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Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao

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Project DELAYED, PCIJ

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DAVAO CITY – For his home region and bailiwick of Davao Region, President Rodrigo R. Duterte gave the largest share of public works funds in the 2017 national budget, the first proposed and passed under his watch.

Duterte offered Davao or Region XI a dose of double love: PhP43.77 billion in infrastructure funds, a 119-percent increase or twice more than its PhP19.97-billion allocation in 2016. It was the first time since 2010 that Davao Region became the most favored with public-works funds of 16 other regions, excluding the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which is not covered by data from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

But a lot of money has not bought Davao a lot of finished projects. Senior officials and some contractors themselves trace the problem to a strange situation in the region: Mostly the same contractors are winning more and more contracts, grabbing more projects than they could finish well within their capability, and within deadline.

And so what should have been a blessing has turned into a curse for residents of at least two villages, Barangays Malugay and Mudiang in this city, where road projects remain unfinished eight months past their completion deadlines early this year. The projects are among 295 projects that, by DPWH data as of April 30, 2018, remain unfinished past contract deadlines.

The unfinished projects, according to data from DPWH’s Bureau of Construction, altogether amount to PhP24.5 billion. This is equivalent to 56 percent if computed against Davao Region’s PhP43.77-billion public works funds in 2017.

These numbers do not look good at all. They raise serious doubts about the absorptive capacity of a region that suddenly has had to manage projects of value and possibly volume twice bigger than what it got a year earlier.

Of the projects awarded in the region in 2017, DPWH said 876 had been “completed”, 186 were still “ongoing”, while three more have “not yet started” by the first quarter of 2018.

Thus, instead of comfort and ease, unfinished road projects here have decked the region with piles of dirt and rubble, daily showers of dust for motorists and residents, and occasional accidents on account of road obstructions.

Lucky set

There are still winners here, though. The financial bonanza from multibillion-pesos worth of projects in the region has benefited not only big contractors but also relatively smaller ones that, through a growing number of joint-venture agreements with the former, have managed to snare more and bigger projects.

To this lucky set of top contractors in Davao Region belong two entities owned by the father and the half-brother of Special Assistant to the President, Christopher Lawrence ‘Bong’ Tesoro Go: CLTG Builders and Alfrego Builders and Supply.

CLTG Builders stood out in PCIJ’s research because all of its joint-venture projects with big contractors in 2017 failed to complete projects by the original deadline. With just a B license, the firm could not have implemented the big-ticket projects it won in 2017 without having a partner.

The company that bears the initials of the presidential aide appears in Davao City’s 10 biggest contractors year on year from 2010 to 2017, according to DPWH data.

CLTG won a total of PhP1.85 billion worth of infrastructure projects for Davao Region from 2007 to 2017. This has yet to include the PhP2.7 billion worth of contracts won by CLTG through joint ventures with four other contractors, including Alfrego Builders, a firm owned by Bong Go’s half-brother Alfredo Go.

In sum, CLTG has been awarded PhP4.6 billion worth of projects, all from the DPWH, in the past decade. It won more than half of that total only last year, however. None of these projects has been awarded by the local government of Davao City.

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Davao_T08_PCIJ

Project status records

More money to spend means more work to be done. In Davao Region’s case, though, more money has also meant more work left undone, or a lot of unfinished projects.

Davao Region consists of the provinces of Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, and Davao Occidental, and Davao City, which serves as regional center. Under Duterte who had served as Davao City mayor for 20 years, the region has assumed political preeminence bar none in the nation.

From the city and the region of Davao comes a powerhouse cast of power-wielders in the Duterte administration. They include Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez, Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, dozens of political appointees in executive agencies and government-owned and -controlled corporations, and 11 district representatives, including former Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez, and Committee on Appropriations Chair Karlo Alexei B. Nograles.

Two other legislators from the region are vice chairpersons of the committee on appropriations, and the rest serve as chair, vice chair, or majority member of the equally significant committees on legislative franchises, constitutional amendments, small business and entrepreneurship, agriculture and food, East ASEAN Growth Area, and Mindanao Affairs. Apart from the DPWH Regional Office, the region has eight district engineering offices.

The projects status records of the DPWH’s Bureau of Construction show that as of April 30, 2018, Davao Region has 295 unfinished projects, including 136 or 46 percent bidded out by the DPWH regional office as implementing agency, and another 75 projects, by the Davao City District Engineering Office.

Davao_T03_PCIJ

In its report on “Project Accomplishment Rate by Region, CY 2017,” DPWH said that Davao Region has a total of 1,065 “active projects,” including 876 projects “completed”, 186 still “ongoing”, and three other projects that have “not yet started,” as of April 30, 2018. (See Table: Project Accomplishment Rate by Region, CY 2017, as of April 30, 2018)

Davao_T02_PCIJ

Click to watch video: Main Frame_PCIJ (3)
In contrast to Davao Region’s negative 2.64 slippage rate, three regions — Metro Manila, Zamboanga Peninsula, and Central Luzon — did not have project delays in 2017. The other regions with much smaller public-works budgets than Davao posted slippage rates of as low as negative 0.44 percent (Bicol Region) to as high as negative 6.68 percent (Western Visayas).

But DPWH Region XI Chief Information Officer Gaudencio Ortiz does not seem to be worried. He said that the uptick in civil-works spending is meant to support the region as it has become a key economic player in Mindanao and the whole country.

“We are enjoying all this attention,” he said. “Therefore, we also have to keep up with that attention. We have to keep up with the development of the entire region, that is why there is this increase in demand for more infrastructure for the efficient delivery of goods and services.”

Unfinished projects

Residents of Barangay Malugay and Mudiang in this city would probably wish that DPWH focus its attention instead on rushing unfinished projects.

The road projects connecting the two villages have been awarded to the same contractor and implementing office: CLTG Builders and its joint-venture partner Three W Builders that won projects from the DPWH regional office.

In separate interviews, DPWH officials and CLTG’s owners cite the same reason for the project delay: the projects were bidded out even before road right-of-way (RROW) issues in the area had been settled.

CLTG Builders, a B-licensed construction firm, is owned by Deciderio L. Go, the father of Duterte’s special assistant Bong Go, while its JV partner Three W Builders is a Triple-A contractor from Las Piñas City.

Malugay and Mudiang are among the many villages in the eastern part of Davao City that are linked by an PhP852-million seven-package concreting and widening road project of DPWH Region XI. Five of those, Packages 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7, were awarded to CLTG and Three W Builders, while Package 6 was awarded to Wee Eng Construction. (PCIJ could not find Package 4 in DPWH and PhilGEPS records and during its field visit to Davao City.)

All the five packages assigned to the CLTG/Three W joint venture should have been done by February and March this year, but, by DPWH’s report as of April 30, 2018, remain still unfinished with 49 to 67 percent accomplishment rates only.

CLTG officers interviewed by PCIJ said that the projects are currently suspended on account of road right-of-way issues encountered during project implementation. DPWH Region XI, they said, is now trying to finish negotiations with affected residents.

Wee Eng’s part that is situated in Barangay Mahayag, meanwhile, is paved and clear and almost done at 96 percent.

3W:CLTG PROJECT. COMPLETION DEADLINE DEC. 2017, DELAYED, PCIJ

PCIJ Photo/John Reiner Antiquerra

Favored contractors?

Two senior government officials and at least four contractors privy to procurement activities in Davao told PCIJ in separate interviews that backroom deals are happening in order for certain companies to corner contracts even though they do not have the capability to take on projects.

The result is a rather skewed spread of infrastructure projects awarded to supposed favored and incapable contractors. The sources have all requested anonymity because of the potential implications on their employment and business.

DPWH officials and contractors alike point to one main reason as cause of delay for these projects: the acquisition of the road right-of-way. Although valid, acquiring RROW has been a longtime problem that has hindered many agencies in the past from implementing infrastructure projects.

What PCIJ also found in its analysis of official records and multiple interviews from sources is a story of individual firms and joint ventures, and an implementing agency with contracting loads that are much heavier than they used to carry, raising questions about their capability to complete the projects.

In fact, many of Davao’s and also the country’s top contractors are also on top of the list of contractors with the most number of delayed projects in the region. All of the contractors that had more than half a billion pesos worth of incomplete projects also belong among Davao’s top 15 contractors, from July 2016 to December 2017.

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Leading this group are Ulticon Builders, St. Gerrard Construction, FFJJ Construction, Three W Builders, and CLTG Builders with more than PhP1 billion worth of delayed projects. They are followed by AB Aponesto Construction, Parts, and Supply, Rely Construction & Supply, and Wee Eng Construction. (See Table: Incomplete Projects in Davao Region by Contractor/Joint Venture, as of April 30, 2018)

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Contractors’ replies

Of Davao’s top contractors, only Ulticon Builders, Wee Eng Construction, Algon Engineering Construction Corp, and CLTG Builders responded to PCIJ and explained the reason for the delay in their respective projects. Ulticon, for instance, refuted that it still had 24 delayed projects on account of the months that passed since PCIJ obtained the data from DPWH in early May 2018.

In a letter dated June 21, 2018, Ulticon’s Vice President for Operations Carlo Lisandro L. Gonzalez provided an updated status of the 24 incomplete projects in DPWH’s list. Four of the 24 projects have already been completed, Gonzalez wrote, while six have a 99-percent accomplishment rate. Three are ongoing, while the rest have either been suspended due to peace and order or road right-of-way issues or have just resumed operations since RROW problems have been settled, he also said.

Having multiple projects, Gonzalez wrote, is not the reason behind projects being incomplete. In Ulticon’s case, he said, here is no shortage in manpower or equipment to be able to finish the projects on time. The major problem that contractors like Ulticon encounter is road right-of-way. Gonzalez said that the DPWH is still negotiating with residents and owners of the area where Ulticon has suspended projects. He said that Ulticon “cannot continue with our operations using our maximum capacity without the necessary Permit to Enter or Writ of Possession.”

3ULTICON PROJECT, DEADLINE JAN 2018, PCIJ

Wee Eng, meantime, confirmed that it had four delayed projects, all because of road right-of-way problems as well. But as of June 29, 2018, Wee Eng said, the Mahayag project has already been substantially completed and due for turnover. Two other projects meanwhile have been suspended while one is delayed in implementation.

Wee Eng Construction was started by Engineer Jesus Wee Eng in 1961 in Davao City as a single proprietor. Currently, Wee Eng has 250 to 300 employees in various projects. The company is also currently implementing 10 projects in Davao Region worth PhP1.17 billion.

“Having multiple big projects at a time do (sic) not pose problems to us because we only take on projects for which we are capable of doing simultaneously,” said Wee Eng manager Erlinda Go in a letter to PCIJ. “But oftentimes, RROW problems arise, which are beyond our control. This causes delay in our project implementation.”

Algon’s Operations Manager Manuel Gonzaga, meanwhile, said that the company’s bridge-widening project, which was at 89-percent completion as of April 30, 2018, was already finished on June 15, 2018. Also writing in reply to PCIJ, Gonzaga said that Algon’s other incomplete project, the construction of the Pagan Pequeño Bridge 2, “has been experiencing road-right-of-way problems.” A joint-venture project with R.D. Policarpio & Company Inc., the project was at 56-percent completion as of April 30, 2018.

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CLTG explains delay

Maritess ‘Ali’ G. de Leon, CLTG’s quality management representative, said that the Malugay and Mudiang projects have been suspended in 2017 due to road right-of-way problems, and DPWH up to now is still negotiating with property owners. De Leon is the second of three children of Deciderio and the younger sister of Bong Go.

In an interview with PCIJ along with other CLTG officials, de Leon said that the situation is beyond the company’s control: “Gustuhin mo mang matrabaho eh hindi pa nila matapos negotiate sa may-ari. Ang tagal (As much as we want to work [we can’t] because they have not finished negotiating with the owner. It’s taken time).”

Asked why CLTG bidded for projects with unsettled right-of-way issues, de Leon said that this kind of problem only comes up once implementation begins. CLTG, she said, won the Mahayag and Mudiang projects unaware that RROW problems would occur. According to de Leon, RROW acquisition is under the purview of DPWH.

Ruth Rodriguez, CLTG Builders’ operations manager, for her part, said that a contractor may inspect the location before bidding, but it cannot tell whether residents would be amenable with the negotiations.

De Leon said that another reason for the project delays is that there are only few assessors for the multiple road projects being implemented across the country. Acquisition of RROW usually becomes an issue when the owner does not agree with the price being offered, the owner is either overseas or dead, disagreements among siblings who own the property, and the like.

In some cases, de Leon explained, some contractors have opted to negotiate with and advance payment to property owners to be able to jumpstart work on their projects. The advanced amount commonly referred to as tapal or abono is then reimbursed from the DPWH. De Leon said that CLTG only does this with owners who have complete papers because DPWH is quite strict with documentation.

At losing end

“Hindi mo talaga mapagalaw ang property hangga’t walang pera (You cannot really do anything with the property until money has been paid),” said de Leon. “’Yung mga tao sinuswelduhan na eh di losing end talaga ang contractor kaya sige tapalan na lang namin para na lang may matrabaho (We have to pay workers their salaries and the contractor is really left at the losing end. That’s why we pay first just so we can work).”

She said that while it may look like CLTG has abandoned the road project, most people do not know the real story behind its delay. CLTG precisely wants to complete the project, she said, otherwise it will not be able to collect full payment from government.

De Leon also noted that unfinished projects may cast a shadow on CLTG’s name, hence, “hindi puwedeng hindi tapusin, hindi puwedeng hindi gawin kasi ikaw rin ang maiipit (you can’t not finish the project, you can’t not do it because you will be the one in trouble in the end).”

All three CLTG officers who met with PCIJ last Monday invariably stressed that Bong Go had nothing to do with the company’s luck in winning projects. CLTG got more projects in 2017, according to de Leon, because of the bigger budget allotted for Davao Region but for the same number of contractors.

CLTG, which Deciderio Go said was put up and registered as a single proprietorship on Aug. 27, 1993, reportedly used to be able to bid for projects with the Davao City local government unit. But since Bong Go became Duterte’s assistant, the company stopped all transactions with the LGU. The CLTG officials at the interview all said it was Bong Go who specifically told them to stay away from city hall. This led CLTG to shift its focus to DPWH.

Rodriguez said that Bong Go has no role at all in CLTG and is unaware of projects it is implementing. “Walang role (No role),” she said. “Wala nga siyang alam kung ano ang project namin (He is not even aware of CLTG’s projects).”

DPWH on CLTG

DPWH officials say that CLTG and Alfrego have a history of implementing projects in the area and have not been favored in any way. For one, Ortiz of DPWH Region XI said, DPWH treats all contractors the same. He also said that the construction companies now winning contracts have existed even before Duterte became president.

“So, they have been winning contracts, they have been doing projects, so, if they qualify why not, ‘di ba?” Ortiz said. “Because they all go through the same process. If they win the bidding, if they qualify for the project, then we cannot do anything about it anymore because we are mandated by law.”

DPWH spokesperson Anna Mae Lamentillo in an August 2018 interview echoed Ortiz’s view. She said that DPWH follows the procurement law and is legally barred to disallow contractors from participating in any bidding procedures. “So kumbaga (in other words), si CLTG, we can’t stop them,” she said. “We are prohibited by law to do that. They’re qualified to join government procurement procedures.”

RELY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT, DELAYED SINCE JAN 2018, PCIJ

‘No human intervention’

Lamentillo said that the procurement process was crafted in such a way that bidding procedures are done without human intervention. “So all contractors can actually participate in the bidding process and if they win, they win it because of the process,” she said.

To be sure, contractors cannot be barred from bidding without cause. PCIJ then asked Lamentillo if DPWH is not one bit concerned about the allegations and whether it cannot take any initiative to look into the matter. She agreed that the allegations about CLTG’s activities are serious, and said that a formal protest mechanism provided by law is a recourse.

“I don’t think we want DPWH to intervene in the procurement process,” she also said. “I mean, it should flow as the process itself. It’s mandated by law. We follow certain rules and regulations.”

“We are open to investigating any issue in DPWH but file a protest first,” she added.

No ‘conflict of interest’?

Section 47, Rule XV of Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act requires bidders to submit a sworn affidavit that it is not related to the head of the procuring entity, members of the Bids and Awards Committee, the Technical Working Group, and the Bids and Awards Committee Secretariat, the head of the project management office, or the end-user or implementing unit, and the project consultants, by consanguinity or affinity up to the third civil degree. Failure to comply with the provision shall be grounds for the automatic disqualification of the bid.

PCIJ does not have information linking CLTG to members of the DPWH offices in Davao. For instance, Davao City 1st District Engineering Office’s list of Bids and Awards Committee members from 2010 to 2016 does not have anyone whose surname is “Go.”

In an interview with PCIJ, Secretary Go said that he will resign if any information is found that he intervened in any way for his father’s contracting firm to get a project.

DPWH Secretary Mark A. Villar told PCIJ that he has not received any calls from Go asking for any favors for any project. He is not aware, Villar said, of any reports about CLTG and its activities in Davao.

ST GERRARD CONSTRUCTION, DELAYED SINCE JAN 2018, PCIJ

Same as before

Gene Lozano, district engineer at the Davao City 2nd District Engineering Office, meantime said that even before he heard about Bong Go, he already knew of CLTG as a contractor. “Wala namang nagbabago kung ano ba ‘yung aming pakikitungo (Nothing has changed in the way we deal with them),” he said. “Before and now is just the same. Kung trabaho, trabaho (Work is work).”

Lozano also said that he has never been in touch with Bong Go. He might have met the father Deciderio, the engineer said, but the family never asked any favor from his office. “We never hear from them, hindi nga kami kilala (they don’t even know us),” he says.

District Engineer Wilfredo Aguilar of the Davao City 1st District Engineering Office also said that Bong Go never meddled with his father’s business. The only time Bong Go called him, said Aguilar, was to relay instruction from the president about an idle project he saw in Davao. He added, referring to CLTG, “Actually, before Bong Go was (assistant) ni Presidente, andiyan na ‘yan sila. Regular contractor na ‘yan. Hindi contractor na pipitsugin, talagang mga big time na ‘yan sila. Na-timing lang ngayon siyempre nakapuwesto (Actually before Bong Go became the President’s assistant, they were already there. They were already a regular contractor. Not a small-time contractor, they were already big time. It’s just that now [Go] is in an important post).”

Joint-venture projects

Davao Region’s No. 1 contractor from July 2016 to December 2017 was actually FFJJ Construction, a Maguindanao-based single proprietorship owned by Osmeña Palanggalan. According to procurement experts, it is not unusual for contractors, even the large ones, to operate as single proprietorships. Many of Davao’s and even the country’s major road project contractors are sole proprietorships.

A procurement expert working in government also says that big contractors need not necessarily incorporate, although care must be taken when taking on projects that are beyond a contractor’s financial and technical capacity.

CLTG started small with a capitalization of PhP3 million and six employees, according to PhilGEPS records. Today CLTG has at least 14 named employees occupying positions in the company’s Equipment, Engineering, Administration, and Continual Improvement divisions. The company also has unidentified backhoe/dump truck operator-drivers, maintenance staff, construction laborers, internal auditors, company drivers, and a warehouse man, according to an organizational chart hanging in the vacant lot next to CLTG’s home-office that doubles as a parking area.

ST GERRARD PROJECT, DELAYED SINCE JAN 2018, PCIJ

Beyond NFCC

At least according to PhilGEPS records, CLTG Builders started implementing government projects in 2007 with a single PhP2.78-million project for the improvement and concreting of Eden-Tagurano Road in Toril District in Davao City. In 2009, it won two projects worth a total of PhP4.23 million for the concreting of Buhangin-Tigatto Road and the construction of a multi-purpose building in Bunawan Aplaya, Davao City.

Since 2010, CLTG’s project portfolio has been growing every year, reaching a peak in 2015 when it won PhP448.8 million worth of projects. (Duterte was mayor of Davao City from 2013 to 2016, replacing his daughter Sara who served from 2010 to 2013. Before Sara, Duterte was also mayor from 2001 to 2010 and 1988 to 1998.)

From 2007 to 2016, all of CLTG’s projects were below PhP50 million each. It was in 2017, the same year when Davao’s DPWH budget doubled, when CLTG began taking on projects that are beyond its individual contracting capacity.

Of the top 15 contractors in the region, only CLTG has a B license issued by the Philippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB) since at least 2010. The rest either hold a Single A, Double A, or Triple A license. The highest license that can be obtained is Quadruple A.

Holding a license category “B” and a size range of “Medium A” for road projects, CLTG must have completed a single largest project worth above PhP10 million to PhP50 million and is allowed to take on projects of up to PhP100 million.

CLTG on its own then would not have been able to take on the PhP2.7 billion worth of projects it won from DPWH Region XI in 2017. Sixteen of those 18 projects were more than PhP100 million each, higher than the cost of projects CLTG is allowed with its B license and Medium A size range.

Too, the required Net Financial Contracting Capacity (NFCC) for such big projects would have been difficult to achieve given CLTG’s financial position and contracting load at the time.

Procurement rules require bidders to have an NFCC that is at least equal to the approved budget of the contract (ABC) or a commitment from a Universal or Commercial Bank to extend a credit line in favor of the prospective bidder if awarded the contract to be bid.

The NFCC is computed as follows: NFCC equals current assets minus current liabilities, multiplied by variable K, then less the value of all outstanding works or projects under ongoing contracts, including awarded contracts yet to be started. Variable K is 10 for a contract duration of one year or less, 15 for a contract duration of more than one year up to two years, and 20 for a contract duration of more than two years.

18 joint-venture deals

In 2017, CLTG won three individual projects and 18 projects with joint ventures. By April 6, 2017, CLTG had already won contracts worth PhP976,959,745.11. By then, PCIJ estimates indicate that it would have been unable to take on more projects because its NFCC would have been in the negative.

CLTG’s financial records obtained from PhilGEPS on June 22, 2018 show that CLTG’s current assets were valued at PhP88,941,029.35 and its current liabilities at PhP873,408.76, as of 2016. If these figures were used to calculate CLTG’s NFCC by April 6, 2018, the result would be
-PhP96,283,539.21. The calculations look like this:

[Current Assets (P88,941,029.35) – Current Liabilities (P873,408.76) X K (10 for projects with a contract duration of one year or less)] – Estimate value of all outstanding works or projects under ongoing contracts (P976,959,745.11) = negative P96,283,539.21

The succeeding two projects that CLTG won after April 6, on April 10, were worth PhP87.2 million and PhP128.4 million each, or more than its estimated NFCC at the time.

To upgrade license

But what CLTG did in 2017 to get more of these projects was to team up with other bigger contractors to meet contracting capacity requirements of the DPWH Region XI’s bigger projects. CLTG engaged in joint ventures with two Davao-based contractors — Alfrego Builders and Rely Construction & Supply — and two Metro Manila-based firms, St. Gerrard Construction and Three W Builders. The projects in Malugay and Mudiang are CLTG’s joint-venture projects with Three W Builders.

Rely Construction, St. Gerrard Construction, and Three W Builders are among the Top 10 contractors in Davao, which means that they too, have multiple and big projects on their own.

CLTG’s Rodriguez said that the company decided to engage in joint ventures because it wanted to qualify for bigger projects and earn more experience to be able to upgrade its license and contracting limit. She said that they knew about Three W and St. Gerrard because they too implement their own projects in Davao.

Two procurement experts interviewed separately by PCIJ agreed that a contractor may indeed enter into a joint venture with another contractor when capacity is already inadequate. But, they both noted, simultaneous projects that contractors are implementing as individual contractors and as a joint venture must also be considered if they qualify in new projects with their capacities pooled.

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One of the experts who currently works in government said that care should be given in the validation of the key personnel to be assigned in the context of other projects to be implemented simultaneously. After all, the expert said, the same technical personnel could be pledged for several simultaneous projects. If their assignment in every project is a full-time job, said the expert, then they cannot be in two projects or more at the same time.

The same would be true for equipment committed for the project and other projects implemented simultaneously, the expert said. Moreover, the financial capacity has to be checked in terms of the NFCC considering other projects to be implemented simultaneously.

The CLTG officials interviewed by PCIJ could not give an estimate of how many employees the company has in all. But they said that the firm has one engineer per project. De Leon said that they do not take on projects they cannot finish and has not had any record of not completing a project. “We can look (you) straight in the eye and say kaya (it’s doable),” she said.

More delayed projects

CLTG’s joint venture partners – Rely, St. Gerrard, Three W, and Alfrego – all have their own individual projects and joint ventures with other contractors. These projects are also on the list (add link to PDF file) of DPWH’s unfinished projects as of April 30, 2018.

Rely Construction, for instance, won PhP3.9 billion worth on DPWH contracts during Duterte’s first 18 months as president, from July 2016 to December 2017. CLTG is not the only partner of Rely in Davao; Rely also has joint ventures with C.T. Leoncio Construction & Trading, Alonzo Construction, Alfrego Builders & Supply, Astrobuilt Construction & Development, and Hi-View Resources & Development. All of these joint ventures have incomplete projects; Rely on its own has unfinished projects as well.

A Double-A, SEC-registered corporation, Rely’s current assets as of 2016 was at PhP311.1 million and current liabilities at PhP81.6 million.

PCIJ visited Rely’s office at the Panorama Summit hotel along Tigatto Road, Buhangin, Davao City to seek comments from its manager Renato Castañeda, but he was not in the office at the time. PCIJ’s inquiry letter has yet to be addressed by the contractor as well.

No. 1 contractor in PH

St. Gerrard, meanwhile, is not just one of Davao’s top contractors; it is the No. 1 contractor in the entire country with PhP12.3 billion worth of projects from July 2016 to December 2017. Based in Pasig City, St. Gerrard is a Double-A contractor registered with the SEC. As of 2016, St. Gerrard’s current assets stood at PhP2.85 billion and current liabilities at PhP9.88 million.

Like Rely Construction, St. Gerrard has several joint-venture partners in Davao apart from CLTG. It has joint projects with Hi-View Resources & Development Corporation, Maer Summit Konstrukt Co., TKS Builders & Supplies, and Digos Tesston Const. & Supplies, all of which have incomplete projects as of the end of this year’s first quarter.

PCIJ has yet to receive St. Gerrard’s response to its letter dated June 27, 2018 despite multiple follow-ups with its owner Pacifico Discaya II.

Three W Builders also has partnerships with several contractors in the region: Tagum Builders Contractors Corp., TKS Builders & Supplies, Davao Rock Mixer Enterprises, and Ecomixed Construction and Development Corporation. These partnerships, like those with Rely and St. Gerrard, have a long list of delayed projects as of end of April this year.

Three W Builders is a Davao top contractor with PhP2.04 billion worth of projects. It is No. 13 by value of contracts won nationwide. Registered with the SEC in January 1984, Three W Builders is a Triple-A contractor with current assets of PhP66.5 million and current liabilities of PhP1.27 million as of 2016.

Three W Builders has also yet to respond to PCIJ’s letter dated June 27, 2018.

Bong Go’s half-brother

Alfrego Builders is the smallest among CLTG’s joint-venture partners. A single proprietorship, Alfrego has a D license. Its current assets, as of 2016, were valued at PhP55.86 million, and current liabilities, PhP22,896. The company’s property and equipment were worth PhP7.9 million during the same period.

From 2005 to early 2016, Alfrego won PhP88 million worth of projects. In 2017, it joined up with CLTG, Triple-A contractor FFJJ Construction, and Double-A contractor Rely Construction to carry out projects worth a total of half a billion pesos.

Alfredo Go, owner of Alfrego and half-brother of Bong Go, told PCIJ that project redesign, apart from peace and order and weather, is another issue that causes delay. This, he said, is the reason why Alfrego’s joint-venture project with CLTG has been delayed.

The Alfrego/CLTG joint venture was awarded two packages of a bypass-road reconstruction and widening project worth PhP91 million and PhP89 million, respectively. Both projects were at 53 percent and 60 percent accomplishment rate, as of April 30, 2018.

Monitoring JVs

DPWH officials in the region said that apart from being able to qualify for bigger projects that are beyond one’s capacity, a contractor goes into a joint venture to earn experience to increase one’s capacity for future projects.

Ortiz said that going into a joint venture with a higher-category contractor will sort of serve as a stepping stone for an individual to get higher contracts in the future. Joint-venture agreements for small-category contractors encourage them to “step up” their game and enable them to be able to compete with large contractors, he said.

Gene Lozano, district engineer at Davao City 2nd District Engineering Office, also said that contractors will earn experience from joint ventures that will help them increase their limit. He said, “Kaya ayun nga ‘yung advantage ng joint venture. Mabilis ‘yung increase of their limits, yung category nila (So that’s the advantage of a joint venture. They can quickly increase their limits, elevate their category).”

In theory, a joint venture or having two or more contractors working on a single project can ensure that a huge project will be successful. In reality, however, such joint ventures for the most part have been problematic.

Legal loophole

Several contractors interviewed by PCIJ on the condition of anonymity said that joint ventures have provided a legal backdoor for smaller contractors to win big projects that they would not have qualified for on their own by “using” or “borrowing” the license of a bigger contractor. On paper, both contractors are supposed to implement the project, but in reality, only the small contractor gets the project and implements it. A “royalty fee” fee worth two to five percent of the contract amount is paid to the big contractor for “lending” its license.

A Triple-A contractor said that these arrangements are most obvious in joint ventures where the “authorized managing office” is the representative of the small firm and not of the big firm. This, he said, is one of the reasons why some projects get delayed because the small contractor is simply incapable of implementing the project in the JV. The only reason the small contractor managed to “win” the project in the first place is because it had help from the big firm.

DPWH records show that joint ventures are also the ones with a significant number of projects left unfinished, leaving Davaoeños unhappy and inconvenienced for at least a year now. As of April 30, 2018, joint ventures have at least PhP6.6 billion worth of delayed projects in the region.

District Engineer Wilfredo Aguilar of the Davao City 1st District Engineering observed that joint ventures seem to have become a trend especially for big projects. He recounted, “May isang small contractor na gustong magpalaki, magje-JV sila, joint venture ng isang contractor. Ngayon, ang gumagawa ‘yung ka-JV (A small contractor who wants to take on bigger projects has a joint venture with a contractor. Now the one actually doing the JV is the other contractor).”

But the bigger contractor is not necessarily the one taking charge in a joint venture. According to Aguilar, this depends on the joint-venture agreement between the partners. Say, for instance, a smaller contractor’s NFCC is 80 percent of the project, he said. The smaller contractor may seek a partner that will take care of the 20 percent in order to be eligible for the project. If this joint venture wins, Aguilar said, the smaller contractor will represent the joint venture because it holds the bigger share in the project.

Asked about joint ventures involving a local contractor and another based in Manila like Davao-based CLTG with Pasig-based St. Gerrard and Las Piñas-based Three W Builders, Lozano meanwhile said that the local contractor may ask its partner to let it be the one to implement the projects. “Ako na lang ang gagawa, eh ‘di ayun, maggawa sila ng agreement… na siya ang authorized to do the project, to implement the project,” he says.

DPWH Secretary Mark A. Villar, interview with PCIJ. Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

DPWH Secretary Mark A. Villar, interview with PCIJ. Photo by John Reiner Antiquerra

Tricky part

DPWH insiders admit, however, that the tricky part is that there seems to be no way for DPWH to know just how much each JV participant is actually contributing to a project, since a joint venture is treated as a single entity, supported by an agreement between two contractors.

Too, the partners might have made a financial arrangement in which the big contractor’s contribution is money while the small contractor takes care of the actual implementation of the project. In this case, only the small contractor will be seen doing work in project site.

