A. Villar. But while these contractors secured contracts with apparent speed, DPWH has been slow to complete its investigation into their alleged irregular conduct or poor performance.

For instance, one of the 10, R.C. Tagala Construction (now registered as Syndtite Construction Corp.), had already bagged PhP5.7 billion worth of contracts in the first 18 months of Duterte in Malacañang when DPWH blacklisted it for a year just last Aug. 16.

The firm, under the name R.C. Tagala, was found to have violated the terms and conditions of its contract to build Phase 1 of Labo Bridge in Camarines Norte. The Camarines Norte District Engineering Office had terminated the contract year earlier on July 19, 2017, but it took DPWH 13 months to blacklist the firm, which only recently re-registered as Syndtite Construction Corp.

The good fortune of the top contractors is enrolled in the DPWH’s database of awarded contracts from July 2016 to December 2017.

The Duterte era’s Top 10 contractors cornered for themselves contracts worth PhP68.5 billion or 14 percent of the PhP500.7-billion total projects with notices to proceed issued by DPWH from July 2016 to December 2017.

Per company, however, the total value of awarded contracts could even be bigger as these firms also participated in joint ventures. DPWH’s data did not break down these details. (See Table: Duterte’s Top Contractors Financial Position)

Top-Contractors-Under-Duterte_T01_PCIJ

To validate their profiles and contracting history, PCIJ reviewed the list of blacklisting reports of the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB); list of licensed contractors of the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB); suspension orders of DPWH; corporate documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); case files at the Sandiganbayan anti-graft court; records of candidates and campaign donors of the Commission on Elections (Comelec); Construction Performance Evaluation System (CPES) reports; and Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS) records.

Same, some new names

Seven firms on the current list of Top 10 contractors under Duterte have had a long run of luck in terms of bagging contracts from the time of former President and now House Speaker Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. They did not all make it, however, to Arroyo’s Top 10 list.

These lucky seven under Duterte are:

• St. Gerrard Construction Gen. Contractor & Development Corp. (formerly St. Gerrard Construction), No. 1;
• Ulticon Builders, Inc., No. 2;
• Equi-Parco Construction Company, No. 3;
• IBC International Builders Corporation, No. 6;
• FFJJ Construction, No. 7;
• Northern Builders, No. 8; and
• ESR Construction and Development Corporation (formerly ESR Construction & Supplies), No. 9.

These seven had also ranked among the top contractors with notices to proceed on projects issued between July 2010 and June 2016 under former President Benigno S. Aquino III. (See Table: Top DPWH Contractors by Administration).

Top-Contractors-Under-Duterte_T02_PCIJ

There are three newcomers, however, in the Top 10 roster under Duterte:

• M. Montesclaros Enterprises, Inc., No. 4;
• Syndtite Construction Corporation (formerly R.C. Tagala Construction), No. 5; and
• Legacy Construction Corporation (formerly Legacy Construction), No.10.

At least two of the firms, meanwhile, not only have Triple-A General Engineering Licenses, but also political connections. One, Equi-Parco Construction Corp., is owned by the current mayor of Butuan City, while another, M. Montesclaros Enterprises, Inc., has two of its seven stockholders as in-laws of the late governor of Iloilo province.

Nine of the obscure contractors that made it to the Top 10 list under Arroyo no longer appear on the lists of the Aquino and Duterte administrations, however. (See Table: Duterte Administration’s Top Contractors General Information)

Top-Contractors-Under-Duterte_T03_PCIJ

Over 2,200 contractors have participated in the bidding of DPWH contracts under the Duterte administration. But apart from the Top 10, only 80 other contractors had each won a billion pesos worth of projects in a span of one and a half years. The 2,120 others got much, much less. (See Table: Contractors Implementing DPWH projects)

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Majority of the Construction Performance Evaluation System (CPES) reports for projects implemented by the top 10 contractors are satisfactory, while some garnered “very satisfactory,” and still a few others, “outstanding” ratings.

Nonetheless, for certain projects, all on the Top 10 list have also obtained low ratings, and some, unsatisfactory scores. A poor CPES rating should result in a contractor’s disqualification from subsequent bidding.

17 years on top

The luckiest of all the contractors would have to be Equi-Parco, which has retained its lock on the Top 10 list since Arroyo’s time, or from 17 years ago. Equi-Parco was the No. 2 top contractor under Arroyo, No. 1 under Aquino, and now No. 3 under Duterte.

The secret to its success derives apparently from its ownership. A Triple-A General Construction/General Engineering firm based out of Ambago town in Agusan del Norte, Equi-Parco is owned by the incumbent city mayor of Butuan, Ronnie Vicente C. Lagnada.

A civil engineer, Lagnada put up the company in 2002 together with Ruben A. Javier, also a civil engineer. By press accounts, friends and associates also call the mayor by his nicknames Equi-Parco, Ronnievic, or RVL.

PhilGEPS data from 2001 to 2018 show no records of any contracts that the local government of Butuan has awarded to Equi-Parco, but only those that the firm had won from the DPWH Butuan District Engineering Office. Equi-Parco has also been awarded contracts from the Philippine Ports Authority, National Irrigation Administration, among other national government agencies.

PCAB’s accreditation list as of June 2018 names Javier, and not Lagnada, as Equi-Parco’s representative.

Equi-Parco’s articles of partnership filed with the SEC in 2003 show that Ronnievic C. Lagnada and Ruben A. Javier contributed PhP25 million each to the firm. This 2003 document is the latest articles of partnership of the firm that is available from the SEC.

In its 2016 financial statement, Equi-Parco declared having PhP2.76 billion in current assets, PhP102.9 million in current liabilities, and PhP696.8 million worth of property and equipment. The company’s website shows various accreditation documents from DPWH for Equi-Parco to operate cement and asphalt batching plants from 2015 to 2017.

These values are just a fraction of the PhP31.82 billion in civil-works contracts that it has secured from DPWH in the last 18 years. Equi-Parco got PhP6.10 billion in civil-works contracts from DPWH under Arroyo from January 2001 to June 2010; PhP17.24 billion under Aquino from July 2010 to June 2016; and the PhP8.48 billion under Duterte from July 2016 to December 2017.

PCIJ wrote to Equi-Parco last June 27 to check if Lagnada has divested his interests from the firm and to request records of his divestment. On July 3, Equi-Parco’s records-section supervisor Vanessa Fuentes told PCIJ by phone to expect a response as soon as information is provided by the office, but this never came. Another woman who introduced herself only as an Equi-Parco representative but refused to give her name told PCIJ that since Lagnada is now part of government, he is therefore no longer part of Equi-Parco. PCIJ asked Fuentes to identify the second caller but she declined to do so. PCIJ also sent a registered mail to the Butuan’s Mayor’s Office but did not get a reply.

Conflict of interest

PCIJ has yet to see any document showing Lagnada as having divested his interests from Equi-Parco; news reports in the last three years, however, have still referred to him as head or president and chief executive officer of the company.

Section 9 of the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees” or R.A. No. 6713 states that a public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times: “When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption. The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a partnership.”

Lagnada won as Butuan mayor in the May 2016 elections. He ran under the National Unity Party that was formed by politicians who broke away from the Lakas-NUCD-CMD party of former Presidents Fidel V. Ramos and Arroyo.

The PhP8.48 billion in DPWH contracts that Equi-Parco won between July 2016 and December 2017 include PhP70.12 million worth of DPWH projects in Butuan where Lagnada is city mayor.

Section 47, Rule XV of Republic Act No. 9184 requires bidders to submit a sworn affidavit that it is not related to the head of the procuring entity, members of the Bids and Awards Committee, the Technical Working Group, and the Bids and Awards Committee Secretariat, the head of the project management office, or the end-user or implementing unit, and the project consultants, by consanguinity or affinity up to the third civil degree. Failure to comply with the provision shall be a ground for the automatic disqualification of the bid.

PCIJ has no information as to whether Lagnada or Javier is related to any member of the DPWH Butuan’s Bids and Awards Committee, the Technical Working Group, and the Bids and Awards Committee Secretariat, or the head of the project management office, the end-user or implementing unit, and project consultants.

Can’t, didn’t intervene

PCIJ shared its findings with DPWH and asked what is being done to ensure the integrity of the procurement infrastructure projects — that contracts are awarded to competent, clean, and capable contractors — especially in light of the government’s Build, Build, Build program.

DPWH spokesperson Anna Mae Lamentillo told PCIJ in an interview last Aug. 6 that DPWH did not intervene in the bidding process of the projects won by the 10 contractors “because that’s what the law mandates.”