Engineer Michael de la Vega of DPWH Region XI commented that joint-venture partners are considered one entity and that it depends on the contractor how they will share responsibilities as long as it fits within the project timeline. DPWH Region XI spokesperson Dean Ortiz also said that a joint venture has only one authorized manager or representative who is recognized by the agency. “So in this case we considered both contractors as one with that representative,” he said.

Asked about the capacity of a smaller but lead contractor to implement a project, which in the first place it could not have done alone, Lozano said that local contractors usually “have all the capabilities.” The local contractor, he said, has the resources but it may not eligible to join the bidding simply because it does hold the proper license category.

Then again, the category of PCAB license issued is based on the financial capacity, equipment capacity, experience of the firm, and experience of technical personnel of the contractor.

Cause for disqualification

Republic Act No. 4566 or the Contractor’s License Law provides that no contractor, including sub-contractors, shall engage in the business of contracting without first having secured the proper PCAB license. The law was enacted to ensure the safety of the public with having only qualified and reliable contractors are allowed to undertake construction in the country.

To Lozano, though, it all boils down to how interested each joint-venture partner is in implementing the project. As for his office, he said that its primary concern is that the project is implemented properly. “If you follow the specification or implement the project on time, wala tayong problema (we have no problem),” he said.

Similarly, Ortiz said that DPWH does not bother itself over which joint-venture partner is really doing the project, so long as this is delivered efficiently. He pointed out, “We consider it, both parties as one, so we only deal with one person. We only hold the representative accountable for that purpose. So, as long as they deliver the goods, as long as they deliver the project in the manner that they should, okay na kami doon.”

Asked why top contractors, including those in joint ventures, have the most number of incomplete projects, Ortiz said that he cannot answer anymore because he has no idea. Then he added, “Siguro if I talk more about it, I will be jobless starting tomorrow.”

DPWH spokesperson Anna Mae Lamentillo said that joint ventures are legally permissible. Only if there is a complaint can DPWH act and investigate, she said. “They (joint ventures) were created by law for certain type of situations,” she said. “As an implementing agency, we (DPWH) cannot amend it.”

But DPWH Secretary Villar’s legal advisor Pristine de Guzman said that misrepresentation in joint ventures is actually a ground for disqualification. For instance, she said that a joint-venture partner who is not actually participating in implementation is a misrepresentation on the part of the joint-venture entity.

“Kasi dapat sila, kung ano ‘yung dapat ni-rerepresent nila, kung ano ‘yung capability nila and ‘yung sabihin natin ‘yung shares nila, dapat ganoon talaga (It should be that what they represented, what their capabilities are, and what they said their shares are, that would be how everything should really be),” de Guzman said. “And if it turns out na hindi (it’s not), then we will really appreciate kung may mga reports na ganoon para madali kaming mag-disqualify (if someone reports to us so we can easily disqualify them).” — With research by John Reinner Antiquerra and Carolyn O. Arguillas, PCIJ, September 2018

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Check out, PCIJ’s reports on “Build, Build, Build” hits chokepoint”

* DPWH under Duterte: Corruption, politics, slippage mar many projects
* Top 10 contractors under Duterte run record of fraud, delays, blacklisting
* Contractors: Candor from a few, thunderous silence from the rest
* Vetting contractors
* Davao Region most favored; others get cuts, token hike in infra budgets
* Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractors: Many JVs, delayed projects in Davao
* Did he help Dad, half-brod get deals? Unfair! Prove it, I will resign – Bong Go


About Bong Go’s statement

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WE STAND by our story and take exception to the statement of Special Assistant to the President Christopher Lawrence “Bong” T. Go that our report on the multibillion-peso civil works contracts that the firms of his father and half-brother was “fake news” and “biased reporting.”

PCIJ had sought out the side of Go and his family members as early as June 21, 2018, and via email and phone calls, followed up with his staff.

Download (PDF, 247KB)

PCIJ also furnished Bong Go an interview guide, to inform him abut the findings of PCIJ’s research.

On field work in Davao City also in June, PCIJ reporters purposely visited the offices of CLTG Builders and Alfrego Builders — companies owned by Go’s father Deciderio and half-brother Alfredo Go, respectively — to interview them for the story.

Last Monday, Sept. 3, on Bong Go’s intercession, Deciderio, Alfredo Go, younger sister Maritess ‘Ali’ G. de Leon, and a lawyer met with PCIJ reporters for an interview.

PCIJ had patiently waited for over two months to get the side of Bong Go and his family members before the story ran.

We regret, however, that we could not grant a request they made for their companies not to be included anymore in the story.

Download (PDF, 309KB)

The PCIJ report was explicit: We did not find any contracts that CLTG Builders and Alfrego Buidlers had secured from the local government of Davao City, but that we also found nearly PhP4.6 billion in civil works contracts that the two firms had won from the Department of Public Works and Highways from 2007 to 2017, on their own or in joint ventures with bigger contractors.

Here is the full text of the statement of Special Assistant to the President Christopher Lawrence “Bong” T. Go on the PCIJ’s story:

“I find myself once again a victim of fake news and biased reporting. PCIJ is raising malicious issues against me based purely on unsubstantiated allegations and hasty conclusions. These false news, guised as “investigative reports”, seem to be politically motivated as the reports suspiciously surfaced around the same time when some groups had clamored for my senate bid.

To draw attention to their article, PCIJ and gma news on line still maliciously bannered this in its headlines: “Firms of Bong Go kin, top contractor: Many JVs, delayed” and “ firm of bong go’s relatives “ despite the fact that PCIJ admitted my non-involvement in said businesses. 

My father has been in the industry long before I was born. Out of delicadeza, he did not bid in the projects of the City Government of Davao in all the 15 years when PRRD was mayor. 

When my father and half brother participated in the bidding of projects, either as sole contractor or as JV partner, they were just exercising their rights. Being related to me does not disqualify them to bid. These projects are publicly bidded anyway. I never intervened nor influenced the DPWH on how they bid or award these projects. My office does not control DPWH to begin with.

I have never been involved in corruption in the government. I have protected my name over the years. If anyone can prove that I spoke with DPWH or any other agency involved in the funding of these projects, I will resign immediately!”

The rights of our children

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PCIJ11. The Rights of the Child, sept 2018

ALL CITIZENS, but most especially our children, are vested with inalienable rights under the Constitution and the laws of the land.

The nation marks this week the 46th anniversary of the declaration of martial law by the late strongman Ferdinand E. Marcos, even as martial law lingers in the southern island of Mindanao under President Rodrigo R. Duterte.

But rights, in the face of serious threat and attacks from both state and non-state agencies and actors, have to be asserted and defended at all times.

Awareness and constant vigilance have become urgent imperatives, too, as the war on illegal drugs continue “as viciously” 21 months into the Duterte administration.

PCIJ. Infographics. Children and Drugs,

The war has claimed both adults and children as alleged suspects, “collateral damage,” or targeted, if defenseless, victims.

For instance, from July 2016 to April 2018, the Philippine National Police (PNP) has tallied 26,905 “children drug surrenderees.” Nearly all or 96.5 percent of these youngsters had reportedly “surrendered” during the first six months of the war on drugs or from July to December 2016.

The number excludes as yet the dozens of children who had been killed in the war, including Grade 11 student Kian Loyd de los Santos, 17; Althea Barbon of Negros Oriental, 4; Danica May Garcia of Dagupan, Pangasinan, 5; Francis Mañosca of Pasay City, 5; and San Niño Batucan of Cebu, 7, apart from many others in their teens.

PNP records obtained by PCIJ showed that 2,279 of the total child “surrenderees” were 15 years old and younger. The rest were “above 15 years old and below 18 years old.”

V2 PCIJ Infog Children Drugs B4 Duterte (1)

A study conducted by the Ateneo School of Government, meanwhile, showed that 26 child deaths under the war on drugs had been reported from May 10, 2016 to Sept 29, 2017. Seven out of the 26 children were below 15 years old. Other later reports have placed the number of children killed at 54 as of October 2017.

The figures of the dead and arrested also exclude the bigger number of children who had lost a father or mother or guardian to the war on drugs. A recent report in Inquirer.net quoted an official from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as saying that by a “conservative estimate,” about 18,000 children had been orphaned by the drug war as of December 2016.

To help foster greater awareness and advisedly respect for the rights of our children, PCIJ is releasing a trilogy of public-service announcements.

The first video showcases provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the rights to protection, promotion, and participation of all citizens below 18 years old.

The second focuses on how and why parents can exercise fairness and due process at home when disciplining their children.

The third and last is a video made for teachers and offers insight on how they are striving to integrate human rights education in their lessons for students.— With reporting and research by Vino Lucero and John Reiner Antiquerra, PCIJ, September 2018

In pictures: Anyare, Marawi?

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This was the spot where people loved to pose when in Marawi. It is now peppered with bullet holes. This "I Love Marawi" site is located beside Lake Lanao. Photo by BOBBY TIMONERA

This was the spot where people loved to pose when in Marawi. It is now peppered with bullet holes. This “I Love Marawi” site is located beside Lake Lanao. Photo by BOBBY TIMONERA

EXACTLY A YEAR AGO today, President Rodrigo R. Duterte declared the “liberation” of the Islamic City of Marawi City from the clutches of Islamist militants.

But before that happened, in five months starting May 2017, soldiers and policemen carpet-bombed and reduced Marawi to a massive wasteland.

Twelve months had lapsed since Duterte declared Marawi “liberated” on Oct. 17, 2017. But the ruin and the rubble remain, and tens of thousands of the Meranaws are still unable to return to their homes and their lives.

In pictures, see but also hear and feel the tragedy that lingers still in Marawi.

One of the damaged mosques at Ground Zero in Marawi City, as of May 8, 2018. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

One of the damaged mosques at Ground Zero in Marawi City, as of May 8, 2018. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

A resident is seen through a spyhole checking out her damaged house in Marawi City on April 5, 2018. Daesh-inspired  gunmen cut through houses using spyholes as they fought government troops for more than five months last year. Task Force Bangon Marawi allowed 1,200 residents to visit their homes in Sector 2. A total of 24,000 residents will be permitted to visit their houses to retrieve their personal belongings and possessions at the Main Affected Areas in Marawi City. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A resident is seen through a spyhole checking out her damaged house in Marawi City on April 5, 2018. Daesh-inspired gunmen cut through houses using spyholes as they fought government troops for more than five months last year. Task Force Bangon Marawi allowed 1,200 residents to visit their homes in Sector 2. A total of 24,000 residents will be permitted to visit their houses to retrieve their personal belongings and possessions at the Main Affected Areas in Marawi City. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Haji Nurian Cabugatan, 51 , weeps as she narrates to reporters that she found her house ransacked, and her jewelry and money already gone. The military allowed Cabugatan and her neighbors to enter their village provided they would only clean the premises of their homes. Many residents, including Hassan, disobeyed the order and entered their houses. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Haji Nurian Cabugatan, 51 , weeps as she narrates to reporters that she found her house ransacked, and her jewelry and money already gone. The military allowed Cabugatan and her neighbors to enter their village provided they would only clean the premises of their homes. Many residents, including Hassan, disobeyed the order and entered their houses. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A sign hangs on a tree warning residents to be careful  of unexploded ordnance, including 500-pound aerial bombs that have not yet been recovered. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A sign hangs on a tree warning residents to be careful of unexploded ordnance, including 500-pound aerial bombs that have not yet been recovered. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Light seeps through a hole caused by a bomb inside the basement of the Bato Ali Mosque in Marawi City on Tuesday, May 8, 2018. Fr. Teresito “Chito” Soganob and another hostage were rescued by Philippine troops in the vicinity of the mosque after its basement was turned into a headquarters of the Daesh-inspired gunmen during the siege of the city last year. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Light seeps through a hole caused by a bomb inside the basement of the Bato Ali Mosque in Marawi City on Tuesday, May 8, 2018. Fr. Teresito “Chito” Soganob and another hostage were rescued by Philippine troops in the vicinity of the mosque after its basement was turned into a headquarters of the Daesh-inspired gunmen during the siege of the city last year. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A resident peers through a spyhole to scan the damage sustained by his community in Barangay Malotlot, Marawi City on Nov. 7, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A resident peers through a spyhole to scan the damage sustained by his community in Barangay Malotlot, Marawi City on Nov. 7, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Residents put up signs claiming ownership over what used to be their homes and buildings when they were allowed to visit Marawi City on May 9, 2018. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Residents put up signs claiming ownership over what used to be their homes and buildings when they were allowed to visit Marawi City on May 9, 2018. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Residents and business owners in the Padian area, Marawi’s business district, get to visit the place for the first time on May 8, 2017. This is what was left of the area. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Residents and business owners in the Padian area, Marawi’s business district, get to visit the place for the first time on May 8, 2017. This is what was left of the area. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Vehicles jam the checkpoint in Mapandi bridge on Apri 5, 2018. Task Force Bangon Marawi allowed residents to visit their homes to retrieve their personal belongings and possessions at the Most Affected Areas in Marawi City. MindaNews photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Vehicles jam the checkpoint in Mapandi bridge on Apri 5, 2018. Task Force Bangon Marawi allowed residents to visit their homes to retrieve their personal belongings and possessions at the Most Affected Areas in Marawi City. MindaNews photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Meranaws, during a rally inside the Mindanao State University (MSU) campus in February 2018, demand their return to their homes and asked government to rush rehabilitation efforts. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

Meranaws, during a rally inside the Mindanao State University (MSU) campus in February 2018, demand their return to their homes and asked government to rush rehabilitation efforts. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

Nurain Cabugatan finds her bedroom in complete disarray when she returned home for the first time since the siege of Marawi City began on May 23, 2017. She discovers that her jewelry box had been emptied and other items had been stolen from her house. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Nurain Cabugatan finds her bedroom in complete disarray when she returned home for the first time since the siege of Marawi City began on May 23, 2017. She discovers that her jewelry box had been emptied and other items had been stolen from her house. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

A Marawi resident returns home in Barangay Malotlot after it was cleared by the Philippine military and police on Oct. 26, 2017. The military and the police had cleared nine villages and allowed residents to return to their homes. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A Marawi resident returns home in Barangay Malotlot after it was cleared by the Philippine military and police on Oct. 26, 2017. The military and the police had cleared nine villages and allowed residents to return to their homes. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Navy officials confer medals on Philippine Marine soldiers aboard the BRP Tarlac, which docked in Iligan City on Nov. 25, 2017. The Navy boat took the Marines home after Marawi City was declared liberated. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Navy officials confer medals on Philippine Marine soldiers aboard the BRP Tarlac, which docked in Iligan City on Nov. 25, 2017. The Navy boat took the Marines home after Marawi City was declared liberated. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Army Scout Rangers gather their gear on the curbside of the Marawi-Iligan highway after the bus they were riding met an accident on Oct. 25, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Army Scout Rangers gather their gear on the curbside of the Marawi-Iligan highway after the bus they were riding met an accident on Oct. 25, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Marine soldiers sit on top of a V150 armoured personnel carrier (APC) with the Philippine flag on display, on Quezon Avenue in Bangolo business district as President Rodrigo Duterte, who was in the next block, declared Marawi City liberated on Oct. 17, 2017 from the ISIS-Maute gunmen who controlled the city for five months. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Marine soldiers sit on top of a V150 armoured personnel carrier (APC) with the Philippine flag on display, on Quezon Avenue in Bangolo business district as President Rodrigo Duterte, who was in the next block, declared Marawi City liberated on Oct. 17, 2017 from the ISIS-Maute gunmen who controlled the city for five months. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

President Rodrigo Duterte arrives in Bangolo District in Marawi where he declared the city free from the Isis-Maute gunmen on Oct. 17, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

President Rodrigo Duterte arrives in Bangolo District in Marawi where he declared the city free from the Isis-Maute gunmen on Oct. 17, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A huge tarpaulin bearing images of slain Maute leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute is displayed where troops were gathered in formation while waiting for President Duterte to arrive. Photo by MANMAN DEJETO

A huge tarpaulin bearing images of slain Maute leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute is displayed where troops were gathered in formation while waiting for President Duterte to arrive. Photo by MANMAN DEJETO

A heavily damaged mosque at Ground Zero, Marawi City on Oct. 25, 2017. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

A heavily damaged mosque at Ground Zero, Marawi City on Oct. 25, 2017. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Eight days after President Rodrigo R. Duterte declared Marawi's liberation, the military opened to journalists on Oct. 25, 2017 certain areas of Ground Zero, the main battle area between government forces and the Maute Group. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Eight days after President Rodrigo R. Duterte declared Marawi’s liberation, the military opened to journalists on Oct. 25, 2017 certain areas of Ground Zero, the main battle area between government forces and the Maute Group. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Some of the finished temporary homes at Barangay Sagonsongan. Oct. 25, 2017. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Some of the finished temporary homes at Barangay Sagonsongan. Oct. 25, 2017. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

“One time, big time," Salic Cadalay says of his losses. "Lahat ng kayamanan namin, kaisa ra nawala (All our wealth gone in an instant).” Cadalay set up his store 32 years ago for his children and grandchildren but lost everything after the Marawi Siege. MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

“One time, big time,” Salic Cadalay says of his losses. “Lahat ng kayamanan namin, kaisa ra nawala (All our wealth gone in an instant).” Cadalay set up his store 32 years ago for his children and grandchildren but lost everything after the Marawi Siege. MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

Salic Cadalay shows off his "Duterte Volunteer" ID; he campaigned for Rodrigo R. Duterte in the 2016 elections. After the Marawi Siege, he says of Duterte; "Kadugo, pero nag-unay sa kadugo (He is of our own blood, but he betrayed us)." MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

Salic Cadalay shows off his “Duterte Volunteer” ID; he campaigned for Rodrigo R. Duterte in the 2016 elections. After the Marawi Siege, he says of Duterte; “Kadugo, pero nag-unay sa kadugo (He is of our own blood, but he betrayed us).” MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

A religious man walks past the ruins of the padian (market) area with copies of the Koran he unearthed from the rubble during the Kambisita on May 8, 2018. Photo by BOBBY TIMONERA

A religious man walks past the ruins of the padian (market) area with copies of the Koran he unearthed from the rubble during the Kambisita on May 8, 2018. Photo by BOBBY TIMONERA

Two men do repair work on the minaret of a mosque in Barangay Mapandi, Marawi City on May 8, 2018. Majority of the mosques, buildings and houses in Marawi were damaged after the five-month fighting between government troops and the ISIS-inspired Maute Group last year. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

Two men do repair work on the minaret of a mosque in Barangay Mapandi, Marawi City on May 8, 2018. Majority of the mosques, buildings and houses in Marawi were damaged after the five-month fighting between government troops and the ISIS-inspired Maute Group last year. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

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Check out, more PCIJ stories about Marawi:

PROJECT BANGON MARAWI, YEAR 1
A patchwork of sketchy plans, loose rules, uncertain funding

A majority of Duterte allies will pick Marawi’s ground-zero contractor

Firms of clans among winners of Marawi road, housing deals

DSWD-Region 12 blows a billion pesos on food packs, various kits for Marawi

Price check: Hygiene kit items cost more than DTI, retail chain rates

Bangon Marawi? Rush to seal deals locked in delay, confusion, funds lack

The PowerChina puzzle: Newly registered ‘domestic firm’ bids for P17-B Marawi deal

A year after ‘liberation’, Meranaws await rehabilitation

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Marawi Liberated Slideshow

Click to view: MarawiLiberated, 17oct18

MARAWI CITY – The groundbreaking for the government’s ambitious rehabilitation of this city was supposed to take place today, the first anniversary of Marawi’s “liberation” from the Islamic State-inspired Maute Group that had laid siege on it last year.

Last October 14, however, Falconi Millar, head of the Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM) Secretariat, said that the event would be postponed since President Rodrigo Duterte would be unavailable today. The new target date for the groundbreaking, he said, was “likely October 28.”

According to Malacañang, the President has two items on his schedule today, both taking place at the Palace: the 102nd anniversary celebration of the Cooperative Movement in the Philippines at 5:30 p.m. and the Traditional Dinner of the AFP Council of Sergeant Majors at 6:30 p.m.

The groundbreaking for the Marawi rebuilding and rehabilitation project had already been pushed back at least 10 times previously, yet TFBM chief Eduardo del Rosario is confident that the project’s completion target date of yearend 2021 will be met. Still, until rehabilitation activities actually start, what used to be Lanao del Sur’s proud and beautiful capital will continue to lie in ruins, and thousands of its residents will remain displaced.

The Siege of Marawi, a city of about 250,000 in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), had resulted in more than 1,100 fatalities, including at least 47 civilians. Other areas of Iligan City and Lanao del Sur were also affected, leading to the displacement of as much as 350,000 people, many with their homes damaged or totally destroyed.

A heavily damaged mosque at Ground Zero, Marawi City on Oct. 25, 2017. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

A heavily damaged mosque at Ground Zero, Marawi City on Oct. 25, 2017. MindaNews photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Disproportionate fury

The five-month fighting between the Maute Group and government troops last year rendered at least 24 of Marawi’s 96 barangays within what is now called the “Most Affected Area” or the MAA uninhabitable, and wiped out the city’s cultural, commercial, and business center.

The Meranaws have since repeatedly said that if President Duterte had only tapped into the cultural resources of his fellow Meranaws, the crisis would have been over in a few days and Marawi would have been saved from massive destruction.

In a policy paper on postwar Marawi submitted to the President last November, Dr. Macapado Muslim, former president of the Mindanao State University (MSU), also noted that while many of the local residents generally blame the Maute Group and the Abu Sayyaf for attacking the city, a number of them “resent the government’s use of massive air strikes and heavy artillery fire (that) caused much of the destruction of their houses and properties.”

But Duterte – the first Mindanawon to lead the nation and the first to claim Meranaw roots – has shrugged off such criticisms, including the assertion that his response to the crisis was disproportionate: martial law all over Mindanao barely eight hours after the first shot was fired, and massive land, air, and sea operations.

And yet, there had been previous instances when a full-blown armed conflict was avoided even after an attack by rebel forces here. Among these was the 2007 siege by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) where its forces took control of the bridges in Marawi.

At the time, Meranaw leader Aga Khan Sharief asked the military and the mayor for two hours to talk with the rebel leaders and convince them to leave. “Usapang Meranaw (Meranaw talk)” was how he later described what had taken place. The situation ended peacefully.

On the night of May 23 last year (the start of the siege) and early the next morning, concerned Meranaw leaders, among them Sharief, had made attempts to dialogue with the Maute brothers — their fellow Meranaws — to spare Marawi. The Meranaw leaders who managed to contact the Mautes would later recount that they had immediately informed local government officials about the result of their talks. But, they said, the officials claimed that their hands were tied as the military was already in charge. “Martial law” was the reason given.

Those who met with the Mautes also urged them to release Fr. Teresito ‘Chito’ Soganub, Vicar General of the Catholic Prelature of Marawi, who was among those grabbed by the Maute Group as hostages.

According to Sharief, a businessman invoking the Meranaws’ maratabat (personal esteem or honor) even offered to shell out money, if ransom was demanded, to avoid the shame the hostage-taking of a Catholic priest would cause the Meranaws.

The armed men in black did indeed have demands, which they ordered Soganub to relay by phone to Marawi Bishop Edwin de la Pena on the evening of May 23: no air strike and the withdrawal of military forces in Marawi.

A resident peers through a spyhole to scan the damage sustained by his community in Barangay Malotlot, Marawi City on Nov. 7, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

A resident peers through a spyhole to scan the damage sustained by his community in Barangay Malotlot, Marawi City on Nov. 7, 2017. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Forced into diaspora

It wasn’t just the Maute Group who didn’t want air strikes, however. Local government officials, residents, and civil-society groups made similar appeals to the authorities. The Ranao Rescue Team also urged the President to order a “half day of no fighting” for a humanitarian corridor that would allow the safe passage of thousands of trapped civilians out of the battlegrounds.

A six-hour window on June 3, negotiated with the Mautes by the Meranaws in the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities of the government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace panels, allowed for the safe passage of 182 trapped civilians. On the whole, however, the appeals went unheeded, and air strikes were launched.

Marawi residents were forced into a diaspora, fleeing to neighboring as well as faraway towns and cities. In all, some 77,000 families were displaced from Marawi City and nearby areas, according to records of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

Residents in 20 of the city’s 96 barangays were able to stay put as they were quite far from the war zone. But those in Marawi’s 76 other villages had to leave, especially in the 24 located in what would be known as Ground Zero, the 250-hectare main battle area between the warring forces, now referred to as the city’s “Most Affected Area.”

That war would befall Marawi had been unthinkable. Until that fateful day in May last year, the Meranaws had been considered the luckiest among the Moro ethnic groups, having been spared for several decades from suffering a cycle of mass evacuations that had been endured by the residents of Maguindanao, Basilan, and Sulu.

Haji Nurian Cabugatan, 51 , weeps as she narrates to reporters that she found her house ransacked, and her jewelry and money already gone. The military allowed Cabugatan and her neighbors to enter their village provided they would only clean the premises of their homes. Many residents, including Hassan, disobeyed the order and entered their houses. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

Haji Nurian Cabugatan, 51 , weeps as she narrates to reporters that she found her house ransacked, and her jewelry and money already gone. The military allowed Cabugatan and her neighbors to enter their village provided they would only clean the premises of their homes. Many residents, including Hassan, disobeyed the order and entered their houses. Photo by FROILAN GALLARDO

They voted for DU30

Luck seemed to smile even more at the Meranaws when Duterte ran, and later won the Presidency.

Records from the Commission on Elections show that Marawi and Lanao del Sur voters elected a city mayor and provincial governor from the Liberal Party but did not elect Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas II, the Presidential standard bearer of the then ruling party. They gave Duterte, their fellow Meranaw, an overwhelming victory: in Marawi, 34,165 votes or 82.98 percent of the total number of votes cast; and in Lanao del Sur, the second vote-richest among the five-province, two-city ARMM, 303,184 votes or 80.14 percent.

Of 81 provinces nationwide, Lanao del Sur ranked 15th in giving Duterte the vote, more than the combined Ilocos Norte and Sur votes for him (189,758). Among Mindanao’s 27 provinces and 33 cities, it ranked fifth.

Nationwide and overseas, thousands of Meranaws campaigned and voted for their brother Duterte.

It is said that even members of the so-called Islamic State voted for Duterte, with talks here saying how a Meranaw Islamic State spiritual leader had admonished his flock that it was haram (forbidden) not to vote for Duterte.

In the end, the Meranaws voted overwhelmingly for the Presidential candidate who claimed to be one of their own. In turn, Duterte rewarded them immediately with three Cabinet posts and several more appointments to key positions.

What the Meranaws did not expect was that Duterte would make a decision that would change the course of their personal and collective histories even long after he would have finished his term in 2022.
The President, for his part, has said that he felt betrayed by the Meranaws for allegedly allowing IS elements into Marawi and not telling the government about it.

President Rodrigo Duterte declares the "liberation" of Marawi City and heads a ceremonial flag-raising inside the Jamaitul Philippine Al-Islamia in Banggolo District, Marawi City. Photo by MANMAN DEJETO

President Rodrigo Duterte declares the “liberation” of Marawi City and heads a ceremonial flag-raising inside the Jamaitul Philippine Al-Islamia in Banggolo District, Marawi City. Photo by MANMAN DEJETO

‘Go ahead… burn it’

On October 17, 2017, the day he declared Marawi “liberated from the terrorist influence,” Duterte said: “So ‘yan ang paghinakit ko. Hindi namin ito gusto. Ginusto ‘to ng mga Maranao, ng mga Maute, at sinakyan ng ISIS. Hindi amin ‘to. Hindi ‘to sa gobyerno. Tandaan ninyo (I am disappointed because we did not want this to happen. The Meranaws did, the Mautes, and ISIS took advantage. This is not our fault. This is not government’s. Remember that).”

Yet while he may not have wanted the destruction of Marawi to take place, Duterte had also said that he wouldn’t care if it happened.

Five months before the Marawi Siege began, the President had dared the Maute Group to “go ahead” and “burn” Marawi.

Addressing the Wallace Business Forum at a dinner hosted by Malacanang on December 12, 2016, Duterte took note of the Maute Group’s demand for government to stop the offensives “in the forest” of Butig, Lanao del Sur, otherwise “they will go down upon Marawi to burn the place.”

The President’s response: “Go ahead, do it!”

“We need to do a lot of constructions in this country,” said a visibly combative Duterte. “There are a lot of materials there and we will be glad to rebuild and rehabilitate every structure that you destroy. As long (as) it’s confined in the areas of Lanao, I don’t really care.”

Unfortunately, the Maute Group and its allies took up the challenge and did “go ahead,” invading Marawi on May 23 last year while the President was on a state visit to Russia. Maute Group members took over key areas in the country’s lone Islamic city, burned buildings, and unfurled their black IS flags.

A huge tarpaulin bearing images of slain Maute leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute is displayed where troops were gathered in formation while waiting for President Duterte to arrive. Photo by MANMAN DEJETO

A huge tarpaulin bearing images of slain Maute leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute is displayed where troops were gathered in formation while waiting for President Duterte to arrive. Photo by MANMAN DEJETO

Bad, no intelligence?

But Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, speaking at a press briefing in Moscow near midnight (Manila time) on May 23, 2017, chose to explain what happened this way: “Elements of the Army and the Police were trying to serve a warrant of arrest on Isnilon Hapilon at Barangay Basak Malutlut in Marawi City when they were met with firefight or firearms — gunfire from the group of Hapilon Isnilon.”

Isnilon Hapilon of the Abu Sayyaf and the proclaimed emir of IS in Southeast Asia, was allegedly holed up in an apartment near the Markaz mosque in Basak Malutlut. He and Omar Maute would end up dead on October 16, 2017, killed by government troops.

Then Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Eduardo Año, who was also in Moscow at the start of the siege, would later say that the failed raid on Hapilon’s apartment foiled the plan of the Mautes and the Abu Sayyaf to take over Marawi at the beginning of the Ramadan on May 26. But it also apparently prompted them to advance their timetable instead.

Interestingly, Lorenzana at the Moscow press conference had also said that he did not think there was a “lapse of intelligence” but “it’s just appreciation of the intelligence that was lacking there.”

A few weeks later, the President himself would tell the media at Camp Evangelista Station Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City: “We had known (all) along the buildup here in Marawi. That is why if you were tracking me, my statement in public was ‘do not force my hand into it.’”

One of the damaged mosques at Ground Zero in Marawi City, as of May 8, 2018. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

One of the damaged mosques at Ground Zero in Marawi City, as of May 8, 2018. MindaNews photo by H. MARCOS C. MORDENO

DU30: Mea culpa

It was a more somber Duterte, however, who spoke last May 22, on the eve of the first anniversary of the start of the siege, describing what took place in Marawi as a “very sad experience.”

He also admitted to having “fallen short in some respects” in the way the crisis was handled, but assumed full responsibility for it, explaining he “did not anticipate or even guess that there would be so much ordnance and that the fight (would take) about four months to finish.”

It had actually lasted five months.

“All of these faults, if it is indeed one, or our faults, it belongs and it falls (sic) on my shoulders as Commander in Chief,” said Duterte at the 120th anniversary celebration of the Philippine Navy at the Coconut Palace, at the CCP Complex in Manila. “And I assume full responsibility to the nation of what’s going to happen.”

Soon after the President declared Marawi “liberated” on October 17 last year, displaced residents from 52 of the 76 villages vacated were allowed to return to Marawi, in batches, from evacuation centers, their relatives’ houses, or rented dwellings in neighboring Iligan and Cagayan de Oro cities, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and other parts of the country.

But it took more months before residents of the 24 villages in Ground Zero – estimated by TFBM to number about 27,000 families – were allowed to visit what used to be their homes or shops and collect whatever they could still salvage from the rubble.

They were also to visit only from last April 1 to May 10, and for just three days each, per sector. Ground Zero has been classified into nine sectors.

Salic Cadalay shows off his "Duterte Volunteer" ID; he campaigned for Rodrigo R. Duterte in the 2016 elections. After the Marawi Siege, he says of Duterte; "Kadugo, pero nag-unay sa kadugo (He is of our own blood, but he betrayed us)." MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

Salic Cadalay shows off his “Duterte Volunteer” ID; he campaigned for Rodrigo R. Duterte in the 2016 elections. After the Marawi Siege, he says of Duterte; “Kadugo, pero nag-unay sa kadugo (He is of our own blood, but he betrayed us).” MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

‘He betrayed us’

Salic Cadalay was among those who took the opportunity to return even for a very brief time to Ground Zero. The owner of a hardware store along Dangcal St. in Padian (market), Cadalay during his short visit last May had quickly begun putting up makeshift signages asserting ownership of his store that had collapsed from the air strikes, and of what used to be his residence and warehouse a few steps away.

It had been a year since he and his family had fled the city and he kept shaking his head in disbelief at the sight of the devastation.

Lahat ng kayamanan namin, kaisa ra nawala (All our wealth gone in an instant),” said the businessman who had set up his store here 32 years ago, laying down the future for his 13 children and 20 grandchildren.

“One time, big time,” he said of his losses.

Cadalay estimated his losses as reaching some P100 million, aside from the debts he has yet to settle.

Kadugo, pero nag-unay sa kadugo (He is of our own blood, but he betrayed us),” he lamented, referring to Duterte. “Yang President, kababayan namin ‘yan (The President is one of our own).”

Cadalay then took out his wallet and showed off his laminated ‘Duterte Volunteer’ ID that he used during the presidential campaign in 2016. His message to his “kadugo” President: “Help us rebuild our homes and stores, provide us reparation and capital to start anew.”

“One time, big time," Salic Cadalay says of his losses. "Lahat ng kayamanan namin, kaisa ra nawala (All our wealth gone in an instant).” Cadalay set up his store 32 years ago for his children and grandchildren but lost everything after the Marawi Siege. MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

“One time, big time,” Salic Cadalay says of his losses. “Lahat ng kayamanan namin, kaisa ra nawala (All our wealth gone in an instant).” Cadalay set up his store 32 years ago for his children and grandchildren but lost everything after the Marawi Siege. MindaNews photo by CAROLYN O. ARGUILLAS

Several observers have already warned the government of dire consequences otherwise, including yet another round of violence.

In his policy paper submitted to President Duterte last year, Dr. Muslim pointed out that Marawi City today is “essentially a powder keg” because of the “destruction and losses and continued sufferings, hardships and indignities in evacuation centers and in private and commercial dwellings in other cities, the growing disillusionment with the never-ending Mindanao peace process, and the perceptible spread of violent extremism and radicalism to the Muslim communities in Mindanao.” — MindaNews and PCIJ, October 2018

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Check out, more PCIJ stories about Marawi:

PROJECT BANGON MARAWI, YEAR 1
A patchwork of sketchy plans, loose rules, uncertain funding

A majority of Duterte allies will pick Marawi’s ground-zero contractor

Firms of clans among winners of Marawi road, housing deals

DSWD-Region 12 blows a billion pesos on food packs, various kits for Marawi

Price check: Hygiene kit items cost more than DTI, retail chain rates

Bangon Marawi? Rush to seal deals locked in delay, confusion, funds lack

The PowerChina puzzle: Newly registered ‘domestic firm’ bids for P17-B Marawi deal

Exceedingly slow rehab work leaves Meranaws restless ‘people of the tents’

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Displaced residents of Marawi at the Balo-i Gymnasium 9, Philippine Information Agency photo published June 2, 2017,
http://pia.gov.ph/photogallery/photos/101

Displaced residents of Marawi at the Balo-i Gymnasium 9, Philippine Information Agency photo published June 2, 2017,
http://pia.gov.ph/photogallery/photos/101

MARAWI CITY — As early as September last year – while battles were still going on here — the Provincial Government of Lanao del Sur and the Marawi City government had submitted a Joint Recovery, Rehabilitation, and Peacebuilding Plan not only for the country’s only Islamic city, but also for the affected towns in Lanao del Sur.

With the Plan received by Task Force Bangon Marawi (TFBM), the hundreds of thousands of Marawi residents displaced by the conflict waited for feedback, if not for any announcements of specific steps to be taken in order for their city to rise again.

Today they are still waiting. Indeed, more than a year later, no one knows for sure how many components of that joint blueprint ever made it into the national government’s Bangon Marawi Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (BMCRRP).

Says Acram Latiph, an economics professor at the Mindanao State University (MSU) who was among those who helped put together the Marawi-Lanao del Sur proposal: “Yung final plan wala kaming access kaya ‘di ko talaga alam ano na kinalabasan ng CRRP (We don’t have access to the final plan that’s why we do not know what CRRP ended up as).”

This is even though last March 20, Undersecretary Adoracion Navarro of the National Economic and Development Authority’s (NEDA) Regional Development Office finally gave some local residents and officials a glimpse – their first — of the BMCRRP.

Navarro gave her presentation at a multisectoral forum held at the provincial gym. Using Powerpoint, she explained that the BMCRRP has a two-pronged approach: the CRRP, which shall include “programs and projects to be located outside of the most affected area” and Executive Order No. 49, which shall “guide the reconstruction process of the Most Affected Area through a joint-venture scheme.”

The “Most Affected Area” is otherwise known as Ground Zero or the 24-barangay area at the heart of the city that suffered the most destruction during the siege.

E.O. 49, issued by President Duterte on February 5, meanwhile exempts the National Housing Authority (NHA) from NEDA guidelines on joint-venture agreements supposedly “to expedite the implementation of recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in the most affected areas of Marawi City.”

People kept in the dark

Based on Navarro’s presentation, the BMCRRP would cover the rest of the city’s 96 barangays while the MAA would be under another plan “guided” by E.O. 49.

The two-day forum had been organized by the provincial government in response to growing complaints from the city’s displaced residents who wanted to know what was going on. The residents felt that they were being kept in the dark as to what was being planned for Marawi and other affected towns in Lanao del Sur, such as Butig and Poona Piagapo.

In his opening remarks at the forum, Lanao del Sur Vice Governor Mamintal Adiong had declared, “Hanggang ngayon, wala pang napre-present ang TFBM na concrete rehab plan (Until now, the TFBM has yet to present a concrete rehabilitation plan).”

Task Force Bangon Marawi or TFBM is an inter-agency body created by President Duterte in June last year through Administrative Order No. 3 for the “recovery, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of the city of Marawi and other affected localities,” referring to the previous battlegrounds of the warring forces in Butig and Piagapo towns in Lanao del Sur. Notably, the Task Force was created a month and five days into what would turn out to be a five-month war.

It has been primarily the Task Force that has been updating the public on what the national government is planning for Marawi. But the “updates” have not really strayed far from promises about building a “new” and “better” Marawi, along with announcements about groundbreaking ceremonies that keep on getting postponed, and budget estimates that change every time the Task Force head speaks.

At the March multisectoral forum, TFBM chairman Eduardo del Rosario did present several slides showing the “development perspective” of the future Marawi: a Marawi with a lakeside promenade, cultural center, resorts, hotels, convention centers, a city green, and an eco-corridor, among other things.

Yet while the artistic renderings of TFBM’s vision of the “new Marawi” were impressive, several participants wondered aloud: “Where is the Meranaw there? Whose perspective is this?”

Displaced residents of Marawi City at the Saguiaran Evacuation Center, Philippine Information Agency photo published May 31, 2017, http://pia.gov.ph/photogallery/photos/20

Displaced residents of Marawi City at the Saguiaran Evacuation Center, Philippine Information Agency photo published May 31, 2017, http://pia.gov.ph/photogallery/photos/20

Unanswered queries

Ground Zero residents were more concerned about answers to questions that had been bothering them since they fled their villages in late May 2017. For example: Can they go back to the land where their homes or shops were built? What about compensation, reparation for the destroyed buildings, as well as for the furniture, cash, jewelry, and other things that had gone missing? And why build another military camp? What is the status of their ancestral lands vis-a-vis the military reservation? What about the shelters for displaced residents?

Displaced residents complained to del Rosario at the forum that no multisectoral consultations had been done before that meeting at the gym. Not content with that, weary Meranaws decided to bring their message directly to the President through an open letter on March 29 and a prayer march-rally the next day.

In its letter to the President, the Ranaw Multi Sectoral Movement (RMSM) said that the future “seems threatening.”

“Forces are moving that threaten to do far greater damage to our people than what the war has done,” it continued. “The bullet-riddled, crumbling remains of the Grand Masjid in our beloved Marawi, silent as it is now and absent of prayers, cries out. For in the guise of rebuilding our home, in the guise of laying down the foundations of a better, progressive and modern city, the will and vision of those who live far from us who built this city are being imposed upon us. This is an invasion of a different kind. This one threatens to rob our soul.”

RMSM lamented that “plans have been made without our participation… that neither bear the stamp of our will nor reflect our culture… whose mechanics and implementation are not clear to us.”

“But one thing is clear: the people of Marawi are largely left out,” it said. “Those who came to present the plan dismissed our comments, recommendations, and protestations as though we knew nothing and have no business getting involved in rebuilding our very own city.”

The RMSM asked Duterte, who claims Meranaw roots, to “grant us, the people of the lake, the rightful heirs to this land, our right to rebuild this city with your guidance, support and protection.”

“We appeal to you to let Marawi be rebuilt the way our ancestors did: one house at a time, one masjid at a time, one village at a time,” it said. The Movement also urged the President to stop the proposed ecozone and military camp plans “until we have been heard, until our dreams and aspirations, our cultural sensitivities and our faith find expression in the rebuilding of Marawi City, our home. This is the cry of our people. This is the cry of Marawi.”

Wept, wailed, prayed

Last March 30 — Good Friday for Christians, Holy Friday for Muslims — a day after the letter-appeal was sent out, Meranaws from various sectors attempted to march to Ground Zero to hold a congregational prayer at the Grand Mosque itself and at the same time pray for those who died in the conflict. The war had left some 1,000 dead, including at least 47 civilians.

But a phalanx of male and female police personnel as well as soldiers stationed at Rapitan (formerly Pumping) Bridge barred the Meranaws entry into Ground Zero. So they laid down their prayer rugs on the road for their congregational prayers and rites for relatives who perished in Ground Zero during the five-month siege.

Men and women wept and wailed openly, their prayers at times drowned out by the sound of sorrow.

Rally organizers had earlier planned a march to Ground Zero from Kilometer Zero near People’s Park, passing through City Hall compound to Pumping Bridge to Banggolo and finally to the Grand Mosque or Islamic Center for the prayers.

But no permit was granted by the military, which has jurisdiction over Ground Zero.

“This is not liberation, this is occupation,” says MSU history professor Tirmizy Abdullah. He points out that “liberation” does not resonate with Meranaws, particularly those in Ground Zero who cannot as yet return home and who cannot even enter their villages without the military’s permission.

Apparently in response to complaints from Marawi residents that they were not consulted on the rehabilitation of Marawi, TFBM with assistance from the World Bank last April conducted Suwara Marawi (Voice of Marawi), in 30 focus-group discussions involving 980 participants in the cities of Marawi, Iligan, the towns of Saguiaran and Pantar in Lanao del Sur, Balo-i in Lano del Norte and Initao in Misamis Oriental.

Findings of the FGDs, like the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), Damage and Loss Assessment (DALA), BMCRRP and MAA Rehabilitation Plan, have not been made public. But according to insiders who have seen copies of the Suwara Marawi Executive Summary, the report states that the participants were “nearly unanimous in their opposition to the establishment of (an) additional military camp in the area.”

The report also supposedly notes other agreements and disagreements to the proposed MAA development plan, among them the expansion of the road to four lanes as three lanes would be acceptable.

The PCNA was supposed to have included a Human Recovery Needs Assessment in August 2017, DALA from September to December 2017, and Social Healing and Peacebuilding Assessment in November 2017.

The BMCRRP, meanwhile, was approved by President Duterte last June. According to NEDA’s Navarro, the BMCRRP by then had a total of 744 priority Programs, Projects, and Activities (PPAs), down from the 902 listed in its April 12, 2018 version.

OCHA. Marawi Conflict Timeline. may 2018

No specific plans yet

The PPAs have been classified under six sectors: Local Governance and Peacebuilding, Housing and Settlement, Livelihood and Business Development, Physical Infrastructure, Social Services, and Land Resource Management.

Proposed projects and activities have been listed, but since copies of the BMCRRP have not been made public, monitoring its implementation is a challenge.

TFBM Field Office Manager Felix Castro has been pushing for the establishment of a Project Monitoring Office and a Management Information System to track down the progress — or lack thereof — of the PPAs.

Castro says that the establishment of the PMO and MIS is ongoing, and that the Task Force has partnered with civil-society groups in Marawi to help them in the monitoring process.

For now, Castro can quickly answer questions on the number of transitory and permanent shelters constructed, but is candid enough to say “I cannot answer that” when asked about the progress of “Bangon Marawi” in the other sectors.

Officials of Marawi and Lanao del Sur have yet to see a copy of what is supposed to be, according to del Rosario, a “voluminous” BMCRRP. Little has been heard as well about specific plans for the MAA.

Based on NEDA and TFBM statements, though, Marawi would need about PhP47 billion for projects outside the conflict zone, about PhP17.2 billion for projects in the MAA, PhP20 billion in compensation for the properties destroyed in the siege (excluding PhP882 million specifically for mosques), and PhP1.2 billion for livelihood.

They want to go home

But Marawi’s displaced residents are getting more restless by the day. Last October 7, some displaced residents and civil-society organizations launched #LetMeGoHomeMovement through social media, calling on the government to just allow them to go home to their villages in the MAA since the rebuilding of their city is taking too long.

The Movement urges fellow Meranaws and friends to upload a photograph, either solo or group, with the message “I am from Marawi. Let me go home” in their social media accounts. Friends of the displaced are also encouraged to join in the uploading of photos with the message “I have friends from Marawi. Let them go home.”

Eighteen-year-old Faykha Khayriyyah Alonto Ala, newly elected chair of Barangay South Madaya Proper, says that there have been “too much grand plans, plans that clearly do not have any direction.”

“Let us keep it simple,” says Ala, who like the barangay chairpersons in the 23 other villages in Ground Zero, has yet to come up with ways on how to serve her dispersed constituents. “Grant the people their rights to their properties, help them rebuild their lives in the way they want, just our old Marawi, our home.”

On October 16, at the top floor of the bullet-peppered five-story Al Farabi International School overlooking Ground Zero, Ala read the open letter of ‘Marawi is Ours, Let Us Go Home Movement’ to President Duterte: “Mr. President, we are your people too. Please, let us go home!”

As she spoke, some of those listening to her wiped away their tears quietly, while those who were looking at the ruins of Marawi scanned the horizon from the bridge in Banggolo, for landmarks they could still identify to guide them, mentally, to where they used to live until May 2017.

Displaced residents of Marawi at the Balo-i Gymnasium 3, Philippine Information Agency photo published June 2, 2017,
http://pia.gov.ph/photogallery/photos/95

Displaced residents of Marawi at the Balo-i Gymnasium 3, Philippine Information Agency photo published June 2, 2017,
http://pia.gov.ph/photogallery/photos/95

‘People of the tents’

“Once, we were the people of the lake,” read Ala. “Now we (have become) the people of the tents. Made to wait indefinitely. The terrible question at the back of our minds: Will we ever get back home?”

Minutes later, at the “Anyare Marawi (What happened Marawi)” rally of the Moro Consensus Group and Bangsamoro National Movement for Peace and Development, in the area called Bangon, participants brought along tarpaulins bearing these appeals to go home: “Hirap na po kami, pauwiin nyo na kami (We are already suffering, will you let us go home)?,” “Tama na! Sobra na! Pauwiin nyo na kami (Enough! Too much! Let us go home!)” and “’Yung totoo, kelan kami makakauwi (The truth, when can we go home)?”

Lawyer Falconi Millar, Secretary General of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council and head of TFBM’s secretariat, says that seeing Marawi’s residents back in their homes is exactly the aim of the Task Force.

“That is what Task Force Bangon Marawi is doing,” he says. “To bring our Maranao brothers and sisters from the MAA back to their home, safely, at the soonest possible time, and to a home that is with an environment that is modern Islamic and culturally sensitive.”

He also says that TFBM has conducted “more than 200 dialogues and will continue to conduct more to engage our Maranao brothers and sisters and to update them as developments unfold.”

TFBM, adds Falconi, “will ensure that they will come home as soon as it is safe to do so and as soon as horizontal development per sector is accomplished and as soon as doing so would not impede the rehabilitation in adjoining sectors in the MAA.”

For his part, del Rosario says, “I fully understand the sentiments of some residents in expressing their wishes.” But, he says, it is “not doable considering the magnitude of the needed rehabilitation in the entire MAA.”

“I am sure,” says the ever optimistic TFBM chief, “they will be satisfied once the whole rehab is over.” — MindaNews and PCIJ, October 2018
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Check out, more PCIJ stories about Marawi:

In pictures: Anyare, Marawi?

THE RUINS OF MARAWI A year after ‘liberation’, Meranaws await rehabilitation

PROJECT BANGON MARAWI, YEAR 1
A patchwork of sketchy plans, loose rules, uncertain funding

A majority of Duterte allies will pick Marawi’s ground-zero contractor

Firms of clans among winners of Marawi road, housing deals

DSWD-Region 12 blows a billion pesos on food packs, various kits for Marawi

Price check: Hygiene kit items cost more than DTI, retail chain rates

Bangon Marawi? Rush to seal deals locked in delay, confusion, funds lack

The PowerChina puzzle: Newly registered ‘domestic firm’ bids for P17-B Marawi deal

Bantay Kita FOI Practice Report: MOAs between IPs and mining firms

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Requests for Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs) between IP Organizations and the 13 large-scale metallic mines that participated in the Fourth PH EITI Report for 2016

BK. Issue, FOI Request

I. Organizational Profile

Bantay Kita (BK) is a national coalition with 84 members, and 70 network affiliates. Established in 2009 and formally registered in 2013, the Coalition advocates for transparency and accountability in the extractives industry to ensure that gains derived are maximized, shared fairly, and contribute to sustainable development. BK’s strategy includes research, capacity building, advocacy, and engagement with multi-stakeholder groups. Bantay Kita led the campaign for the adoption of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in the Philippines. To date, BK remains a member of the PH-EITI Mutistakeholder Group (MSG). EITI is touted as the FOI counterpart for mining, oil, and gas sectors. EITI requires extractive companies to report on payments made to the government and Indigenous Peoples, while demanding the government to report its revenues for the same. The amounts reported are reconciled and validated by an independent administrator. The PH-EITI also demands a report on employment, as well as social and environmental expenditures made by the companies. BK is a Publish What You Pay affiliate.

II. Context for the Information Request

The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Administrative Order No. (AO) 03, series of 2012, entitled “The Revised Guidelines on Free and Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) and Related Processes of 2012,” provides guidelines on the process of acquiring, implementing, and monitoring a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between extractive companies and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) Ancestral Domain owners. The MOA serves as a contract between the IP and the company, with the NCIP as the third party. It states mutual consent and identifies direct and indirect benefits as a result of negotiations. This includes, but is not limited to, royalty payments; detailed use of funds by IPs in accordance with their development framework; and inclusive dates and duration of the MOA.

According to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, IP owners of Ancestral Domains are mandated to receive at least one percent of the gross output of a mine as royalty payment. The royalty is intended to form part of a trust fund for the socioeconomic wellbeing of community.

According to NCIP AO 3 s. 2012, royalties should have allocations for livelihood and social development projects; these must be allocated with not less than 30 percent of each and every release, among others.

The said AO prescribes that royalties cannot be released without the concurrence of the NCIP, secured by the IP Organization. The concurrence is intended to be a check on the use of the funds based on the Community Royalty Development Plan (CRDP). The CRDP is a development plan for the management and use of royalties. It considers the Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP)1.

Per the Fourth Philippine Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (PH-EITI) Report, reconciled IP royalty share in 2016 was over PhP155 million. The Philippines has been publishing EITI Reports for four years. The NCIP has consistently had the highest percentage of unexplained variance. In 2016, the NCIP declared that it had monitored royalty payments of PhP29 million while large-scale metallic mines reported paying PhP266 million .

According to the United Nations Development Programme, the Philippines is home to some 110 ethnolinguistic groups mainly concentrated in Mindanao (61 percent) and Luzon (33 percent). IPs make up about 14 to 17 percent of the country’s total population. Data from the National Statistical Coordination Board show that in Mindanao, poverty incidence during the first semester of 2015 was at 33.8 percent in areas where most IPs were located. This is despite Mindanao’s vast natural resources. In the same year, 11of the 20 poorest provinces were also in Mindanao.

Bantay Kita works with IP communities to build capacities around extractives. One initiative is to guide IP organizations in crafting their CRDP as provided by NCIP AO 3 s. 2012. The CRDP serves as a tool for IPs to ensure socio-economic and cultural sustainability in their respective communities even after mines cease to operate. This requires access and understanding of data and documents so that they can make evidence-based decisions concerning mineral management proceeds.

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Target Government Institutions

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA or RA 8371) created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples under the Office of the President. It is mandated to promote and protect the interest of Indigenous Peoples.

The NCIP acts as the third party in the MOA between the IP and the company. The Commission monitors MOA implementation and may direct financial and management audits of IP organizations (IPOs) managing royalties and other benefits, or exercise its visitorial powers as provided for by law per NCIP AO 3 s. 2012.

It is assumed that the third party is the record keeper.In order to exercise its monitoring and visitorial powers, it must have a basis for monitoring. The MOA serves as a basis to monitor.

Specific Information/Documents Requested

BK requested for copies of MOAs between IPOs and the 13 large-scale metallic mines that participated in the Fourth PH-EITI Report for 2016. We want to validate with IPs if MOAs were implemented, particularly regarding royalty payments. Access to the said documents would serve as reference to facilitate the crafting of CRDPs of the IPOs that BK is currently engaged with.

BK. Results Table

II. Monitoring and Results

On April 18, 2018, Bantay Kita through the e-FOI portal requested for copies of the Memoranda of Agreement between all large-scale metallic mining companies and IPOs for better understanding and enhanced monitoring.

On April 27, 2018, Luzviminda Donato, FOI Officer accepted the request with Tracking Number #NCIP-177392456461. She communicated that NCIP would respond on or before May 9, 2018 per Executive Order 2 s. 2016. Since BK did not receive at the appointed date, it followed up through the e-FOIportal on May 14, 2018 and on June 28, 2018. No response was received. The exchanges may beaccessed through: https://efoi-ph.appspot.com/requests/aglzfmVmb2ktcGhyHgsSB0NvbnRlbnQiEU5DSVAtMTc3MzkyNDU2NDYxDA
After months of no response, BK followed up with the NCIP through a letter addressed to the Chairperson, dated August 23, 2018, and a series of phone calls, thereafter. Based on a phone conversation with the NCIP Ancestral Domains Office (ADO), the requested documents are available with PH-EITI and BK could get copies from them.

On October 15, 2018, BK requested the documents from the PH-EITI. However, PH-EITI said that it would not be able to provide the copies of the documents without the consent of each tribal leader involved the MOAs.

Given the situation, BK asked for a meeting with the NCIP Chairperson Leonor Oralde-Quintayo to be able to discuss the purpose and intent of the request. On November 6, 2018 the Chairperson released a Memorandum Order directing all regional directors to act on the request appropriately.

On November 29, 2018, Bantay Kita received the copy of MOA between Philex Mines Corporation and APPSOL from NCIP – CAR.

The delayed release of documents prompted Bantay Kita to recalibrate strategies in project implementation. In the absence of official documents, BK project implementers had to rely mainly on key informant data as bases for context analysis. At some point, some of the planned activities needed to be moved or cancelled.

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IV. Insights

In sum, the FOI practice started slow and was unsuccessful in obtaining documents within the prescribed period. Things turned for the better when BK deployed other means to get the documents it needed. BK notes the following observations:

• Follow-ups can be more efficient if we knew the particular person to ask the documents from. It seems that agencies do not have assigned point persons for FOI. Oftentimes, requesting parties are referred to different persons or departments with different contact numbers in every follow-up. This results to confusion and difficulty in tracking the requests.

• Role of network. It helps to know someone from the office where the document is being requested. Having a direct line to a particular staff within the agency can fast-track the request.

• Clarity on the rationale of the request for documents. Requests for documents will be most likely granted or acknowledged if the purpose of document utilization is made explicit.

• Agency buy-in. Having points of convergences in terms of advocacy and/or mandate between the agency and the requesting party may help ease the process of releasing documents.

• List of documents allowed for disclosure. It is observed that there is no inventory and disaggregation of documents that are publicly accessible and those that require consent. The officers in charge in the institutions where documents are requested do not seem oriented on the disclosure guidelines (if any), hence causing delays.

• Filing system. Retrieval of documents requested takes time due to the lack of or weak filing system within government agencies.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

The constraints enumerated above should be addressed by:

• Ensuring Quality of Data. Certified photocopies of documents should be legible.

• Improving the Filing System.

• Clearly identifying and/or designating the FOI receiving officers. The contact details should also be reflected in the agency’s website.

• Information Map. Each government agency should provide a list of documents for public consumption, and those with restricted access. The inventory of documents, together with the guidelines on documents needing consent, should be accessible in the agency website. — Bantay Kita, Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, December 2018

FOI Practice Report of Action forEconomic Reforms: Is TRAIN on Track?

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FOI Practice of the Action for Economic Reforms on the Implementation of the TRAIN Law’s Social Mitigating Measures

AER. Results Table

I. Organizational Profile

Action for Economic Reforms (AER) is a public-interest organization that conducts policy analysis and advocacy on key macroeconomic and governance issues. Access to relevant and timely data that can be easily managed and used for analysis is a critical tool in its work. Together with transparency (FOI Program), industrial policy and fiscal policy constitute AER’s flagship programs.

AER supported the passage of the Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law, in line with its advocacy for a fairer tax system. Recognizing that the law is not perfect, mindful of the transitory issues, and aware that implementation is critical, AER enrolled in the R2KRN FOI Practice Round 4 the monitoring of the revenues generated and social mitigating measures under TRAIN.

The FOI Practice is meant to demonstrate that succesful tax reform does not end with legislation, and that conscientious implementation is one of the pathways for greater understanding and acceptability of the reform. Response of target agencies will also showcase how they coordinate with each other, how seriously they treat specific provisions of the law, and will check how efficiently they perform their mandate.

II. Context for the Information Request

In December 2017, Republic Act No. 10963 (the TRAIN Law) was signed. It was the first of a series of tax-reform packages being pushed by the government. TRAIN aims to correct weaknesses in the country’s tax system, and make it simpler, more efficient, and progressive. It is expected to generate additional revenues for government. Seventy percent of the incremental revenues from TRAIN are earmarked for the Build, Build, Build Program to boost the country’s infrastructure. Included in this tax-reform package are:

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III. Results

AER used email, the eFOI portal, fax, phone calls, and personal visits to send and follow up FOI requests. The eFOI portal is the website created by the Philippine Communications Operations Office (PCOO) where FOI requests to different agencies can be lodged. Requesters are encouraged to use the eFOI portal for the speedy processing of their requests. In actual practice, however, agencies follow different protocols in receiving requests. Some still prefer emails or personal visits. Table 2 summarizes AER’s FOI requests done through different modes. Multiple entries for agencies indicate multiple and separate requests. In case of a referral, a new request is given as a new entry. Table 3 provides a list of FOI Receiving Officers (FRO) and other agency officials engaged in the FOI Practice.

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AER filed 14 requests to 10 agencies, and made a total of 156 contacts: 75 phone calls, 58 emails, 21 eFOI requests, and two personal visits.

On a per request basis, NFA required the most number of contacts (12 phone calls, 10 emails and three eFOI filings). BIR came in second, requiring 16 contacts (10 phone calls, five emails and one eFOI filing). DBM and LTFB tied on third, requiring 15 contacts (DBM: seven phone calls, six emails and two eFOI filings; LTFRB: eight phone calls, three emails, three eFOI filings and one personal visit).

Lack of clarity or awareness on who were responsible for receiving and processing FOI requests resulted in many referrals and redirection of phone calls and emails, especially in the NFA, BIR, and LTFRB. Related problems were non-working emails (NFA) and absence of contact information for the FRO (BIR).

Non-working (LTFRB) or incorrect (DOF) published phone numbers resulted in the need to go direct to specific offices (DOF) or for personal visits (LTFRB). In a few instances, phones were kept ringing, or when picked up, the responsible officers were not around (and nobody would take the request, and the requester was just asked to call again).

Inadequate email disk space has also been cited for un-received and un-acknowledged emails (BIR). Some emails were not properly transmitted to the FRO (TESDA).

Response time to eFOI filings was mixed. DBM, DOF, and DSWD were fast. NFA took one month to respond, while SRA, LTFRB, TESDA, and BIR did not respond at all. AER was able to engage these agencies through phone calls, emails, and personal visits, but they have not engaged the group in the eFOI portal.

Of the different modes of engagement, the two personal visits were most unpleasant. Requesters felt unattended, while the officer went in and out of the room, minding other matters. Moreover, upon follow-up, a hand-delivered request was denied as being submitted, despite a signed receiving copy.

In the end, it is the outcome, shown in Table 4, that matters most.

AER filed 14 requests to 10 agencies, and made a total of 156 contacts: 75 phone calls, 58 emails, 21 eFOI requests, and two personal visits.

On a per request basis, NFA required the most number of contacts (12 phone calls, 10 emails and three eFOI filings). BIR came in second, requiring 16 contacts (10 phone calls, five emails and one eFOI filing). DBM and LTFB tied on third, requiring 15 contacts (DBM: seven phone calls, six emails and two eFOI filings; LTFRB: eight phone calls, three emails, three eFOI filings and one personal visit).

Lack of clarity or awareness on who were responsible for receiving and processing FOI requests resulted in many referrals and redirection of phone calls and emails, especially in the NFA, BIR, and LTFRB. Related problems were non-working emails (NFA) and absence of contact information for the FRO (BIR).

Non-working (LTFRB) or incorrect (DOF) published phone numbers resulted in the need to go direct to specific offices (DOF) or for personal visits (LTFRB). In a few instances, phones were kept ringing, or when picked up, the responsible officers were not around (and nobody would take the request, and the requester was just asked to call again).

Inadequate email disk space has also been cited for un-received and un-acknowledged emails (BIR). Some emails were not properly transmitted to the FRO (TESDA).

Response time to eFOI filings was mixed. DBM, DOF, and DSWD were fast. NFA took one month to respond, while SRA, LTFRB, TESDA, and BIR did not respond at all. AER was able to engage these agencies through phone calls, emails, and personal visits, but they have not engaged the group in the eFOI portal.

Of the different modes of engagement, the two personal visits were most unpleasant. Requesters felt unattended, while the officer went in and out of the room, minding other matters. Moreover, upon follow-up, a hand-delivered request was denied as being submitted, despite a signed receiving copy.

In the end, it is the outcome, shown in Table 4, that matters most.

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Almost two-thirds of AER’s 14 FOI requests were unsuccessful. Only five were either partially (three) or completely successful (two), while the rest were unsuccessful (eight were pending including one referral, and one was denied and still under appeal). The successful requests all breached the 15-working day period for response. DSWD was the quickest to (partially) release information at 17 working days. Denied requests and referrals were within the prescribed period (three to 12 days). As of this writing, some requests have been pending for as long as 68 working days. Not one of the agencies (including those that released information late) issued a notice of extension.