What DPWH can guarantee, she said, is that the contractors will now be examined for their performance. “So if the previous administration did not look into their prior performance before bidding out another project,” Lamentillo said, “it will not happen in this administration because of the Infratrack system.”

DPWH uses an application called Infratrack supposedly to improve transparency and accountability in the monitoring of civil-works projects. It uses geotagging technology to help the agency monitor the progress of projects virtually.

When PCIJ commented that findings such as political ties and graft charges cannot be captured automatically by software, Lamentillo said that the agency “cannot do anything about it.” She added, “For as long as the procurement law allows it, DPWH cannot intervene. You cannot participate because then we will be contradicting the law. We will be violating the law.”

Lamentillo also said that some of the 10 firms are among the 43 contractors currently facing suspension over delayed projects. One of the 10 contractors, R.C. Tagala Construction which is now operating under the name Syndtite Construction Corporation, was recently blacklisted for one year beginning Aug. 16, 2018.

Secretary Villar on July 11 told reporters that contractors implementing more than 400 delayed infrastructure projects are close to being suspended and eventually will be blacklisted. According to Lamentillo, meanwhile, all 10 contractors are under investigation by the DPWH for various reasons.

Suspended, blacklisted

The No. 1 contractor in the Duterte era, St. Gerrard Construction General Contractor & Development Corp., had been suspended by DPWH under its former name St. Gerrard Construction.

From July 2016 to December 2017, St. Gerrard won PhP12.3 billion worth of contracts, excluding joint-venture projects it carried out with other firms.

On Aug. 12, 2015, DPWH issued a suspension order on St. Gerrard Construction because it submitted a tax clearance to the Procurement Service that was confirmed spurious by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The order, signed by then DPWH Secretary Rogelio Singson, suspended St. Gerrard and its owner Pacifico F. Discaya II from participating in DPWH public biddings for one year.

The suspension was based on the implementing rules and regulation of Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act, which penalizes bidders for one year for the first offense of submitting eligibility requirements containing false information or falsified documents.

On March 4, 2016, DPWH lifted St. Gerrard’s suspension after finding merit in Discaya’s letter for reconsideration.

Three months after DPWH suspended “St. Gerrard Construction,” a new firm named “St. Gerrard Construction General Contractor & Development Corp.,” registered with the SEC on Nov. 12, 2015. Based in Pasig City, the firm is still owned by Pacifico F. Discaya II with four other stockholders: Cezarah Rowena C. Discaya, Krizza Mae S. Enerio, Christian Andrew J. Cruz, and Jenie P. Tumalin.

(Discaya was among the BIR’s Top 500 Taxpayers in 2014. Discaya paid PhP12.7 million in taxes that year.)

Got deals, while suspended

PCIJ, though, found that “St. Gerrard Construction” and “St. Gerrard Construction Gen. Contractor & Development Corp.” still won a total of nine contracts that were advertised within the period of its suspension from Aug. 12, 2015 to March 4, 2016. The contracts amounted to a total of PhP440.5 million.

On June 27, 2018, PCIJ sent a letter to Discaya asking why a new entity was registered and whether it was done to be able to bid on contracts despite the suspension of St. Gerrard Construction.

On July 2, Discaya initially asked PCIJ to follow up after a few days so that he could present “complete data.” PCIJ called him on July 5 and again on July 9, when he said he would try to give his answers within the same week. PCIJ has yet to get a reply from the St. Gerrard owner as of press time.

St. Gerrard has a Double A license category with a primary classification under General Building, according to PCAB records, as of June 2018.

Republic Act No. 4566, also known as the Contractors License Law, provides that no contractor shall engage in the business of contracting without first having secured a PCAB license to conduct business. It is considered an offense to engage in contracting business without a license first being obtained. This is to ensure that only qualified and reliable contractors are allowed to undertake construction in the country and to promote the growth of the contracting sector and the upgrading of construction capability.

A contractor’s license classification refers to the area of operation the firm can engage in. This is determined by the firm’s technical experience of its sustaining technical employee (STE). A contractor may apply for and be issued more than one classification, one of which shall be designated as his principal classification.

The license category, meanwhile, indicates the graded level of aggregate capability of a contractor with respect to its principal classification and is based on predetermined qualification criteria such as financial capacity, experience of STE, track record, and equipment.

Minimum requirements

In determining a contractor’s category, its qualification must satisfy all the minimum requirements, corresponding to the classification and category being applied for, qualified, and rated according to equivalent credit points and shall be the lowest sustainable by all three determinants as follows: financial capacity, experience of STE, and overall credit points based on the four qualification criteria.

A Double-A General Building license means, among other requirements, that St. Gerrard Construction must have had a minimum of PhP45 million stockholder’s equity and minimum of 895 credit points, computed according to PCAB guidelines.

St. Gerrard has current assets worth PhP2.85 billion and current liabilities of PhP9.88 million, according to its 2016 financial statement. It also has property and equipment worth PhP54.6 million.

Suspended, too

Another blacklisted contractor that changed its name is Syndtite Construction Corporation, which used to operate as R.C. Tagala Construction.

R.C. Tagala Construction has just been blacklisted for one year by the DPWH starting Aug. 16, 2018. The firm was among the 43 contractors facing suspension over delayed projects. R.C. Tagala was suspended for violating the terms and conditions of its contract during the implementation of the construction of Labo Bridge and its approaches (Phase 1) in Labo, Camarines Norte. Camarines Norte District Engineering Office thus terminated R.C. Tagala’s contract on July 19, 2017.

Records from the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines (CIAP) show that earlier, R.C. Tagala Construction had been blacklisted in public biddings by the Local Government of Manolo Fortich in Bukidnon in 2016. The blacklisting ended on July 31, 2017.

Records obtained from the Philippine Overseas and Domestic Construction Board show that R.C. Tagala Construction incurred a negative slippage of more than 15 percent, in addition to submitting a counterfeit bank guarantee as performance security. Slippage refers to a contractor failing to meet a deadline.

The blacklisting order, signed by Manolo Fortich Mayor Clive Quiño, indicated that R.C. Tagala, after already incurring a slippage of negative 15 percent, failed to correct the violation despite several notices and warning. The slippage, Quiño wrote, already reached negative 23.98 percent. The contract for the “Rehabilitation/Concreting of Mantibugao-Minsuro Farm-to-Market Road” awarded to R.C. Tagala was thus terminated on July 14, 2016.

In July 2017, Quiño issued a delisting order, which lifted the sanction against R.C. Tagala. According to the order, the contractor paid PhP9.59 million to the local government unit, which corresponds to the amount advanced to the contractor as authorized mobilization and part of the performance guarantee.

A Triple-A contractor based in Quezon City, Syndtite Construction registered with the SEC on April 24, 2015, a year before R.C. Tagala was blacklisted by the Manolo Fortich LGU. Syndtite is owned by Rosanno C. Tagala, Jusiah S. Tagala, Christian Dalmes S. Tagala, Marithel T. de Jesus, Edwin Sabas Recto J. Homena. Rosanno C. Tagala, who owned R.C. Tagala Construction, owns majority or 70 percent of Syndtite Construction, according to its 2017 general information sheet.

From July 2016 to December 2017, Syndtite won contracts worth a total of PhP5.7 billion, DPWH data show.

Syndtite has current assets of PhP1.97 billion and current liabilities of PhP18.9 million. The company also has property and equipment worth PhP183.4 million, according to its 2016 financial statement.

No. 4 suspended also

The fourth top contractor, M. Montesclaros Enterprises Inc. (MMEI), also has a history of suspension with DPWH. Registered with SEC in 1995, MMEI got P6.36 billion worth of DPWH projects during Duterte’s first one and a half years in office.

On Dec. 15, 1989, DPWH, under then Secretary Fiorello R. Estuar, suspended M. Montesclaros Enterprises together with its partner A.C. Geronimo in a joint venture and Urban Consolidated Contractors (Phil.) Inc. for one year. The reason for suspension was not indicated in the official records, however.

On June 19, 1990, DPWH issued an order reducing the period of suspension from one year to six months. The suspension was in effect lifted on June 8, 1990. The order was issued in view of the representations made by the contractors that they had already realized the consequences of their actions and were at the time “supplicating for condonation with commitment of reform.”

PCIJ did not find any records showing that MMEI has been suspended or blacklisted again from any public bidding with DPWH since 1990.

Bukidnon-based MMEI has a Triple-A General Engineering license issued by PCAB. It is owned by Mariano R. Montesclaros together with seven other stockholders and family members: Esther T. Montesclaros, Maita Montesclaros-Gue, Mariano Rico T. Montesclaros, Totsy T. Montesclaros-Duenas, Binky Montesclaros-Tupas, Marious T. Montesclaros, and Marlah Montesclaros-Tomboc.