The requests that required most contact (NFA, BIR, DBM and LTFRB) were 75 percent unsuccessful, with only NFA partially releasing the requested information.

Of the two denials (one full, one partial), AER chose to appeal the partial denial by DSWD. The appeal clarified the request related to the 2018 UCT and the 2019 budget for UCT. DSWD released the information on UCT, but only covering the UCT targets per region and not actual distribution, and have yet to send details of the 2019 allocations.

Does AER have enough information to draw a picture of how TRAIN is faring in terms of revenues and mitigating measures?

Based on retrieved documents and experience from the FOI Practice, information from agency websites, and news reports, some elements of this picture include:

• There is confusion as to which agency is responsible for keeping records of the inter-agency committee on social mitigating measures. The FOI Request to DBM was referred to DOF, which referred the request back to DBM. No document from the request or from the website was generated, and there were no news reports to get leads from.
o A Joint Memorandum Circular (JMC No. 1 s. 2018) on the general guidelines on the implementation of the social welfare and benefits programs under TRAIN was issued by DBM, DOF and DSWD only in August 2018.

• In February 2018, DSWD promulgated the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) for the UCT program, outlining its procedures, management, and timeline. Based on this, distribution of UCT should have been completed by August 2018. DSWD only released a document on UCT targets per region, and not of actual distribution, which is not enough to make a determination of how well the program is being implemented. There are also no details yet on how much allocation the program will get for 2019. The IRR says that distribution of the UCT in 2019 and 2020 shall be completed within the first quarter.
o In different months, some regional news reports would carry detailed updates from the some regional DSWD offices (Bicol, Caraga, Central Visayas, Socksargen). National news would quote figures and updates from congressional and Senate hearings.

• The LTFRB website and Facebook page carry information on the process for accessing the PantawidPasada and the deadlines for claiming the subsidy (only FB page has this information). The master list of eligible accounts is published in the LTFRB website, but there are no updates/details on how much and where the actual availment has been.
o There were news reports, quoting government officials, on supposed extent of distribution of the fuel subsidy. However, as no official record can be accessed, it is difficult to verify the reports.

• NFA issued guidelines for the TRAIN Rice Distribution Program. JMC No. 1 s. 2018 also has provisions on subsidized NFA rice.
o While doing the FOI Practice, NFA staff said that that because NFA rice is already highly subsidized, the additional 10-percent discount mandated in TRAIN will not be implemented anymore. This is a misleading statement. According to the JMC, what in fact will be given is more than what TRAIN requires. This subsidy (for 20 kilograms per month) is available to 2.6 million UCT household beneficiaries and senior pensioners.

• The DPWH budget is available on its website. As the 2019 budget is not yet available, it remains to be seen how the agency will reflect incremental allocations from TRAIN earmarks.

• There was no official document accessed on the breakdown of incremental revenues from TRAIN to show whether or not it is meeting its target. Absent the official data, it is not possible to check the accuracy of news reports on this.

AER. Recommendations

IV. Insights

While much of the problems encountered are still procedural, AER also flags several substantive issues.

Poor communication infrastructure. Non-functioning phones and email addresses, low email storage capacity, and irregular checking of email (including forwards from the eFOI portal) not only hampers the FOI program, but slows down overall public service. Some agencies that give central contact details (email address, phone/fax numbers, websites) sometimes do not have the capacity to route requests or queries. While this is not something that afflicts all agencies, it is jarring that it burdens some of key frontline agencies like LTFB and NFA.

The eFOI portal provides a more accessible way to lodge requests, but not all government agencies respond through the platform. This again indicates poor routing capacity, and/or the lack of dedicated personnel to check the platform (or the central email, for that matter). In any case, traditional request modes are still important, which makes the quality of traditional communication devices a primary consideration.

Low awareness of FOI procedures; low information consciousness. Two years since EO No. 2, some agencies still grapple with the FOI program, with their FROs in need of capacity building or are yet to be assigned. This may be understandable as government programs tend to have long gestation periods. Of greater concern is the persistent low consciousness of where a specific piece of information is and who is responsible for it. This betrays government personnel’s lack of appreciation of who is doing what, and what information is generated where, or perhaps simply a case of nobody wanting to take responsibility. This results in frequent redirection and referrals, which could frustrate requesters.

Breach of FOI request timeline.The 15-day response period is habitually violated. Extensions are done de-facto, and without formal notice. Rare occasions of appeal also get ignored. All these are closely linked to the two previous issues. It also points to poor client orientation of government offices.

Quality of information received. Most of those marked “successful” or “partially successful” requests involved being directed to the agencies’ websites. However, not all were able to give exact instructions or links; some just directed requesters to the general website. Some older datasets are also not found on the websites – quick checks with the Philippine Statistics Authority’s website also yielded negative results, raising questions on how and where older information is stored.

Document format is also an issue. Some documents are available only as images.

Special channels/access. Beyond the FOI Practice, and rooting out what may be weaknesses in the implementation of the FOI program, getting hold of the documents and information is primary for requesters. Since AER needs the documents to inform its work better, it sent a special request to DOF, through Undersecretary Karl Chua, for the TRAIN-related data. R2KRN made a separate request, on behalf of all Practice Teams, to PCOO, through Assistant Secretary Kris Ablan, for all the pending or problematic requests. Both offices promptly acknowledged the requests, and nudged the offices concerned. The hope is that such special access can help expedite FOI requests.

Having special access, whether through prior engagement or personal ties, to government offices facilitates service delivery. Such access sometimes provides shortcuts to procedures or help direct requesters to the proper offices. But special channels are not always available, and it certainly is not available to everyone. Citizens should be able to expect a minimum standard of service without need for special access.

Poor coordination and accountability? Lack of clarity on what unit or which personnel should have certain information exposes a deeper problem in governance. It can be symptomatic of poor coordination. When it happens in relation to a policy that has wide-ranging effects, including the further marginalization of already poor segments of the population, it can be taken as a disregard for accountability. It diminishes the effectivity of policies and threatens their acceptability. Citizens will not always take government’s word that a policy will benefit them; they have to see for themselves. Unless information is freely available, in a timely manner, there will always be doubt.

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V. Recommendations

• Create permanent positions for FOI in every agency, integrating critical information and communication concerns. To raise the profile of and properly implement the program, an FOI officer at the Director level might be necessary, supported by permanent positions for the FRO. This office shall be responsible for preparing the agency information map, and training the personnel on handling information and carrying out the FOI program.
• Address gaps in information and communication infrastructure and knowledge of various platforms (including eFOI). This includes proper information handling and storage (archiving).
• Proactively disclose information related to issues of most interest to the public (e.g. TRAIN, BBB, China agreements).
• Put more teeth to the FOI program by passing the FOI Law. — Action for Economic Reforms, Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, December 2018


Usapang Bigas: FOI Practice on Availability, Price Stability, and Importation of Rice

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BIgas, Request Log

I. Organizational Profile

The Right to Know, Right Now! (R2KRN) Coalition has been a staunch advocate for the passage of the FOI Law since it was convened in 2002, initially as the Access to Information Network (ATIN), before expanding into R2KRN in 2009. It is the main civil-society network that engages both the executive and legislative fronts.

R2KRN has adopted a systematic approach for documenting cases of FOI practice to build public demand for FOI and nurture a community of practice whereby citizens can claim their rights to information. Thus far, three rounds of coordinated FOI Practice had been completed by the Coalition members. In the second half of 2018, the Right to Know Coalition focused on how FOI affects the appreciation and discussion of the most pressing economic and political issues that are emblematic of the state of governance, transparency and accountability, and the delivery of public services in the country. The Coalition’s FOI Practice Round 4 specifically focused on the following:

● The implementation of Package 1 of the Comprehensive Tax Reform Program (Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion or TRAIN Law) of the Duterte administration. The Action for Economic Reforms is lead researcher for this project.

● The Memoranda of Agreement, contracts, and relevant documents covering mining operations and companies in the Philippines. Bantay Kita, a coalition of CSOs monitoring mining and extractive industries is lead researcher.

● Contracts, projects, and issues surrounding the “Build, Build, Build” program or the massive infrastructure and civil-works program of the Duterte administration. The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, ANSA-EAP, Ateneo Policy Center, and the Makati Business Club are the parallel research teams.

An audit of the provisions and implementation of FOI Manuals, and action taken on citizen requests, by various agencies of the Executive Branch, under EO No. 2 or the Duterte administration’s FOI policy.

● The crisis in the supply and distribution of rice. A common-concern project of the Right to Know Coalition, Action for Economic Reforms, Focus on the Global South, Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights Services, Social Watch, and Rice Watch Action Network.

In the 4th round, the coalition decided to take on a common FOI Practice project, where different coalition members do coordinated work on a single issue and/or agency. It chose the rice issue, specifically the questions of how the country came to a point of a rice-supply crunch and how this was managed by the government, as its initial joint project. A group of five member organizations, with established campaigns and advocacies on agrarian reform, rural development, the right to food, social reform and fiscal policy, was formed to reconstruct the story of rice through FOI Practice.

The core team includes the following R2KRN Members:

Action for Economic Reforms (AER), a public-interest organization that conducts policy analysis and advocacy on key economic issues, is a co-convenor of R2KRN. It considers access to relevant and timely data critical to judicious research and analysis.

Focus on Global South is an activist think tank that works with social movements, progressive individuals and organizations, academics, policy makers and legislators in challenging neoliberalism, market capitalism, militarism, and corporate-driven globalization, while strengthening just and equitable alternatives. Its Philippines Program focuses on development policy research, advocacy campaigning, and grassroots capacity building on socio-economic issues, trade and investment agreements, the commons (land, water, freedom of information, public services), climate and environmental justice, and power and democracy.

Rice Watch and Action Network (R1) is a network committed to push the following agenda: (a) Promoting sustainable rice farming; (b) Strengthening community and farmers’ rights over seeds; (c) Retaining quantitative restrictions (QRs) on rice; and (d) Increasing domestic support for the rice industry.

Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights Services (Rights! Network) supports the struggle of landless and near-landless rural poor communities, including indigenous peoples and informal rural settlers, for agrarian reform, rural development, and rural democratization in agrarian flashpoint provinces. It is a polycentric network of independent and autonomous member-NGOs/CSOs based in different provinces in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao islands.

Social Watch Philippines is part of an international network of citizens’ organizations struggling to eradicate poverty and the causes of poverty, to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and the realization of human rights. It puts forward a strategy of advocacy, awareness-building, monitoring, organizational development, and networking to promote social development concerns, through increasing social participation and awareness. The network counts as members around 100 CSOs and individuals.

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II. Context for the Information Requests

As a food staple, rice is among, if not the, most important commodities in the country. Its availability and affordability affect millions, particularly those who are struggling against hunger and poverty. While the government has declared commitment to achieve rice self-sufficiency since 2010, and despite billions of pesos allotted for the rice self-sufficiency bid, local outputs have been unable to meet national demand, much less compete with other Southeast Asian countries in the trade arena.

In 2016, the Duterte administration adopted rice self-sufficiency as a goal, extending key programs to enhance local production until 2020. Such strategy, however, was challenged by economic advisers/experts, arguing that food security through importation might make better use of public funds allocated for the agriculture sector. In 2018, the Duterte administration pronounced that it will instead focus on enhancing local competitiveness and now views “self-sufficiency as impossible.”

A critical context to the rice issue is the matter of quantitative restriction (QR), or the limits imposed on the importation of rice. When the Philippines acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, it negotiated for special treatment in rice, exempting it from tariffication for 10 years. In exchange for the exemption, the Philippines committed to import a minimum quantity of rice (minimum access volumes). Internally, it has likewise committed to prepare the sector so that it can face open competition when the time comes. It has since negotiated two extensions, from 2005 to 2012, and then again from 2012 to 2017. In 2017, the Philippines gave formal notice that it will lift the QR on rice, and move toward tariffication.

By September 2018, the calls for rice tariffication had been amplified in light of the steep increases in rice prices. This came at a time when national inflation reached 6.7 percent, with regional inflation hitting as high as 12 percent. The Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) Law was blamed for the surge in prices, but a closer look at the data also pointed to the contribution of food prices, especially rice.

Rice prices have gone up since 2017. The highest price increase was recorded in September 2018, when average retail price for well-milled rice reached PhP48.98 per kilogram. Economic managers, who placed the direct inflationary impact of TRAIN at around 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points, failed to take into account TRAIN’s speculative effect. Nonetheless, it could not be denied that critically low levels of rice stocks, delayed arrival of rice imported by the private sector, hoarding by traders, and farm devastation due to typhoons, all contributed to increases in rice prices. Abetting worries about rice were news reports of the National Food Authority importing weevil-infested rice from Thailand.

Bigas. Context for Request

Clearly, rice is a complicated issue. Through FOI Practice, R2KRN hopes to reconstruct the story of rice, and shed light on the following questions:

● What happened to the rice industry under a WTO-exempt status?
● How does NFA perform its mandate of rice price and supply stabilization?
● Who are the actors engaged in and benefiting from the business of rice?
● Special topics:
o Why did the weevil infestation of a batch of rice imports happen, who was responsible for it, and what was done to remedy the situation?
o How big a problem is rice smuggling and hoarding?

Ultimately, answers to these questions will also give a picture of how government manages the rice situation which has teremendous impact on the people’s welfare.

This FOI Practice is meant to underscore the importance of the following:
● Access to information is access to services: information on government action tracks how it fulfills its mandate for securing the availability and affordability of rice.
● Information is accountability: information shows who benefit from government regulation (licensing) and programs (distribution).
● Information is crucial for policy development: accurate information is crucial for timely decisions and trouble-shooting; it signals policy and implementation gaps, and the need to update or establish new rules.
● Information as policy history: it is important for the government to have proper data standards, including in data archiving, to preserve critical documents of historical significance.

Bigas. Target Agencies Table

Target Government Institutions and Documents/Information Requested

The FOI Practice Team contacted the following agencies to request for specific information related to the issues above.

Department of Agriculture (DA). Executive Order (EO) No. 116 series of 1987, reorganized the Ministry of Agriculture and renamed it the Department of Agriculture. The DA is the frontline agency for agriculture and fisheries, takes charge of the agricultural policy framework, directs public investments in the agricultural sector, and provides support services necessary to make the industry profitable and to spread the benefits of development to the rural poor. In 2016, the DA declared the continuation of the rice self-sufficiency program. For 2018, DA had a budget of PhP53 billion, and a renewed focus on enhancing the productivity of small-scale and community-based food-farming.

The Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (ACEF) is a loan and grant facility implemented by the DA. It provides loans or income generating project grants for food producers in the agriculture and fisheries sector. ACEF was created by Republic Act (RA) No. 8178 in 1996 from proceeds of the importation of the minimum access volumes of agricultural products tarrified under the WTO, with a life of nine years. It was extended by RA9496 (2007) until 2015, and by RA 10848 (2015) until 2022.

Under the Rice Tariffication Bill, which was approved by the bicameral conference committee in late November 2018, a Rice Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (RCEF) was created, with an annual appropriation of PhP10 billion for six years after its signing. DA is the agency primarily responsible and accountable for RCEF.

The requesters asked for the following documents from DA:

● Documents on the importation and distribution of rice and Reports related to the weevil-infested rice from Vietnam and Thailand (similar to the requests made to NFA, see below);
● Documents related to the government’s request to extend the quantitative restrictions (QRs) on rice and the concessions that were given as compensation for these extensions (similar to the requests made to DTI, see below); and
● Documents related to ACEF and RCEF
o Annual reports (narrative and audit/expenditure) 2000 to 2007 and its succeeding extension from 2007 to 2015
o Available pertinent and related documents on RCEF.

National Food Authority (NFA). The NFA is mandated to ensure food security and the stability of supply and price of rice. It is responsible for the procurement of paddy from bonafide farmers and their organizations, buffer stocking, processing activities, dispersal of paddy and milled rice to strategic locations, and distribution of the staple grain to various marketing outlets at appropriate times of the year.

The following documents were requested from NFA:

• Documents on the importation and distribution of rice
o Official documents on the mechanisms for the allocation of Minimum Access Volume (MAV), as well as the General Guidelines for Importation by the NFA from 1995 to the present;
o List of institutions/corporations with import licenses for rice from 1995 to present, as well as the status of such licenses;
o Minutes of all the NFA Rice Council’s regular and special meetings held from January 2016 to the present;
o Documentation and related documents regarding the concessions for extending the QRs on rice with the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2005, 2012, and 2017;
o Reports related to the weevil-infested rice imported from Vietnam and Thailand;
o Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures for rice imports from 2014 to 2018;
o Agency level reports detailing the “weevil infested” rice imports from Thailand and Vietnam that arrived in Subic Bay Freeport and Tabaco City, Albay this year; and
o Reports showing the markets to which the weevil-infested rice have been distributed.

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). DTI also plays a pivotal part in the rice crisis primarily because of its central role in the trade of agricultural products. Under EO 133, dated February 27, 1987, the DTI is mandated to coordinate, promote, and facilitate the country’s trade, industry, and investment activities, with the end in view of accelerating and sustaining economic growth. Through its international trade office, DTI exercises responsibility over all matters pertaining to foreign-trade relations, including the implementation of the country’s commitments to the WTO. Among these commitments is the tariffication of rice after the expiration of the special treatment on rice.

From DTI, the following documents were requested:

● Request letters submitted by the Philippine government to the WTO in 2007 and 2012 seeking to extend the QRs on rice
o WTO response to the government’s request to extend QRs on rice
o Official documents reflecting the concessions given in return for these extensions;
● Official documents/statements issued by the government that (1) declare the extension of the concessions on lower tariffs to certain agricultural products, and (2) grant such concessions to interested WTO parties, as compensation for the government’s extension of the QRs on rice;
● Official document/s submitted by the government to WTO in March 2017 declaring that it will tariffy the QRs on rice once the waiver on the special treatment on rice expires on June 30, 2017; and
● Letters received from WTO/WTO members in reaction to the government’s extension of the QRs on rice, as well as the government’s responses to these letters (2017).

Bureau of Customs (BOC). Created by Republic Act No. 1937 in 1957, the BOC has the principal mandate to implement an effective revenue-collection method, and to prevent and suppress smuggling and the entry of prohibited imported goods into the country. BOC supervises and controls the entrance and clearance of vessels and aircrafts engaged in foreign commerce.

The requesters asked for the following documents:
• Official report on smuggled rice intercepted at designated ports of entry containing the following details:
o Registered name of importer
o Source country of smuggled rice
o Volume and value of smuggled rice; and
● Official report on the disposal of intercepted smuggled rice.

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III. RESULTS

In total, we filed FOI requests with four agencies, covering 19 classes of documents (with some documents requested from multiple agencies). We made eight calls, sent 21 email and three fax messages, logged in to the eFOI portal once, and made two hand deliveries. Agency response time took one to 21 days (as of December 6, 2018). We received three referrals or redirection, and three denials, two of which were for the same documents requested separately by different team members. An appeal for these documents was filed, and has been pending for 18 days. Of the 19 documents, we obtained the following: five complete, four incomplete (data do not cover earlier years); while 10 documents have either been denied or have yet to be released.

Annexes I and II provide details of the documents requested and the agency response.

Below are notes of the team’s experience with the four agencies.

National Food Authority (NFA)
● Response time was quick at two days, with some documents released, and an update on the remaining requests. For statistical data, NFA referred us to the archive in their website. We got the general guidelines on rice importation, but there are data for MAV allocation only from 2014 to 2018, and nothing from before that until 1995.
● Two team members (AER and Focus) both requested for the minutes of the NFA Council’s meetings. Both were denied on the basis of confidentiality. The AER appeal is still pending at the time of this writing.
● The request for the documents related to the Philippine government’s communication with the WTO on the extension of the QRs on rice was ignored.
● Reports on the weevil-infested rice was released only after some back-and-forth with NFA. Prior to release, the NFA contact only said that the rice from Thailand was distributed in Regions III and V, but no official report was give.
● In the frequent communication with NFA, the team had to explain the request several times, and was asked to provide information on the requester’s organization. Several requests had to be sent to different offices, and the team even had to be asked to file an eFOI request for documents the NFA could not release (e.g. data related to rice import licenses).
● For referral to its website, NFA gave exact links only to some documents, while some requests were left hanging (no data for all the years covered by the requests).

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
● Requests to DTI were filed with different offices, and sent by email and fax.
● Response was quick at six days.
● DTI through a different email address (NCR@dti.gov.ph) responded through email to clarify that DA is the more appropriate agency to handle our request (for WTO-related documents).

Department of Agriculture (DA)
● We sent several requests to DA, some of which we also filed with NFA (reports on the weevil-infested rice) or DTI (documents related to the extension of QR on rice, communications with the WTO).
● Requests were sent to different offices by email, one was hand-delivered, and followed up with phone calls.
● Some of the difficulties encountered when following up requests were the unavailability of the contact person, calls not being received/answered, and long/complicated request rerouting process.
● No document was obtained from DA as of this writing. For information on the extension of QR on rice, the team was sent the following link: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/qr_e.htm.

Bureau of Customs (BOC)
● BOC has no information (name, contact details) for its FRO. The person who received the call at the BOC did not know what an FRO meant, and the team was referred to the Public Information and Assistance Division and the Office of the Commissioner. The FRO who responded to our request did not provide his/her name and/or contact information.
● The team was asked to file a request through the eFOI. After one working day, BOC denied our request citing confidentiality and suggested that we provide a duly signed request letter addressed to the Management Information System and Technology Group.

The FOI Practice experience showed sluggish, although positive responses from two out of four agencies, particularly the DA and the NFA through their FROs. We observed that processing FOI requests requires a handful of approvals before data/information can reach the requester.

It is also important to note that the FOI request process for NFA is not clear. Although we followed the instructions indicated in its manual on sending information requests through email, the FRO instructed us to file our request under the Electronic Freedom of Information (e-FOI) Portal — a procedure that is not specified in the NFA manual when sending requests through email.

It is unclear to some agencies how the request process should go. The BOC request might have gone more smoothly had the request been filed with the Department of Finance, but we were also interested in how attached agencies would respond to FOI requests.

All agencies have either denied access, rerouted the requests to other offices that cannot disclose information out of “confidentiality.” None of the agencies specified which exception/s the requested documents fall under. Several offices did not respond despite follow-ups, or may have deliberately ignored requests since it was out of their jurisdiction. Most offices justified their non-release of data/information due to: (a) inconsistencies between requested data and actual data sets available; (b) confidentiality of the requested information; (c) no actual data/information was available specific to the request; or (d) the data/information is already available in website external to the agency.

IV. INSIGHTS

The most critical issues we noted in this FOI Practice are: (1) agency knowledge of documents in its possession, and which units should requests be properly referred to; and (2) the question of where older records and data can be located.

Referrals, rerouting, and redirection are understandable, especially if requests are complicated and/or involve older documents, as long as the request is eventually successful. Non-responsive units, incomplete data, and dead ends are frustrating for requesters.

In the end, we were not able to get all the data and documents we need. Based only on what we obtained through the FOI Practice, supplemented by data procured from the agency websites or news reports, it is difficult to paint a full picture of the rice industry. Particularly, the request for the minutes of the NFA council meetings, which could have shed light upon how the council might have possibly discussed their plans of action on responding to the different issues concerning the rice sector, was denied. Another important document that we were not given access to is the BOC’s reports on smuggled rice intercepted at ports of entry. Such information could have allowed us to better understand the factors that contributed to the ongoing rice crisis. Since we were deprived access to such documents, we have been likewise deprived access to the information that can identify the possible root cause(s) of the problem and consequently have also been deprived of the ability to come up with appropriate recommendations. Further, this poses issues on the agency’s accountability measures.

With regard to the actual data that were retrieved, here are our observations:

● The general guidelines on the importation of rice and MAV allocation contain pertinent information that allow us to create a comprehensive picture of the private sector’s rice importation process — from the application process of institutions interested to import rice to the post-importation process. However, while the guidelines on rice importation could have served as a useful benchmark in identifying possible noncompliance of NFA, which may have contributed to the rice crisis, this document is difficult to optimize since we were not provided with the minutes of the NFA Council’s meetings on rice importation that reflect what actions the agency actually took or what decisions it made.

● BOC denied the request for details on rice smuggling, citing confidentiality issues. While the request was broad, it asked for names of the importers of the smuggled rice, as well as for less personal details like the volume of rice smuggled into the country. There had been numerous criticisms about the failure of BOC to curb smuggling in rice, and there had been news reports on smuggled rice being intercepted or disposed. If at least some information is being released to the media, why is it not also released to researchers? Smuggling is among the concerns of farmers who, already burdened by high input costs and hit by natural calamities, become even less competitive in the face of cheaper smuggled rice. On a related note, if huge quantities of rice are being smuggled into the country, yet prices continue to be high, what then are the greater contributing factors to the rice problem?

● Some information on increases on the country’s MAV for rice as a result of the extensions of the QR in rice, from news reports or documents submitted to legislative bodies. There are no information, however, on other concessions made on non-rice commodities. Without this, the real costs and benefits of retaining the QRs or tariffication cannot be estimated with accuracy.

● The ACEF was supposed to be a mechanism to assist farmers affected by the liberalization of agriculture trade. It is the inspiration for the RCEF proposed under the Rice Tariffication Bill. A close evaluation of ACEF’s performance would go a long way in ensuring that RCEF will indeed be able to respond to the needs of affected rice farmers.

The FOI Practice Team on Rice tried to piece together the information gathered, and made more detailed notes on the rice issue. See Box –Usapang Bigas: Notes on the Story of Rice

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based from our experience on this practice round, we recommend the following measures:

● There should be dedicated personnel to manage not only information requests, but to maintain information and data-management systems. Such personnel should have full knowledge of where documents originate and where they are kept, to help expedite request routing. The approval system should also be streamlined, and should be reflected in an FOI request flowchart.

● Each agency should have a comprehensive information map, clearly identifying the documents that are publicly available and documents with restructed access, and marking information co-managed with other agencies.

● There should be stricter implementation of basic manual requirements:
o As an exercise of due diligence, the receipt of a request (even those not delivered personally) should be communicated to the requester, preferably through a written response. The same goes for denials where the reason for the non-release of data/information is provided in written form to the requester.
o Names and contact details of FOI receiving officers should be clearly indicated in agency websites and directories, and distributed to all offices for reference.
o Agencies have to be more conscious about the prescribed 15-day response period and the 20-day extension period.

● Data format issues: As far as practicable, documents for release should also be in soft copies and/or machine-readable format.

● Data storage and archiving issues: Agency websites do not always carry the historical data and documents. In such cases, FROs should be able to direct requesters to libraries or other relevant offices for physical copies of the documents. Needless to say, the storage and archiving policies should be clear to FROs and other personnel responsible for record management. — Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, December 2018

FOI Practice Report of Ateneo Policy Center: A Transparent Age of Infrastructure?

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FOI Practice Report from the Ateneo Policy Center (APC)

APC. Results Table 1

I. Organizational Profile

Established in 1996, the Ateneo School of Government boasts 20 years of experience in delivering leading-edge policy research and in promoting good-governance reforms. The School’s programs have made significant contributions in advancing discussion for policy reforms and innovative solutions that strengthen key democratic institutions like elections, political parties, legislature, bureaucracy, and accountability mechanisms. In 2017, amidst efforts to respond more effectively to emerging political, economic, and social issues, the Ateneo Policy Center (APC) was established to serve as the School’s dedicated research and public policy unit. The APC’s present engagements include work in advancing Inclusive Economies, Inclusive Democracies, and Inclusive Societies.

Throughout 2018, the APC has been undertaking a monitoring initiative of the Duterte administration’s ambitious PhP 8.4-trillion Build, Build, Build (BBB) infrastructure program. The initiative aims to examine the governance processes of the administration in the planning, procurement, and implementation of Build, Build, Build projects (both flagship and non-flagship), and has also involved an assessment of its progress on the transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption fronts. The aim of the research is to provide a scoping as well as an evidence-based assessment of the emerging issues in infrastructure and public-works planning and procurement amidst BBB’s implementation.

II. Context for the Information Request

Significant steps toward improving government transparency in infrastructure have unfolded under the current administration of President Rodrigo R. Duterte. Within his first month of assuming office, President Duterte signed Executive Order no. 2 (s. 2016), which mandated freedom of information for agencies under the executive branch, including agencies involved in infrastructure governance and development. As part of this effort, an electronic freedom of information (e-FOI) portal (http://www.foi.gov.ph) was also launched in November 2016 to facilitate easier information requests by the public. More recently, in April 2017, several government agencies publicly unveiled the Philippine Infrastructure Transparency Portal (http://www.build.gov.ph), to proactively share information concerning the flagship ventures of the BBB program. The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) also releases specific updates on the 75 flagship infrastructure projects in its website.

Despite these commendable initiatives, the administration’s transparency drive has not eluded challenges. While cabinet members have provided assurance on their willingness to provide information on infrastructure projects, several government agencies have not been as forthcoming in providing information as expected. With regards to proactive disclosure measures, a cursory survey of the Philippine Infrastructure Transparency Portal reveals only limited coverage of BBB projects (with information for only 61 ventures in total, including 21 flagship projects, showcased as of August 2018). On a similar note, requests for information access on BBB projects can likewise be restricted on the basis of legal limitations, such as those expressed in the FOI executive order. These exceptions to the access of information have been enumerated in a November 2016 memorandum to all government agencies, which includes information deemed to be confidential, such as “trade secrets, intellectual property, business, commercial, financial, and other proprietary information,” as well as “documents submitted through the Government Electronic Procurement System.” Throughout 2017, several FOI requests related to BBB and its priority projects have reportedly not been met for reasons ranging from the unavailability of such information online to confidentiality grounds .

The potential risks posed by a lack of transparency in the BBB program are well-known. An infrastructure transparency deficit could obscure procedural weaknesses and potential rent-seeking dynamics in the conceptualization, selection, planning, procurement, and implementation of both large-scale and small-scale infrastructure projects— the ultimate costs of which will be borne by Filipino taxpayers. At minimum, a lack of full disclosure is bound to inhibit proper understanding and deliberation among the public of the true benefits, costs, and risks of projects. Even from the government’s perspective, such discussions are best had prior to the execution of infrastructure ventures, to ensure stronger buy-in, greater financial sustainability, and clarity on the measures needed to mitigate and equitably distribute the long-term burdens of such projects on the public.

APC. Results Table 2

Target Government Institutions and Specific Information/Documents Requested

To better assess the quality of infrastructure transparency in the Duterte administration, a total of 55 requests were lodged through the e-FOI portal, between June 26 and July 24, 2018, for copies of the feasibility studies of 48 flagship infrastructure projects that NEDA listed as having complete feasibility studies as of its June 13, 2018 update . Feasibility studies were focused upon specifically by the APC team, given the importance of such studies to determining the costs, benefits, risks, and overall viability of proposed infrastructure projects. Presently, according to NEDA operations manuals , full feasibility studies are a mandatory documentary requirement for the evaluation of major infrastructure projects by the NEDA Investment Coordinating Committee.

These 48 projects listed as having completed feasibility studies spanned eight different government agencies: (1) the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), (2) the Department of Transportation (DOTr), (3) the Department of Agriculture (DA), (4) the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority of the Department of Agriculture (DA/PFDA), (5) the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), (6) the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), (7) the National Irrigation Authority (NIA), (8) the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), (8) and the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). Table 1 lists down the specific projects as well as the implementing agencies affiliated with them in the NEDA update.

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III. Results

Out of the 55 requests lodged through the e-FOI portal, only 26 were duly received by the FOI Receiving Offices (RO) of pertinent IAs within the 15 business days prescribed by the FOI executive order. Out of the 26 requests, 10 were marked ‘successful’ by the agencies requested. One other request was marked as ‘partially successful.’

Meanwhile, 15 requests were denied by the receiving agencies, nine of which were turned down within the 15-day period, and the remaining six done belatedly. Six of these requests were denied because the agencies in question (i.e. the DA, DOTr, PPA, and CPA) referred the FOI requests to a different IA, even if they had been identified by NEDA or other agencies as the entity responsible for the listed projects (see Table 2). Another six projects under the DOTr were also denied, following a review of the said agency’s legal department on trade secrecy grounds for projects that have not yet been awarded, the full response for which is provided for in Annex III. Finally, three other denied information requests concerned the Kaliwa Dam project (for which APC was asked to contact MWSS directly outside the e-FOI portal), and the Pulangi 4 Selective Dredging Phase 3 project (for which APC was first requested via a formal request letter, which was afterward denied on the reported unavailability of the document in question).

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In a number of requests, the respective implementing agencies of each project were also contacted through telephone for follow-up purposes. Indeed, this was especially necessary in the case of three agencies (i.e. DA-PFDA, NIA, and MWSS) who reported not having access to their e-FOI portals, and thus were or could not taking action in response to respective e-FOI requests within the 15-day period. Additionally, two agencies asked for a formal request letter aside from the e-FOI request — but even filing a request letter did not automatically translate to an approved request.

All told, of the 48 projects access to the feasibility studies requested were granted in only seven instances— with only one, moreover, involving the actual provision of a digital file of the feasibility study by the IA in question. For two projects under the BCDA, an in-house viewing of the feasibility studies was granted due to confidentiality concerns cited by the said agency; meanwhile, access to the studies of four other airport projects handled by DOTr required visiting the said Department’s office in Clark, Pampanga, as only hard copies were reported to be available. Table 3 presents the roster of these successful requests.The request log and details of problems encountered with the remaining requests is shown in Annexes I and II respectively.

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IV. Insights

Despite the promise of ease of access to documents through the e-FOI portal, various feasibility study requests still suffered from bureaucratic obstacles and legal limitations. Out of the 55 requests made, 29 were not acted upon by project IAs within the 15 working-day period prescribed by Executive Order No. 2. Of these 29, 18 e-FOI requests— all submitted to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)— were accepted by the department beyond the 15 working-day period. No further action on the request has been undertaken by the DPWH on the requests up until the time of writing (i.e. November 12, 2018). Another seven requests were accepted by the agencies within the 15 working-day period, but were not approved or denied within the same time frame.

The results reveal a clear disparity in the responsiveness and service quality among agencies in the e-FOI portal. Some agencies stand out as prompt and effective in accepting and reviewing the requests— particularly the BCDA and the DOTr, who together accounted for the seven cases in which potential access to project feasibility studies were granted— whereas others, such as the DPWH, were much more sluggish in acting on the requests.

Unevenness was not only evident across different agencies, but could also be witnessed in different divisions within the same agencies. For example, the DOTr, which had been quite prompt in accepting e-FOI requests, was not as consistent in approving or denying the requests within the 15 working-day period. On one hand, the DOTR Air Transport Planning Division demonstrated a high level of responsiveness in approving requests under their jurisdiction. On the other hand, requests on projects of the Philippine National Railways and the Metro Manila Bus Rapid Transits , which are also under DOTr jurisdiction, were denied outside the prescribed time period.

Providing the data has come with other symptoms of uneven service quality— particularly with handling confidentiality concerns. Citing confidentiality concerns, BCDA allowed a limited in-house viewing for two of its projects’ feasibility studies . Yet other IAs have used confidentiality as reason to completely deny access to their feasibility studies. This was specifically the case with numerous projects under different divisions of the DOTr, for which the access to feasibility studies were denied on trade secrecy grounds following a legal review. On a similar note, the feasibility study for the DOTr’s Mindanao Railway Project was not shared on the basis of the confidentiality of the project’s ongoing bidding process.

Other denials of requests seem to have resulted mainly from coordination issues between agencies, as well as between agencies and their e-FOI portals. In one project, the New Cebu International Container Port, neither the DOTr, the PPA, and the CPA appeared to have clarity on which specific government office was supposed to have been the ultimate recipient agency for the request. Meantime, several government agencies such as the DA-PFDA, the MWSS, and the NIA, seemed to have had no access whatsoever to their e-FOI portals, and up to the present have left requests for feasibility studies unheeded in the e-FOI website . Coupled with major gaps in the project coverage of the Philippine Infrastructure Transparency Portal, such situations have been indicative of coordination failures between infrastructure-related agencies and the transparency mechanisms established under the present administration.

Positive experiences with the BCDA and the DOTr Air Transport Division aside, these trends in documentary requests concerning the administration’s flagship infrastructure projects are not encouraging. While the establishment of the e-FOI portal has increased the convenience of making information/document access requests, major hurdles remain in accessing critical documents for ascertaining the viability and integrity of flagship BBB projects. With the feasibility studies for most of these projects remaining out of reach, it is possible to imagine increased chances for avoidable flaws to remain in the development and design of these projects, which heightened public access to information could help minimize. Indeed, recent scandals in various agencies— e.g. Department of Tourism, Department of Justice, the Bureau of Customs, the National Food Authority—further underscores the urgency of more robust transparency measures.

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V. Recommendations

In the medium term, the FOI executive order of the Duterte administration must be expanded into a full-fledged FOI law, which will cover not only the national executive branch, but also the legislature, local government units, and the judiciary, to further expand and strengthen citizen’s access to key public documents concerning infrastructure projects. In the shorter term, however, the following recommendations are advanced to better ensure that a “golden age of transparency” can parallel the administration’s vaunted “golden age of infrastructure.”

● Discrepancies and gaps in public information portals need to be streamlined into a single authoritative database, compared to the fragmented, and occasionally conflicting set-up across multiple government agencies. While such a database can be a multi-agency initiative (as with the BBB Portal), a designated lead agency with expertise in infrastructure-project formulation and/or implementation, should have the final say on public information shared concerning projects so as to promote coherence and consistency in released data.

● Building upon the BCDA’s practice of allowing in-house viewing of documents marked as confidential, other agencies and offices of government should explore middle-ground options that respect such confidentiality concerns, while nonetheless enabling greater public access to key data and information. The formulation of a set of guidelines in handling and publicizing such confidential data and documents can help standardize some degree of disclosure across the various infrastructure-related agencies.

● While the Government Procurement Reform Act(R.A. 9184) enables participation and monitoring of public procurement processes, including for infrastructure and public works development, opportunities for citizen participation and monitoring appear to still be sparse at the planning and pre-bidding stage of project formulation and development. In this regard, it is recommended that public hearings and consultations with qualified representatives from civil society, the academe, and other relevant sectors for the conducting of needs and risks assessments, feasibility studies, and environmental and social impact studies, among others, be made part and parcel of infrastructure development procedures. Similarly, the celebrated practice of Citizen’s Participatory Audits for public works and infrastructure projects can likewise be extended to the assessment of Feasibility Studies and other key project formulation documents by qualified representatives from outside the public sector. — Ateneo Policy Center, Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, December 2018
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Prepared by Jerik Cruz, Economist of the Ateneo Policy Center (APC), as well as Miguel Enriquez, an APC intern, during the information request period for this practice effort. Any errors are solely those of the authors. The views and conclusions of the paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Ateneo School of Government or the Ateneo de Manila University.

This report’s content is condensed and adapted from a forthcoming working paper of the Ateneo Policy Center, “Governing the ‘Golden Age of Infrastructure’: Build, Build, Build from an Accountability Perspective.” We invite readers to visit http://www.ateneo.edu/aps/asog/research_and_publications/research_materials/working_paper_series in late December 2018 for a copy of this forthcoming paper.

ANSA-EAP FOI Practice Report: What’s wrong with ‘Build, Build, Build’?

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FOI Practice Report of the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability (ANSA) in East Asia & Pacific

ANSA EAP. Results Table 1

I. Organizational Profile

The Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia & Pacific Foundation, Inc. (ANSA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation registered under Philippine law. It provides a networking and learning facility for social accountability stakeholders and practitioners. It empowers people by facilitating constructive engagement with the government in monitoring the use of public resources, based on the assertion of rights and geared toward better service delivery and promotion of community welfare.

ANSA has established geographical presence by organizing seven convener groups in four countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines. It has covered various thematic issues, such as public procurement, extractive industries, youth and children, education, infrastructure, and recently, social protection and PWD. It also has partnerships in Myanmar, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and the South Pacific.

ANSA has implemented projects that promoted the use of evidence-based participatory tools, such as for budgeting, public-expenditure tracking, citizen report card, community scorecard, and audit. Among its most innovative and most replicated projects are the Citizen Participatory Audit (CPA) with the Commission on Audit, and CheckMySchool(CMS) with the Department of Education.

In pursuing its mission, ANSA has received support from donors, such as the World Bank, Open Society Foundation, Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hivos, Save the Children, United Nations Development Programme, The Asia Foundation, World Health Organization, Jollibee Group Foundation, Partnership for Transparency Fund, Revenue Watch Institute, USAID/Results for Development (R4D), among others.

II. Context of Information Request

The Duterte administration’s Build, Build, Build (BBB) program is estimated to cost PhP8 trillion over the next five years. As of April 2018, 18 projects worth PhP462.7 billion have been approved. Eight of these projects, accounting for around 64 percent of those approved, are in Metro Manila. In a policy forum, economist Emmanuel De Dios pointed out underperformance in infrastructure spending. There were also news reports about projects encountering glitches, delays, and other inefficiencies, not to mention anomalies.

BBB is such a massive program that promises many things, including economic gains, jobs, traffic decongestion, among others. In view of this, the public must be fully informed about how the projects are being developed, their progress in implementation and, more importantly, if they are achieving target results. The public must be adequately alerted and consulted on ways to address program issues and its overall direction.

ANSAEAP. Results Table 2

Targeted Government Agencies and Requested Information

This FOI Practice focused on BBB aimed to test access to (a) feasibility studies, and (b) progress reports of selected BBB projects, which are implemented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Department of Transportation (DOTr).

DPWH and DOTr were selected in view of their crucial role in the BBB program. The targeted areas were spread out in NCR, Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, with sampled projects in varying degrees of reported accomplishment at different stages of operation. The sampling was expected to show level of ease or difficulty in securing information depending on the stage of project operation. These stages are: project development, project procurement, and project implementation. Information regarding project status was derived from the government’s official website on BBB projects.

As of August 15, 2018, when this round of FOI Practice was being prepared, the official status of the selected projects was as follows:

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Note that after more than three months — as of December 4, 2018 — none of the information on the status of these same projects has changed, as reported in the BBB website. Either none of the projects has moved/progressed or the website is not being updated.

III. Results

The Annex: FOI Practice Results Matrix provides a summary of ANSA EAP’s FOI practice experience with the DPWH and the DOTr.

After more than three months, and up to 30 working days of engagement with the agencies, our FOI Practice yielded the following results:

• All of the six documents requested from DPWH were approved for release, while only two out four requests were approved by DOTr. DOTr released one of the two approved documents only after the requester submitted a notarized Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA).

• Neither of the two agencies complied with the 15-working-days time allowance. The requested documents were made available within the extended time of 24-30 working days. Note that the agencies did not make any official request for extension.

• Most of the DPWH documents were given in hard printed copy. Electronic copy was requested, but it was not available or could not be made available by the FOI Receiving Officer. Given the bulk of the documents, their sharing and distribution has been difficult for the researchers.

• The Metro-Manila Bus Rapid Transit – Line 2 is undergoing a re-evaluation process. Apparently, the Asian Development Bank has raised some issues on the intersection along EDSA. DOTr did not furnish copy of the requested documents because of these pending questions on the project. Further, it considers information in this stage as privilege and a recognized exception. In its response letter, DOTr says:

“[I]t appears that the subject, which are still under evaluation by other Government agencies, partake the nature of an information or document comprising drafts of decisions, orders, rulings, policy and decisions memoranda that are addressed to the Government Officials concerned who are yet to finalize its recommendation and decision whether to approve or disapprove the projects. Hence, pending the decision or resolution of these Government agencies on the approval or disapproval of the projects, the same cannot yet be disclosed or disseminated to the public.”

• The DOTr initially denied the request for a copy of the feasibility study of the Bicol International Airport, due to proprietary rights. According to its Legal Division, “the DOTr, being the recipient of these documents has the right to safeguard its trade or industrial secrets against competitors of said individuals, consulting firms and institutions as well as the public. Otherwise, such information, if disclosed or disseminated can be illegally and unfairly utilized by other business competitors who, through their access to those business secrets, may use the same for their own private gain and to the irreparable prejudice of the owner of the said ‘documents’.”

After appealing the decision, the DOTr negotiated a condition for the release of the document, which was for the requester to sign and notarize an NDA. The requester complied with the condition, which made the agency release the document.

IV. Insights

ANSA EAP distilled several keen observations from this round of FOI Practice.

First, the length of time (24-30 working days) before the agencies released the requested documents and the printed format by which they were provided indicate the agencies’ low level of readiness to comply with the demands of the FOI policy. While DPWH was cooperative and responsive to the requests, it took so long to locate, prepare, and physically provide the documents. For DOTr, it appears to be a case of both low-level readiness and high resistance to execute the access-to-information directive. The internal deliberation its FOI officers that went through its lawyers before a decision was made on the merit of the request and the time consumed for back-and-forth communication, including the appeal, made access difficult and tedious.

Second, the DOTr’s BRT in NCR presents a unique case because it is still in the early project development stage, where information may still be raw or has yet to be finalized. On this basis, the ongoing re-evaluation process was cited as the reason for the agency’s inability to provide information on the project. It is important to note, however, that information from a discussion, re-evaluation, or draft document on plans for government service delivery projects has great public value as it affects key project implementation decisions.

The Legal Division’s claim of exception for this type of information is merely an opinion and must thus be challenged. When does information become privilege and qualify as state secret? The tentative or unpolished characteristic of project information cannot serve as basis for it. There is more benefit than danger in publicly sharing the way projects are being developed as it invites more ideas and better innovations. Planning and project-development activities are not supposed to be secretive, and have long been opened up to participatory processes. Information generated during this stage should be made accessible to the public.

Third, DPWH provided the feasibility study and progress reports for its projects in the implementation stage. DOTr, for its Bicol project, which is also in the implementation stage, denied the request initially and later made a condition for its release. This shows that reaching the more advanced implementation stage of the project does not guarantee ease in accessing project documents.

Agency officials still dictate the rules on what information to disclose, and when, how, or why to disclose. It is important to understand what prompted DOTr to deny access to the feasibility study. Is the protection of proprietary rights a valid reason? How should contractor’s proprietary rights to financial information, intellectual property (concepts, designs, technique), and other technical documentation be handled in publicly funded projects? Why did DPWH release the same documents while DOTr did not?

Finally, the DOTr’s condition of signing the NDA is arguably tantamount to denial. It eventually released the document to the individual requester after complying with the condition, but its use must be limited to the individual. As the agreement implies, the individual requester cannot disclose it further to anyone. Journalists who secured this information, for instance, cannot use it in any of their news reports. Does individual consumption of information fulfill the requirement of access to information? Obviously no, because publicity is the spirit of access to information. Constraint on the public use of information defeats the right to, and the freedom of, information. The condition of signing a non-disclosure agreement must be stopped.

Download (PDF, 52KB)

V. Recommendations

For better FOI implementation and service delivery to requesters, ANSA EAP offers the following recommendations:

• Agencies should review their readiness to supply documents and information, from locating, preparing, and actually transmitting information or documents to the requester. They should be able to determine ways of improving their readiness.

• The Cabinet Secretary should require agencies to have electronic copy of all documents and introduce protocols on storage and public sharing of these electronically accessible files.

• State and reiterate as policy the public’s claim to all government project information in all stages of project operation, namely: project development, procurement, and implementation. Information from deliberations, planning, and other preparatory work are crucial information that must be documented and shared with the public.

• Clarify the proprietary rights over certain information owned by contractors in a publicly funded project.

• Instruct agencies to cease from requiring requesters to sign NDA as a condition for the release of documents and inform the public about the untenability of the NDA condition. — ANSA-EAP, Right to Know, Right Now! Coalition, December 2018

FOI, Kaya pa? Is there a future for FOI under DU30 administration?

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FOI advocates march to Malacanang, November 2012. Should it happen again? File photo

FOI advocates march to Malacanang, November 2012. Should it happen again? File photo

WE LOOK BACK to two years ago when hopes were high –- for order, for rule of law, for discipline, for transparency, for accountable governance. With the rise of the President who held sway over our legislators and even had as one of his first official issuances an executive order that operationalized accessing information held by government, many expected a most open government and the passage of the FOI Law to be a Year 1 Christmas gift even.

Fast-forward to today and as we near mid-term elections, there is no FOI Law in sight. And with the past years of practice using the FOI EO and eFOI portal, we have become all too familiar with its limitations. Several areas of concern have surfaced in fact, including excessive discretion on the approving person, privacy and confidentiality concerns, a wanting infrastructure, lack of training, ‘part-time’ institutional FOI officers, paranoia on supposed proprietary information, non-disclosure agreement first access later policies, among others. These all underscore that a clear Freedom of Information Law which clearly and completely outlines access and disclosure mechanisms is imperative for a functioning democracy. We don’t have that.

FOI-badge-300x277

The Right to Know. Right Now! Coaliton, to support its advocacy, continues to undertake coordinated FOI Practice. For Round 4 of the Coalition’s FOI Practice, we sought to highlight the following objectives: (1) to interface transparency principles with FOI practice; (2) to audit and review data standards and quality; and (3) to enhance and expand the public discourse on public policy issues, transparency, and governance. In this round, we focused on the following:

• The implementation of the social mitigating measures in Package 1 of the Comprehensive Tax Reform Program (Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion or TRAIN Law);
• The Memoranda of Agreement covering mining operations and companies in the Philippines;
• Relevant documents for the “Build, Build, Build” program or the massive infrastructure and civil works program of the Government; and,
• The crisis in the supply and distribution of rice.

In total, the Coalition filed requests with 20 agencies, asked for 141 documents, made 230 contacts, and waited for up to 159 working days. All this effort resulted in a measly 17 (12%) documents retrieved or with positive response, with around 88% with a negative response, consisting of 9% outright denied and 79% of documents still pending (way beyond the prescribed period in the EO, and hence should be considered as denied).

The picture is more complicated than the numbers. We recognize that some agencies perform better than others, and that efforts to mainstream the FOI Program do need time to percolate and bear fruit. But we hope for more.

Ngayong papalapit na ang midterm elections, bagamat may iilang kwento ng tagumpay at mga bagong kampeon ng bukas na pamamahala tulad ng iilang mga opisyales na sa abot ng kanilang makakaya ay subok na binibigyang buhay ang FOI tulad ng mga nasa Presidential Communications Operations Office, Department of Budget and Management at iba pang ahensya, hindi pa rin ganap na masasabing may right to information na tayo.

Barring barbed wire and inaction by political leaders then, students take a stand for FOI at a protest march in Malacanang in November 2012. PCIJ file photo

Barring barbed wire and inaction by political leaders then, students take a stand for FOI at a protest march in Malacanang in November 2012. PCIJ file photo

We challenge leaders in the Executive and movers in the Legislative branches: make the decisive move and pass the FOI Law. This is the critical proactive move needed to deliver the promise of Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.

Now of all times there is a need for an FOI – not just law but a true appreciation and recognition of it and an authentic desire to truly be open, accessible, accountable, and transparent to the public. If there is ever a time where it is even more crucial to be armed with the tools to be able to distinguish policy statements from mere expressions of opinion and misused hyperboles, it would be now.

To borrow the words of a famous bee, “Bida ang saya” kung tunay na malaya ang sambayanan – malayang makaalam, makialam, makilahok.

“Ang sarap maging at home” sa sariling bayan kung walang pangambang ipagkait ang mga karapatan, at hindi na kailangang ipaglaban pa ang matagal nang ipinagkait sa mga taumbayan.

THE RIGHT TO KNOW, RIGHT KNOW! COALITION
11 December 2018

P2.4-B pre-campaign ads: Bong Go, Marcos, Roxas, Roque top spenders

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TO THE last, they have pledged to fight poverty and corruption, promote health and education, protect the environment, and serve the poor who make up a majority of over 60 million registered voters.

Yet while politics may divide them, money, apparent access to state funds and facilities, and donations from private pockets and public coffers that could have funded their pol ads, seem to unite those with the biggest pre-campaign adspend among the senatorial candidates in the upcoming May elections.

Competing for only 12 Senate seats are 61 candidates, making for a rather crowded pool. Not surprisingly, based on data from Nielsen Media, the major candidates for senator from the administration and opposition parties and some independents appear to have already turned the May 2019 polls into a virtual marketplace for votes, starting with a circus of pre-campaign ads on air, on ground, and online.

From January 2018 to January 2019, the combined ad spending of 18 candidates on TV, radio, print, and outdoor ads have reached PhP2.4 billion, by the rate card of media agencies monitored by Nielsen Media. Yet, just a few have net worth values bigger than their respective adspend.

In fact, those with the lowest net worth, the biggest liabilities, and the smallest cash on hand are, as of their latest Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN), among the biggest spenders on pre-campaign ads.

The possible sources of those millions of pesos poured into pre-campaign ads include hidden or unexplained wealth, public funds, and even indirect bribery from private donors.

‘Policacy’ ads

“The fact that the net worth of these candidates could not support the costs of the(ir) adspend necessarily gives rise to the presumption that either the candidate has hidden wealth or that these were donated to the candidate while in public office,” remarks lawyer Christian Robert S. Lim, a former Election Commissioner who headed the Campaign Finance Office (CFO) of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) until 2018.

Under the Revised Penal Code, Lim says, it is a criminal offense to receive gifts by reason of their office. “This is called indirect bribery,” he says.

By Nielsen Media’s monitoring of television, radio, print, and outdoor “social concern” ads from January 2018 to January 2019, easily the most moneyed candidates include 12 of the 14 candidates endorsed by President Rodrigo R. Duterte, those recently resigned from executive positions, and those running for re-election or returning to the Senate. They were featured as the “advertiser,” “brand”, and “product” in these ads that ran starting June 2018, or while they were still government officials. In advertising circles, these ads also go by the moniker “policacy” or political advocacy ads.

PCIJ has subscribed to Nielsen Media’s monitoring reports on the political adspend of the candidates for elective posts since 2010. PCIJ data show that the re-electionist candidates for senator today are in truth repeat offenders — they had also splurged millions on pre-campaign ads in elections past.

In 2010, the combined pre-campaign adspend of six candidates for president and four for vice president from Nov.1, 2009 to Feb. 8, 2010 amounted to PhP1.472 billion.

In 2013, the leading candidates for senator incurred pre-campaign ads worth PhP892 million, from Jan. 1 to February 11, 2013.

From Jan. 1, 2015 to Jan. 21, 2016, about 105,000 pre-campaign ads valued at PhP6.7 billion featured the candidates for president and vice president in the May 2016 elections.

Bong Go net worth: PhP12.8-M

In the runup to the May 2019 polls, the 12 candidates under the Hugpong ng Pagbabago-Partido Demokratikong Pilipino (HNP-PDP-LABAN) banner and endorsed by Duterte, incurred a combined adspend of PhP1.32 billion in the last 13 months ending January 2019.

A third of this total or PhP422,498,647 consists of ads purchased by and for Christopher Lawrence ‘Bong’ Go, the biggest spender thus far among all 61 candidates for senator.

The mystery is stark: Go – formerly Special Assistant to the President — is the poorest of the top adspenders with a declared net worth of only PhP12.85 million, and cash on hand/in bank of only PhP3.9 million, as of his December 2017 SALN. His PhP422-million total ad buys amount to 3,287 percent of his net worth.

Put another way, he bought political ads 32.9 times in value compared to his total personal wealth. Minus all that he owns, PhP409.6 million was the unfunded balance of his ad buys that Go might have paid using money from either public or private sources.

In January 2019, Nielsen Media’s monitoring of TV ads only listed Go as the product, brand, and advertiser in at least 1,016 ad spots equivalent to 29,940 seconds of airtime exposure at a cost of PhP247.9 million.

Nearly one in every three ads (total of 3,261 ad spots) that aired on TV channels last month featured Go. For January 2019 then, Go spent an average of PhP7.99 million every day on TV ads, or two-thirds of his latest declared net worth.

Marcos, Roque, too

Another Hugpong candidate, Ma. Imelda ‘Imee’ Marcos, the second biggest adspender, repeats Go’s strange story. Marcos, currently the third-term governor of Ilocos Norte, has acquired PhP413,160,423 worth of ads from January 2018 to January 2019, but has declared a net worth of only PhP24.49 million and cash on hand of only PhP2.45 million in her December 2017 SALN. Her adspend comes up to 1,687 percent of her net worth; her adspend deficit, minus all her declared wealth, amounts to PhP388,666,931.

The fourth placer among the big ad buyers is Harry Roque, a Hugpong-endorsed candidate who quit the Senate race last February 1, reportedly for health reasons.

As of last January 31, however, Roque’s adspend had reached PhP174,013,944, or PhP75.1 million more than his declared net worth of PhP98.87 million, as of December 2017. The former Presidential Spokesman’s adspend amounts to 176 percent of his net worth, and even his PhP54.6 million cash on hand and in bank that he reported in his latest SALN.

The other Hugpong candidates who have also incurred pre-campaign ads are re-electionist senators Cynthia Villar, Joseph Victor ‘JV’ Estrada Ejercito, Juan Edgardo ‘Sonny’ Angara, and Aquilino ‘Koko’ Pimentel III; former senators Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Ramon ‘Bong’ Revilla Jr., and Pia Cayetano (currently 2nd District Representative of Taguig City-Pateros); Maguindanao 2nd District Rep. Zajid Mangudadatu, former Duterte adviser Francis Tolentino, and former TV journalist Jiggy Manicad.

Yet while all of them are among the top 20 pre-campaign adspenders, these candidates’ combined adspend in the last 13 months comes to only a third of the administration slate’s total of more than PhP1.5 billion, or over PhP518 million. The bigger two-thirds balance represents the pre-campaign adspend of Go, Marcos, and Roque.

Two other pro-Duterte candidates had not incurred ad buys as of January 2019: former police chief Ronald ‘Bato’ de la Rosa and medical practitioner Willie Ong.

Otso Diretso: PhP132-M bill

The opposition Otso-Diretso! team of the Liberal Party also had no ads at all in 2018. In January 2019, however, it bought 107 TV ad spots that ran for a total of 2,910 seconds on ABS-CBN and GMA-7 Network. Its adspend bill: PhP132,256,000.

Three of its candidates are also among the top 20 pre-campaign adspenders, including two of LP’s frontrunners, former Interior and Local Government Secretary Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas II and re-electionist Senator Paolo Benigno ‘Bam’ Aquino IV. Roxas ranks third with an adspend of PhP401,264,380, while Aquino is sixth with an adspend of PhP136,490,982, according to Nielsen Media’s monitoring reports from January 2018 to January 2019.

Roxas’s adspend actually shot up sharply in January 2019, during which he bought 570 TV ad spots lasting 16,125 seconds in total. He paid a total of PhP349.5 million for his mostly 30-second ad spots for that month alone. Aquino’s adspending last month also increased significantly from his total in the entire 2018, reaching nearly PhP89 million just for TV-ad placements.

By their latest available SALN, Roxas and Aquino are also in deficit spending, in terms of their pre-campaign ad buys.

In his 2014 SALN, the latest available, Roxas declared a net worth of PhP202,080,452.71. His adspend of PhP401,264,380 by January 2019 put him in deficit spending by PhP199,183,928. Roxas thus splurged on ads 198 percent more money than all that he declared he owns.

Aquino, for his part, declared his net worth as of December 2017 at PhP39,192,743.62, but spent thrice more or PhP136,490,982 on pre-campaign ads until last month. His adspend is 328 percent of his wealth, for a deficit spending of PhP97,298,239.

Roxas, Aquino and two more of Otso Diretso!’s eight candidates incurred a combined adspend of PhP752,301,442 in 13 months ending January 2019. Contributing to this total were Magdalo Party-list Rep. Gary Alejano (10th among the top adspenders) and election lawyer Romy Macalintal who incurred ad buys of P76,403,080 and P5,887,000, respectively during the same period.

Independents spent, too

Five other candidates running under other political parties or as independents had a combined adspend of PhP216,941,524 from January 2018 to January 2019.

They are re-electionist Senator Grace Poe, with an adspend of PhP99,385,184; “Friends of JPE” or apparently returning senator Juan Ponce Enrile of Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino, PhP72,552,000; re-electionist Senator Nancy Binay of the United Nationalist Alliance, PhP37,131,740; Rafael ‘Raffy’ Alunan of the Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines, PhP5,573,880; and Neri Colmenares of the Makabayang Koalisyon ng Mamamayan, PhP2,298,720.

Alejano, Tolentino, and re-electionists Poe, Ejercito, and Pimentel have all spent more monies on pre-campaign ads than the net worth they declared in their latest SALNs.

Still, it is the case of Bong Go, the candidate with the lowest net worth among the top 20 adspenders, that remains the most intriguing. After all, the poorest managed to buy the most ad spots.

Malasakit Center ads

As early as June 2018, or four months before he filed his certificate of candidacy, paid ads featuring taped voice and video clips of Go had begun airing on TV and radio stations in Manila, Davao City, Cagayan de Oro, and Zamboanga.

At the time, Go was still Duterte’s special assistant. Yet in December 2018, after he was supposed to have resigned when he filed his candidacy for senator, at least 30 ads about the Malasakit Center program of the Department of Health (DOH) and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) featured Go as its supposed chief sponsor. The ads aired during the Christmas holidays on television.

Except for promoting Go’s run for the Senate, nothing much is new about the Malasakit Centers. These are actually a refurbished one-stop-shop for indigents seeking medical assistance under the same, usual program that the DOH, DSWD, Philippine Health Insurance Corp., Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Philippine Amusement Gaming Corp. have been supporting for years now, even before Duterte became president. At present, 21 Malasakit Centers have opened across the nation; in all but one, the pilot site in the Visayas, Go had attended events as guest speaker.

The President himself has lent Go’s candidacy a special push, more than any of the other administration candidates. Duterte’s photo appears as ‘Tatay Digong’ side by side with Go as ‘Kuya Bong’ in tarpaulins on the façade of the Malasakit Centers, government agencies, and barangay halls, as well as on posters and billboards all over the country’s towns and cities. Duterte has also appeared in pre-campaign ads featuring Go as someone whose supposed only vice – bisyo — is “serbisyo” or service.

Must post tarps?

Too, some civil servants have exposed on social-media posts that certain government agencies have been required to post tarpaulins bearing the image of Go.

“Unfortunately,” says former Election Commissioner Lim, “due to a Supreme Court ruling and as restated by the Civil Service Commission in its Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 1992,” the President, the Vice President, Cabinet members, all other elective officials, and their personal and confidential staff “are deemed to be holding political offices and are not covered by the prohibition on electioneering or partisan political activity.”

Nonetheless, Lim says, “While it may be legal, the same remains to be morally reprehensible as our expectations of government officials who are using official time of the government are best spent on resolving the multitude of problems besetting our country rather than campaigning.”

He adds that such patently partisan actions by the President and senior executive and elective officials set “a bad precedent to create a distinction that the highest officials are exempt from this prohibition while the rest of them have to abide.”