MMEI has current assets worth PhP1.72 billion and current liabilities worth PhP797 million. The company also has property and equipment valued at PhP158 million, according to its 2016 financial statement.

Pending graft charges

The owners of Syndtite (formerly R.C. Tagala Construction), MMEI, and two other top contractors, IBC International Builders Corp. and Legacy Construction, appear in the Sandiganbayan graft case database.

Syndtite’s authorized managing officer, Rosanno C. Tagala, is among those charged by the Sandiganbayan for anomalies in contracts funded by the PhP1.53-billion royalties from the Malampaya gas field in 2008 and 2009. Former Palawan Governor Mario Joel Reyes and 40 other individuals are also among those charged.

According to records obtained by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, R.C. Tagala Construction, Syndtite’s former name, was involved in airport, road and water projects, some of which were declared to have been completed, but were not actually finished.

Inquirer reported state prosecutors as saying that Reyes conspired with seven other public officials to award 209 contracts to 11 construction firms sometime in 2008, despite violations of several requirements provided in R.A. No. 9184. These included the failure to post the bid invitation on the PhilGEPS website and the province’s website, as well as the non-submission of bidding documents.

State prosecutors likewise alleged that the engineering office faked the accomplishment and inspection reports and allowed the violation of terms for 39 infrastructure contracts worth a total of PhP461.37 million.

Half the value of the projects went to Puerto Princesa City-based BCT Trading and Construction, which had 80 contracts worth PhP722.75 million altogether, while R.C. Tagala Construction won 14 contracts worth PhP301.46 million in all.

According to the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division, the cases against former governor Reyes and the other accused including Rosanno C. Tagala are still pending with a pre-trial order to be issued, as of July 6, 2018.

The presentation of prosecution evidence is set on certain dates from January to March of 2019, while the defense is scheduled to present its evidence on several dates from April to June of next year.

Falsified minutes

The Sandiganbayan, meanwhile, found Helen Edith L. Tan, IBC International Builders Corp.’s proprietor, together with local officials of Maasin, Iloilo guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

In 2015, the anti-graft court found that public officials falsified the Minutes of the Regular Session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin, Iloilo City by making it appear that the body enacted resolutions on a certain date, which led to the signing of a memorandum of agreement between the Maasin municipal mayor and IBC’s Tan for the supposed rechanneling of the Tigum River path and the quarrying activities of IBC International Builders Corp. at the Tigum River.

Each of the accused was meted with the penalty of imprisonment of six years and one month to 10 years, as well as perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

In October 2016, however, the Supreme Court issued a decision that said that since Tan’s conviction was based on the presence of conspiracy, which the prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt, her conviction of the offense charged must be reversed. Tan was thus acquitted.

Registered on March 12, 1985, IBC International Builders Corp. is a Triple-A General Engineering contracting firm based Iloilo City. It bagged PhP5.25 billion in project contracts from July 2016 to December 2017.

According to records filed with the SEC, IBC has current assets worth PhP944 million and current liabilities of PhP55.9 million. IBC also reported property and equipment worth PhP1.3 billion, as of 2016.

Dishonored checks

For their part, Alex and Dominador Abelido, owners of Legacy Construction, are accused in a case that the Supreme Court found probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On Aug. 13, 2000, the Local Government of Valencia, Negros Oriental awarded Legacy Construction a contract for the improvement of its waterworks system for the amount of PhP14.62 million.

To implement the project, Legacy purchased pipes worth PhP2.82 million from New Bian Yek Commercial, Inc. But the check payments it issued were dishonored and not replaced. Because Legacy had already received a significant portion of the contract amount from Valencia LGU, New Bian Yek demanded payment for the pipes. Legacy, however, ignored the demand.

New Bian Yek brought the case to the Office of the Ombudsman, which in turn did not find probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. New Bian Yek then filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. The High Court in 2009 found that the local government officials conspired with the Abelidos in depriving New Bian Yek Commercial of payment for Legacy’s obligation. “Such act was therefore undertaken in bad faith, with manifest partiality and in utter disregard of petitioners rights under PD 1594,” the court said.

The 2005 resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas were thus reversed and set aside except insofar as one respondent is concerned. New judgment was then rendered finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) R.A. No. 3019 against Alex Abelido and Dominador Abelido and Valencia officials. The Office of the Ombudsman – Visayas was likewise directed to file the necessary information against the respondents.

On March 26, 2015, Alex Abelido and his co-accused, were acquitted by the Sandiganbayan’s Fifth Division. The charge against Legacy owner and Alex’s father Dominador Abelido, meanwhile, was dismissed because he died in 2006 prior to the filing of the information with the anti-graft court.

In the decision signed by Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, the accused were acquitted of the charge of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 because the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Undue injury

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 pertains to officials and employees of offices or government corporations “causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.”

To hold a person liable under this section, the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:

• The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
• He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
• His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

The court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the second and the third elements of the offense. The defense presented evidence that former Valencia Mayor Rodolfo V. Gonzalez Jr. wrote a letter inviting Dominador Abelido and his lawyer to a meeting with a lawyer and representative of New Bian Yek, belying the prosecution’s claim of evident bad faith and manifest partiality.

Legacy Construction also denied that the purchases made by its engineer Jaime Lu was the firm’s transaction because the latter was not authorized to do so; it also said that the check issued by Lu was not Legacy Construction’s but his personal one. The court then inferred that the purchases of Lu was purely personal and could not be attributed to Legacy Construction. Hence, contractor’s lien cannot be exercised, the court ruled.

Acquitted by Sandigan

Meanwhile, MMEI’s stockholders Marianito Montesclaros, Esther Montesclaros, Maita Montesclaros-Gue, Mariano Rico Montesclaros, and Totsy Montesclaros were acquitted in a graft case filed by the Office of the Ombudsman against them in 2010. Among the co-accused was former Iloilo governor Niel Tupas Sr., who died in 2015.

The Sandiganbayan’s First Division said state prosecutors from the Office of the Ombudsman failed to prove allegations that Tupas acted with “evident bad faith, manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence” or conspired with the other respondents in issuing a quarrying permit to a private contractor in 2004.

The case stemmed from Tupas’s allegedly anomalous issuance of an industrial sand-and-gravel (ISAG) permit to Melvin Requinto despite the latter’s lack of track record and technical capability to go into the quarrying business.

With permit in hand, Requinto entered into a memorandum of agreement with the M. Montesclaros Enterprises Inc. for the operation and maintenance of a rock crushing plant. MMEI is a private company whose owners are Tupas’s relatives.

The MMEI in turn entered into a PhP63-million subcontractor agreement with Taisei-Shimizu Joint Venture (TSJV), which won the contract to build the New Iloilo Airport.

Marianito Montesclaros is the father of Binky Montesclaros-Tupas, also an MMEI stockholder and wife of Raul Tupas, son of the elder Tupas.

Poor performance

Majority of the CPES reports for projects implemented by the top 10 contractors are satisfactory, with some very satisfactory and outstanding ratings. All, however, also posted low ratings, with some unsatisfactory and poor scores. A “poor” (less than 75 percent) or “unsatisfactory” (75-82 percent) CPES rating should result in a contractor’s disqualification from succeeding biddings.

CIAP, through the Philippine Domestic Construction Board, implements the Construction Performance Evaluation System, a rating system used in evaluating the performance of constructors based on a set of criteria. The CPES is envisioned to provide information on the performance of constructors in government projects that may be used as basis for prequalification/eligibility check of constructors, agency shortlist, awarding of contracts, project monitoring and control, blacklisting of constructors, policy review/formulation, among others.

The No. 8 contractor, FFJJ Construction, got several unsatisfactory and poor CPES ratings, well below the passing rate of 82 percent. Of the 62 projects evaluated, FFJJ had at least 18 projects with poor and unsatisfactory ratings, while the rest are either satisfactory or very satisfactory. Except for 2012, FFJJ Construction had project evaluated with unsatisfactory ratings from 2008 to 2016. (See Table: Top Contractors with Unsatisfactory CPES Ratings)

Download (PDF, 113KB)

A DTI-registered firm, FFJJ Construction, is a Triple-A General Engineering contractor based in Cotabato City. From July 2016 to December 2017, it bagged PhP5.03 billion worth of contracts. The business is owned by Engr. Osmeña L. Palanggalan.

R.C. Tagala Construction (now registered as Syndtite Construction) implemented eight projects that got unsatisfactory and poor CPES evaluations.

Northern Builders had two poor and one unsatisfactory evaluations, while Equi-Parco, IBC, MMEI, and St. Gerrard each had two unsatisfactory or poor ratings.