And yet, despite all of Duterte’s special assist for his ex-special assistant, Go seems to still have found it necessary to go on what can be described as an aggressive ad campaign for his senatorial bid.

Started in 2018

In 2018, on various television channels, Go was featured in 519 ad spots, compared with 185 for Roque, 166 for Marcos, and 62 for Tolentino. TV networks require a “pay before broadcast” rule on political ads to compel candidates to pay up before their ads could air.

Also in 2018, out of 21,268 ad spots aired in various radio stations under the “social concerns” subcategory, nearly half or 9,278 ad spots featured “Bong Go” as brand, product, and advertiser.

Roque was featured in 3,324 radio ads, Marcos in 2,401 radio ads, and Tolentino in 651 radio ads. LP’s Roxas was featured in 2,299 radio ad spots.

Monitoring reports by Nielsen Media showed that these “social concerns” and “policacy” or political advocacy ads started airing in January 2018, but hit steadily rising charts in June 2018, led by a flurry of ads placed by Go, Roque, and Marcos.

For the whole of 2018, Nielsen Media monitored the adspend of the candidates under the “social concerns” subcategory of ads on TV, radio, print, and outdoor platforms.

In January 2019, Nielsen Media’s monitoring report focused on TV only.

The top adspenders among the candidates for senator, by order of value of TV ads only for the 13-month period ending January 2019, are:

• Bong Go, PhP422,498,647;
• Imee Marcos, PhP413,160,423;
• Mar Roxas, PhP401,264,380;
• Harry Roque, PhP174,013,944;
• Sonny Angara, PhP156,739,657;
• Bam Aquino, PhP136,490,982;
• Grace Poe, PhP99,385,184;
• Francis Tolentino, PhP92,479,821;
• Cynthia Villar, PhP80,838,942;
• Gary Alejano, PhP76,403,080;
• Friends of JPE (Juan Ponce Enrile), PhP72,552,000;
• Bong Revilla, PhP51,213,850;
• Pia Cayetano, PhP46,027,000;
• Nancy Binay, PhP37,131,740;
• JV Estrada, PhP26,387,900;
• Koko Pimentel, PhP22,798,000;
• Jinggoy Estrada, PhP21,945,000;
• Zajid Mangudadatu, PhP21,357,000;
• Bong Revilla Family, PhP13,257,000; and
• Jiggy Manicad, PhP11,919,03.

— With research by Vino Lucero and infographics by Arnel Rival, PCIJ, February 2019

PCIJ Audit: Candidates on Social Media

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A “PROMOTIONAL TOUCHPOINT.” That, in advertising and PR parlance, is what social media apparently looks like to candidates for senator in the May 2019 elections, and they have been using it as such even ahead of the official 90-day campaign period, which started last Tuesday.

Because the use — and even abuse — of social media is practically free and unbridled, PCIJ launched this audit of how and what the candidates are posting, how often and where, and how much organic or boosted engagement they are drawing. Are their posts backed by heavily paid media push? Who have invested in small or big ways in social-media management? Who command small or big social-media machinery, or enjoy affinity with Filipinos online?

This audit covers 20 candidates for senator listed in Pulse Asia’s latest nationwide survey on the May 2019 Senatorial Elections that was conducted from December 14 to 21, 2018 using face-to-face interviews. These candidates are also among those most actively engaged in social media.

This audit offers information reflected from scans and observations based on the curated social-media posts of the candidates throughout the month of January.

It presents at best some discernible trends but does not assume or conclude that certain candidates have “paid” supporters/trolls, have resorted to boosting their posts, or are using advertising monies, unless stated otherwise with supporting data and documents.

The key figures presented, notably fan/follower base and number of posts and engagement, are the data gathered when this report was written on Feb. 8, 2019. There could be discrepancies in the key figures after this date because the fan/follower base and additional new posts of the candidates may have already either increased or decreased during the intervening days.

This report has two sections. The first is a Social Media Landscape Overview. It looks at which candidates are on which social media platform, and what they are doing there. This focuses on a rundown of the social-media assets where the 20 candidates for senator are active, with topline observation on their overall use of social media.

The second is a Content Scan of the Facebook pages of 13 candidates with more frequent activities on Facebook. It looks at who are saying what on Facebook, and how they are saying it. This section offers information on the total posts, total engagement, average engagement per post, and numbers of likes, comments, and shares reflected on the candidates’ Facebook pages.

Candidates on SM

Their social media and communication strategies vary but all the 20 candidates covered in this audit are consistent about one thing: they have all turned to Facebook as their go-to social media platform of choice, apparently to reach the greatest number of Filipinos online.

The data gathered for this audit offer more insights:

• Majority of the candidates who use Twitter include those currently in office, running for re-election, or recently resigned from executive positions. They are regularly tweeting about their work at the Senate, posting photos of their events and links to press releases, or retweeting news articles associated with their efforts. These candidates have been posting more “editorial-type” content that depart from the more personal and lifestyle-slanted use of Facebook by its native followers.

• Certain social-media pages have apparently been created solely for the purpose of the upcoming midterm elections. These include the recently created “Anak ng Masa” page of Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada and the “Agimat ng Masa” page of Ramon ‘Bong’ Revilla Jr. Both candidates have had existing social-media accounts prior to January 2019. Juan Ponce Enrile, meanwhile, has been active on Facebook way before, but Twitter and Instagram accounts have been set up for him recently, as additional channels.

• Instagram and YouTube appear to be less popular channels for the candidates’ promotional efforts on social media. Some candidates are more active than others in terms of updating their accounts on Instagram and YouTube. These are not as heavily and as regularly used as the candidates’ Facebook and Twitter accounts.

• The websites or microsites of many candidates appear to be static and are not being updated regularly. The only exceptions are the websites of Ma. Imelda ‘Imee’ Marcos and Paolo Benigno ‘Bam’ Aquino IV that feature regular content uploads of press releases and other engagement materials. The other websites contain key information about the candidate only, i.e., Jose Manuel ‘Chel’ Diokno, Lorenzo ‘Erin’ Tanada III, and Pia Cayetano. The website of Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas II features materials from the 2016 elections yet and is not loading properly. Bong Revilla’s website is password-protected while Grace Poe’s is still under construction (as of Feb. 12, 2019).

• A majority of the candidates have provided public contact details that allow interested audiences to use to get in touch with them or their team/staff.

Facebook content scan

• In January 2019, the frequency of posting on Facebook among the 13 candidates scanned varied from as few as 14 to as many as over 150 posts, with corresponding Post Engagement (Likes, Comments, Shares) ranging from a little over 3,000 to an unusually high 6.7 million in total.

• Quantity does not automatically translate to quality, however. Some candidates have achieved a much higher engagement on fewer posts than others who have published more posts but have drawn relatively less interaction from the audience.

For example:

○ Bong Go published over 160 Facebook posts in January 2019, gaining over 6.7 million Likes, Comments, and Shares in total engagement. This number excludes as yet his page’s video views. Dividing 6.7-million engagement by his 160-plus Facebook posts, Go has achieved an average of 40,800 engagements per post.

○ Imee Marcos comes in second in terms of posting frequency on Facebook. In January 2019, she published a total of 108 posts. Her average engagement per post of 6,300, however, is significantly lower than Roxas’s average engagement: his 42 posts last month drew an average of 8,900 engagements per post. Juan Ponce Enrile, meanwhile, published 30 posts that each yielded 7,900 engagements on average.

These contrasting results could be explained in part by certain reasons such as, but not limited to, the following:

• Some candidates have offered content and messaging that possibly encouraged higher affinity and relatability values with the audience; and

• The use of “influencers” and “paid media” support to boost the “reach” and “air time” of the candidates’ Facebook posts and/or pages via the audience’s newsfeed.

Video, content drivers

Video content appears to gain the most traction compared to other content formats used by the candidates. This is most apparent in the case of some administration candidates (Bong Go and Francis Tolentino). The main engagement drivers on their Facebook pages are content or posts that include or feature President Rodrigo R. Duterte. These particular posts have drawn more engagement on the Facebook pages of Go and Tolentino, in the form of Comments that are a mix of positive and negative sentiments.

While certain social-media pages are perceived to have been created solely for the purpose of the upcoming midterm elections (i.e., Estrada’s “Anak ng Masa”, Revilla’s “Agimat ng Masa”, and Enrile’s additional Twitter and Instagram channels), the other candidates (Bam Aquino, Nancy Binay, Marcos, Poe, and Cynthia Villar) have just shifted or added ‘topics’ to the existing content on their social-media pages. These additional content have given these candidates a subtle push for their campaign for the Senate.

Puzzling numbers

Data on the total engagement and average engagement per post of the 13 candidates, referenced against the number of their fans or followers, are rather puzzling. The data point to possible boosting of the posts of some candidates via clearly aggressive social-media management and marketing strategies.

Those obtained from the Facebook pages of Bong Go and Imee Marcos show them to be outliers, in terms of unusually high numbers of total engagement, compared with the rest of the 13 candidates included in this Facebook content scan.

For instance, by the number of organic followers or fan base reflected on their Facebook pages, as of last Feb. 8, here’s how the candidates rank:

1. Grace Poe, 3,402,339 followers;
2. Cynthia Villar, 1,558,153;
3. Mar Roxas, 1,411,917;
4. Imee Marcos, 1,172,499;
5. Francis Tolentino, 1,012,456;
6. Bam Aquino, 751,722;
7. Pia Cayetano, 473,823;
8. Bong Go, 388,852;
9. Juan Ponce Enrile, 362,748;
10. Ronald ‘Bato’ dela Rosa, 301,075;
11. Nancy Binay, 59,043;
12. Jinggoy Estrada, 13,099; and
13. Bong Revilla, 1,808.

By the number of posts that they published on their Facebook pages from January 1 to 31, 2019, here’s how they rank:

1. Bong Go, 166 posts;
2. Imee Marcos, 108;
3. Francis Tolentino, 83;
4. Bam Aquino, 70;
5. Cynthia Villar, 52;
6. Bong Revilla, 44;
7. Mar Roxas, 42;
8. Nancy Binay, 41;
9. Jinggoy Estrada, 41;
10. Pia Cayetano, 35;
11. Juan Ponce Enrile, 30;
12. Grace Poe, 29; and
13. Bato dela Rosa, 14.

No guarantees
Big fan bases did not automatically deliver big reach and engagement for all the candidates. By the total engagement numbers (sum of Likes, Comments, Shares) they got for the posts they published on their Facebook pages from January 1 to 31, 2019, they ended up in this unusual kind of ranking:

1. Bong Go, 6,773,248 total engagement;
2. Imee Marcos, 681,167;
3. Mar Roxas, 374,288;
4. Juan Ponce Enrile, 237,603;
5. Francis Tolentino, 182,064;
6. Cynthia Villar, 147,362;
7. Bam Aquino, 102,023;
8. Grace Poe, 81,714;
9. Nancy Binay, 32,041;
10. Pia Cayetano, 30,212;
11. Jinggoy Estrada, 16,301;
12. Bong Revilla, 6,082; and
13. Bato dela Rosa, 3,476.

Dividing their total engagement numbers by their total posts for the month of January, here’s how the candidates rank by average engagement per post:

1. Bong Go, 40,803 average engagement per post;
2. Mar Roxas, 8,912;
3. Juan Ponce Enrile, 7,920;
4. Imee Marcos, 6,307;
5. Cynthia Villar, 2,634;
6. Grace Poe, 2,618;
7. Francis Tolentino, 2,194;
8. Bam Aquino, 1,457;
9. Pia Cayetano, 863;
10. Nancy Binay, 781;
11. Jinggoy Estrada, 398;
12. Bato dela Rosa, 248; And
13. Bong Revilla, 138.

Incredible few

What the data show are incredibly high total and average engagement numbers for just a few candidates. For instance, while the 13 candidates obtained combined total engagement of 8,667,581 in all, the 12 candidates (excluding Bong Go) accounted only for 21.8 percent or 1,894,333 combined total engagement in their Facebook pages in January.

In contrast, Bong Go’s total engagement number of 6,773,248 that same month accounted for 78.1 percent of the grand total engagement for the 13 candidates.

In other words, Bong Go’s total engagement number is thrice more than what the 12 other candidates achieved in January 2019.

If the composite total of 1,894,333 for the 12 candidates is further reduced by Imee Marcos’s total engagement of 681,167 (7.8 percent of grand total engagement of the 13 candidates), the new composite total for the remaining 11 candidates would be 1,213,466 only, or just 14 percent of the grand total of 8,667,581 engagement.

Boosting posts

Facebook allows page admin managers to boost posts to reach targeted audiences to grow their organic fan base and reach new audiences, based on specified age, location, sex, or interests. Boosting may be done across duration periods of one day, seven days, or 14 days, by Facebook’s default buttons.

Hootsuite, a social-media management system that gives users an integrated user interface from which to manage their social interactions, gives a glimpse of how this is done in the United States.

In its guide to using Facebook’s push button, Hootsuite explains that boosting a post for people living in the United States 18 years old and above may cost from as low as US$1 to US$2 to reach from 163 to 872 people; US$5 (432 to 2,070 people), and US$15 (1,506 to 6,834 people). The fees may vary, depending on the location of the targeted audience, but “technically, you can pay any amount you want.”

According to Hootsuite’s guide, “the minimum budget is $1 per day, so hypothetically, you could run a campaign for a week with just $7. Obviously, the more you pay, the more reach you’re going to get.” — With reporting by Malou Mangahas and infographics by Arnel Rival, PCIJ, February 2019

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QUICK READ:

Post: A material published on someone’s Facebook page, whether in the form of a static post, GIF/slideshow, video, long-form note, or text status.

Engagement: The response a post receives from the audience, including Likes/Reactions, Comments, and Shares or Retweets.

Total Engagement: The sum of all the Likes/Reactions, Comments, and Shares or Retweets a post receives.

Average Engagement per Post: The average number of engagement a particular set of posts receives. (Total Engagement divided by Total Posts = Average Engagement per Post)

Reach & Impressions:Metrics that can be seen only by FB Page Admins via FB Insights/Ads Manager). “Reach” pertains to the actual number of people who have seen a post, while “Impression” pertains to the number of times it was seen or served to the people reached, i.e. if a post is seen twice by each of the 10 people reached, then the total impressions of the said post would be 20.

“Boosting”: The use of paid advertising monies to push for higher reach/impressions, engagement, and/or views for a particular post or content. “Boosting” of a Facebook page can also be done to increase its number of fans/followers.
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HERE ARE THE 13 CANDIDATES ON FACEBOOK, RANKED BY TOTAL ENGAGEMENT, AS OF FEB. 10, 2019:

Voters, winners, regions, towns, cities: Data, stats on PH elections since 2004

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WHO have run for senator and won in the last five elections since 2004?

As of the May 2016 elections, how many of the registered voters actually voted, and in which provinces, towns, and cities of the country? How many are women, how many men? How big, how small, are our voters, by age group? How many come from the indigenous communities? How many are persons with disability?

In your town, city, province, or region, what is the picture, by data and stats, of the state of education, health, social services, labor and employment, the environment, public order, and poverty?

Let us help you get started.

Click on the Philippine map on PCIJ’s homepage to explore PCIJ’s database on “Voter Statistics and Elected Officials.”

A searchable database, it allows you to drill down data by region, province, and city/municipality in the last five national and local elections held in 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016.

On the main filter, click on any of the 18 regions of the country to get data on any of the provinces each covers.

Click on the filter for cities and towns that each province covers and you will get more granular data.

Pie charts will give you the composite data. But you have another option: mouse over the colors of the pie charts to launch more specific data.

This database was organized by PCIJ’s Data Team using the Philippine Statistical Geographic Codes or PSGC that define the administrative/geographical boundaries of the nation by specific periods in time.

If you want more data, let’s get moving. After all, this database is just a part of PCIJ’s Money Politics Online, a data journalism project of PCIJ.

Money Politics Online is a treasure trove of data and public documents on elections, public funds, and governance that PCIJ has gathered, sorted, analyzed, and digitized to serve as a research and analysis tool for citizens.

On the leaderboard of Money Politics Online, click on the Governance bar, and then the Socio Econ tab, to get more data on 12 major categories:

• Agriculture;
• Demographics;
• Education;
• Energy;
• Environment;
• Health;
• Labor and Employment;
• Poverty;
• Public Administration;
• Public Order, Safety, and Justice;
• Science and Technology; and
• Social Services.

Each category launches dozens of data fields as indicators.

The process is just as easy – you just have to click on each category, and the filter for indicators, and, where applicable, drill down on more filters for location (region or province), or calendar year.

PCIJ built the Socio Econ page of Money Politics Online using the government’s Philippine Statistical Yearbook (PSY) as basic foundation.

The data for the categories and indicators are robust and layered for most, with some information leading back to the ‘70s, but in some cases, are still thin and sparse.

Money Politics Online has moved PSY’s data steps further and farther, however.

In Money Politics Online, you may see, grab, and analyze all the available data on each of the 100-plus indicators across time, and in a matter of seconds.

Our Data Team has done more for you. Bar and line graphs, pie charts, and data tables on these indicators will give you a quick, easy, and enjoyable read!

We’d all do well to check out how the numbers fall, for good reason or bad, and why, on the state of our towns, cities, provinces, and regions, before the day of the vote.

Happy browsing, friends!


Gov’t, media can’t play fast, loose with due process and rule of law

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Statement of Journalists and Media Organizations on the Duterte Administration’s List of Alleged “Narco Politicians”  

WE, JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, express grave concern about the likely breach of professional ethics and adverse legal implications of the publication and broadcast of the Duterte Administration’s list of public officials allegedly involved in the illegal-drugs trade.

The list reportedly enrolls the names of 82 candidates in the May 2019 elections. The list was reportedly based on still to be verified intelligence reports and wiretapped information received from foreign governments.

President Duterte and his spokesperson Salvador Panelo have announced plans to release the list to the public next week, even before the National Bureau of Investigation could validate its contents, or even before the authorities could build cases and file the appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors. The chief of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency said he is against the release of the list, adding that his agency has yet to re-validate it. The Commission on Elections’ spokesperson said the government must “convict first” before those on the list could be disqualified as candidates.

On Aug. 7, 2016 at a wake in a military camp in Davao City, the President had read names from what he called a “validated” list of 163 barangay officials, mayors, vice mayors, judges, police officers, and soldiers allegedly linked to the illegal drugs trade. He said those on the list have 24 hours to report to their superiors, or they will be hunted down by the police and military. Many of those on the list had long been dead, or wrongly named. Many others had been killed after the partial release of the list. 

By December 2016, in a series of TV interviews, however, the President said his list of 163 had grown to 6,000 names. Two years hence, the President said his list enrolls the names of 82 politicians running in the May 2019 elections.

This matter is more than just about a list, and its disclosure, more than just a story that the Duterte Administration seems to want the news media to publish and broadcast with no thought to the journalistic values of fairness, accuracy, and independence.

Instead of rushing to print or air, we now urge all our colleagues to exercise utter prudence and fastidious judgment in evaluating this “story.”

To be sure, the “story” offers just a list of names, but not the full, substantive details of why or how those on the list had been tagged or plugged as so-called “narco politicians.”

In the Duterte Administration’s view, naming and shaming those seeking public office allegedly involved in the illegal drugs trade may serve the public interest. 

But absent convincing proof of the Administration’s claims, or cases it has filed or plans to file in the courts, such naming and shaming redounds to mere trial by publicity of political rivals, and a publicity stunt for the public and the news media’s transient amusement.

Such naming and shaming calls attention to the possible invasion of privacy, as well as denial of due process and presumption of innocence, for those on the list. 

Once published or broadcast, the travesty will be magnified as a collective disregard for the rule of law, and a clear breach of the time-honored traditions of fair, accurate, and independent journalism, by the news media.

Rather than seek publicity for its unverified “narco list” story, the Duterte Administration should waste no time to build cases, file charges, prosecute, and send to jail the guilty, if indeed it had proof and evidence on hand.

The Constitution, in Article III, Section 14 (1-2), upholds the principle of presumption of innocence. Contrary to Mr. Panelo’s assertion, there are no exemptions to this principle.

In what seems to be his own apparent doubts about the list’s veracity, Mr. Panelo has said that those on the list could always sue for libel, if it could be proved that they had been falsely tagged or accused.

But that also means that the aggrieved parties would have to file suit against news-media agencies that would publish or broadcast the names on the unverified list. The likely respondents, though, will not include the President, because he enjoys immunity from suit while in office.

Verify, verify, verify. And do so independently. That is the first thing that the news media can and should do, before running a list that tags and links people to hateful crimes, on the mere say-so of the President and his political lieutenants,

Taking their word at face value, reporting their claims uncritically, rushing to print or broadcast just a list that tags people without proof, are not without serious consequences. All these could put the life and liberty of persons in serious peril; all these could put the ethics and credibility of the journalism profession in serious doubt.

It is from the courts — by due process, by evidence, by fair trial – that the people must know who are guilty, and who are innocent. It is not the Duterte Administration that, by press release alone, must name and shame possibly both the guilty and the innocent via an unverified “narco list.”

We, journalists and media organizations can, at the very least, refuse to play along when the government and those who are supposed to lead the nation play fast and loose with due process and the rule of law.

Signatories:

·       NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP)

·       PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (PCIJ)

·       PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI)

·       CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR)

·       MINDANEWS

·       CENTER FOR COMMUNITY JOURNALISM AND DEVELOPMENT (CCJD)

·       FREEDOM FOR MEDIA, FREEDOM FOR ALL NETWORK

Law firm not registered, some biz interests not disclosed, lender gets deal to import rice

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By Malou Mangahas and Floreen Simon

RICH MAN, poor man, Mayor, President.

Back in 15thcentury England, this was how a traditional nursery rhyme and fortune-telling game ran. Later in the United States, it became a popular counting song of children playing tag as they called out who would be “it.” In the Philippines today, it could well be the riddle that is the state of wealth of the President’s family.

Honesty, full and unvarnished, is something that one could wish of the Dutertes, or more than the data that they have disclosed in their asset records.

On several occasions, President Rodrigo R. Duterte has claimed that he was born to poverty. Yet at other times, he has boasted that he was raised in wealth. 

Is the President honestly poor or honestly rich? The disclosures in his asset records across 20 years are woefully inconsistent, or less than fully open.

Daughter Sara, Davao City mayor, and son Paolo, resigned Davao City vice mayor, are similarly  ambiguous in the declarations they have made under oath in their respective Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) across 11 years.

Token reveal

Checked against records of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the businesses they declared they own or have interests in, the President, Sara, and Paolo separately and together offer a muddled mix of token or opaque data that, under the law, they are required to reveal in “truthful and complete” SALN submissions. 

Such requirement is aimed in part at bringing to surface any possible conflicts of interest that public servants may have gotten themselves into. Faced with the apparent lack of pertinent data and details in the Dutertes’ SALNs, PCIJ reviewed not only SEC documents on their business interests but also provisions of relevant laws, as well as interviewed legal experts and other sources. 

Among its findings are:

  • The Carpio & Duterte Lawyers entity, which has Sara and husband Manases ‘Mans’ R. Carpio as partners, was born over 10 years ago but has not registered at all with the SEC, as of this posting. The Supreme Court and the Local Government Code prohibit mayors and governors from practicing their professions, but Sara has not formally, publicly declared her leave of absence from the firm. Since 2016, however, Manases has appeared as legal counsel to big companies with big cases before government regulatory agencies. Last month, the firm opened a branch office in Cebu, its second after that in Davao City.
  • Duterte, Sara, and Paolo have either belatedly disclosed their interests in certain companies, remain listed in some other as shareholders but did not disclose these in their SALNs, or are part of certain companies that are not at all registered with the SEC or the Department of Trade and Industry.
  • The President and Paolo have separately listed several “donated” real properties but do not identify their donors by name, to validate their donors’ potential or real conflicts of interest with their public functions. 
  • The Dutertes have reported “liabilities” in their SALNs as “various personal loans” (Sara) or “personal loans” or “miscellaneous payables” (Duterte, Paolo) that they owe Davao city-based businessmen who are apparently among their business partners and campaign donors. 
  • For 10 years running from 1999 to 2009, the President’s SALNs showed an unchanged liability he called “miscellaneous payables” of an absolute PhP1,000,000. By 2013, he gave a new name for his liability –“personal loan” — from “Sammy Uy.”

PCIJ requests

By email, fax, and courier, PCIJ sent two batches of request letters to the President, Sara, and Paolo for comment and, if possible, sit-down interviews. The first batch moved in October 2018 and the second, in January 2019. The letters raised specific questions about the wealth, business engagements, and properties of the Dutertes.

Last March 26, a letter from the Office of Presidential Legal Counsel Salvador Panelo reached the PCIJ’s offices, although it was dated a month earlier. Panelo wrote that he had referred PCIJ’s queries to the office of Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea. PCIJ checked with Medialdea and Deputy Executive Secretary Ryan Acosta; both said they would first have to consult with the President’s staff who helped prepare his SALNs. They asked for more time to respond to PCIJ. Medialdea’s office was actually furnished copies of the first letter that PCIJ sent in October 2018 to the President. 

Until Tuesday, April 2, Medialdea’s office had not sent a reply, even as Acosta told PCIJ that it would be ready possibly next week.

PCIJ’s October 2018 letters were received and acknowledged by the Office of the President and the City Mayor’s Office of Davao City; Mayor Sara’s Office also acknowledged receipt of the January letter. PCIJ was less successful with that addressed to Paolo; it did not get any response at all.

The January 2019 letter to Paolo, who resigned as vice mayor in December 2017, was coursed through the office of his wife, Davao City Councilor January Duterte, and sent by courier to his residence. Attempts were also made to contact him through his business links.

Creditor, biz pal

Among the matters that Paolo may have helped clarify had he replied is that involving one of his personal creditors who had secured not just an appointment in 2016 as chairman of the Philippine Judo Federation, but also a certificate to import rice from the Bureau of Plant Industry in March 2017.

In his 2013 SALN, Paolo said that he got a PhP3-million loan from Nestor Ma, owner of the “San-Ei Group of Companies” that reportedly owns the San-Ei Building in Ma-a, Davao City, which had served as the national headquarters of the “Duterte for President Movement” in 2016.  

Four years hence in his 2017 SALN, Paolo said that he still had a “personal loan” from Ma amounting to PhP2.2 million.

Soon after Ma was appointed Philippine Judo Federation (PJF) chairman in 2016, the businessman offered a part of his 1,000-square-meter building along Ma-a Diversion Road as the new training center for judo and office of the Philippine Sports Commission-Philippine Sports Institute (PSC-PSI). A SunStarreport quoted Ma as saying that the center will accommodate all judokas not just in the city, but also from the entire region, starting 2017.

Meanwhile, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) in 2017 granted Ma’s Davao San-Ei Trading Inc. a certificate of registration as an importer of rice covering a three-year period, or from March 15, 2017 to March 15, 2020. In his LinkedIn profile, Ma said that he is president of Davao San-Ei Trading Inc., which does not seem to have prior involvement in rice importation. On its Facebook page, the firm said that it is engaged in “transportation, trucking, and railroad” services, and is a “direct importer, Japan & U.S.A surplus, light and heavy equipments (sic), light & heavy vehicle.”

The databases of both the SEC and DTI do not show any registration or other corporate documents for Davao San-Ei Trading Inc. Two other companies where Ma is listed as president and stockholder have records as of 2018 and 2019 with the SEC: Mindanao Allied Industrial Mining Sales (MAIMS) and Davao Rental Co. Inc.(Davrenco).

The President, for his part, could have confirmed or denied whether the Sammy Uy he identified as his creditor is the same Davao businessman Sammy Uy who donated PhP30 million to his presidential campaign in May 2016.

Businessman Uy runs a cockpit that counts some local officials and some police and military officers as patrons. SEC records also show that he and Duterte are incorporators and shareholders, since 1996, of Honda Cars General Santos Inc. Duterte, however, was four years late in reporting that he was an incorporator of the company; the information appears in his 2000 to 2016 SALNs, which say nothing about his being among its shareholders.

Not registered

As for Mayor Sara, among her apparent holdings is a law firm she had set up with her husband months after they were married. 

While it has not registered with the SEC, the “Carpio & Duterte Lawyers” entity was organized in 2008, according to Manases’s public profile on LinkedIn. In her 2008 SALN, Sara had also put Manases as a “Law Office Partner” in the “Carpio-Duterte Law Office.” In her 2011 SALN, the reference to the firm was changed to “Carpio Duterte Lawyers.”The law firm, however, has yet to appear in Sara’s SALN declarations as among her business interests and financial connections.

What sources in legal circles now call “The Firm” of note and influence under the Duterte Administration lists Sara as a “partner” together with husband Manases Carpio in press releases and advertisements. 

Carpio & Duterte Lawyers is a hugely opaque matter in the Dutertes’ wealth records particularly because it has recently shown an appetite for big corporations with big controversial cases before government regulatory agencies.

PCIJ has secured a dozen written certifications from the SEC that the Carpio & Duterte Lawyers and 11 other possible derivative names (i.e. Carpio Duterte Lawyers, Carpio Duerte Law Office, etc.) are not registered entities at all as of this posting.

Political clients

On Feb. 13, 2019, the Cebu Daily News  reported that Sara has been on leave from the firm — but with no details about when that happened. She herself has not made an explicit statement to this effect since the firm was organized more than a decade ago. At the time it was set up, Sara was vice mayor of Davao City (2007-2010).  She was mayor of the city from 2010 to 2013 and was re-elected in 2016. She is currently vying for another term as mayor. From 2013 to 2016, however, Sara did not have a public post.

Sara’s husband Manases has acknowledged that some of the firm’s clients “appear to have interest in politics… but the firm is not going to handle political cases.”

“If feeling ninyo lalapit kayo sa akin just to get close to (Mayor) Sara, pasensiyahan tayo,” the Cebu Daily Newsquoted him as saying. “I’m not a political person.”

According to the newspaper, Manases explained that mixing politics and legal cases would be difficult as his wife is a politician while he, the report said, is “more inclined to the legal profession because both his parents are lawyers.”

Manases told Cebu Daily Newsthat his firm specializes in “family law like annulment, nullity of marriage, adoption and custody cases, as well as labor and corporate cases.”

Mighty, PECO

The firm through Manases is the lawyer on record of clients with big, controversial cases before state regulatory agencies. Two are most notable: cigarette manufacturer Mighty Corporation that in August 2017 paid PhP30 billion to settle a PhP37.88-billion tax evasion case, and Panay Electric Co. that in September 2018 filed a petition to lobby for renewal of its franchise before the House of Representatives. Manases’s father, Lucas Carpio Jr., is also into lawyering for corporations with big cases before government agencies. 

Sara married Manases on October 27, 2007, months after she was elected vice mayor on her first electoral run. She finished law at the San Sebastian College-Recoletos in May 2005, was admitted to the bar in May 2006, and for a few months worked as a court attorney at the office of then Supreme Court Associate Justice Romeo Callejo Sr.

Manases finished law, also at San Sebastian College, in 2002, and was admitted to the bar in 2004. His mother, Agnes Reyes Carpio, was associate justice at the Court of Appeals until December 2016 and was a former regional trial court judge in Davao City, Manila, Paranaque, and Pasig. Manases’s father Lucas Jr. is the brother of former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales and cousin of Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio. 

Lucas Carpio Jr. co-founded the Carpio & Bello Law Offices with Labor Secretary Silvestre Bello III. The firm’s stationery reportedly states that Bello had retired as partner.