Legacy Construction, ESR Construction & Supply, and Ulticon Builders, meanwhile, implemented at least one project that received a poor or unsatisfactory score.

Procurement rules require contractors to obtain at least a “satisfactory” performance or 82 above. A below-82 percent CPES rating means an “unsatisfactory” or poor performance, which should have resulted in a disqualification from succeeding biddings.

A constructor with a CPES rating of “poor” or “unsatisfactory” in any of its projects shall be blacklisted from participating in any government project, according to Section 4.2 (f) of the GPPB’s Guidelines for Blacklisting of Constructors.

A blacklisted person/entity is automatically delisted when the period for the penalty has elapsed, unless the blacklisting agency requests the GPPB to maintain the blacklisted person/entity in the blacklisting report due to justifiable reasons. In the latter case, the blacklisted person/entity is delisted only upon the blacklisting agency’s issuance of a delisting order.

Registration revoked

The SEC revoked the registration of Northern Builders for its failure to submit the required general information sheets and financial statements from 1997 to 2002.

Based in Tarlac, Northern Builders is a Triple-A contractor that bagged PhP4.95 billion worth of contracts under the Duterte administration. Northern Builders is now listed as being registered with DTI.

The 2017 financial statement of Northern Builders shows that it has current assets worth PhP1.84 billion and current liabilities of PhP407.7 million. It also reported property and equipment worth PhP621.7 million. –With research by John Antiquerra, Alyssa Rafael, Mildred Mira, Yzabel Layson, Vino Lucero, and Fern Felix, PCIJ, September 2018
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Check out, PCIJ’s reports on “Build, Build, Build” hits chokepoint”

* DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects
* Top 10 contractors under Duterte run record of fraud, delays, blacklisting
* Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest
* Vetting contractors
* Davao Region most favored; others get cuts, token hike in infra budgets
* Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao
* Did he help Dad, half-brod get deals? Unfair! Prove it, I will resign – Bong Go

Vetting contractors

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THE GOVERNMENT awards a contractor-bidder a contract if its bid amount has been evaluated and found to be the “lowest calculated bid.” The bid will be subjected next to post-qualification, which involves verifying if it has complied with the requirements listed below. Complying with these prerequisites makes the bid “responsive.” A bidder is declared the winner once its bid is deemed “responsive” and the “lowest calculated” one.

Composition

A Filipino citizen/sole proprietor, or;
A corporation with at least 75 percent outstanding capital stock that belongs to Filipino citizens, or;
A partnership of with at least 75 percent interest that belongs to Filipino citizens, or;
A joint venture with at least 75 percent Filipino ownership or interest, or;
A cooperative of which at least 75 percent of the interest belongs to Filipino citizens.

License and registration

Valid license and registration issued by the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB) to engage or act as a contractor for the type of contract subject of the bidding; and
Mayor’s permit issued by the city or municipality where the bidder’s principal place of business is located.

Competence and Capacity

Experience of having completed, within a period of 10 years from the date of submission and receipt of bids, at least one contract that is similar to the contract to be bidded out, and whose value, adjusted to current prices using the Philippine Statistics Authority’s consumer price indices, must be at least 50 percent of the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) to be bid;

Note: Contractors under Small A and Small B categories without similar experience on the contract to be bid may be allowed to bid if the cost of such contract is not more than 50 percent of the Allowable Range of Contract Cost of their registration based on the guidelines as prescribed by PCAB.

The competence and experience of the bidder’s key personnel to be assigned to the project comply with the requirements of the bid documents for the project;

Availability, commitment, capacities, and operating conditions of equipment units to be owned/leased/under purchase by the bidder for use in the contract under bidding;

No record of any of the following in ongoing government and private contracts of the bidder:

  • Reported negative slippage of at least 15 percent, or;
  • Substandard quality of work as per contract plans and specifications, or;
  • Unsatisfactory performance of the contractor’s obligations as per contract terms and conditions, at the time of inspection, the deficiencies were not due to the contractor’s fault or negligence.

Bidder’s Constructors Performance Evaluation Summary (CPES) and/or certificate of completion and owner’s acceptance of the contract was at least satisfactory;

Authenticity of the bid security and its sufficiency as to type, amount, form and wording, and validity period;

Net Financial Contracting Capacity (NFCC) is at least equal to the ABC or the Credit Line Certificate in favor of the prospective bidder if awarded the contract is at least 10 percent of the ABC.

Note: The NFCC is computed thus: NFCC = [(Current assets minus current liabilities) multiplied by (K)] minus the value of all outstanding works or projects under ongoing contracts, including awarded contracts yet to be started. 
Where:
K = 10 for a contract duration of one year or less, 15 for a contract duration of more than one year up to two years, and 20 for a contract duration of more than two years.

Blacklisting
Bidder is not blacklisted.

Note: Blacklisted contractors are barred from participating in all government procurement opportunities according to the Blacklisting Order issued by procuring entities. Blacklisted contractors are likewise deemed automatically delisted after the period stated in the corresponding Blacklisting Order, unless the blacklisting agency requests the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) not to delist them.

Relatives in government

Compliance by the bidder with the “no relationship” provision in Section 47 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9184, i.e., that the bidder is not related by consanguinity or affinity up to the third civil degree to the:

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Check out PCIJ’s reports on “Build, Build, Build hits chokepoint”

* DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects
* Top 10 contractors under Duterte run record of fraud, delays, blacklisting
* Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest
* Vetting contractors
* Davao Region most favored; others get cuts, token hike in infra budgets
* Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao
* Did he help Dad, half-brod get deals? Unfair! Prove it, I will resign – Bong Go

Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest

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Editor’s Note: PCIJ’s multi-part report on civil works projects under the Duterte Administration is the composite work of seven PCIJ editors and reporters, and three student interns, over the last eight months. It builds on 11 gigabytes of documents and data that PCIJ has gathered from at least nine government agencies; reply letters and comments from contractors; and transcripts, notes, and video of interviews with contractors, senior government officials, and 31 other relevant sources.
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ACROSS a 75-day period, PCIJ made 135 phone calls and sent at least 42 letters to get the side of 21 contractors for its reports on the infrastructure projects bidded and awarded by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in the first two years of the Duterte administration.

From June 2018 to last Monday, Sept. 3, PCIJ also spoke with at least 31 individuals connected with the 21 companies for comments on the record. Some promised to send comments, but until posting time have failed to do so. Seven firms, however, either sent a written reply or granted interviews: Wee Eng Construction, Maer Summit Konstrukt, Legacy Construction, Ulticon Builders, CLTG Builders, Alfrego Builders & Supply, and Algon Engineering Construction Corp.

The PCIJ also spoke with contractors other than the 21 on its list, as well as former and current public officials with experience and insight into procurement of civil works projects. They discussed various matters at length, but stipulated that their comments were not for attribution.

The PCIJ staff had personally delivered letters to all the Davao-based contractors on its list, while the rest of the 20 received communication via registered mail. The same letters were also emailed to all the contractors cited in the stories.

In the correspondence, PCIJ had sought each of the firms’ comments on how they came to be among the country’s top contractors, why some of their projects had met with delay and slippage, and their procurement history with the DPWH.

Wee Eng managing officer Erlinda W. Go was the first to respond to PCIJ. Wee Eng is based in Davao City and is one of the top contractors in Region XI. On June 25, 2018, four days after the letter was sent, PCIJ received a letter from Go.

Download (PDF, 547KB)

Ulticon Builders, also based in Davao City, took far longer to respond. In fact, it was only two weeks ago that PCIJ finally heard back from the company, through one of the firm’s lawyers. PCIJ’s letter to Ulticon was apparently first forwarded to the company’s managing officer, Manuel ‘Manny’ Gonzalez, who after several follow-ups referred PCIJ to Carlos ‘Charlie’ S. Gonzalez, the firm’s president. Charlie Gonzalez was in Europe when PCIJ contacted him. He said that he was attending a Volvo machineries road show and would inform PCIJ when he would be in Manila.

A fortnight ago, PCIJ got the reply letter from the Ulticon lawyer.

Download (PDF, 1.57MB)

Download (PDF, 8.86MB)

Legacy Construction’s lawyer Apolonio Mayuga and a Maer Summit representative, meanwhile, met with PCIJ in person. Maer is among the top contractors in Davao while Legacy, which has its headquarters in Laguna, in the last two years has become among the biggest contractors nationwide.

Download (PDF, 860KB)

PCIJ received Algon’s written reply just last Monday, Sept. 3. The letter is dated Aug. 28, 2018 and is signed by Manuel F. Gonzaga, the firm’s operations manager.

Download (PDF, 355KB)

Deciderio Go and Alfredo Go, proprietors of CLTG Builders and Alfrego Builders & Supply respectively, only met with PCIJ last Monday since requests were delivered to their offices more than two months ago. The father and son did not entertain PCIJ’s letters until after PCIJ’s interview with Special Assistant to the President Christopher Lawrence ‘Bong’ T. Go, who then spoke with his father Deciderio.

Representatives of three firms — St. Gerrard Construction General Contractor & Development Corp., Equi-Parco Construction Company, and Hexamindz Corporation – had also said that they would respond or meet with PCIJ, but their promises yielded no results.

A fourth contractor, Alzam Enterprises Inc., said PCIJ should raise its queries about the firm with DPWH instead.

Contacted on July 2, Pacifico Discaya, St. Gerrard’s authorized managing officer, asked PCIJ to follow up after a few days so he could present “complete data.” PCIJ called him on July 5 and again on July 9; he said that he would try to give his answers within that week. As of press time, PCIJ has yet to get replies to its queries from St. Gerrard, which is based in Pasig City.

Equi-Parco’s records section supervisor Vanessa Fuentes, for her part, told PCIJ on July 3 to expect a response as soon as information is provided by “the office.” But that never came.

One of Equi-Parco’s founders is Ronnie Vicente C. Lagnada, the incumbent mayor of Butuan City, where the company is based. Among other things, PCIJ wanted to know if Lagnada had divested his interests from Equi-Parco.

In a follow-up call to the company, PCIJ was told simply that Lagnada is now part of the government and therefore no longer part of Equi-Parco. The woman speaking refused to give her name. Fuentes likewise withheld the woman’s name when queried later by PCIJ.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6713 or the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees” states that a public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times: “When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption. The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a partnership.”

PCIJ also tried reaching out to Lagnada via the Butuan City Mayor’s Office. All of the numbers published in the city government’s website were unreachable. PCIJ also asked for the Butuan local government unit’s number from the Department of the Interior and Local Government, but the agency apparently does not keep file of the LGU’s active number. PCIJ also sent a registered mail to the mayor’s office.

On July 2, 2018, Joralyn Cabanga of Hexamindz Corporation, another Davao city-based firm, said that the company had “no comment,” although it would send a formal response through email at 11 a.m. of the same day. PCIJ did not receive the promised email.

A staff named “Jackie” of Alzam Enterprises – also based in Davao City — meanwhile told PCIJ that the firm could not give comments and instead referred the Center directly to DPWH.

The remaining 10 firms — AB Aponesto Construction, Genesis 88 Construction, R. Semilla Construction and Marketing, Rely Construction and Supply, Maverick Builders Inc., O.G. Santos Construction, Three W Builders, Syndtite Construction, IBC International Builders Corporation, and M. Montesclaros Enterprises Inc. – did not respond in any manner at all to PCIJ queries despite multiple follow-up calls and emails. — With reporting and research by Karol Ilagan, Malou Mangahas, John Reiner Antiquerra, Carolyn O. Arguillas, Vino Lucero, and Fern Felix; and with additional research by Yzabel Layson, Mildred Mira, and Alyssa Rafael, PCIJ, September 2018
————————————————————————————————————————————————————————————–
Check out, PCIJ’s reports on “Build, Build, Build” hits chokepoint”

* DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects
* Top 10 contractors under Duterte run record of fraud, delays, blacklisting
* Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest
* Vetting contractors
* Davao Region most favored; others get cuts, token hike in infra budgets
* Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao
* Did he help Dad, half-brod get deals? Unfair! Prove it, I will resign – Bong Go

Davao Region most favored; othersget cuts, token hike in infra budgets

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IT’S AS GOOD as it gets for Davao Region, home and bailiwick of President Rodrigo R. Duterte.

And by the government’s own data, it’s as bad as it gets for many other regions of the country in terms of the spread of monies for civil-works projects, although a few have also managed to receive slight boosts.

There seems to be great promise though that this year, several regions have started to get more blessings in terms of infrastructure funds — apparently because there is more money to pass around from public funds, loans, and grants.

Davao City folk rest under the eagle's embrace. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

Davao City folk rest under the eagle’s embrace. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

The 2018 budget for capital outlay of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), for distribution among the 16 regions (excluding the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) increased by 44.94 percent to PhP613.1 billion, including PhP40.9 billion “for inter-regional/nationwide projects.”

In 2017, the agency’s capital outlay to be distributed among the 16 regions totaled PhP423 billion, including Ph40.6 billion for “inter-regional/nationwide projects.”

But from 2016 to 2017 under Duterte, two regions suffered budget cuts, three got negligible increases, and the rest just a billion to at most six billion pesos more in civil-works contracts.

Unfinished: PhP24.5B

In contrast, Davao Region, the most blessed hands down, got PhP24 billion more. Its civil-works budget of PhP19.97 billion in 2016 rose by 119 percent, or more than doubled to PhP43.77 billion, in 2017.

As if this were not enough, this year the region’s civil-works programs got a super uptick again: PhP56 billion, or another 27-percent increase in capital outlay under DPWH’s 2018 Infrastructure Program.

By all indications, Duterte has vested Davao the most-favored region status with a 146-percent total increase in its civil-works budget in the last two years.

The 2016 national budget was the last proposed and passed under former President Benigno S. Aquino III while the 2017 national budget, the first proposed and passed under Duterte.

But by DPWH’s own data as of April 30, 2018, at least 295 unfinished projects account for more than half or PhP24.5 billion of Davao Region’s PhP43.77-billion civil works budget in 2017.

Davao Region consists of the provinces of Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, and Davao Occidental, and Davao City, which serves as regional center.

DVO-Most-Favored_01_PCIJ

Favored region, too

To be sure, Aquino and before him, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, had also clearly taken care of their similar home region and bailiwick of Central Luzon. Duterte’s immediate predecessor belongs to the Aquino and Cojuangco clans of Tarlac province, while Arroyo hails from Pampanga province.

Central Luzon was on top from 2010 to 2012, No. 2 in 2013, then No. 1 again in 2015, in its DPWH allocations under Aquino. The 2010 national budget, though, was the last proposed and passed under the Arroyo administration.

Western Visayas was on top in 2014, and Northern Mindanao in 2016. CALABARZON meanwhile has consistently been in the top three from 2010 to 2017.

But it was only in 2017 under Duterte that Davao shot up to the top. Davao Region, from 2010 to 2016, had

Yet in its big comeback under Duterte, Davao Region’s 119-percent increase in its civil-works budget from 2016 to 2017 is exceedingly skewed compared with the just 86.8-percent composite increase in the civil-works budget of Metro Manila and six Luzon island regions — Cordillera Administrative Region, Ilocos Region, Central Luzon, CALABARZON, MIMAROPA, and Bicol Region—for the same period.

A seventh Luzon region, Cagayan Valley, even suffered a budget cut of 1.7 percent.

In all, Luzon’s seven regions are home to a total of 38,795,855 people, while Metro Manila hosts another12,877,253 residents, according to the 2015 national census of population.

Visayas, Mindanao

Yet again, compared with the civil-works budgets of the three regions of the Visayas, the 119-percent increase in Davao Region’s civil-works budget seems incredibly unequal.

The three Visayas regions — Western Visayas Visayas, Central Visayas, and Eastern Visayas — altogether got just 36.7 percent more in their combined civil-works budget in the first two years of Duterte.

Then again, the combined population of the three Visayas island regions comes up to 14,959,300, as of 2015 official data.

Three other Mindanao regions meanwhile received a composite increase of 83.13 percent in their civil-works budget, notably SOCCSKSARGEN (32.78-percent increase), Northern Mindanao (20.7-percent increase), and CARAGA (29.65-percent increase).

But then a fourth Mindanao Region, Zamboanga Peninsula, recorded a 19.4-percent drop in its civil-works budget. No data could be obtained from the DPWH for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao or ARMM.

Interestingly, while the Mindanao regions as a group got twice more money for civil-works projects under Duterte, the island accounts for only half the combined population of Luzon’s seven regions.

Apart from ARMM’s population of 3,781,387, the five regions of Mindanao account for a combined population of only 20,354,388, or just half of Luzon island’s total.

DPWH 2017 Capital Outlays, By Region

Monies and regions

The smallest budget increase in 2017 for civil-works projects was given to Central Visayas: a mere 0.42 percent. The National Capital Region and the Cordillera Administrative Region fared a little better, but still paled in comparison with the rest; both saw their respective civil-works project budgets rise by just seven percent more from 2016 to 2017.