According to Philippine Star  columnist Jarius Bondoc, Lucas’s name had appeared in “an official correspondence of Busan Universal Rail Inc. (BURI)” dated Apr. 27, 2017 to the Department of Transportation (DOTr) regarding the operations shutdowns since January 2016 of the Metro Railway Transit (MRT)-3.

BURI had won a PhP3.8-billion non-bid contract from the Aquino Administration for the maintenance of the MRT-3 trains, tracks, and power supply, but has been blamed for frequent breakdowns of train system. DOTr had issued three memoranda and had asked BURI to explain the maintenance issues, or the contract would be rescinded. BURI’s reply letter was signed by in-house lawyers Charles Mercado and Redentor Roque, as well as Lucas Carpio Jr.

No problem at all

But lawyering for big corporations with big cases before government regulatory agencies does not seem to bother President Duterte, even if it involves his daughter-mayor, son-in-law, and in-laws. 

After it was exposed that Mans Carpio was confirmed to have visited then Customs Commissioner Nicanor Faeldon to discuss Mighty Corporation’s case, the President, in a loose-lipped moment in August 2017 said: “Ang anak ko was lawyering for the Mighty King. Siyempre piliin mo ‘yung kliyenteng may pera. Kaya sabi ko, kung hanggang diyan, okay lang, sabi ko (My daughter was lawyering for the Mighty King. Of course you will choose the client with money. So I said, if it’s just up to a certain point, it’s okay, I said.)”

“It’s lawyering,” the President said. “Nobody can question us and even I, when as a matter of fact it is just part of our profession, our vocation as a lawyer. Alam naman natin‘yang mga abogado(We lawyers know that).”

The President had also told reporters in 2017 that “the law firm of Sara and her husband, abogadoManases ‘Mans’ R. Carpio, had been the legal consultant of Mighty long before it was accused of using fake stamp taxes to avoid tax payments.”

Si Mans Carpio, ang tatay niya kapatid niya si  Ombudsman Morales (Conchita) Carpio-Morales,” he said as well. “Ito, abogado ito.Long before ‘yung Mighty ano— Mighty King, angoffice nila ang nag-handle niyan.

Mans’ FB post

In his social-media account, Manases himself has admitted to having “many clients” dealing with the Bureau of Customs.  On his Facebook account in 2017, he wrote: “I represent many clients who have transactions with the Bureau of Customs.” That Facebook post had Manases confirming that he went to the agency because “I represent many clients who have transactions with the Bureau of Customs. It is my job as a lawyer to appear before government agencies for and on behalf of my principals.”

If, according to the President, Manases and Sara had represented or served as counsel for Mighty Corporation years earlier, that same period also marked the years Sara was vice mayor of Davao City (2007 to 2010), mayor from 2010 to 2013, and mayor again from 2016 to the present.

A sitting mayor cannot perform duties as a lawyer, or engage in the practice of his or her profession, according to the Supreme Court and the Local Government Code or Republic Act No. 7160.

Provisions of the Code of Conduct and Professional Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 on “conflict of interest” are just as relevant. The Code states that “conflict of interest arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a substantial stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a business, and the interest of such corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein may be opposed to or affected by the faithful performance of official duty.”

Ambit of conflict

RA No. 6713 also says that such conflict of interest situations may involve the conduct of public officials vis-à-vis their “relatives” that include “any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, including bilas, inso and balae.”

Section 9 on “Divestment” of RA No. 6713 is equally important advisory in the case of the Carpio & Duterte Lawyers.

It reads: “A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from such assumption. The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a partnership. The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who serve the Government in an honorary capacity nor to laborers and casual or temporary workers.”

On Feb. 19, 2008, the Supreme Court’s First Division, resolved Administrative Case No. 5738 (Wilfredo M. Catu, complainant, vs. Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa, respondent) and affirmed the ban on mayors and governors practicing law.

The high court’s resolution cited Section 90 of the Local Government Code, which “prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.”

Ban on mayors, govs

For elective local government officials, the court affirmed, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] stipulates that “all governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.”

A lawyer with expertise in legal ethics told PCIJ that the Code’s provision is “a total proscription for local elected officials like a sitting mayor, Sara Duterte-Carpio. The reason behind this rule, from case law, is that a sitting mayor should fully devote her time and attention to the performance of her official duties.”

PCIJ asked the expert whether Sara might have violated any law or rule when she allowed her name to be listed as a partner of Manases, until the recent opening of its branch office in Cebu. Has the Davao City mayor sent a message, intended or unintended, that she is still a part of the firm because she has not expressly recused herself from it?

The legal expert replied: “Since the total proscription/prohibition to practice the legal profession adheres to Mayor Sara, then she should not allow her name to be printed or advertised as a name partner, holding out to the public that she, together with the partners of the firm, can practice law.”

By the Canons of Professional Ethics of lawyers, the expert said, Sara and Manases may have misrepresented or falsely advertised her role in the firm, despite one news report that she has taken a leave of absence.

Misleading claim

Said the legal expert: “The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts (Canon 3, CPR).  He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, CPR).”

Most important of all, the source said, “the standards of the legal profession condemn lawyers’ advertisement in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.  The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession, not a money-making enterprise (Mauricio C. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc., Bar Matter No. 553, June 17, 1993).”

Carpio & Duterte Lawyers had a “grand opening” on Feb. 13, 2019 at the City Times Square II in Mandaue City. At least 13 congratulatory half-page ads ran simultaneously in SunStar Cebunewspaper from a variety of political and corporate well-wishers.

13 greeting ads

The identical greeting ads came from Presidential Assistant for the Visayas Michael Lloyd Dino; Cebu Vice Gov. Agnes Almendras-Magpale; E.C. Labella & Partners Law Office that is owned by Cebu City Vice Mayor Edgardo Labella, Sara Duterte’s Hugpong ng Pagbabago candidate for mayor against incumbent Mayor Tomas Osmena; Tuburan Mayor Democrito ‘Aljun’ Diamante; Marty Pimentel; Rep. Wilfredo “Willy” Caminero (Cebu, 2ndDist.); Rep. Peter John D. Calderon (Cebu, 7thDist.); Toyota Team Cebu (Talisay, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue North, Mandaue South); motorcycle dealer Du Ek Sam, Inc.; Catalina Car Rentals; Topline Express Ferries; Stradcom Corporation; Roble Shipping, Inc.; and Hercules Transport, Inc.

Another lawyer who teaches law ethics said, though, that if it is run as a “general practice partnership,” Carpio & Duterte Lawyers may not need to register with the SEC. That is, if its lawyers are rendering legal services on their own as officers of the law, and not as a business unit. 

“The right to practice law, represent clients, file pleadings with the court is vested in the individual lawyer, and not in law firms,” the lawyer said.  But the source said that it is important for Sara to explicitly state in the firm’s stationery that she has taken a leave of absence, because as a mayor she may not render legal services at all.

Yet how Carpio & Duterte Lawyers secured business permit to operate, issue receipts to clients and in whose name/s, cover the social benefits of their employees, and pay business taxes are matters not quite clear for the unregistered law firm.


Civil Code: Must register

An ancient but still valid law enacted on June 18, 1949, Republic Act No. 386   or The Civil Code of the Philippines, spells out in various provisions the obligations of parties to various types of partnerships to register via public instruments when these start acquiring “immovable property”  and deal in transactions affecting “real rights.” The Code also defines the rights of partners in regard to the distribution of profits, and transactions with creditors, debtors, and other parties.

“A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property or real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall be necessary,” according to the Civil Code.

Just as important, the Code states that, “every contract of partnership having a capital of three thousand pesos or more, in money or property, shall appear in a public instrument, which must be recorded in the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission.”

That is exactly what a sitting commissioner of the SEC told PCIJ: “To the extent that they are not single/solo practitioners, law partnerships register with the SEC.” 

More than just a conjugal affair for “partners” Sara Duterte and Manases Carpio, Carpio & Duterte Lawyers has also hired other lawyers as associates at their offices in Davao City and Cebu.  At the latter, its associates are Nikko Jay G. Gagno and Goldy Luck C. Dacal-Mayol, both of whom passed the bar only in 2017.

Duterte’s law firm

Mayor Sara, however, may be just taking a cue from her father. The President himself was a partner at the Fabiosa Duterte Cimafranca Carcedo Law Firm (FDC CO. LAW). The firm has never appeared in any of his SALNs. At least though, the SEC has records of its Articles of Partnership, which indicate that it was established on Feb. 6, 2003 and that Duterte and three other lawyer-partners each put in PhP100,000 in subscribed capital. At the time, Duterte was mayor of Davao City. 

In January 2017, President Duterte appointed the firm’s managing partner, Filemon S. Cimafranca Jr., then 70, as independent director of the United Coconut Planters’ Bank; he was later named director also of UCPB Securities, Inc. The government has a 73.9 percent stake in UCPB.

(Nicanor Gabunada Jr., Duterte’s social-media campaign manager in 2016, has also been appointed to the UCPB board and the bank’s Executive Committee.)

In his public profile online, Cimafranca said that he had worked as consultant of theNational Bureau of Investigation director’s office; consultant for Public Order and Security, Office of the Mayor, Davao City; special counsel and head, Philippine National Bank Legal, Mindanao Region; and agent of “Interpol National Bureau of Investigation.”

Another partner, Ricardo B. Fabiosa, is an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator as of the 2013 list of the Department of Labor and Employment – National Conciliation and Mediation Board. 

A fourth partner, Oscar A. Carcedo, was admitted to the roll of attorneys in 1981. – First of Three Parts, with research by Vino Lucero and infographics by Arnel Rival, PCIJ, April 2019

Duterte, Sara, Paolo mark big spikesin wealth, cash, while in public office

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By Floreen Simon and Malou Mangahas

IN THE May 2019 elections, not just two but all three children of President Rodrigo R. Duterte by estranged spouse Elizabeth A. Zimmerman are running. But unlike those of many other candidates, their clan coffers won’t be running empty. In fact, these are probably going to end up largely untouched, or may even be further enhanced wealth-wise, as in previous campaigns.

In large part, that is thanks to a family brand name that has instant recall for most Filipinos nowadays. Indeed, the three adult Duterte children only need to remind people what they are gunning for: another term as mayor for Sara; as 1st District Representative of Davao City for the eldest, Paolo; and as vice mayor of Davao City for the youngest, Sebastian.

Their father also isn’t poor, although he has said on several occasions that he was raised in a poor family. When allegations rose two years ago about his supposedly having questionable bank transactions that ran into multimillions of pesos, the President had shot back that his family had really done quite well.

To be more exact, in a speech in February 2017, Duterte addressed his nemesis, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, who was calling for a probe into the transactions. Said the President: “Hindi kami kasing malas sa pamilya mo. Hindi kami mahirap. Tatay ko, governor noon, may iniwan sa akin.(We are not as unfortunate as your family. We are not poor. My father who used to be governor left me inheritance.)”

So if he isn’t poor, then how rich is Duterte? And Sara? And Paolo?

The President has yet to go into detail about his questioned bank accounts, at least in public. In theory, however, citizens can find that out for themselves by looking at the SALNs that the Dutertes had filed during their extended years in public office.

A bundle of SALNs 

PCIJ did just that, and looked at 22 SALNs that Duterte had filed since 1998; 11 filed by Paolo since 2007; and eight filed by Sara since 2007. PCIJ also checked with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) records on the business interests and financial connections listed and not listed in their SALNs, and with relevant sources, the background of their major business associates, debtors, and relatives in government. 

Not surprisingly, father, son, and daughter, now all have a net worth in eight digits each; Sara seems to be the wealthiest among the three as of their 2017 SALNs, Duterte a far second, and Paolo, a close third. 

Still, the President, Sara, and Paolo have all consistently grown richer over the years, even on the modest salaries they have received for various public posts, and despite the negligible retained earnings reflected in the financial statements of the companies they own or co-own. How and why their fortunes are rising remain a mystery; the numbers do not seem to add up, and what they reveal in their SALNs breed riddles of incongruent details instead of clarifying questions. 

Numbers in a jumble

In truth, filling out the SALN form by the rules appeared to be a challenge at times for all three, even though the President and Sara are both lawyers and Paolo has a “PhD in Public Administration” courtesy of short courses offered by the Philippine Councilors League  Legislative Academy. In earlier SALNs, for example, all three pegged their net worth on the fair market values of their real assets, instead of on their acquisition costs, as the rules require.

Too, the SALNs offer little or no clues for some curious instances, such as where excess campaign funds went in the case of the President in 2016, or a sudden spike in the cash assets of Paolo, or his acquisition of real estate properties with no clear source of funding. 

Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees was enacted on February 20, 1989. The law states that “Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.” It also stipulates that SALNs be within 30 days after assumption of office; on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and within 30 days after separation from the service.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations or IRR of R.A. No. 6713 was approved on April 21, 1989, which set the effectivity of the law 30 days thereafter or specifically, May 21, 1989. In compliance with the law, public officials began filing SALNs in 1990 declaring their assets, liabilities, and net worth for year 1989. There was some observed confusion, however, as to where SALNs should be submitted, necessitating the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to issue Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of 1991, to clear up the matter.  

Millionaire kids

The earliest SALN of President Duterte that PCIJ was able to obtain was the one he filed in 1998, when he was the representative of Davao’s 1st District. At the time, he declared having a net worth of PhP898,000. By then he had already spent a decade as mayor of Davao City. PCIJ could not ascertain as of press time if he had filed earlier SALNs.

Sara filed her first SALN in 2007, when she was elected vice mayor of Davao City, her debut year in public office. She declared her net worth at the time as being PhP7.25 million. Paolo filed his first SALN also in 2007, after being elected Barangay Captain of Catalunan Grande, Davao City. He declared a net worth of PhP8.34 million

Rodrigo Duterte should have been filing his 11thSALN by then. But there is something unusual, even inscrutable, about the SALNs that the three Dutertes filed in the year 2007. 

Born on May 31, 1978, Sara Z. Duterte was then just 29 years old. She had passed the bar only a year earlier and was later briefly employed as a court attorney with a Supreme Court associate justice. In her 2007 SALN, Sara declared PhP3.77 million in real assets (by fair market value), PhP5.47 million in personal assets, and liabilities of PhP2 million. She also said that she was a stockholder in three entities engaged in “miscellaneous service activities” (restaurants, coffee shops) and wholesale trade. Two of these three were established and registered also in 2007. 

Paolo earned a commerce degree from the University of Mindanao in 2002, a master’s degree in public administration from the University of Southeastern Philippines in 2009, and a PhD in public administration from the Philippine Councilors League-Legislative Academy and the Lyceum-Northwestern University in 2015. Documents show that before he became an elected official, he had at least one business venture, Server Cuisine, which was registered with the SEC in November 2006. He declared three more firms engaged in “hotels and restaurants” and real estate as part of his business portfolio in his 2007 SALN. 

Born on March 28, 1945, Rodrigo R. Duterte was already 62 years old in 2007 and in his 21st    year as a public official, after nine years of labor as a prosecutor and trial lawyer. He was appointed vice mayor in 1986, and then was elected mayor for several terms beginning 1998. In his 2007 SALN, Duterte declared a net worth of only PhP9.69 million. It consisted of PhP241,570 in real assets (combined fair market value and improvements), PhP10.44 million in personal assets, and liabilities of PhP1 million. The latter is the same absolute amount of his liabilities from 1999, when he filed what should have been his third SALN. 

Among the three, Duterte had obviously worked the longest by 2007. But if their net worths were recalculated using the acquisition cost instead of fair market value for their real-estate holdings, he would emerge as the least wealthy.

CSC requirement

One thing that the three Dutertes’ earlier SALNs have in common is the absence of the acquisition cost of their real properties. According to R.A. No. 6713, a properly accomplished SALN form should indicate the public official’s real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value, and current fair market value. A 2011 CSC memorandum circular also says that “for computation purposes of real properties, acquisition cost shall be used.”

The acquisition cost of a real or personal property is the amount by which the property was acquired. Unlike assessed and current fair market value, the acquisition cost of a property does not change over time unless improvements are undertaken, in the case of real properties. Leaving it out in the SALN thus provides no means to compute a public official’s net worth unless the amount is reported in previous or succeeding SALN submissions.

The President, Sara, and Paolo, however, later provided in their 2008 SALNs the acquisition costs of their real properties that were missing in their earlier SALNs. 

Using these figures, PCIJ recalculated their net worth for their earliest SALNs that the Center was able to obtain. Paolo Duterte’s net worth in 2007 thus climbed to PhP11.7 million, Mayor Sara’s to PhP13.9 million, and the President’s (in 1998) to PhP934,000. For 2007, the President’s recalculated net worth came up to PhP9.74 million.

Inherited assets?

If he were only less destitute than his children, it would seem possible that their relative affluence had been boosted by inherited cash and assets. But he was the most soaked in penury at the time.

Then again, the SALNs that Duterte filed in 2005 and 2006 offer some data about real assets that he said he had passed down to his three children by Elizabeth Zimmerman. 

In 2005, Duterte had listed owning one inherited and two purchased farm land, all in Binugao, Davao City; an inherited lot in Dumoy, Davao City; three purchased residential lots (in Bangkal, Bago, and Ma-a in Davao City), and a residential house and lot in Catalunan Grande, Davao City. He said that the fair market value and improvement costs of the eight real properties he purchased and two properties he inherited amounted to PhP1.44 million.

But by his 2006 SALN,  Duterte listed only two residential lots – in Bago Aplaya and Ma-a – as his own properties. He made this declaration: “Note: All other lots previously declared were already transferred to the three (3) children and to Elizabeth Zimmerman on May 24, 2006.”

That meant that Duterte had transferred six of his real assets to Zimmerman, Paolo, Sara, and Sebastian, but his 2006 SALN did not specify who got which property. 

One possible connecting data showed up in Paolo’s 2007 SALN where he declared three properties as “donations,” including one in Catalunan Grande with a fair market value of PhP146,290. This is the same amount that Duterte’s 2005 SALN enrolled for the same property. The only difference is Paolo’s 2007 SALN says that this property is a “land and building,” in contrast to Duterte’s 2005 SALN, which calls it just a “residential house & lot.”

Sara’s 2007 SALN, meanwhile, listed six real properties (one land and building and four parcels of “lands” in Ecoland, Buhangin, Binugao, and Catigan, all in Davao City; and a condo unit in Quezon City) that were all “purchased.” Sara did not declare any inherited or donated property in her 2007 SALN.

A lot more real assets

By her 2008 SALN, Sara reported owning 11 pieces of real properties worth a total of PhP11.91 million — not by fair market value, but by acquisition cost. These included five pieces of agricultural land (two in Catigan, one in Binugao, and one in Malagos, all in Davao City; and one in Sto. Nino, Babak, Davao del Norte). 

The other six properties include four pieces of residential land and a residential land and building worth a total of PhP4.67 million, all in Davao City; and a condominium unit in Quezon City that she said was purchased in 2006 for PhP6.39 million.

Sara’s 2008 SALN also shows that she acquired an agricultural land, two pieces of residential land, and the residential land and building in 1999 with a combined worth of PhP3.76 million. In 1999, she was 21 years old, and still enrolled in college. Sara also said in her 2008 SALN that the condominium unit and an agricultural land were both purchased in 2006, the year she passed the bar; the two pieces of agricultural land in 2007; and two pieces of residential land and another agricultural land in 2008.

Meanwhile, in his 2008 SALN, Paolo reported owning nine pieces of real properties,  including three (a residential land and building, a residential land, and an agricultural land) that he said were all “donated” in 2006.

He said that the six other properties, by acquisition cost, were worth a total of PhP10.83 million. Paolo said that in “1999/2005” he bought a residential land and building in Quezon City for PhP1 million; in 2005,one residential land and building in Ecoland, Davao City for PhP5 million; n 2007, two residential land worth PhP750,000 each; and in 2008, an agricultural land worth PhP200,000 and “residential lands with building and improvements” worth PhP3.13 million. 

The last property, according to Paolo’s 2008 SALN, was purchased “in an auction sale with DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines).” It was “paid with DBP (Development Bank of the Philippines) on Dec. 3, 2007 but the deed of sale was notarized in 2008.” The property, located in Catalunan Grande Davao City, was covered by three land titles.

(For some reason, however, both Sara and Paolo included the value of their vehicles in computing for the value of their respective real assets in their 2008 SALN. These then would have inflated the total value of the real-estate holdings they declared for that year: PhP15.56 million for Sara and PhP13.74 million for Paolo.)

Du30: 3 lots, then more

As for Rodrigo Duterte, in his 2007 SALN, he reported owning only three residential lots that, by fair market value and improvement costs combined, were worth PhP172,000, PhP42,570, and PhP27,000, or PhP241,570 in all. He did not declare the acquisition values of these properties.

In his 2008 SALN, however, Duterte enrolled 10 pieces of real property: seven pieces of residential land, two residential land and building, and an agricultural land. He said nine of the 10 properties were worth a total of PhP2.76 million, by acquisition cost. He put zero value to a residential land and building in Matina, Davao City because it was supposedly “exchanged.” He did not explain what he meant by “exchanged.”

According to Duterte, he acquired four of his 10 real properties in 1996; one in 1997; one in 1999; one in 2005; one in 2007; and two in 2008. 

He put three of the 10 properties in the name of Veronica ‘Kitty’ A. Duterte, his child by current partner Cielito ‘Honeylet’ Avanceña.  Kitty was born on April 10, 2004. The three properties were acquired by Duterte in 2005, 2007, and 2008. By 2015, he would declare these and two more properties as “purchased through the exclusive funds of the mother, Cielito S. Avanceña.”

Rising, rising 

Ten years later in 2017, Duterte, Paolo, and Sara filed SALNs that continue to confuse because of similarly sharp upticks in their wealth. After all, their primary sources of lawful income remained their salaries as public officials and whatever profits from a few corporate entities they own or co-own. Of their firms with financial statements at the SEC, nearly all reported negligible retained earnings year on year.

In their respective SALNs for 2017, President Duterte declared a net worth of PhP28.54 million; Paolo, P27.74 million; and Sara, PhP44.83 million. The numbers show that across the 10-year period from 2007, Rodrigo’s wealth nearly tripled, Paolo’s more than tripled, and Sara’s grew more than six times.

 2007 Net Worth (in PhP Millions)2017 Net Worth (in  PhP Millions)% Increase
Rodrigo R. Duterte9.6928.54195%
Paolo Z. Duterte8.3427.74233%
Sara Z. Duterte7.2544.83518%

The President’s net worth through the years seems to have risen slowly but steadily, with an average annual increase of PhP1.4 million. Between 2016 and 2017, his net worth saw a modest rise of only four percent. The highest increase in his net worth was in 2008 at PhP5.6 million; in 2001, there was no movement in his net worth at all compared to the previous year.

More cash assets now

President Duterte has maintained liquidity with more personal than real assets. His personal assets – which include his cash on hand and in bank, vehicles, jewelry, investments, and even furniture — reached their largest share of his total assets in 2006 and 2007, at 98 percent, while the biggest share of his total assets that real properties ever got was 38 percent in 2002. In his 2017 SALN, President Duterte declared PhP4.5 million in real assets, PhP25 million in personal assets, and liabilities of almost PhP1 million. 

All of the President’s SALNs reflect an increase in his cash on hand and in bank every year except in 1999 and 2001, when his cash assets remained the same as that in 1998 and 2000, respectively. The President’s cash assets grew least in December 1998 at PhP150,000 and most in December 2016 at PhP3.15 million.  Both 1998 and 2016 were election years.

The President’s 2017 SALN reflects the biggest cash assets he has ever declared since 1998 at PhP19.4 million. The figure is also the highest among the three Dutertes’ cash assets in 2017.

Untouched by elections

Since 1998, President Duterte has run seven times for different posts: once as Congressman for the 1st District of Davao City (1998), four times as Mayor of Davao City (2001, 2004, 2007, and 2013), once as Vice Mayor of the same city (2010), and once as President of the Philippines (2016).

In all these election years, Rodrigo Duterte did not only win the post he ran for; he also managed to leave his cash assets untouched for campaign purposes. In fact, his SALNs during these years would indicate increases in his cash assets, except for the one he filed in 2001, when he ran again as Davao City Mayor. 

In the 2013 elections, Rodrigo Duterte ran unopposed for mayor of Davao City. In his campaign-finance documents, he declared a meager PhP85,884 in campaign expenditures, with the bulk of that amount  – PhP60,000 – going to meals and drinks at the After Dark Piano Bar. His submitted papers also say that he did not receive any contribution and had zero unpaid obligations.

His 2013 SALN would reflect a PhP723,000 increase in his total net worth from 2012. Broken down, this was due in part to an uptick of PhP1.023 million in his cash assets and PhP50,000 in jewelry. And while the worth of his vehicles slid by PhP500,00, there was also a decrease of PhP150,000 in his liabilities.  

In the 2016 Presidential elections, Duterte reported a total of PhP375 million cash and in-kind contributions. He said that he used PhP371.5 million for his campaign, with PhP200,000 coming from his personal funds. That would therefore leave some PhP3.7 million in unspent funds from the contributions he had received. 

Duterte’s net worth rose by PhP3.9 million from 2015 to 2016, based on the SALNs he filed during these two years. In fact, much of the increase happened in just six months, between June and December 2016, when his net worth somehow shot up by PhP3.35 million. 

His December 2016 SALN reflects an increase of PhP3.6 million in cash assets compared with the corresponding figure in his December 2015 SALN, plus “Other Personal Properties” valued at PhP1 million. Yet even as his liabilities declined by PhP200,000, his investments decreased as well, by PhP900,000, during this period.  Then again, 2016 was when he divested from Honda Cars Gen. Santos – his only for-profit private interest appearing in his SALNs since 2000 — which should translate to an increase in his cash assets.

Sudden, sharp rise

In Sara’s case, some unusual situations are apparent, in terms of sudden and sharp rise in her net worth; for certain years, her real assets and personal properties kept growing, despite parallel increases in her liabilities. A year after she was elected vice mayor in 2007, her declared net worth of PhP7.25 million grew to PhP18.49 million in 2008. Curated data using belated declarations of acquisition costs, however, reflect a more modest increase of PhP4.6 million in her net worth from PhP13.88 in 2007.

Yet, her marriage to fellow lawyer Manases R. Carpio in October 2008 may have boosted her net worth only slightly at this time. Sara reported in her 2008 SALN an annual gross salary of PhP340,000, and an annual gross family income of only PhP667,422. By these amounts, it would be hard to explain the significant rise in her net worth, and acquisition of more real assets, from 2007 to 2008 – declared or curated.

She reported an even bigger increase in her net worth as mayor in 2012 of PhP22.12 million, from just PhP14.27 million in 2011. She had in 2012 slightly more liabilities of PhP8.69 million (an additional PhP1.14 million), but also huge upticks in her real assets at PhP18.59 million (an additional PhP7.79 million) and personal assets at PhP12.22 million (an additional PhP1.2 million). 

In 2011, Sara had liabilities of PhP7.55 million, real assets of only PhP10.80 million, and personal properties of only PhP11.02 million.

Bigger after break

After a three-year break from public office, Sara reported in her 2016 SALN a net worth of  PhP34.9 million, or 58 percent more than her SALN filing in 2012 of PhP22.12 million. A PhP12-million increase in the value of her real assets accounted for the difference.

But the biggest increase in her net worth year-to-year was recorded in her 2017 SALN, filed nearly a year after she returned to work as mayor of Davao City, and her father was elected President. Sara’s net worth in 2017 climbed to PhP44.83 million, or an increase of 28.45 percent from what she had declared the year before. This time, the difference came from a surge in her personal assets, which in 2016 was only PhP11.30 million but ballooned to PhP20.59 million in 2017, or an additional PhP9.29 million. 

In her 2017 SALN, Sara reported that her cash on hand/in bank had grown to PhP6.37 million (up from PhP3.75 million in 2016); vehicle/van and vehicle/motorcycles valued at a combined PhP4.1 million (from PhP2.53 million in 2016); and her “Other Personal Properties” valued at PhP3.62 million (from PhP1.18 million in 2015).

She reported, too, that in 2017, her husband Manases had a PhP3.4-million vehicle bought in 2014; PhP1.45-million pick-up bought in 2017; and PhP1.64 million in “Other Personal Properties.” In her 2016 SALN, Sara said that Manases owned only these personal assets: the PhP3.4-million car and PhP500,000 in “Other Personal Properties.”

Her 2017 SALN also shows PhP30.55 million in real assets and liabilities of PhP6.31 million.

Paolo: Same path

Paolo’s net worth tracked a similar path. The SALN he filed in 2007on his first year in office as barangay captain showed a net worth of PhP8.34 million that rose by 98 percent in 2008 to PhP16.51 million, when he reported the acquisition values of all seven real properties. 

In his 2008 SALN, his real assets represented acquisition costs of real properties and vehicles bringing the amount up to PhP13.74 million. Sans the vehicles, he declared his personal assets at PhP4.27 million.

Curated data of his 2007 and 2008 SALNs using acquisition costs of his real properties and reflecting acquisition costs of vehicles under personal properties, Paolo’s 2008 net worth reflects an increase of PhP4.77 million, and increases in real and personal assets computed at PhP3.33 million and PhP342,020, respectively.

In his 2008 SALN, Paolo reported receiving an annual gross salary of only PhP324,624 as barangay captain, and an annual gross family income of PhP951,926.33. These amounts could hardly explain the huge uptick in his net worth from 2007 to 2008.

Paolo would experience his second net-worth upsurge in 2017, although by December of that year he would resign as vice mayor of Davao City.

From PhP19.84 million in 2016, Paolo’s net worth rose to PhP27.74 million in 2017, an increase of PhP7.9 million or 39.8 percent. 

What accounted for the rise is his personal assets’ growth from only PhP7.82 million in 2016 to PhP13.32 million in 2017. Paolo reported that he had PhP4.3 million more cash on hand (PhP7.29 million from only PhP3 million in 2016); acquired PhP500,000 more jewelry and firearms and PhP110,000 more furniture/furnishings; and invested an additional PhP600,000 in 2017. The increase in his net worth was also boosted by a PhP2-million decrease in his liabilities.

Like his father and kid sister, Paolo had also come out of the 2016 elections with his wallet intact. In fact, from having a declared net worth of PhP18.54 million in 2015, Paolo in 2016 had a net worth of PhP19.84 million.  — With infographics by Arnel Rival, Second of Three Parts, PCIJ, 4 April 2019

Check out! First part of PCIJ report on The Dutertes: Wealth Reveal and Riddles — “Law firm not registered, some biz interests not disclosed, debtor gets deal to import rice” 

Dutertes mix up data on 23 business interests, posts of 16 relatives in gov’t

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By Floreen Simon and Malou Mangahas

 
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BY THE DISCLOSURES in their asset records, President Rodrigo Duterte, Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte, and former Davao City Vice Mayor Paolo Duterte have interests and engagements in a total of at least 23 corporate entities.

A majority of these are involved in the food and catering business, a few in freight and trucking services, and others in education, medical service, and foundation work.

Apart from scores of business partners — some of whose names appear repeatedly across the boards of several companies — the Dutertes also have at least 16 relatives by blood and affinity working in appointive positions, mostly at Davao City Hall, and also in executive and judiciary posts.

But the token disclosure and inconsistencies that define their real and personal assets, as well as liabilities, also plague their declarations regarding the businesses they own or co-own, and their relatives by blood and affinity who are in public positions.

The inconsistencies include declaring different positions for one relative in the same SALN (Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth) year, or even missing out a high-profile relative, and a possible deliberate non-mention of a relative in the list.

PCIJ has reviewed a total of 22 SALNs that Duterte had filed since 1998; eight filed by Sara since 2007; and 11 filed by Paolo also since 2007. It is conceivable that, in specific cases, the Dutertes may have just been less than attentive to filling out the seemingly unimportant list of “Relatives in Government” that forms part of the SALN form, or the section regarding their business interests. 