This is how the civil-works budgets of the regions across the country looked like from 2016 to 2017, in cold cash:

The Regions of Luzon:
• National Capital Region, PhP18,986,752,300 to PhP20,445,691,000, up 7 percent
• Cordillera Administrative Region, PhP12,625,016,500 toPhP13,518,436,740, up 7 percent;
• Ilocos Region, PhP17,157,391,200 to PhP18,172,783,730, up 5.9 percent;
• Cagayan Valley, PhP14,873,307,700 to PhP14,607,758,000, down 1.7 percent;
• Central Luzon, PhP21,261,828,200 to PhP25,093,740,000, up 18 percent;
• CALABARZON, PhP23,952,300,100to PhP27,699,132,040, up 15 percent;
• MIMAROPA, PhP16,752,762,000 to PhP20,134,987,990, up 20 percent; and
• Bicol Region PhP21,393,598,500 to PhP24,368,039,180, up 13.9 percent.

The Regions of the Visayas:
• Western Visayas. PhP18,882,854,700 to PhP23,308,304,000, up 23.4 percent;
• Central Visayas. PhP14,936,035,600 to PhP14,998,586,000, up 0.42 percent; and
• Eastern Visayas, PhP20,822,244,800 to PhP23,504,127,000, up 12.88 percent.

The Regions of Mindanao:
• Zamboanga Peninsula, PhP18,394,915,100 to PhP14,826,980,000, down 19.4 percent;
• Northern Mindanao, PhP 30,226,317,000 to PhP36,499,414,000, up 20.7 percent;
• Davao Region, PhP19,972,454,700 to PhP43,768,401,630, up 119 percent;
• SOCCSKSARGEN, PhP13,584,846,500 to PhP18,037,756,530., up 32.78 percent;
• CARAGA, PhP16,574,950,900 to PhP21,489,528,010, up 29.65 percent; and
• Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, No data available.

DVO-Most-Favored_02_PCIJ

Per capita values

Analyzed for per capita spending, by population, the numbers suggest that more funds have been allocated for people in some regions that for others, and yet again, Davao Region emerges as the big winner.

For instance, DPWH allocated PhP8,944.52 per capita in Davao Region for its population of 4,893,318 as of the 2015 National Census.

This implies an unusual scenario, however: That for every resident of Davao Region, DPWH is spending twice more money than the national per capita per population cost of civil-works projects.

Here’s how the numbers fall for the Philippines: The programmed amount for infrastructure amounted to PhP360,473,665,850 in 2017; by the 2015 national census, the national population has reached 100,981,437. This then results in an estimated infra spending of only PhP3,708.57 per Filipino in 2017.

Apart from Davao, outer regions such as CARAGA, Cordillera Administrative Region, Northern Mindanao, and MIMAROPA received more money per person.

The most populous regions, CALABARZON, Metro Manila, and Central Luzon, got the lowest per capita spending.

DVO-Most-Favored_03_PCIJ

Per road kilometer

Computing for infrastructure spending per national road kilometer is another mode of inquiry.

The data show that in 2017, DPWH allocated PhP25.9 million per road kilometer in Davao for its 1,684.98 kilometers of national roads.

Apart from Davao Region, Northern Mindanao, Metro Manila, CARAGA, and Western Visayas, got higher per road-kilometer spending. Cagayan Valley and CAR got lower.

Yet again, Davao Region’s per capita infra spending for 2017 surpassed the average national spending per capita per kilometer of national road by more than twice more.

Because it got PhP43.77 billion in civil works budget for 2017, and has only 1,684.98 kilometers of national roads, Davao Region’s infra spending per kilometer of national road comes up to PhP25,975,620.86.

This is more than double the national per capital per kilometer of road, for all Philippines, of only PhP11,585,961.28. This figure derives from the infrastructure budget of PhP360,473,665,850 in 2017, computed against a total of 32,770.27 kilometers of national roads.

DPWH 2018 Capital Outlays By Region

2018 allocations

This year, under its PhP613.1-billion budget for infrastructure (capital outlays), DPWH said the allocations for the regions follow:

• National Capital Region (Metro Manila), PhP42.6 billion;
• Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), PhP19.8 billion;
• Region I (Ilocos Region), PhP28.9 billion;
• Region II (Cagayan Valley), PhP19.8 billion;
• Region III (Central Luzon), PhP55.9 billion;
• Region IV-A (CALABARZON), PhP47 billion;
• Region IV-B (MIMAROPA), PhP32.3 billion;
• Region V (Bicol Region), PhP41.3 billion;
• Region VI (Western Visayas), PhP32 billion;
• Region VII (Central Visayas), PhP27.7 billion;
• Region VIII (Eastern Visayas), PhP34.9 billion;
• Region IX (Zamboanga Peninsula), PhP23.1 billion; and
• Region X (Northern Mindanao), PhP55.6 billion;
• Region XI (Davao Region), PhP56 billion;
• Region XII (SOCCSKSARGEN), PhP23.9 billion;
• Region XIII (CARAGA), Php31.4 billion;
• Inter-regional/nationwide projects, PhP40.9 billion.

In this spread of public works monies, DPWH said that Northern Luzon has been allotted 21.75 percent of the total, Southern Luzon 21.08 percent, the Visayas 16.52 percent, and NCR 7.46 percent. Mindanao gets a bigger 36.5 percent.

By the amount of infrastructure budgets they will get from DPWH this year, this is how the regions rank from highest to lowest: Davao Region, Central Luzon, Northern Mindanao, CALABARZON, NCR, Bicol Region, Eastern Visayas, MIMAROPA, CARAGA, Ilocos Region, Central Visayas, SOCCSKSARGEN, Zamboanga Peninsula, and Cagayan Valley and Cordillera Administrative Region.

DVO-Most-Favored_05_PCIJ

Value and volume

Under the Duterte administration, DPWH has awarded an estimated 19,810 projects per year since July 2016. This is more than the average number of DPWH projects awarded during the Aquino administration of 17,042 contracts per year. The data covered Aquino’s full six years in office, while the data for Duterte covered only 1.5 years, or from July 2016 to December 2017.

DVO-Most-Favored_04_PCIJ

The Duterte and Aquino data may be compared because they came from the same database. The data for the nine-year rule of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo from 2000 to June 2010 came from earlier database that PCIJ obtained from DPWH. This second set might not be complete, however. — With reporting and research by Karol Ilagan, PCIJ, September 2018
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Check out, PCIJ’s reports on “Build, Build, Build” hits chokepoint”

* DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects
* Top 10 contractors under Duterte run record of fraud, delays, blacklisting
* Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest
* Vetting contractors
* Davao Region most favored; others get cuts, token hike in infra budgets
* Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao
* Did he help Dad, half-brod get deals? Unfair! Prove it, I will resign – Bong Go

Did he help firms of Dad, half-brod? Unfair! Prove it, I’ll resign – Bong Go

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GOBATO? Just can't miss this huge tarpaulin on a major road in Davao City. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

GOBATO? Just can’t miss this huge tarpaulin on a major road in Davao City. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

SIXTEEN TIMES across a two-hour interview he uttered the word “unfair.”

At one point, he said it five times in a row: “’Yun ang unfair (That’s what’s unfair). ‘Yun ang unfair. ‘Yun ang unfair. ‘Yun ang unfair. ‘Yun ang unfair. ‘Yun ang masakit (That’s what’s painful) on my part. That’s why I said it’s abuse. My name is being abused talaga. Sa totoo lang talaga (For real), Ma’am.” At another time, he ratcheted his remarks to “very, very, very unfair.”

Thrice, he offered to resign. “I will resign. I will resign immediately.”

By the discourse and devices of his boss, President Rodrigo R. Duterte, Special Assistant to the President Christopher Lawrence ‘Bong’ T. Go had these words to say to PCIJ when asked about the multibillion-peso public works contracts awarded to CLTG Builders and Alfrego Builders, Davao-based construction firms owned by his father Deciderio and half-brother Alfredo, respectively.

Go, the eldest of three children, also said of his initials being the same as the first part of the name of his father’s firm: “Kasi alam mo ‘yung mga bata, noon tayo, tulad noong sa mga SM, usually pinapangalan natin sa mga anak natin.” People usually name companies they own after their children, he said, “just like SM,” apparently referring to the famous mall chain. (SM, owned by the Sy family, is actually shorthand for ‘ShoeMart.’)

But Go swears — and public-works officials interviewed separately by PCIJ confirm — that he has not once or ever brokered or appealed for any of the contracts that the firms owned by his closest of kin have won from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Notably, too, the two companies had not been awarded any contracts by the local government of Davao City, according to procurement data from 2000 to 2018.

‘Projects ni SAP’

Still, PCIJ told Go several times during its recent interview with him that the situational context of his closeness to Duterte is a clear message in itself — and may not require him to say or do anything at all for the firms his family owns to bag deals.

Indeed, in DPWH offices and in the areas where the projects are rolling out, people refer to the same projects as “projects ni SAP Bong Go” or “kay Sec. Bong Go.”

Curiously, too, the DPWH central office had granted multiple requests for information PCIJ requested nine months ago, except for one particular set of data: the CLTG files.

On Nov. 22, 2017, PCIJ sent DPWH a request for the bid documents submitted by bidders, complete contract agreement with annexes, and post-qualification report of several projects that had been awarded to CLTG.

These documents are not uploaded on the websites of DPWH or the Philippine Government Electronic Procurement System (PhilGEPS). Although contract agreements are published online, these are not complete and exclude annexes.

The request for records specific to CLTG’s contracts was the only request denied by DPWH of all the documents PCIJ sought to obtain from that office.

Family speaks out

PCIJ sat down with Go on a recent rainy August afternoon at a restaurant just outside Malacañan Palace. The secretary came in a casual light pink polo with a small red “Du30” logo embroidered on his right breast pocket. He sat across two PCIJ reporters, ordered tea from the waiter he called “boss,” and engaged in small talk over some pork, paella, and pinakbet. Once lunch was over, Go spent the next two hours determined to clear his name.

Several days later, PCIJ would also meet up with a few members of Go’s family, as well as an official of CLTG. They, too, would say the president’s trusted aide has nothing to do with the family’s businesses, among other things.

Secretary Go had sought out PCIJ after learning that it was doing a story about his family’s businesses in Davao. He said that he was unaware that PCIJ had been seeking an interview with him for more than a month, although a letter of request had been sent to his appointments office on June 21 and then a list of questions on July 2.

PCIJ had also emailed Secretary Go last June, in which it noted that CLTG Builders, a B-licensed firm, has become one of the biggest contractors in Davao and also among those that had the most number of civil-works projects delayed in the region. The rise of CLTG Builders also coincides with the allotment of more money for roads in Region XI. (See Davao story)

Less than 15 minutes into the interview proper, Go told PCIJ he would resign immediately if it found any information that he used his position to favor his kin’s businesses.

Bong Go. PCIJ

Click to play: Bong Go Quote_PCIJ
“Ni hindi nga ako nakikiusap sa mga engineer, ‘Ito pondohan mo’ (I don’t even talk to engineers and say, ‘Fund this’),” the secretary said. “Si DBM (Department of Budget and Management), ni minsan hindi ko sinabihan na lagyan mo ang Davao City para makapabor doon sa (Not once have I told DBM to allot money for Davao City to favor)….” He left the sentence hanging and instead said, “Once you are able to prove that I spoke with anyone — secretary, regional directors, DBM — everyone who is connected in your research, if I ever did, I will resign. I will resign immediately.”

PhP4.6-B contracts

CLTG bagged a total of PhP1.85-billion worth of infrastructure projects for the entire region from 2007 to 2017, plus some PhP2.7-billion worth of contracts won through joint ventures with four other contractors, including Alfrego Builders. In total, the firm won PhP4.6-billion worth of projects in a decade, more than half of which it clinched just last year, during Duterte’s first year in office as president.

Alfrego meanwhile got PhP88-million worth of projects in a span of more than decade, from 2005 to early 2016. In 2017, during Duterte’s first 18 months as president, it joined up with CLTG, Triple-A contractor FFJJ Construction, and Double-A contractor Rely Construction to carry out projects worth a total of half a billion pesos.

All these projects were won from the DPWH. CLTG and Alfrego, however, failed to finish on time the big projects it won in 2017, allegedly due to road right-of-way issues, even as Davao’s infra budget doubled during the first year of the Duterte presidency.

“Hindi ko alam yung mga tinatawag na joint ventures na iyan ah (I don’t know these things they call joint ventures),” Secretary Go said. “Kaya nga po ang point ko lang dito (my only point here is), it would be very, very, very unfair on my part kung nagkaroon ng dobleng (funds) sila (if they secured double funds).”

He also said of his kin’s delayed projects for the government:“’Yang mga bagay na ‘yan sagutin ng DPWH ‘yan. Kung kailangan i-sanction sila or i-suspend sila, or i-blacklist sila. I-blacklist sila (It is the DPWH that must address those matters. If there is need to sanction them or suspend them or to blacklist them, then they should be blacklisted).”

Yet again, Go said any suggestions of his links to the DPWH contracts that his family members’ firms had won were “very unfair”. All through the 20 years that he has worked with Duterte, he said he had tried to protect his name because “ako ang pinakamalapit sa presidente, ako ‘yung puwedeng magbulong sa president. Ako ‘yung katabi ko lahat ng Gabinete (I am the closest to the president, I am the one who can whisper in his ears. I sit beside those in the Cabinet).”

CLTG is owned solely by the elder Go. Before Secretary Go became Duterte’s assistant, however, he had been the company’s assistant manager for at least a year and a half right after finishing college. Go said, though, that since he is no longer part of CLTG, his family does not talk about it or its projects with him.

Not in Bong SALN

Go’s Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) from at least 2003 to 2017 do not include CLTG Builders as a business interest or financial connection. But he declared four firms in his latest SALN (2017): Cruz Electrical & Const. Supply Corp. (electrical supplier), Keizenng Trucking Corporation (trucking), EMSI Ventures (cemetery), and EMSI Prime (real estate). Cruz Electrical, whose cashier is Bong Go’s wife Emmylou, was acquired in 2007, while the three other businesses were all acquired in 2012.

PhilGEPS data show that a “Cruz Electrical and Construction Supply” was awarded a PhP1.1 million project for the “Infrastructure Projects of North Luzon TransCo O&M” implemented by the National Transmission Corp. The project, however, was awarded in 2006, while Go’s business of the same name was acquired in 2007. The three other companies disclosed in his SALN do not appear in PhilGEPS bids and awards notices database from 2001 to 2018.

Go said that since 1998, when he replaced Duterte’s former assistant, he had made it a point that members of his family stayed away from the Davao City Hall. “Binabawalan ko talaga sila. Pili kayo — kung ano kayo o ako aalis dito? Ganoon ako (I have really barred them. I told them, choose — you do as you please or I will leave this post. That’s how I am),” he said.

“Physically, as in lahat (everything),” the secretary continued. “Lahat. Makipagtransaksyon — ayaw na ayaw ko (Everything. For them to have transactions — I am averse to that).”

In this residential subdivision in Davao City, CLTG Builders holds office next to a vacant lot that doubles as a parking lot. Alfrego Builders holds office in a bungalow in another subdivision
that was unoccupied when PCIJ visited because it was undergoing renovation. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

In this residential subdivision in Davao City, CLTG Builders holds office next to a vacant lot that doubles as a parking lot. Alfrego Builders holds office in a bungalow in another subdivision
that was unoccupied when PCIJ visited because it was undergoing renovation. PCIJ Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

PCIJ field visit

CLTG operations manager Ruth Rodriguez also told PCIJ in a later interview along with a few Go family members – accompanied by a lawyer — that Duterte’s close aide had explicitly told them to stop participating in biddings with the Davao City local government unit “for the sake of delicadeza.” According to Rodriguez, CLTG used to participate in bids at the Davao City LGU but had to stop because of Go’s request. This is the reason why, she said, the company then focused solely on DPWH projects.

Rodriguez had joined Go’s father Deciderio, sister Maritess ‘Ali’ G. de Leon, and half-brother Alfredo in a trip to Manila where they talked to PCIJ last Monday. Apparently, Secretary Go had kept his promise to try to convince his family to agree to be interviewed by the Center.

In early June, PCIJ had visited the listed office addresses of CLTG and Alfrego in Davao City. Both offices are located in residential properties in separate subdivisions there. The property that houses CLTG’s office sits next to vacant lot that doubles as a parking lot. Alfrego’s office, a bungalow, was unoccupied since it was undergoing renovation.

PCIJ was told that CLTG’s general manager Deciderio Go was not available for an interview then since, according to the company’s purchasing manager Sheryl Marino, he was vacationing overseas. Alfredo Go, owner of Alfrego Builders, was also not available. PCIJ then left letters requesting for comment. PCIJ likewise called and sent follow-up emails from Manila.

After almost three months, PCIJ received a call from Rodriguez who said that they were flying to Manila. She would later say during the interview in Manila that they weren’t sure at first if the Center’s request was legitimate because the PCIJ’s logo is red, just like that of a rebel group. But then she also said that they were thinking DPWH would be in a better position to answer the queries posed by the Center.