In two sets of letter requests for comment sent in October 2018 and in February 2019, PCIJ had thus explicitly asked the Dutertes: “Do you, then and now, personally take part in preparing your SALNs and are fully aware of all the data and information that are declared in these documents? Or do your personal accountants or lawyers assist you in doing your SALNs for you?”

But up until this writing, the President, Mayor Sara, and Paolo, had yet to respond to these and other questions sent to them by PCIJ.

Delisted but still linked

Sara Duterte was vice mayor of Davao City from 2007 to 2010, and then its mayor from 2010 to 2013. She took a three-year break from public office before clinching another term as mayor in 2016. She is running again in the city’s mayoralty race this May.

Sara’s SALNs from 2007 to 2012 listed Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation and City Hall King Chow Foods Corporation among her business interests.  According to records of the Securities and Exchange Commission or SEC, Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation (Davao Emerging) registered with it on May 19, 2004 for the primary purpose of “establishing, operating, and maintaining restaurants, coffee shops, refreshment parlors, cocktail lounges, and food catering.” City Hall King Chow Foods Corporation (City Hall King Chow), which was registered with the SEC on May 9, 2007, has the same declared purpose. 

In 2016, after she returned to public office, Sara no longer included these two companies in her list of business interests. They were absent as well in her 2017 SALN.

Davao Emerging’s 2016 and 2017 General Information Sheets (GIS), however, reveal that Sara still sits on its Board of Directors, with 10-percent ownership. Similarly, the 2016 and 2017 GIS of City Hall King Chow have Sara as a board director with 20-percent ownership.  These records have been authenticated by the SEC. 

Yet while she had delisted Davao Emerging and City Hall King Chow in her 2016 SALN, Sara listed two apparently new business interests: Davao New Royal Taipan Corp. (Davao New Royal) and Metro City Chow Foods Corp. (Metro City Chow).

But confusion arises still as to when exactly she got involved in these two ventures. Sara’s 2016 SALN said that she had been connected to Davao New Royal since 2004, and to Metro City Chow since 2007. SEC records show, however, that both companies registered with the SEC only in 2016. 

The years she cited match those when Davao Emerging registered with the SEC (2004) and City Hall King Chow (2007). There are no indications, though, that Davao New Royal and Metro City Chow had taken over the operations of the two delisted businesses. According to the SEC database, all four companies still exist.

The case of Timesquare Bee Foods (Timesquare), meanwhile, is unique. Sara listed this company in her 2016 and 2017 SALNs and declared herself as an incorporator and stockholder. Company papers, however, say otherwise.

Timesquare registered with the SEC on June 24, 2013. Its 2016 GIS names the following as board members and stockholders: Ang Hai Peng (Chairman); Roxanne T. Ang (CFO or Corporate Finance Officer); Gerlie S. Dela Cruz (COS or Corporate Secretary); and Board members Bolly G. Gimenes and Gordon T. Gimenes. All five are also its only incorporators, according to the firm’s documents. 

Too long to dissolve

In 2017, meanwhile, Sara dropped from her SALN an entity called 3Kids Trucking Services, Inc. (3Kids), even as the 2017 GIS of 3Kids would reveal her as a board director, with 16.64-percent ownership of the company.

Sara had listed 3Kids as “Not Existing” in her 2012 SALN, and “For Dissolution” in her 2016 SALN. 

3Kids registered with the SEC on Jan. 24, 2012 and said that its primary purpose was “to engage in the transportation business for the carriage of general cargoes, merchandise, and freight auto truck services.”

As of October 2018, 3Kids was listed as “suspended” in the SEC database and later listed as “dissolved” before the year ended.

Since 2012, Sara has also been listing at least two other business entities as being headed “for dissolution.”  

One of these companies, SGT Fortune Horse Corp. (SGT), registered with the SEC on March 29, 2010 to engage in the transportation business for the carriage of general cargoes, merchandise, and freight auto truck services. Sara said that she was one of the firm’s incorporators.

In 2012, she declared SGT as “for dissolution.” But three years after, SGT would still be reflected in Sara’s 2016 SALN, and still with a “for dissolution” note. 

In her 2017 SALN, Sara delisted SGT from her business interests. Yet while SGT’s 2013 and 2017 GIS no longer included her as a board member, dissolution has yet to come for this company. As of Feb. 4, 2019, the company is still listed as “registered” in the SEC database.

CYK&T Davao Corporation (CYK&T) also appeared to have met the same fate. CYK&T is a joint business undertaking of Sara and husband Manases ‘Mans’ R. Carpio, together with three other Filipinos and two Korean nationals. 

It registered in the SEC on March 1, 2010 and was established to “provide technical, vocational, education, and training, and to provide effective language courses both in oral written communication to local and foreign students.” It was listed in Mayor Sara’s 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2016 SALNs as CYKT, Inc.

Like SGT Fortune Horse, CYK&T was listed by Sara in her 2012 and 2016 SALNs as “for dissolution.” 

Years after, the company would still be filing its GIS, with that in  2018 saying that it is 40 percent owned by its Korean partners and 60 percent owned by Filipinos. Of the 60-percent Filipino ownership, 24 percent belongs to Sara and 10 percent to husband Manases Carpio.

Finally, however, as of Feb. 4, 2019, the SEC database would show CYK&T as having a “revoked” status.

Sole business interest

CYK&T also appears to be the only business interest of Manases Carpio that has records at the SEC.  

A second entity, ZeltaMatiem Salon, was declared by Sara in 2011 as a “sole proprietorship” business interest of Manases Carpio. But she would declare the salon to be “for retirement” in her 2012 SALN, and “closed” in her 2016 SALN. 

CYK&T would appear to be the only source of Manases Carpio’s increase in real and other personal properties as identified in the SALNs of Sara. 

While in the process of dissolving his sole business interest, Manases Carpio had also reportedly acquired the following assets, according to Sara’s SALNs:

·     Condo Unit in Mandaluyong City reportedly acquired in years 1999 and 2012 worth PhP2.8 million (although in 2012, the amount listed was was PhP815,000); 

  • Subaru Brz acquired in 2012 worth PhP1.9 million (assumed to have been bought by selling Honda CRV worth PhP1.3 million);
  • House and Lot in Artiaga, Davao City, acquired in 2015 worth PhP1.3 million;
  • House and Lot in Parañaque, Metro Manila acquired in 2013 worth PhP2.2 million;
  • Vehicle (car) acquired in 2014 worth PhP3.4 million (the Subaru BRZ was no longer part of his personal properties by the time this “Vehicle [car]” was listed);
  • Increase of P500,000 in other personal properties in 2016;
  • Vehicle (pick-up) acquired in 2017 worth PhP1.5 million; and
  • Increase of PhP1.1 million in other personal properties in 2017.

Sara indicated in her 2008 to 2010 SALNs that Manases Carpio has been a lawyer at Carpio-Duterte Law Office and at Carpio Duterte Lawyers in 2011, 2012, 2016, and 2017.  But she did not list the law firm as among her husband’s business interests. 

The law office has online presence, a head office in Davao City, and a recently opened branch office in Mandaue City, Cebu. But the SEC has no records at all of its registration as a partnership or corporation, as of March 2019.

Paolo & Baste

Sara, however, is not alone in her seeming confusion over which board of which business entity she has a seat in, or which company is still in operation and which has closed, and when. 

Her big brother Paolo, for one, had listed Grand King Foods Corp (Grand King) as one of his business interests in his 2007 to 2012 SALNs. It registered with the SEC on Oct. 2, 2007, with its primary purpose being “to establish, operate and maintain restaurants, coffee shops, refreshment parlors, cocktail lounges and cater foods.”

Grand King would be dropped from Paolo’s business interests in the SALNs he filed from 2013 to 2017. But the company’s GIS filed during this period show Paolo as still part of its board of directors, with five-percent ownership. Younger brother Sebastian is also listed as among Grand King’s board directors.

Paolo was Barangay Captain of Catalunan Grande in Davao City from 2007 to 2013. He was elected the city’s vice mayor in 2013 but resigned in December 2017.

Still, except for the delisting of Grand King in his SALNs, Paolo, compared to his sister, appears to be relatively transparent in terms of data about his business holdings.

Paolo had listed at least eight business interests in his 2017 SALN, with two of these — Grand MD Business Development Corp (Grand MD) and Chinese Gen Bee Foods Corp. (Chinese Gen) – having Sebastian (more popularly known as ‘Baste’) as co-owner.

According to his 2017 SALN, Paolo’s business interests include:

  • Grand M.D. Business Development Corporation (Grand M.D.), as. incorporator and shareholder;
  • Jolly General Foods Corporation (Jolly General), as shareholder;
  • Server Cuisine Corp (Server Cuisine), as stockholder;
  • Chinese Gen Bee Foods Corp. (Chinese Gen), as incorporator;
  • Davao Doctors Hospital (Clinica Hilario), Inc., as stockholder;
  • Boarding House, as proprietor;
  • Long Water, as proprietor; and
  • Long Tuna, as proprietor.

When his SALN declaration and the corporate papers of his business interests are compared, however, some discrepancies emerge in terms of his role in some companies. 

For instance, in his SALNS from 2007 to 2017, Paolo did not declare that he is one of the incorporators of Server Cuisine. But the company’s Articles of Incorporation, signed on Nov. 17, 2006, show otherwise. 

As well, in his 2013 to 2017 SALNs, Paolo said only that he was one of Chinese Gen’s incorporators, even though the company’s 2016 GIS lists him still as a stockholder.

Gave kids permits

Interestingly, at least two of the companies declared by Paolo in his various SALNs at one time or another had also secured permits to operate from Davao City Hall between 2004 and 2011, while his father, and then his younger sister Sara, was mayor. So, too, had two companies that had Sara as board member and stockholder. Two other companies, this time connected primarily to Sebastian, also secured permits from Davao City Hall during the same period. 

According to a May 6, 2016 report of GMANews Online, these six companies were all engaged in the food business and had declared a common primary purpose in their Articles of Incorporation: “establish and maintain restaurants, coffee shops”, among others and to “make, cook, arrange, serve and cater food.” Among these were two that Sara would declare later in her SALNs: City Hall King Chow Foods Corp., which got its first permit in 2007, and Davao Emerging Taipans Corps, which received its permit in 2004. 

In City Hall King Chow Foods’s 2014 GIS, Sara is listed to own 20 percent of the firm with PhP250,000-worth of paid shares, according to records obtained by GMANews Online. Davao Emerging’s 2014 documents meanwhile had Sara as owning 10 percent of the company with 3,750 shares and amount paid at P375,000. Both companies also said that Sara was a member of their respective boards. 

There are also Grand M.D. and Grand King, declared by Paolo in his SALNs later and which also counted Sebastian as among their board members and shareholders. Both got their first permit to operate from Davao City Hall in 2011. 

GMANews Online reported that Grand M.D.’s company records in 2015 showed Paolo and Sebastian as owning five percent of the company each, with 125 shares worth PhP25,000 each. 

The brothers also owned five percent of Grand King Foods Corp., which would later go missing in Paolo’s SALNs. GMANews Online also reported that based on the company’s 2015 GIS, Paolo and Sebastian each had a total of PhP25,000 amount subscribed.

The last two companies had Sebastian listed as board member and stockholder: SPMC Chow Foods Corp., which got its first permit from Davao City Hall in 2011; and  Timesquare Chow Foods Corp, in 2013. 

GMANews Online, quoting the firms’ corporate records, said that Sebastian owned 15 percent of SPMC and 20 percent of Timesquare Chow, equivalent to PhP 37,500 in amount subscribed for each of the companies.

Sought for comment about his children’s businesses, Duterte told GMANews Online in 2016: “Ma’am, kailangan ang tao sa mundong ito mabuhay. Just because they are my children does not…Papaano ito? Kasi dahil anak ko sila hindi na sila mabuhay?  Eh kung ako magbibigay ng pera n’yan, kung ako magbibigay ng pera n’yan ang salaryko hindi tama. E ‘di ako magbibigay, ma-graft and corruption ako. They are of age, ‘yung isa mayorna, yung isa vice mayor and they have a family to support.

(Ma’am, people in this world need to live. Just because they are my children does not…How should it be? Just because they are my children they have no right to make a living? If I have to give them money, if I will be the one giving money, my salary would not be enough. I won’t give, I may end up committing graft and corruption. They are of age, one is already mayor, the other vice mayor and they have a family to support).”

Divested, years later

For sure, even the President had thought it necessary to invest in businesses while he was in public office. His 1998 to 2017 SALNs revealed these business connections:

  • Mister Donuts – Reported in SALN year 1998;
  • Honda Cars Gen. Santos, Inc. – Reported in SALN years 2000 to June 2016; and
  • Poeng Yue Foundation, Inc. – Reported in SALN years 2012 to June 2016.

His June 2016 SALN – his first as President — still indicated his connection to Honda Cars Gen. Santos, Inc. and Poeng Yue Foundation, Inc. By his December SALN, however, the President had divested himself of his long-time businesses.

Based on his SALNs through the years, though, it would seem that Duterte — much like his children Sara and Paolo — had jumbled memories of his involvement in companies. For example:  he started reporting a connection with Honda Cars Gen. Santos, Inc. only in 2000, even though the company’s official papers listed him as an incorporator from the time it registered with the SEC on Oct. 11, 1996. Its GIS from 1997 to 1999 also consistently named Duterte as an incorporator with 2,625 shares or three percent of the firm’s 87,500 total shares. 

But Duterte’s SALNs filed during these years were silent about his involvement with the firm. Still, his SALNs from 2000 to 2017 indicated that his connection with Honda Cars started way back in 1997.

Missed out law firm

There is at least one more firm, however, that Duterte has neglected to declare in his SALN as among his business interests. 

It is unfortunate that the SEC no longer provides for a reverse-search facility, which previously allowed research on companies via links to a person or persons. Today only company names can be searched from the database.

Yet, a quick search of “Duterte” in the Commission’s database revealed one Fabiosa Duterte Cimasranca (sic) Carcedo Law Firm (FDCCO Law) Co. registered in the SEC on February 6, 2003.

Its Articles of Partnership, which is the firm’s only available document in the SEC database, listed its partners as Ricardo B. Fabiosa, Rodrigo R. Duterte, Filemon S. Cimafranca Jr., and Oscar A. Carcedo. (The partnership papers show the firm’s name as Fabiosa Duterte Cimafranca Carcedo Law Firm or FDC CO. LAW)  

Firm partner Duterte, unlike the others, did not put his Tax Identification Number in the document. It indicated, though, that the Rodrigo Duterte in the document was born on March 28, 1945 and resided in Central Park Subdivision, Bangkal Davao City. In his 1998 to 2000 SALNs, then Davao City Mayor and now Philippine President Duterte explicitly indicated that he resides in Taal St. Davao Central Park, Bangkal, Davao City. The President’s birthday is March 28, 1945.

The firm has never appeared in any and all of Duterte’s SALNs from 2003 to 2017. Its status in the SEC database remains as “registered” as of Feb. 4, 2019.  

Frequent partners

Excluding their names, Duterte, Sara, and Paolo count about 140 business associates as  incorporators and board members in the 23 companies they have owned or co-own to this day. These names appear in respective Articles of Incorporation (AI) and General Information Sheets (GIS) that the companies have filed with the SEC through the years.

At least 17 names stand out, however, for being repeat co-shareholders and co-incorporators of the Dutertes in two to nine companies. They include:

Gerlie S. Dela Cruz 

  1. Chinese Gen Bee Foods Corporation, Treasurer, 2016 GIS;
  2. City Hall King Chow Foods Corporation,  CFO; COS, 2016 GIS;
  3. Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation, COS, 2017 GIS;
  4. Davao New Royal Taipan Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2016 AI; First Director, 2016 AI;
  5. Grand King Foods Corp., Treasurer, 2018 GIS;
  6. Grand M.D. Business Development Corporation, Treasurer, 2018 GIS;
  7. Jolly General Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; Treasurer, 2016 GIS;
  8. Metro City Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2016 AI; First Director,  2016 AI; and 
  9. Timesquare Bee Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2013 AI; COS, 2016 GIS.

Jaime T. Cruz 

  1. Chinese Gen Bee Foods Corporation, President, 2016 GIS;
  2. City Hall King Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; President, 2016 GIS;
  3. Davao Bounty Times Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; First Director, 2007 AI;
  4. Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation, Incorporator, 2008 AI;  President, 2017 GIS;
  5. Davao New Royal Taipan Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2016 AI; First Director, 2016 AI;
  6. Grand King Foods Corp., Incorporator, 2007AI; President, 2018 GIS;
  7. Grand M.D. Business Development Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; President, 2018 GIS;
  8. Jolly General Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; President; Individual Stockholder, Stockholder by way of Sydney Food Corp; and Stockholder by way of Grand MD, 2016 GIS; and 
  9. Metro City Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2016, AI; First Director, 2016 AI.

Ricci Evette L. Cruz 

  1. Chinese Gen Bee Foods Corporation, COS, 2016 GIS;
  2. Davao Bounty Times Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; First Director 2007 AI;
  3. Davao New Royal Taipan Foods Corporation, Incorporator,2016 AI; First Director, 2016 AI; 
  4. Grand King Foods Corp., COS., 2018 GIS;
  5. Grand M.D. Business Development Corporation, COS, 2018 GIS;
  6. Jolly General Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; COS, 2016 GIS;
  7. Metro City Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2016 AI; Treasurer, 2016 AI; and
  8. Timesquare Bee Foods Corporation,  Member, 2016 GIS.

Dolly Grace G. Yuste 

  1. City Hall King Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI, Member, 2016 GIS;
  2. Davao Bounty Times Foods Corporation, Incorporator and First Director, 2007 AI; and
  3. Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation, Incorporator, 2005 AI; CFO, 2017 GIS.                 

Felisa T. Tan 

  1. City Hall King Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI;  Member, 2016 GIS;
  2. Davao Bounty Times Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; Treasurer, 2007 AI; and
  3. Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation, Incorporator, 2006 AI; Member, 2017 GIS.

Kimberly Justine Y. Cruz 

  1. Davao New Royal Taipan Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2016 AI; First Director, 2016 AI;
  2. Jolly General Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; Member, 2016 GIS; and 
  3. Metro City Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2016 AI ; First Director, 2016 AI.

Ma. Luz J. Manlapas

  1. Chinese Gen Bee Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2013 AI; Member, 2016 GIS; 
  2. Grand King Foods Corp., Incorporator, 2009AI; Member, 2018 GIS; and 
  3. Grand M.D. Business Development Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; Member, 2018 GIS.

Jeanette Y. Ngo

  1. Grand King Foods Corp., Incorporator, 2008AI; Member, 2018 GIS; and 
  2. Grand M.D. Business Development Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; Member, 2018 GIS.

Celerino P. Eralino 

  1. Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation, Incorporator, 2004 AI; Member, 2017 GIS; and 
  2. Jolly General Foods Corporation, Member, 2016 GIS.

Samuel C. Uy 

  1. Honda Cars Gen. Santos, Inc., Incorporator, 1996, Certif.  of Incorporation; Member, 2015 GIS;  and
  2. Poeng Yue Foundation, Inc., Incorporator, 2012 AI; Vice President, 2014 GIS.

Susan H. Cua 

  1. City Hall King Chow Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; Member, 2016 GIS; and
  2. Davao Emerging Taipans Corporation, Incorporator, 2013 AI; Member, 2017 GIS

Vilma Uy Ang 

  1. Grand King Foods Corp., Incorporator, 2013AI; Member, 2018 GIS; and
  2. Grand M.D. Business Development Corporation, Incorporator, 2007 AI; Member, 2018 GIS.

Ang Hai Peng 

  1. Chinese Gen Bee Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2013 AI; and
  2. Timesquare Bee Foods Corporation, Incorporator, 2013, AI; President 2016 GIS.

Neil A. Gellegani

  1. SGT Fortune Horse Corp., Incorporator, 2011 AI; President, 2017 GIS; and
  2. 3Kids Trucking Services, Inc., Incorporator, 2011 AI; CFO, 2017 GIS.

Sharon Carla A. Gellegani 

  1. SGT Fortune Horse Corp., Incorporator, 2014 AI; Member, 2017 GIS.                                           

Ma. Guadalupe R. Magallanes 

  1. 3Kids Trucking Services, Inc., Incorporator, 2011 AI; Member, 2017 GIS; and 
  2. SGT Fortune Horse Corp, Incorporator, 2010 AI; CFO and COS, 2017 GIS.

Randy F. Magallanes 

  1. SGT Fortune Horse Corp,  Incorporator, 2012 AI                                         

Relatives in gov’t

Apart from Father, Daughter, and Eldest Son, 16 people who are relatives by blood or affinity of the Dutertes have worked or remain in government posts. 

They come from three major lineages: Duterte, Zimmerman, and Carpio. 

Included are a few who were no longer holding public office as of the 2017 SALN submissions of the President, Sara, and Paolo. 

In all, seven Dutertes, three Zimmermans, and six Carpios complete the picture. 

The list varies, though, with the inconsistent declarations that Duterte, Sara, and Paolo had made in their respective SALNs about what positions in government these relatives have occupied, during the same period of time.

The Dutertes

In their 2007 SALNs, Sara and Paolo listed Wilfredo Villarica, sometimes listed as Wilfrido, as one of their relatives in government. That year, Sara and Paolo declared Villarica to be a Supply Officer I holding office at the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City. He is Sara’s and Paolo’s cousin – and Duterte’s nephew.

But Duterte’s 2007 SALN, did not include Villarica. At the time, Duterte was Davao City Mayor.

By 2017, the President, Sara, and Paolo all listed Villarica in their respective SALNs, albeit with different designations.

The President declared Villarica to be “Admin Officer I” of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City; Sara said that he was a “Supply Officer I” of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City; Paolo listed him to be a “Senior Insurance Specialist” at the Insurance Commission in Davao City.

Villarica’s wife, Jean, is also an appointee at the Davao City Government and has held different positions since 2007. Among these posts were Administrative Aide III (2007-2010) and Auxiliary Service Worker (2010-2012) at the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City; Auxiliary Worker at the Davao City Mayor’s Office (2011-2012); and Auxiliary Worker I at the Davao City’s CENRO or Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (2013-2016).

In 2017, Jean Villarica was listed by Duterte to be an Auxiliary Worker I at CENRO in Davao City and by Paolo as a contractual employee at the City Mayor’s Office of Davao. Sara did not list Jean in her 2016 and 2017 SALNs.

But it is Paolo who appears to be the most forgetful or negligent; in his 2016 SALN, he did not even name his kid sister Mayor Sara, who had him as her running mate in the 2016 elections, as among his relatives in government.

Another Duterte, the President’s brother Benjamin, is on the list of Duterte relatives in government. Benjamin was a councilor of Davao City from 1998 to 2001. But from an elective position, he shifted to an appointive post as “Private Secretary at the City Mayor’s Office” from 2007 to 2017 under both Rodrigo and Sara serving as mayor.

January Duterte, wife of Paolo, is also in public office. Currently, she is serving her second term as Barangay Captain of Catalunan Grande and Councilor of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City – a post held previously by Paolo. 

The Zimmermans

From 2007 to the present, James and John Zimmerman, both brothers of Duterte’s estranged spouse Elizabeth Zimmerman, have held and still hold positions at the Davao City Hall and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City.

From 2007 to 2012, James Zimmerman was a Supply Officer at Davao City Hall. From 2012 to 2016 he was Admin Officer IV of Davao City Hall’s General Services. 

According to Paolo’s 2017 SALN, James Zimmerman is the Supervising Administrative Officer at the Davao City CENRO. But Sara had declared him to be holding another job at the time. She listed James Zimmerman as a Supply Officer at the Davao City Hall from 2016 to 2017.

John Zimmerman, meantime, was Local Legislative Staff Officer I at Davao City’s Sangguniang Panlungsod from 2007 to 2012. From 2012 to 2015 he was Supply Officer II also at the city’s Sangguniang Panlungsod. 

In 2016, Paolo listed John as a Supply Officer II, while Sara listed him as Local Legislative Staff Officer I. At the very least, Paolo and Sara agreed that both posts were at the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City. 

By the following year, Paolo and Sara were apparently still not comparing notes. Paolo listed uncle John Zimmerman as Admin Officer V at the General Services Office in Davao City Hall; Sara had John as Local Legislative Staff Officer I at the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City.

Another Zimmerman in the Dutertes’ roster of relatives in government is Manuel Dela Serna (sometimes listed as “Dela Cerna”). He is Elizabeth Zimmerman’s uncle; Paolo also listed Dela Serna in his SALN as the brother of his maternal grandfather. Dela Cerna was Mayor of Libungan, Cotabato City from 2013 to 2016. 

The Carpios

By her marriage to Mans Carpio in October 2008, Sara introduced a third lineage to the Dutertes’ web of relatives in government. At least six Carpios make up about half the 13 total Duterte kin by blood or affinity holding public positions.

From her paternal in-laws, Sara became related to Davao City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Emmanuel ‘Manolo’ Carpio (uncle to Mans), retired Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales (aunt to Mans), and Eugenio Carpio Morales (son of the retired Ombudsman). All three were listed in Sara’s 2016 and 2017 SALN. 

Judge Manolo, however, was not listed in the previous SALNs of Sara even though he had been part of the bench even in years prior.  In 2011, the judge and then Davao City Mayor and niece-in-law Sara Duterte had an argument over an order the former had issued for the demolition of an illegal settlement in Barangay Tomas Monteverde Sr. in Agdao, Davao City.

The two reconciled in 2014. In 2015, the Supreme Court designated Judge Manolo as the new Executive Judge of the Davao City RTC, after the retirement of Judge Pelagio Paguican. Among those who signed the Supreme Court Administrative Order on Manolo’s appointment was Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, a cousin of Mans’s father but who is not required to be among Sara’s list of relatives in government. 

Sara’s mother-in-law, Agnes Reyes-Carpio, was also a member of the bench. By the time Sara and Mans were married in 2008, Reyes-Carpio was already an RTC judge in Pasig City. In 2009, she became Court of Appeals Justice in Cebu City, and then in Manila from 2010 to December 2016, when she retired. From 2008 to 2012, daughter-in-law Sara listed Justice Reyes-Carpio in her SALN, but not in the one she filed in 2016. 

Benedicto Carpio, brother of Mans, was also a lawyer at the Office of the Solicitor General from 2008 to 2011 spanning the incumbency of Soliticor-General (SG) Agnes Devanadera (2007-2010), Acting SG Albert Agra (2010), and SG Jose Anselmo Cadiz (2010-2012).

Another brother of Mans, Waldo Carpio, served as Councilor in the Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte from 2010 to 2012. 

President Duterte appointed Waldo assistant secretary of the Department of Agriculture in September 2017, and promoted him to undersecretary “for special concerns” in November 2018. 

Waldo had also served as consultant for “Community Relations and Services” at the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) from November 2016 to August 2017. The President was a godfather at Waldo’s wedding in September 2016 — With infographics by Vino Lucero, R-Jay Sale, and Arnel Rival, Last of Three Parts,  PCIJ, 5 April 2019

Check out! PCIJ’s report on “The Dutertes: Wealth Reveal & Riddles” – Part 1: Law firm not registered, some biz interests not disclosed, lender gets deal to import rice; and Part 2: Duterte, Sara, Paolo mark big spikes in wealth, cash, while in public office

 

PCIJ on ‘Oust-Duterte plot’: Wrong report, on many counts

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PCIJ Statement on The Manila Times‘s report on “Oust-Duterte plot”, 22 April 2019

The Manila Times’s “association matrix” and story about a supposed “oust-Duterte plot” that include journalists with the PCIJ are wrong on many points.

1.    PCIJ had absolutely not nor ever received any email from Ms. Ellen Tordesillas on the link to the so-called “narcolist video” of “Bikoy.” PCIJ has neither posted nor distributed any stories or commentaries on the “narcolist video” of “Bikoy.” The video was posted on YouTube from where the news media and citizens got to watch it. That is where the so-called “cybercrime experts” of the unnamed “highly placed source in the Office of the President” should look instead.

2.    The Manila Times story admits to a crime that may have been committed, and fundamental freedoms that may have been violated.It offers tacit admission that these “experts,” apparently working with the Office of the President, had invaded the privacy of the emails and correspondence of journalists now being singled out.

3.    For the record, the “matrix” had linked at least five persons to the PCIJ who are in fact no longer in PCIJ’s employ.Three of the five are personnel who had resigned from as far back as March 2018 to January 2019. Two others, OtsoDiretso candidate for senator Jose Manuel Diokno and Summit Media publisher Lisa Gokongwei-Cheng, had quit their posts in the PCIJ’s Board of Editors. Diokno resigned before the campaign period started.

4.    PCIJ, a non-stock, not-for-profit independent media organization, is funded in various ways: revenues from sale of publications and video, contributions from PCIJ patrons, interest income from an endowment fund that Ford Foundation gave in 2003, and grants for projects, from both local and foreign sources.

Foreign funding is not equivalent to foreign ownership of for-profit media. Truth be told, government agencies are the biggest recipients of foreign funding from the United States, Japan, China, Australia, and other multilateral and bilateral agencies.

For instance, since 2017, the state-run People’s Television (PTV-4) and the Presidential Communication Operations Office (PCOO) have received from China’s state-run media donations of digital radio and other broadcast equipment; brought to China a number of journalists and columnists, including those from The Manila Times, via a “professional exchange program”; started to re-broadcast China programs in Manila; and sent PCOO personnel to learn the Chinese language.

5.    Mr. Rigoberto Tiglao, a co-founder and the first treasurer of PCIJ, helped raise seed money for PCIJ’s operations initially from the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation. Mr. Tiglao himself wrote about his role in PCIJ’s funding in this article in Harvard’s Nieman Reports: The PCIJ has helped change Philippine journalism… It’s a success story of an NGO, non-governmental organization, committed to a specific cause and funded by both foreign and local development agencies.”

PCIJ has disclosed that it has received funds from the National Endowment for Democracy for the conduct of training seminar-workshops since 2014, in all such events. These seminars had drawn the participation of hundreds of reporters and editors from national and regional print, TV, radio, and online media agencies, including about a dozen from The Manila Times.

6.    As early as 2005, PCIJ had disclosed on numerous occasions its funding structure. Check out https://pcij.org/patron/

About the PCIJ: Who we are · Writing fellowships · Investigative reports · Be a PCIJ patron · Awards and Citations

“The PCIJ is funded in various ways. Funds come from revenues from the sale of publications and videos as well as contributions from PCIJ Patrons (who donate P3,000 to P10,000 each a year and get PCIJ products in return). The PCIJ also makes money by conducting journalism training in the Philippines and other countries.

“Revenue also comes from the proceeds of an Endowment Fund whose seed money was donated by the Ford Foundation (the rest was contributed by PCIJ revenues). That donation came with few conditions, only that the money be properly managed and used only to fund PCIJ operations.

“The remaining funds for our budget consist of grants for special projects.

“The PCIJ is unique — and not only because of its special focus on investigative reporting. No other media organization in the Philippines is funded in a similar way: a combination of grants, revenues, and contributions from individual supporters.

“Our funding structure allows us to be independent because we are beholden neither to media owners nor to advertisers, nor even to grant-giving organizations (the diversity of our funding base allows us to choose the projects we want to do with donors and to set our own terms with them). We are, however, accountable to our board and ultimately, to our readers.”

7. Finally, and most importantly: A free, independent, and critical press is a hallmark of democracy. A press beholden to the powers-that-be and shirks from its responsibility to fully inform the people on issues of grave public concern mocks its purpose for being.  – PCIJ, 22 April 2019

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