Gos: It’s expected

Go’s sister Ali de Leon meanwhile said that they are well aware of Go’s sensitive position especially since Duterte became president, and had expected that issues like CLTG getting contracts would crop up. But she said that it’s not like they could easily shift business since they have made big investments in the company already, and acquired equipment that are hard to dispose of. Issues will always be raised, she noted, whichever government agency the Gos will deal with.

“Kung bigas kami, mag-susupply kami sa DSWD, magkaka-issue ‘di ba? Or hardware ba, mag-susupply sa kung ano, anything na nag-supply ka sa gobyerno (If we’re into rice and we supply to DSWD, there will also be an issue, right? Or hardware, anything that we supply to government),” said de Leon. “Nagkataon lang sa DPWH kami so kahit naman saan nga, magkakaroon talaga ng issue (It just so happened that we deal with DPWH, but anywhere we go, there will likely be an issue).”

The secretary himself had said during his interview with PCIJ, “Hindi ko naman puwedeng pagbawalan sila na huwag na kayo magnegosyo, huwag na lang kayo kumain kasi nandito ako sa gobyerno (I cannot prevent them from doing business, and tell them not to eat just because I’m in government).”

The 44-year-old Bong Go said that his father has been in business even before he was born. The elder Go for his part said that he has been in contracting since “around 1985,” with the Davao Golden Construction, a firm owned by her late older sister. The firm no longer exists but he continued on his own with CLTG Builders, which he put up in 1993, he said.

Needs appointment

The secretary’s half-brother Alfredo expressed disbelief when told that Davao residents had referred to Bong Go as ‘SAP.’ Rodriguez also said that people in Davao know the Palace official as ‘Bong’ and not by his full first name ‘Christopher Lawrence,’ and was therefore surprised to hear that they associate CLTG with him.

De Leon, CLTG’s quality management representative, said that having her older brother in public office has not favored their business because “anyone can bid” in government projects. “Hindi po ‘yung title ng company ang titingnan nila, ‘yung bid po ([DPWH] does not look at the title of the company, it looks at the bid),” she said.

According to Deciderio Go, he even needs to set an appointment to be able to see his own son. “Galit na ako sa kanya kasi mag-usap man kami, two minutes, three minutes (I’m already mad at him because we would talk for just two or three minutes),” he said. “Paghintayin niya ako, dalawang oras, ha (He would have me wait for two hours).”

He said that he and the secretary share a love for basketball, which they like playing together. But Deciderio said, “Pero wala siyang time (But he has no time).”

When de Leon commented that her brother has spent more than half of his life with Duterte, Rodriguez followed up with a remark that while Go had publicly said that he would die serving the president, he has never said he would die for his family.

To which Deciderio added: “Hanggang kamatayan na magkasama sila. Hindi kami. (They’d be together till death. Not us).”

The secretary had also told PCIJ that he has distanced himself from his family — not attending birthday celebrations or holding one for himself — because of his work and especially since Duterte became president.

“In fact, hindi ko nga sila nakakasama (I don’t even get to spend time with them),” he said. “Umiiwas din ako sa kanila lalo na ngayon presidente na si boss. Hindi ako nagpapakita sa kanila… siguro mamamatay na lang ‘yung parents ko na – matanda na – mamamatay sila na may sama ng loob sa akin (I also avoid them especially now that boss is president. I don’t show myself to them… my parents will probably pass away having ill feelings toward me).”

Unaware of deals

Go said that he has no reason to help his half-brother’s business because his mother simply would not approve. He said, “Napakasakit on my part. Galit ang nanay ko doon tapos bakit ko siya tutulungan (It’s upsetting on my part. My mother is angry with [him], so why would I help him)?”

Told that PCIJ had learned from multiple sources that CLTG had been allegedly cornering contracts through deals, Go said that he was unaware of such. But he said that these issues must be addressed by DPWH or Davao representatives who are among those approving the budget. Former House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez and House Appropriations Committee Chair Karlo Alexei Nograles are both from Davao.

Said the secretary: “Ako napaka-careful ko, inaalagaan ko (pangalan ko) hindi tumatanggap ng regalo, hindi ako nag-intervene, nagtatawag ng mga ganito, sobrang ingat ko (I am very careful, protective about my name, I do not intervene or call people, I am very careful).”

As everyone’s “referee,” Go said that he is just so busy with work and more. “Ang trabaho ko lang talaga sangkatutak lang na problema ang dumadating sa buhay ko (My job has wrought a multitude of problems in my life),” he said. “Ako ‘yung referee ng lahat, referee ng opisina, referee sa lahat ng problema diyan sa gobyerno kung may hindi magkaintindihan. (I am everyone’s referee, the office referee, the referee of all the problems in government, when people get into misunderstandings).”

No less than some Cabinet secretaries run to him for help, Go said.

Billboard of support for SAP Bong Go cover a project billboard in Davao City. Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

Billboard of support for SAP Bong Go cover a project billboard in Davao City. Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

Reluctant bet, too?

Yet for all of Go’s denials of using his position to benefit others, he himself seems to be enjoying the inherent perks of being the president’s closest aide. For several months now, Go has been preoccupied with activities akin to running an election campaign. On the morning before his interview with PCIJ, the secretary attended the anniversary of the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) in Navotas, where he announced that PhP225 million has been allotted for a fishport project in the city. This is one of many public events Go has attended in and out of the country without his superior.

Much like his boss, the supposedly reluctant presidential candidate three years ago, Go these days has repeatedly said he has no plans to run for senator – although he has also said he will consider it if the President says so.

According to Go, it was actually his idea for Duterte to delay filing his candidacy for president in 2015. Duterte first filed a certificate of candidacy for reelection as Davao City mayor in October 2015. But months later, the presidential candidate fielded by Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan withdrew his bid to give way to Duterte, who eventually ran for the post of the country’s chief executive.

These days, Go’s face can be seen on billboards and posters along major thoroughfares while his name is heard in public service announcements on radio. “Ready, Set, Go!,” “Go, Philippines, Go,” and “SaluBONG sa PagbabaGO” are among some of the slogans used in print collaterals, including green-and-white posters placed in strategic spots in Metro Manila and some cities and provinces.

But several news reports have quoted Go as saying that he has no hand in the production of billboards. And while he has gone as far as admitting there have been donations, he has said that these came from private friends, not public funds.

His family also said that they had nothing to do with the posters and billboards. All they know, they said, is that the materials came from various supporters.

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Net worth: P12.8M

With assets worth PhP25.4 million and liabilities at PhP12.5 million, the secretary’s current wealth stands at PhP12.8 million, a figure that may not be enough to cover expenses of a full campaign. His liquid assets come up to PhP3.9 million, according to his 2017 SALN.

At a recent forum, however, the President had referred in jest to Go as a “bilyonaro” (billionaire), adding that the Gos have always run various businesses, including a printing press from the time of the secretary’s grandfather, who was a close friend of Duterte’s father.

Deciderio Go, who owns a coconut farm apart from CLTG, told PCIJ that his family is neither rich nor poor – “just right,” he said. But he said that his wife comes from a wealthy clan, the Tesoros, who own one of the largest printing presses in Davao City. He said that the secretary’s wife also comes from a family who has businesses in Davao.

Bong Go has yet to make it to Pulse Asia’s Ulat ng Bayan survey on the 2019 senatorial elections, which has showed mostly incumbent senators in the Top 12 of voter preferences. A recent survey conducted by the University of Mindanao’s Institute of Popular Opinion (UM-IPO), however, showed Go on the top spot of voter preference. Released Aug. 18, 2018, the UM-IPO survey results showed that 76 percent of Davao City residents would vote for Go for senator.

But Go’s family is not too keen about his running for senator. De Leon, for one, pointed out that they are already facing questions over CTLG’s contracts now even though her brother is “just” an assistant to the president. “How much more if he’s senator?” she asked.

She said though that they are leaving Bong Go’s political career up to fate, even as Deciderio Go said that everything will become clear come October when certificates of candidacy will be filed for the 2019 midterm elections.

“Bahala na sila (It’s up to them),” said Bong Go’s father. “Bahala na si Lord (It’s up to the Lord).” — With additional reporting by John Reiner Antiquerra, PCIJ, September 2018
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Check out, PCIJ’s reports on “Build, Build, Build” hits chokepoint”

* DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects
* Top 10 contractors under Duterte run record of fraud, delays, blacklisting
* Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest
* Vetting contractors
* Davao Region most favored; others get cuts, token hike in infra budgets
* Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao
* Did he help Dad, half-brod get deals? Unfair! Prove it, I will resign – Bong Go

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